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This	  dissertation	  analyzes	  a	  cause	  of	  action	  created	  by	  the	  Colombian	  constitutional	  
reform	  of	  1991:	  administrative	  morality.	  This	  cause	  of	  action	  was	  created	  with	  the	  
purpose	  of	  facilitating	  citizen	  engagement	  in	  governmental	  administration	  by	  allowing	  
ordinary	  people	  to	  file	  a	  lawsuit	  to	  challenge	  governmental	  corruption.	  This	  
constitutional	  reform	  fostered	  high	  hopes	  of	  law-­‐inspired	  social	  change.	  The	  
Constitution	  of	  1991	  did	  not	  define	  administrative	  morality	  and	  there	  has	  been	  no	  study	  
of	  its	  meaning	  or	  effect.	  This	  dissertation	  addresses	  two	  questions:	  what	  is	  
administrative	  morality?	  And	  what	  has	  been	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  cause	  of	  action	  on	  
governmental	  administration?	  Drawing	  on	  governmental	  and	  legislative	  documents,	  
court	  cases,	  journalistic	  articles,	  and	  interviews	  with	  key	  actors,	  the	  dissertation	  
demonstrates	  that	  administrative	  morality	  has	  only	  partially	  met	  its	  framers’	  aspirations.	  
The	  Colombian	  legislature	  adopted	  enabling	  legislation	  that	  provided	  a	  financial	  
incentive	  to	  file	  lawsuits	  on	  administrative	  morality	  but	  then	  revised	  the	  law	  to	  reduce	  
this	  incentive.	  The	  Colombian	  Council	  of	  State	  (the	  supreme	  court	  for	  administrative	  
matters)	  has	  generally	  ruled	  against	  plaintiffs	  and	  with	  governmental	  defendants.	  	  Key	  
agencies	  of	  public	  administration	  have	  developed	  no	  common	  interpretation	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  do	  not	  provide	  policy	  guidance,	  training,	  or	  oversight	  in	  
order	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  norm.	  Media	  coverage	  initially	  fostered	  hope	  that	  the	  new	  
norm	  would	  bring	  significant	  reforms,	  but	  as	  time	  passed	  the	  media	  have	  become	  less	  
hopeful.	  Still,	  the	  dissertation	  also	  suggests	  that	  administrative	  morality	  has	  encouraged	  














“Don't	  let	  your	  life	  be	  barren.	  Be	  useful.	  Make	  yourself	  felt”	  (Josemaria	  Escriva	  
de	  Balaguer).	  	  Since	  I	  first	  decided	  to	  pursue	  a	  Ph.D.	  degree	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Kansas	  
these	  words	  have	  been	  an	  inspiration	  for	  all	  the	  hard	  work	  and	  commitment	  that	  it	  
entailed.	  My	  decision	  to	  pursue	  a	  Ph.D.	  degree	  at	  KU	  was	  based	  on	  my	  interest	  in	  
finding	  a	  place	  that	  could	  challenge	  my	  intellectual	  curiosity	  and	  in	  which	  I	  had	  he	  
opportunity	  of	  sharing	  with	  professors	  and	  colleagues	  the	  noble	  task	  of	  intellectual	  
inquiry	  on	  governmental	  administration.	  In	  the	  School	  of	  Public	  Affairs	  and	  
Administration	  I	  found	  this	  environment.	  My	  classes,	  seminars,	  discussions,	  and	  
conversations	  with	  faculty	  and	  fellow	  students	  allow	  me	  to	  deepen	  my	  understanding	  of	  
public	  administration	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  social	  life.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  God,	  my	  family,	  
and	  friends	  who	  supported	  me	  during	  these	  years.	  	  
	  
Especially	  I	  want	  to	  thank	  the	  following	  people	  for	  their	  encouragement	  and	  
support:	  	  
My	  gratitude	  goes	  to	  my	  academic	  advisor	  professor	  Charles	  R.	  Epp	  for	  providing	  
me	  with	  the	  opportunity	  of	  working	  with	  him.	  I	  received	  constant	  and	  valuable	  insights	  
from	  professor	  Epp	  that	  have	  undoubtedly	  shaped	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  research	  
process	  and	  of	  governmental	  administration.	  I	  want	  to	  thank	  professor	  Epp	  for	  his	  
valuable	  advice	  and	  his	  constant	  motivation	  to	  conquer	  higher	  goals.	  	  
I	  would	  also	  like	  to	  thank	  my	  committee	  members,	  professor	  H.	  George	  
Frederickson,	  professor	  Steven	  Maynard-­‐Moody,	  professor	  Ebenezer	  Obadare,	  and	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professor	  Ruben	  Flores	  for	  their	  comments,	  questions,	  and	  suggestions	  about	  my	  
dissertation	  that	  challenged	  me	  academically.	  Thank	  you	  for	  your	  support	  and	  interest	  
in	  my	  research	  project.	  	  
Also	  I	  want	  to	  thank	  professor	  Steven	  Maynard-­‐Moody	  for	  his	  support	  and	  
encouragement	  that	  helped	  to	  keep	  things	  in	  perspective	  in	  my	  research	  journey. 
My	  sincere	  appreciation	  goes	  to	  my	  good	  friends	  in	  Lawrence,	  Maneekwan	  
Chandarasorn,	  Arely	  Torres	  (Patricia),	  and	  Alisa	  Moldavanova.	  Your	  friendship	  and	  
support	  along	  this	  process	  made	  me	  feel	  that	  Lawrence	  was	  home	  and	  they	  helped	  me	  
to	  see	  all	  the	  good	  things	  even	  when	  times	  were	  challenging.	  I	  am	  deeply	  grateful	  for	  
having	  the	  opportunity	  of	  sharing	  this	  journey	  with	  you,	  and	  I	  am	  honored	  to	  have	  you	  
as	  friends.	  	  
I	  want	  to	  thank	  my	  very	  good	  friends	  Maria	  Clara	  Obando,	  Johanna	  Vega,	  Hilba	  
Guzman,	  and	  Viviana	  Moreno	  who	  motivated	  me	  on	  every	  step	  of	  this	  process	  that	  
started	  a	  long	  time	  ago.	  I	  am	  deeply	  thankful	  because	  you	  patiently	  shared	  smiles	  and	  
tears,	  and	  you	  helped	  me	  to	  keep	  things	  in	  perspective	  specially	  when	  the	  
circumstances	  were	  more	  challenging.	  I	  am	  very	  grateful	  for	  your	  friendship.	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  express	  my	  gratitude	  to	  each	  person	  who	  has	  supported	  me	  in	  
this	  path.	  Isaac	  Nichols	  thanks	  for	  changing	  my	  plans,	  for	  making	  me	  smile	  when	  I	  felt	  
that	  I	  was	  running	  up	  the	  hill	  (metaphorically	  and	  literally),	  and	  for	  providing	  me	  with	  
the	  support	  that	  I	  needed	  in	  those	  last	  of	  stages	  of	  my	  dissertation;	  it’s	  always	  fun	  
dancing	  with	  you.	  I	  am	  deeply	  grateful	  to	  the	  wonderful	  Lawrence	  Tango	  Community	  
because	  it	  helped	  me	  to	  dance	  through	  the	  good	  times	  and	  the	  more	  challenging	  times	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of	  my	  dissertation	  process.	  Particularly	  I	  want	  to	  thank	  Jean,	  Eric,	  Ray,	  Michael	  and	  all	  
the	  other	  tangueros	  that	  I	  had	  the	  pleasure	  to	  dance	  with	  in	  our	  Monday	  practicas.	  I	  
would	  also	  like	  to	  thank	  my	  colleagues	  and	  friends	  in	  the	  School	  of	  Public	  Affairs	  and	  
Administration	  for	  supporting	  me	  and	  for	  making	  this	  journey	  memorable.	  I	  am	  deeply	  
grateful	  to	  the	  KU	  Fulbright	  Scholars	  Association	  for	  being	  welcoming	  and	  for	  its	  
immense	  support	  when	  I	  first	  came	  to	  KU.	  Thanks	  to	  my	  good	  friends	  in	  Kansas	  City:	  
Grace,	  Vicky,	  Nuris,	  Wendy,	  Laurie,	  Mary,	  Ruth,	  Jeanne,	  Maria	  Susana,	  Lilian,	  and	  Susan.	  
I	  always	  knew	  I	  could	  count	  on	  your	  prayers	  and	  support.	  Yoly,	  you	  have	  taught	  me	  so	  
many	  things	  and	  specially	  you	  made	  me	  feel	  supported	  and	  loved;	  thank	  you	  very	  much.	  
Thanks	  to	  all	  my	  dear	  friends	  in	  Kansas	  and	  in	  Colombia	  for	  the	  emotional	  support,	  
camaraderie,	  entertainment,	  and	  caring	  they	  provided:	  Nathan,	  Anne,	  Eric,	  Julia,	  
Kristina,	  Dasha,	  Sarah	  and	  Weng,	  Alexandra,	  Adriana	  Patricia	  and	  Miguel,	  and	  Serna.	  
Harry,	  your	  comments	  and	  feedback	  when	  I	  was	  getting	  ready	  for	  presentations	  were	  
always	  helpful	  and	  encouraging;	  thank	  you	  very	  much.	  Thanks	  to	  my	  Colombian	  friends	  
at	  KU,	  Adriana,	  Gabi,	  Valeria,	  Gabriel,	  and	  Manuel;	  it	  was	  fun	  to	  have	  our	  very	  own	  
Colombian	  celebrations	  here	  in	  Lawrence.	  	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  express	  my	  gratitude	  to	  the	  Universidad	  de	  La	  Sabana	  in	  Colombia	  
for	  granting	  me	  with	  the	  invaluable	  opportunity	  of	  attending	  the	  University	  of	  Kansas	  
for	  my	  doctoral	  studies.	  Especially,	  I	  want	  to	  thank	  the	  Chancellor	  Obdulio	  Velasquez	  
and	  the	  Director	  for	  Teaching	  Luz	  Angela	  Vanegas	  for	  their	  constant	  support.	  	  I	  would	  
also	  like	  to	  show	  my	  gratitude	  to	  the	  Fulbright	  program,	  Colciencias,	  and	  DNP	  for	  
providing	  me	  the	  doctoral	  scholarship	  to	  study	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Kansas.	  My	  sincere	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appreciation	  goes	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Spanish	  and	  Portuguese	  at	  KU,	  particularly	  to	  
professor	  Amy	  Rossomondo,	  for	  giving	  me	  the	  valuable	  of	  opportunity	  of	  sharing	  my	  
language	  and	  culture	  with	  KU	  students.	  	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  express	  my	  gratitude	  to	  the	  Dean	  and	  my	  colleagues	  at	  the	  Law	  
School	  of	  Universidad	  de	  La	  Sabana	  who	  provided	  me	  with	  their	  insights	  during	  my	  
doctoral	  studies.	  	  
My	  sincere	  appreciation	  goes	  to	  the	  experts	  who	  participated	  in	  my	  interviews.	  	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  my	  family	  for	  their	  love	  and	  support:	  	  
Quiero	  agradecer	  a	  cada	  miembro	  de	  mi	  familia	  por	  su	  apoyo.	  A	  mis	  abuelos,	  mis	  tíos	  y	  
primos	  por	  su	  motivación	  y	  aliento.	  De	  manera	  especial	  mi	  cariño	  y	  afecto	  están	  en	  el	  
papá	  Clodomiro	  y	  la	  mamá	  Rosa	  Maria	  por	  los	  miles	  de	  recuerdos	  y	  momentos	  dulces	  
que	  viví	  a	  su	  lado.	  Quiero	  agradecer	  a	  Claudia:	  tu	  ayuda	  y	  apoyo	  siempre	  con	  una	  sonrisa	  
hicieron	  más	  fácil	  para	  mí	  acoplarme	  y	  aprovechar	  al	  máximo	  esta	  experiencia.	  De	  
manera	  especial	  gracias	  por	  entender	  cada	  nuevo	  reto	  al	  que	  me	  enfrenté	  y	  por	  
compartir	  conmigo	  la	  convicción	  de	  que	  podía	  alcanzar	  la	  meta.	  Me	  alegra	  muchísimo	  
haber	  podido	  compartir	  contigo	  este	  proceso.	  	  
Agradezco	  infinitamente	  a	  mis	  papás	  y	  a	  mi	  hermano	  por	  ser	  mi	  “barra”	  constante.	  Sus	  
oraciones	  y	  cariño	  han	  sido	  el	  apoyo	  sin	  el	  cual	  no	  habría	  podido	  alcanzar	  esta	  meta.	  
Papi,	  tu	  afán	  por	  conocer	  y	  aprender	  sobre	  cosas	  nuevas	  cada	  día	  es	  una	  motivación	  y	  
modelo	  para	  mí.	  Con	  tu	  sabiduría	  y	  experiencia	  me	  dibujaste	  mundos	  insospechados	  que	  
poco	  a	  poco	  he	  podido	  vislumbrar.	  Por	  ser	  inspiración	  y	  aliento,	  muchas	  gracias.	  Te	  
quiero	  mucho.	  Mami,	  le	  doy	  gracias	  a	  Dios	  por	  tener	  en	  tí	  tal	  modelo	  y	  voz	  de	  aliento	  a	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mi	  lado	  que	  han	  hecho	  más	  fácil	  recorrer	  este	  camino.	  Tu	  voz	  siempre	  oportuna,	  tus	  mil	  
detalles	  y	  cariño,	  tu	  capacidad	  de	  hacerme	  reir	  me	  llenan	  de	  admiración	  y	  son	  una	  
bendición	  constante.	  Con	  tu	  apoyo	  y	  amor	  quiero	  seguir	  conquistando	  metas	  que	  nos	  
permitan	  disfrutar	  muchas	  cosas	  juntas.	  Te	  quiero	  mucho.	  Al,	  es	  una	  verdadera	  fortuna	  
tener	  un	  hermano	  como	  tú	  que	  me	  ha	  enseñado	  tanto	  con	  su	  inteligencia	  y	  carisma.	  
Gracias	  por	  tu	  apoyo	  y	  consejos,	  por	  hacerme	  reir	  en	  medio	  de	  escritos	  y	  carreras,	  y	  por	  
ser	  tan	  maravilloso	  compañero	  de	  viaje.	  Que	  la	  Virgen	  te	  lleve	  de	  su	  mano	  a	  alcanzar	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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  
	  
“Look	  there	  are	  no	  protests	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Congress.	  Rather,	  citizens	  see	  and	  
legitimate	  more	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge	  because	  he	  is	  capable	  of	  making	  fair	  
decisions,	  because	  as	  long	  as	  the	  judiciary	  makes	  coherent	  decisions,	  decisions	  
that	  are	  coherent	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  people,	  the	  government	  is	  legitimate.”	  
	  
-­‐Remarks	  of	  justice	  Enrique	  Gil	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  protest	  of	  individuals	  




The	  Colombian	  constitution	  of	  1991	  was	  framed	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  strengthen	  the	  
democratic	  system	  by	  creating	  mechanisms	  aimed	  at	  broadening	  political	  participation	  
and	  stating	  a	  longer	  catalog	  of	  civil	  and	  political	  rights.	  This	  constitution	  implied	  a	  
profound	  change	  in	  the	  institutional	  frame	  of	  the	  country.	  It	  shifted	  from	  being	  
conservative	  politically	  and	  legally	  to	  being	  more	  inclusive	  and	  participatory.1	  New	  and	  
more	  robust	  guarantees	  of	  rights	  were	  a	  key	  component	  of	  the	  1991	  constitutional	  
reform.2	  	  	  
This	  dissertation	  examines	  one	  of	  these	  new	  rights,	  a	  collective	  right	  to	  
“administrative	  morality.”	  	  My	  core	  question	  is:	  what	  is	  the	  character	  of	  the	  new	  right	  to	  
administrative	  morality,	  and	  what	  are	  its	  implications	  for	  public	  administration	  in	  
Colombia?	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Luis	  Carlos	  Sachica	  and	  Jaime	  Vidal	  Perdomo,	  La	  Constituyente	  De	  1991:	  Compilacion	  Y	  Analisis	  
Historico-­Juridico	  De	  Sus	  Antecedentes	  Y	  Primeras	  Decisiones	  	  (Editorial	  Camara	  de	  Comercio	  de	  
Bogota,	  1991).	  
2	  Beatriz	  Londoño-­‐Toro	  and	  María	  Lucía	  Torres-­‐Villarreal,	  "¿Podrán	  Las	  Acciones	  Populares	  




The	  framers	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  developed	  administrative	  morality	  
specifically	  as	  a	  means	  to	  check	  bureaucratic	  corruption.	  By	  stating	  that	  administrative	  
morality	  is	  a	  principle	  of	  public	  administration	  and	  a	  collective	  right,	  framers	  of	  the	  
Constitution	  of	  1991	  meant	  to	  provide	  individuals	  with	  legal	  mechanisms	  to	  improve	  
public	  administration.	  Specifically,	  individuals	  were	  entitled	  with	  judicial	  actions	  that	  
they	  could	  use	  when	  bureaucrats	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  administrative	  morality.3	  In	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  these	  legal	  mechanisms	  were	  meant	  to	  encourage	  
citizen	  participation	  in	  the	  improvement	  of	  public	  administration.	  	  
The	  meaning	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  consequently	  what	  it	  demands	  from	  
public	  administrators,	  however,	  is	  somewhat	  unclear.	  	  This	  dissertation	  examines	  a)	  the	  
meaning	  of	  “administrative	  morality”	  in	  the	  view	  of	  the	  framers	  of	  the	  1991	  Colombian	  
Constitution	  and,	  to	  the	  extent	  this	  can	  be	  known,	  what	  they	  hoped	  to	  achieve	  with	  it;	  
b)	  implementation	  of	  the	  new	  constitutional	  provisions	  in	  subsequent	  statutes;	  c)	  how	  
this	  meaning	  has	  been	  developed	  or	  altered	  in	  the	  course	  of	  subsequent	  litigation	  and	  
judicial	  decisions;	  and	  d)	  how	  the	  news	  media	  and	  official	  public	  administration	  leaders	  
have	  framed	  and	  interpreted	  this	  right.	  	  
This	  chapter	  describes	  the	  cultural	  and	  governmental	  context	  for	  the	  1991	  
constitutional	  reforms;	  summarizes	  what	  is	  known	  about	  those	  reforms	  and	  what	  is	  
known	  about	  the	  right	  to	  “administrative	  morality”	  in	  particular;	  describes	  my	  research	  
questions	  in	  more	  detail;	  and	  then	  summarizes	  the	  theoretical	  lenses	  and	  data	  that	  I	  will	  
use	  to	  answer	  these	  questions.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Ernesto	  Matallana	  Camacho,	  "Acción	  Popular	  De	  Moralidad	  Administrativa	  (Popular	  Action	  of	  




The	  context:	  Colombian	  government	  and	  society	  	  
Colombia	  has	  been	  an	  independent	  state	  since	  1810	  and	  it	  follows	  the	  European	  
tradition	  of	  civil	  law.4	  Colombia	  has	  been	  traditionally	  Catholic	  and	  it	  was	  a	  Catholic-­‐
based	  state	  until	  1991	  when	  the	  constitution	  declared	  the	  equality	  of	  religions	  under	  
the	  law.5	  In	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  the	  framers	  invoked	  God’s	  
protection	  but	  did	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  particular	  religion	  or	  set	  of	  beliefs.6	  As	  this	  this	  
statement	  illustrates,	  Colombia	  has	  been	  a	  religious	  country	  that	  has	  been	  moving	  from	  
being	  mainly	  Catholic	  to	  having	  more	  participation	  of	  other	  religions	  and	  beliefs.	  	  
Political	  power	  in	  the	  country	  is	  organized	  in	  three	  branches:	  the	  executive,	  the	  
legislature	  (Congress	  with	  two	  chambers),	  and	  the	  judiciary.7	  In	  the	  top	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  
of	  the	  judiciary	  there	  are	  four	  courts	  that	  analyze	  lawsuits	  on	  specific	  areas	  of	  law:	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  (civil	  and	  criminal	  law),	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  (administrative	  law),	  the	  
Constitutional	  Court,	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Council	  for	  the	  Judiciary.8	  	  
Colombia	  is	  a	  republic	  with	  a	  centralized	  political	  power	  (one	  president	  and	  one	  
congress)	  and	  it	  grants	  administrative	  autonomy	  to	  regional	  governments.	  The	  political	  
system	  is	  presidential,	  organized	  under	  principles	  of	  democracy,	  participation,	  pluralism,	  
respect	  for	  human	  dignity,	  work,	  and	  solidarity	  among	  the	  people.9	  	  
With	  regards	  to	  public	  administration	  Colombia	  has	  professional	  administrators	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  JH	  Merryman,	  The	  Civil	  Law	  Tradition:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Legal	  Systems	  of	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  
America	  	  (Stanford	  Univ	  Pr,	  1985).	  
5	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991,	  article	  19.	  	  	  
6	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991,	  Preamble.	  
7	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991,	  article	  113.	  	  
8	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991,	  article	  28.	  
9	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991,	  article	  1.	  	  
4	  
	  
under	  a	  civil	  service	  regime	  that	  was	  established	  in	  1938.	  Regulations	  addressing	  the	  
civil	  service	  aim	  to	  foster	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  merit	  and	  equality	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  access,	  promotion,	  and	  retire	  of	  the	  public	  service.10	  The	  National	  
Commission	  for	  the	  Civil	  Service	  is	  the	  governmental	  agency	  responsible	  for	  the	  
administration	  and	  oversight	  of	  civil	  servants’	  careers.11	  	  
Notwithstanding	  Colombia’s	  institutional	  commitment	  to	  the	  civil	  service	  and	  
professional	  administration,	  corruption	  in	  governmental	  administration	  has	  been	  a	  
significant	  concern..	  Governmental	  documents	  have	  recognized	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  
corruption	  on	  governmental	  legitimacy	  and	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  governmental	  services	  due	  
to	  the	  economic	  inefficiency	  that	  corruption	  fosters.12	  Currently	  the	  governmental	  
strategy	  for	  anti-­‐corruption	  focuses	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Observatory	  for	  Anticorruption	  
that	  articulates	  efforts	  of	  information	  management,	  communication	  campaigns,	  and	  
education	  on	  anticorruption	  by	  involving	  different	  social	  actors.	  By	  strengthening	  the	  
anti-­‐corruption	  campaign	  the	  government	  aims	  to	  enforce	  the	  value	  of	  integrity	  and	  to	  
improve	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  services	  that	  citizens	  receive.	  In	  this	  context	  integrity	  in	  
governmental	  administration	  implies	  that	  the	  governmental	  organization	  grants	  services	  
in	  the	  conditions	  that	  are	  expected	  by	  the	  citizens.13	  	  	  
The	  increasing	  concern	  about	  the	  need	  to	  address	  issues	  of	  corruption	  and	  lack	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Pedro	  Alfonso	  Hernández,	  "La	  Provisión	  De	  Empleos	  De	  Carrera	  En	  Colombia:	  Lineamientos	  De	  Un	  
Nuevo	  Modelo	  De	  Gestión	  De	  Personal	  En	  El	  Sector	  Público,"	  (Bogotá,	  CNSC,	  mimeo,	  2005).	  
11	  Comisión	  Nacional	  del	  Servicio	  Civil,	  "Comisión	  Nacional	  Del	  Servicio	  Civil,"	  	  
http://www.cnsc.gov.co/esp/quienes_somos.php.	  
12	  CONPES,	  "	  Document	  3186.	  A	  National	  Policy	  for	  Improving	  Efficiency	  and	  Transparency	  in	  Public	  
Contracting,"	  (Bogotá2002).	  




of	  transparency	  has	  been	  present	  not	  only	  in	  Colombia	  but	  in	  Latin	  America	  overall.	  A	  
key	  impetus	  for	  the	  new	  Latin	  American	  constitutionalism	  of	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  to	  
be	  discussed	  below,	  is	  the	  growing	  desire	  to	  address	  corruption	  via	  a	  strengthening	  of	  
the	  rule	  of	  law.	  The	  Latin	  American	  constitutional	  reforms	  of	  the	  1990s	  focused	  on	  
strengthening	  constitutional	  rights	  and	  creating	  judicial	  actions	  allowing	  courts	  to	  
challenge	  governmental	  corruption.	  I	  next	  turn	  to	  these	  constitutional	  reforms.	  	  
	  
Latin	  American	  Constitutionalism	  and	  the	  Judicialization	  of	  politics	  	  
Latin	  American	  legal	  practices	  and	  ideas	  about	  law	  witnessed	  profound	  changes	  
during	  the	  90s	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  constitutional	  reforms	  and	  the	  new	  role	  of	  legal	  
actors	  like	  the	  courts.14	  During	  this	  decade	  constitutions	  were	  amended	  in	  a	  number	  of	  
Latin	  American	  countries.	  These	  new	  constitutions	  incorporated	  longer	  catalogs	  of	  
social,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  grant	  better	  protection	  to	  the	  people.15	  
For	  instance,	  Rosenn	  observes	  that	  Brazil	  and	  Colombia	  have	  long	  traditions	  of	  failing	  to	  
enforce	  key	  rights,	  and	  this	  is	  especially	  true	  during	  states	  of	  exception	  when	  basic	  
constitutional	  controls	  are	  relaxed.	  By	  the	  late	  1980s	  democratic	  reformers	  throughout	  
Latin	  America	  had	  come	  to	  see	  these	  violations	  as	  unacceptable,	  and	  they	  worked	  to	  
reform	  constitutions	  to	  address	  the	  problem.	  Enhancing	  the	  judiciary	  was	  a	  key	  element	  
of	  these	  reforms.	  Thus	  the	  Brazilian	  and	  Colombian	  constitutional	  reforms	  (1988	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  J	  Couso,	  A	  Huneeus,	  and	  R	  Sieder,	  Cultures	  of	  Legality:	  Judicialization	  and	  Political	  Activism	  in	  Latin	  
America	  	  (Cambridge	  Univ	  Pr,	  2010).	  “A	  number	  of	  the	  chapters	  suggest	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  
foundational	  or	  constitutional	  moment	  in	  explaining	  subsequent	  patterns	  of	  judicialization.”	  R	  Sieder,	  
L	  Schjolden,	  and	  A	  Angell,	  Judicialization	  of	  Politics	  in	  Latin	  America	  	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2005),	  10.	  




1991	  respectively)	  included	  procedural	  mechanisms	  to	  permit	  the	  courts	  to	  remedy	  in	  
practice	  alleged	  violations	  of	  constitutional	  rights.16	  
Throughout	  the	  region	  these	  institutional	  changes	  focused	  on	  key	  aspects	  of	  
constitutional	  systems	  like	  establishing	  constitutional	  checks	  on	  bureaucratic	  behavior,	  
enforcing	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  and	  facilitating	  citizen	  participation	  in	  government.	  The	  
Colombian	  constitutional	  reform	  of	  1991	  is	  an	  example	  of	  these	  changes	  in	  Latin	  
America.	  The	  popular	  action	  on	  administrative	  morality,	  established	  as	  part	  of	  those	  
reforms,	  particularly	  exemplifies	  these	  bureaucracy-­‐checking	  purposes.	  	  	  
As	  a	  consequence	  of	  these	  institutional	  changes	  courts	  in	  many	  Latin	  American	  
countries	  were	  granted	  a	  key	  political	  role	  as	  defenders	  of	  constitutional	  commitments,	  
advocates	  of	  rights,	  and	  arbiters	  of	  social	  policy	  conflicts.17	  In	  a	  significant	  institutional	  
shift,	  courts	  were	  also	  granted	  the	  power	  to	  review	  legislation	  and	  strike	  it	  down	  as	  
inconsistent	  with	  the	  constitution.	  Consequently	  judges	  have	  begun	  participating	  in	  
social	  debates	  that	  previously	  were	  officially	  deferred	  to	  elected	  branches	  of	  
government.18	  This	  process	  has	  been	  called	  the	  “judicialization	  of	  politics.”19	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  KS	  Rosenn,	  "The	  Success	  of	  Constitutionalism	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Its	  Failure	  in	  Latin	  America:	  
An	  Explanation,"	  The	  University	  of	  Miami	  Inter-­American	  Law	  Review	  22,	  no.	  1	  (1990).	  
17	  Couso,	  Huneeus,	  and	  Sieder,	  Cultures	  of	  Legality:	  Judicialization	  and	  Political	  Activism	  in	  Latin	  
America.	  
18	  Ibid.,	  8.	  The	  role	  of	  judges	  in	  Latin	  American	  countries	  is	  different	  from	  the	  role	  of	  judges	  in	  the	  
United	  States.	  Latin	  American	  legal	  systems	  were	  built	  keeping	  the	  sharp	  separation	  of	  powers	  of	  
Montesquieu,	  under	  the	  civil	  law	  tradition.	  The	  separation	  of	  powers	  in	  civil	  law	  systems	  intended	  to	  
establish	  and	  maintain	  a	  division	  between	  executive,	  legislative,	  and	  judiciary	  branches	  of	  power.	  
The	  main	  purpose	  of	  this	  separation	  was	  to	  prevent	  intrusions	  from	  one	  branch	  into	  the	  other.	  There	  
was	  a	  specific	  concern	  about	  governmental	  and	  judicial	  discretion	  because	  historically	  these	  two	  
branches	  offered	  dramatic	  examples	  of	  abuses	  against	  individuals’	  rights.	  This	  attitude	  towards	  
judiciary	  didn’t	  exist	  in	  the	  United	  States	  because	  the	  system	  of	  checks	  and	  balances	  that	  emerged	  in	  
this	  country	  didn’t	  fear	  the	  judicial	  lawmaking	  and	  judicial	  interference	  in	  administration.	  Judges	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  and	  England	  had	  been	  a	  progressive	  force	  interested	  in	  protecting	  the	  individual	  
against	  the	  abuse	  of	  power	  by	  the	  ruler.	  These	  differences	  in	  the	  role	  of	  judges	  among	  the	  civil	  law	  




Scholars	  have	  long	  observed	  that	  democratic	  nations	  in	  Latin	  America	  tend	  to	  
have	  more	  effective	  judicial	  protection	  of	  the	  constitution	  than	  do	  authoritarian	  
systems.20	  They	  have	  observed	  that	  democracy,	  as	  a	  system	  built	  upon	  pluralism,	  
require	  a	  relatively	  strong	  judiciary.21	  The	  recent	  trend	  towards	  the	  judicialization	  of	  
politics	  seems	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  an	  increasing	  emphasis	  on	  democratic	  pluralism	  in	  
Latin	  American	  constitutional	  systems.	  Thus,	  in	  Colombia,	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  
granted	  enhanced	  means	  of	  participation	  in	  government	  to	  several	  racial,	  religious,	  
social,	  and	  political	  groups.22	  	  
Still,	  the	  relationship	  between	  courts	  and	  democracy	  is	  far	  from	  being	  clear.	  
Couso	  argues	  that	  in	  the	  Chilean	  context,	  courts	  have	  not	  actively	  engaged	  in	  rights	  
protection	  and	  have	  not	  contributed	  to	  democratization.	  He	  relates	  this	  judicial	  
conservatism	  in	  Chile	  to	  such	  factors	  as	  judges’	  ideology,	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  courts,	  
and	  the	  focus	  on	  private	  law	  in	  the	  Chilean	  system.23	  Sieder,	  too,	  observes	  that	  
increasing	  protection	  for	  peoples’	  rights	  depends	  on	  more	  than	  the	  involvement	  of	  
courts.24	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
America	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  policymaking	  processes.	  Merryman,	  The	  Civil	  Law	  Tradition:	  An	  
Introduction	  to	  the	  Legal	  Systems	  of	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America.	  
19	  Ibid.	  
20	  DS	  Clark,	  "Judicial	  Protection	  of	  the	  Constitution	  in	  Latin	  America,"	  Hastings	  Const.	  LQ	  2(1974):	  
422.	  
21	  Ibid.	  
22	  Luis	  Felipe	  	  Botero,	  Acción	  Popular	  Y	  Nulidad	  De	  Actos	  Administrativos:	  Protección	  De	  Derechos	  
Colectivos	  	  (2004).	  
23	  J.	  Couso,	  "The	  Judicialization	  of	  Chilean	  Politics:	  The	  Rights	  Revolution	  That	  Never	  Was,"	  The	  
Judicialization	  of	  Politics	  in	  Latin	  America	  (2005).	  
24	  Sieder,	  Schjolden,	  and	  Angell,	  Judicialization	  of	  Politics	  in	  Latin	  America.	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Scholars	  have	  identified	  three	  characteristic	  effects	  of	  the	  judicialization	  of	  
politics	  in	  Latin	  America.	  25	  First,	  political	  discourse	  has	  increasingly	  used	  the	  language	  of	  
the	  law	  and	  of	  judicial	  decisions.	  The	  people	  have	  learned	  about	  core	  judicial	  decisions	  
from	  the	  media	  and	  from	  individual	  successful	  cases.	  Based	  on	  the	  knowledge	  of	  these	  
lawsuits,	  the	  language	  and	  categories	  used	  by	  judges	  became	  popular	  and	  individuals	  
have	  included	  these	  new	  terms	  in	  their	  conversations	  and	  their	  lives.	  Judges'	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  constitution	  is	  now	  part	  of	  social	  dynamics.	  	  
Second,	  participants	  in	  political	  struggles	  increasingly	  have	  turned	  to	  the	  courts	  
to	  influence	  the	  political	  process.26	  They	  do	  so	  with	  what	  Couso	  has	  called	  new	  “juridical	  
tools”	  that	  authorize	  new	  causes	  of	  action	  in	  court.27	  He	  has	  argued	  that	  a	  key	  
component	  of	  the	  judicialization	  of	  politics	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  these	  new	  juridical	  tools.	  
These	  causes	  of	  action	  allow	  individuals	  to	  sue	  government	  officials	  and	  agencies,	  thus,	  
in	  theory,	  enhancing	  their	  legal	  accountability.	  	  
A	  third	  characteristic	  of	  the	  judicialization	  of	  politics	  is	  the	  increasing	  use	  of	  legal	  
language	  and	  legal	  instruments	  in	  daily	  life.28	  The	  new	  legal	  actions	  created	  by	  
constitutions	  seemed	  to	  be	  an	  alternative	  way	  for	  people	  to	  "play	  the	  system."	  It	  is	  said	  
that	  people	  realized	  that	  by	  learning	  how	  to	  use	  legal	  language	  their	  problems	  were	  
more	  likely	  to	  receive	  a	  favorable	  ruling	  from	  the	  court.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  reported	  that	  when	  
an	  individual	  could	  not	  get	  a	  particular	  health	  treatment	  in	  Colombia	  the	  most	  efficient	  
way	  to	  get	  it	  was	  by	  filing	  a	  lawsuit	  claiming	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  such	  treatment	  was	  a	  threat	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Couso,	  Huneeus,	  and	  Sieder,	  Cultures	  of	  Legality:	  Judicialization	  and	  Political	  Activism	  in	  Latin	  
America,	  9-­‐10.	  
26	  Ibid.,	  10.	  
27	  Ibid.	  
28	  Ibid.,	  9.	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to	  his	  life;	  in	  doing	  so	  the	  treatment	  became	  a	  matter	  of	  constitutional	  rights.	  In	  cases	  
like	  this,	  individuals	  started	  using	  legal	  terms	  that	  were	  previously	  considered	  technical	  
language	  reserved	  for	  lawyers.	  	  
A	  key	  motivation	  for	  these	  institutional	  changes	  in	  Latin	  American	  countries	  has	  
been	  to	  make	  rights	  more	  effective.	  Thus,	  a	  key	  reason	  for	  the	  turn	  to	  judicial	  
enforcement	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  has	  been	  to	  bring	  greater	  protection	  to	  individual	  
rights.	  	  A	  related	  motivation	  has	  been	  to	  enhance	  the	  quality	  of	  citizenship.	  By	  enforcing	  
rights	  (in	  this	  case	  through	  judicial	  mechanisms)	  it	  is	  said	  that	  democratic	  citizenship	  
becomes	  stronger.29	  This	  concern	  for	  enhancing	  citizenship	  in	  Latin	  America	  reflects	  the	  
widespread	  acknowledgment	  that	  persistent	  poverty	  under	  the	  previous	  regimes	  
reflected	  a	  weak	  conception	  of	  democratic	  citizenship.30	  
In	  all,	  the	  judicialization	  of	  politics	  reflects	  a	  deep	  change	  in	  institutional	  
arrangements.	  Traditionally	  under	  Latin	  American	  constitutions	  the	  separation	  of	  
powers	  implied	  that	  judiciaries	  were	  to	  remain	  insulated	  from	  politics	  and	  to	  refrain	  
from	  engaging	  in	  political	  disputes	  and	  policy	  making.31	  The	  new	  Latin	  American	  
constitutionalism	  seemed	  to	  alter	  this	  previous	  understanding	  and	  to	  favor	  the	  power	  of	  
judges	  in	  relation	  the	  other	  two	  branches.32	  The	  new	  constitutions	  declared	  that	  all	  
public	  authorities	  are	  required	  to	  protect	  constitutional	  rights	  and	  that	  judges	  have	  
authority	  to	  rule	  against	  violators.	  	  The	  new	  constitutions	  even	  declared	  that	  judges	  
have	  authority	  to	  control	  executive	  and	  legislative	  action	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  individual	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  Sieder,	  Schjolden,	  and	  Angell,	  Judicialization	  of	  Politics	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  Latin	  America,	  1.	  
30	  Ibid.	  
31	  Clark,	  "Judicial	  Protection	  of	  the	  Constitution	  in	  Latin	  America,"	  415	  -­‐	  16.	  




The	  Colombian	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  
The	  Colombian	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  new	  Latin	  American	  
constitutionalism.	  The	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  was	  born	  as	  an	  initiative	  of	  students	  (in	  a	  
movement	  called	  the	  seventh	  ballot),	  political	  elites,	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  the	  media,	  and	  
even	  guerrilla	  groups34	  who	  claimed	  that	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1886	  was	  not	  legitimate	  
and	  that	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  create	  a	  political	  frame	  more	  adequate	  to	  the	  modern	  
Colombian	  context.35	  
Restoring	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Colombian	  political	  system	  was	  a	  core	  concern	  of	  
the	  constitutional	  assembly.	  The	  Constitution	  of	  1886	  was	  crafted	  as	  a	  conservative	  
constitution	  with	  mechanisms	  of	  representative	  democracy	  and	  favoring	  formal	  
structures	  of	  participation.	  The	  Constitution	  of	  1886	  was	  conceived	  to	  promote	  a	  
stronger	  central	  power	  in	  the	  executive	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  restoring	  the	  stability	  and	  
the	  peace	  that	  had	  been	  threatened	  by	  the	  tensions	  between	  traditional	  political	  
parties.36	  The	  constitution	  designed	  the	  regions	  (departments)	  as	  units	  of	  the	  central	  
government;	  the	  governors	  were	  agents	  of	  the	  central	  government.37	  	  
The	  Constitution	  of	  1886	  intended	  to	  recover	  stability	  and	  order	  in	  the	  country	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Ibid.,	  416.	  
34	  Sachica	  and	  Vidal	  Perdomo,	  La	  Constituyente	  De	  1991:	  Compilacion	  Y	  Analisis	  Historico-­Juridico	  De	  
Sus	  Antecedentes	  Y	  Primeras	  Decisiones.	  
35	  Hernan.	  Olano	  Garcia,	  Constitucion	  Politica	  De	  Colombia	  (Comentada	  Y	  Concordada)	  	  (Bogota:	  
Ediciones	  Libreria	  Doctrina	  y	  Ley,	  2006).	  
36	  Miguel.	  	  Malagon	  Pinzon,	  "La	  Regeneracion,	  La	  Constitucion	  De	  1886	  Y	  El	  Papel	  De	  La	  Iglesia	  
Catolica,"	  Revista	  Civilizar,	  no.	  11	  (2006).	  
37	  Art.	  193,	  Colombian	  constitution,	  1886.	  The	  introduction	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  1886	  stated:	  “In	  the	  
name	  of	  God,	  source	  of	  supreme	  authority,	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  states	  of	  Antioquia,	  Bolivar,	  
Boyacá,	  Cauca,	  Cundinamarca,	  Magdalena,	  Panama,	  Santander	  y	  Tolima,	  gathered	  in	  a	  National	  
Constitutional	  Assembly…	  And	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  strengthening	  national	  unity,	  justice,	  freedom,	  
and	  peace,	  state	  the	  following	  constitution.”37	  
11	  
	  
after	  an	  era	  of	  politic	  turmoil	  and	  violence	  among	  political	  parties.	  In	  1885	  the	  
representatives	  from	  different	  regions	  of	  the	  country	  gathered	  to	  frame	  a	  new	  
constitution	  and	  started	  a	  new	  era	  that	  has	  been	  called	  “Regeneration.”	  	  Order	  in	  the	  
country	  was	  achieved	  through	  three	  key	  mechanisms:	  centralizing	  political	  power,	  
strengthening	  the	  executive,	  and	  enhancing	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  as	  a	  
source	  of	  education	  and	  social	  control.38	  These	  three	  pillars	  were	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  
values	  of	  the	  conservative	  party	  in	  Colombia	  at	  that	  time.	  	  
The	  focus	  of	  enhancing	  order	  in	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1886	  was	  a	  sharp	  departure	  
from	  the	  previous	  regime	  (the	  Constitution	  of	  1863),	  which	  had	  established	  a	  federal	  
system	  and	  liberalized	  the	  economic	  system	  by	  reducing	  considerably	  governmental	  
intervention.	  After	  1885	  Conservatives	  changed	  this	  regime	  by	  strengthening	  values	  like	  
order	  and	  unity,	  and	  consequently	  by	  favoring	  political	  centralism.	  In	  this	  political	  
system	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  had	  considerable	  influence	  in	  the	  country	  and	  over	  the	  
government	  as	  a	  means	  to	  achieving	  national	  unity.39	  The	  national	  unity	  led	  to	  a	  
constitutional	  system	  in	  which	  centralized	  political	  control	  was	  the	  core	  value.	  	  
A	  key	  characteristic	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1886	  was	  a	  restrictive	  understanding	  
of	  civil	  rights.	  The	  constitution	  of	  1886	  avoided	  general	  enunciations	  of	  rights	  and,	  
instead	  of	  protecting	  human	  liberties,	  it	  placed	  particular	  limitations	  on	  governmental	  
powers.	  For	  instance,	  the	  article	  32	  of	  the	  constitution	  stated	  that	  in	  time	  of	  peace	  
nobody	  could	  be	  affected	  in	  his	  property	  unless	  this	  disturbance	  is	  due	  to	  conviction,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  J.O.	  Melo,	  "La	  Constitucion	  De	  1886,"	  Nueva	  historia	  de	  Colombia	  1(1989).	  
39	  Malagon	  Pinzon,	  "La	  Regeneracion,	  La	  Constitucion	  De	  1886	  Y	  El	  Papel	  De	  La	  Iglesia	  Catolica."	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compensation,	  or	  contribution	  according	  to	  the	  law.40	  Although	  this	  article	  is	  akin	  to	  a	  
right	  to	  private	  property	  it	  does	  not	  declare	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  right	  but	  instead	  merely	  
forbids	  its	  disturbance	  in	  times	  of	  peace.	  The	  distinction	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  significant:	  
the	  Constitution	  of	  1886	  was	  a	  constitution	  of	  governmental	  powers	  and	  limits	  on	  them,	  
not	  a	  constitution	  of	  rights.	  Another	  example	  is	  related	  to	  freedom	  of	  press;	  the	  
constitution	  of	  1886	  stated	  that	  the	  media	  is	  free	  in	  time	  of	  peace	  but	  it	  is	  also	  
responsible	  for	  violations	  against	  the	  good	  name	  of	  the	  people,	  social	  order,	  and	  public	  
peace.41	  This	  is	  quite	  far	  from	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  the	  press	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  
elsewhere.	  
By	  the	  beginning	  the	  1990’s	  this	  19th-­‐century	  constitutional	  frame	  did	  not	  
represent	  the	  Colombian	  social	  spectrum	  and	  did	  not	  provide	  enough	  mechanisms	  for	  
minority-­‐group	  participation.	  The	  campaign	  for	  restoring	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  political	  
system	  focused	  on	  motivating	  citizen	  engagement	  and	  participation.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  the	  
Colombian	  president	  when	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  was	  framed:	  “The	  institutional	  
legitimacy	  will	  be	  more	  solid	  as	  long	  as	  citizen	  engagement	  includes	  all	  the	  social	  groups	  
that	  had	  the	  opportunity	  of	  expressing	  their	  opinions	  in	  this	  evolution	  of	  the	  country.	  
We	  are	  then,	  witnesses	  of	  a	  fascinating	  process	  of	  constitutional	  engineering	  or,	  if	  you	  
wish,	  of	  a	  proof	  of	  the	  art	  of	  governing	  a	  nation.”42	  Put	  simply,	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  
was	  born	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  fostering	  social	  change	  towards	  invigorating	  citizen	  
engagement.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Article	  32,	  Colombian	  constitution	  1886.	  	  
41	  Melo,	  "La	  Constitucion	  De	  1886."	  
42	  Former	  president	  Cesar	  Gaviria	  Trujillo.	  In:	  Olano	  Garcia,	  Constitucion	  Politica	  De	  Colombia	  
(Comentada	  Y	  Concordada).	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The	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  is	  recognized	  as	  a	  landmark	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  
country	  for	  it	  created	  mechanisms	  to	  improve	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  political	  
system.43	  By	  fostering	  democratic	  participation,	  granting	  administrative	  autonomy	  to	  
the	  regions,	  and	  recognizing	  civil	  rights	  of	  under-­‐protected	  minorities	  the	  constitution	  
meant	  to	  change	  the	  dynamics	  in	  the	  country.	  The	  catalog	  of	  rights	  in	  the	  Constitution	  is	  
longer	  and	  specifically	  identifies	  three	  types	  of	  rights:	  civil	  rights;44	  social,	  economic,	  and	  
cultural	  rights;45	  and	  collective	  rights.46	  In	  the	  chapter	  of	  social,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  
rights,	  the	  Constitution	  grants	  protection	  to	  the	  journalistic	  activity	  and	  it	  states:	  “The	  
journalistic	  activity	  will	  receive	  protection	  from	  the	  government	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	  
its	  freedom	  and	  professional	  independence.”47	  Therefore,	  the	  constitution	  guarantees	  
freedom	  of	  the	  press	  but	  does	  not	  limit	  its	  protection	  to	  the	  press:	  	  it	  refers	  to	  all	  the	  
expressions	  of	  the	  journalistic	  activity.	  This	  statement	  is	  broader	  than	  the	  one	  included	  
in	  the	  constitution	  of	  1886	  and	  it	  focuses	  on	  specific	  characteristics	  of	  the	  journalistic	  
activity	  that	  deserve	  protection	  from	  the	  state.	  
In	  addition	  to	  creating	  or	  expanding	  substantive	  rights,	  the	  Constitution	  created	  
new	  mechanisms	  for	  enforcing	  these	  rights.	  	  One	  of	  these	  was	  the	  action	  of	  tutelage	  
(accion	  de	  tutela).48	  Through	  this	  action	  individuals	  are	  entitled	  to	  file	  a	  lawsuit	  when	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  M.	  Cardenas,	  R.	  Junguito,	  and	  M.	  Pachon,	  "Political	  Institutions	  and	  Policy	  Outcomes	  in	  Colombia:	  
The	  Effects	  of	  the	  1991	  Constitution,"	  Documento	  de	  Trabajo,	  Washington,	  Banco	  Interamericano	  de	  
Desarrollo	  (2006).	  
44	  Title	  II,	  chapter	  1	  Colombian	  constitution:	  About	  the	  fundamental	  rights.	  	  	  
45	  Title	  II,	  chapter	  2	  Colombian	  constitution:	  About	  the	  social,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  rights.	  
46	  Title	  II,	  chapter	  3	  Colombian	  constitution:	  About	  collective	  rights.	  	  
47	  Article	  73,	  Colombian	  constitution.	  	  
48	  In	  a	  civil	  law	  system	  an	  action	  is	  the	  right	  to	  claim	  judicial	  protection	  when	  a	  certain	  right	  or	  
interest	  has	  been	  violated.	  Actions	  are	  created	  by	  the	  constitution	  or	  the	  statutes	  and	  they	  entitle	  
individuals	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  filing	  a	  claim	  against	  the	  individual	  (or	  group	  of	  individuals)	  that	  
harmed	  a	  right	  or	  interest	  protected	  by	  the	  law.	  Actions	  can	  be	  public	  or	  private	  depending	  on	  the	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public	  or	  private	  authority	  is	  violating	  or	  posing	  a	  threat	  to	  a	  civil	  right.49	  The	  procedures	  
necessary	  to	  file	  such	  a	  lawsuit	  were	  deliberately	  made	  simple;	  an	  attorney	  is	  not	  even	  
necessary	  to	  pursue	  such	  a	  lawsuit.	  This	  new	  cause	  of	  action	  attempted	  to	  empower	  
individuals	  so	  they	  will	  pursue	  judicial	  remedy	  in	  cases	  of	  civil	  rights	  violations,	  with	  the	  
hope	  that	  in	  the	  long-­‐term	  this	  action	  would	  improve	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  the	  country.	  
The	  action	  for	  tutelage	  has	  had	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  policy-­‐making	  processes	  in	  
Colombia	  and	  several	  factors	  have	  contributed	  for	  this	  impact	  to	  be	  considerable.	  
Constitutional	  Court	  Justice	  Manuel	  J.	  Cepeda	  argued	  that	  citizens	  have	  increasingly	  
used	  the	  action	  for	  tutelage	  because	  they	  perceive	  that	  rulings	  in	  actions	  for	  tutelage	  
can	  improve	  civil	  rights	  violations	  specifically	  in	  cases	  related	  to	  health-­‐care,	  pensions,	  
and	  salaries.	  Justice	  Cepeda	  also	  argues	  that	  the	  action	  for	  tutelage	  has	  been	  able	  to	  
address	  social	  problems	  that	  other	  organs	  in	  the	  government	  and	  the	  legislative	  have	  
not	  been	  able	  to	  address.50	  
Justice	  Cepeda	  described	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  rulings	  in	  actions	  for	  tutelage	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  to	  enforce	  its	  rulings.	  The	  enabling	  
legislation	  for	  the	  action	  for	  tutelage	  states	  that	  once	  the	  ruling	  has	  been	  made	  the	  
authorities	  (public	  or	  private)	  that	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  violation	  of	  civil	  rights	  should	  
comply	  with	  it	  without	  delay.	  If	  these	  authorities	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  ruling	  within	  
the	  next	  48	  hours	  after	  it	  was	  made	  the	  judge	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  contact	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
type	  of	  right	  or	  interest	  they	  aim	  to	  protect.	  Popular	  actions	  (my	  emphasis)	  are	  a	  public	  type	  of	  action	  
because	  they	  aim	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights.	  Juan	  Angel	  Palacio	  Hincapie,	  Derecho	  Procesal	  
Administrativo	  	  (Libreria	  Juridica	  Sanchez	  R.,	  2004).	  
49	  Article	  86,	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991.	  
50	  Manuel	  J	  Cepeda,	  "Judicialization	  of	  Politics	  in	  Colombia,"	  in	  Cultures	  of	  Legality:	  Judicialization	  and	  
Political	  Activism	  in	  Latin	  America,	  ed.	  J	  Couso	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010).	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superiors	  and	  demand	  compliance.	  If	  these	  actions	  do	  not	  lead	  to	  compliance	  the	  judge	  
could	  declare	  that	  the	  authories	  have	  disrespected	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Court	  and	  put	  
them	  in	  prison	  until	  they	  comply	  with	  the	  ruling.	  Also	  the	  judge	  will	  retain	  the	  authority	  
until	  civil	  rights	  have	  been	  entirely	  restored	  or	  the	  threat	  has	  ceased.51	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  power	  of	  the	  judge	  to	  enforce	  rulings	  of	  actions	  for	  tutelage	  
media	  have	  also	  recognized	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  Cepeda	  explains:	  
“…when	  newspapers	  speak	  of	  ‘the	  Court’	  it	  is	  almost	  immediately	  assumed	  that	  they	  
refer	  to	  the	  constitutional	  court,	  although	  there	  are	  several	  different	  high	  courts	  in	  
Colombia.”52	  Media	  coverage	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  suggests	  the	  salience	  of	  this	  
court	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  social	  issues.	  	  
Thus,	  when	  analyzing	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  action	  for	  tutelage	  there	  are	  three	  
institutional	  conditions	  that	  seem	  to	  make	  this	  action	  effective	  in	  terms	  of	  fostering	  
social	  change:	  first,	  judges	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  make	  rulings	  to	  protect	  civil	  rights	  and	  who	  
are	  willing	  to	  enforce	  these	  rulings.	  The	  second	  condition	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  enabling	  
legislation	  that	  grants	  judges	  with	  the	  authority	  to	  enforce	  effectively	  their	  rulings.	  
Third,	  the	  public	  perceives	  that	  the	  action	  for	  tutelage	  is	  a	  cause	  of	  action	  that	  
effectively	  resolves	  violations	  of	  civil	  rights.	  In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  analyze	  a	  different	  
cause	  of	  action	  stated	  by	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  (popular	  actions	  in	  administrative	  
morality)	  and	  I	  demonstrate	  that	  in	  administrative	  morality	  some	  of	  these	  institutional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Departamento	  Administrativo	  de	  la	  Presidencia	  de	  la	  República	  de	  Colombia,	  "Decreto	  2591,"	  in	  
Por	  el	  cual	  se	  reglamenta	  la	  acción	  de	  tutela	  consagrada	  en	  el	  artículo	  86	  de	  la	  Constitución	  Política	  
(Bogotá1991).	  
52	  Cepeda,	  "Judicialization	  of	  Politics	  in	  Colombia."	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mechanisms	  have	  not	  been	  achieved.	  Consequently	  the	  impact	  of	  popular	  actions	  in	  
administrative	  morality	  has	  been	  only	  partially	  achieved.	  	  
Administrative	  morality,	  the	  topic	  of	  my	  proposed	  dissertation,	  is	  part	  of	  a	  new	  
category	  of	  rights	  called	  “collective	  rights.”	  These	  rights	  are	  different	  from	  civil	  rights	  to	  
the	  extent	  that	  civil	  rights	  are	  individual	  while	  collective	  rights	  are	  said	  to	  belong	  to	  the	  
society	  as	  a	  whole.53	  	  They	  are	  collective	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  protect	  interests	  of	  the	  
population	  as	  a	  whole	  or,	  at	  least,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  population.	  Some	  examples	  of	  
collective	  rights	  are:	  public	  goods,	  public	  space,	  public	  security,	  free	  economic	  
competition,	  and	  administrative	  morality	  (my	  emphasis),	  among	  others.54	  	  Thus	  the	  
range	  of	  collective	  rights	  under	  the	  Colombian	  law	  is	  broad	  and	  involves	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
areas	  of	  social	  and	  political	  life.55	  
To	  enforce	  the	  new	  collective	  rights	  the	  constitution	  also	  created	  a	  new	  cause	  of	  
action,	  or,	  in	  common	  language,	  a	  new	  type	  of	  lawsuit.	  This	  is	  the	  popular	  action,	  
established	  by	  article	  88	  of	  the	  constitution.	  Popular	  actions	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  easily	  
accessible	  to	  the	  ordinary	  citizen.	  The	  Constitution	  delegated	  to	  the	  legislature	  the	  
matter	  of	  how	  to	  structure	  these	  popular	  actions.56	  	  Subsequent	  legislative	  statutes	  
have	  been	  adopted	  for	  this	  purpose,	  and	  this	  legislation	  clarifies	  that	  popular	  actions	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Luis	  Felipe	  Botero,	  Accion	  Popular	  Y	  Nulidad	  De	  Actos	  Administrativos	  	  (Bogota:	  Legis,	  2004).	  
54	  Art	  88,	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991.	  The	  constitution	  seemed	  to	  have	  created	  a	  mixture	  between	  
collectivist	  ideals	  and	  individualist	  pragmatism.	  The	  application	  of	  collectivist	  ideals	  means	  that	  
groups’	  interests	  prevail	  over	  individual’s	  interest,	  and	  the	  Constitution	  refers	  to	  a	  prevalent	  general	  
interest	  over	  individual’s	  interests.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  application	  of	  individual	  pragmatism	  
implies	  that	  only	  individuals	  are	  legitimized	  to	  make	  decisions	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  rights,	  but	  that	  
individuals	  need	  the	  group	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  their	  expectations.	  Botero	  contends	  that	  the	  
Colombian	  Constitution	  seems	  to	  apply	  this	  latter	  concept	  as	  well	  because	  individual’s	  rights	  are	  
inalienable	  and	  they	  are	  entitled	  to	  claim	  for	  their	  protection	  by	  judicial	  actions	  (ibid.	  	  
55	  Congreso	  de	  la	  Republica	  de	  Colombia,	  "Ley	  472,"	  (Colombia1998).	  Colombian	  Constitution,	  1991.	  	  
56	  Article	  88,	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991.	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protect	  collective	  rights	  are	  viable	  in	  two	  cases:	  when	  collective	  rights	  are	  under	  a	  threat	  
or	  when	  they	  have	  been	  violated	  by	  public	  or	  private	  agents.57	  The	  statute	  also	  defined	  
that	  once	  an	  individual	  files	  a	  popular	  action	  the	  judge	  is	  responsible	  for	  adjudicating	  
the	  process	  even	  if	  the	  initial	  complaint	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  formalities	  required	  by	  law.	  In	  
other	  words,	  all	  individuals	  are	  entitled	  to	  file	  a	  popular	  action,	  even	  without	  legal	  
training	  or	  legal	  representation	  and	  it	  is	  the	  judge’s	  responsibility	  to	  interpret	  the	  claim	  
in	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  decision.58	  	  
The	  constitution	  of	  1991	  also	  changed	  the	  judicial	  structure	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  
judicial	  enforcement	  of	  the	  new	  constitutional	  rights.	  	  Prior	  to	  the	  reforms,	  Colombia	  
had	  two	  apex	  courts:	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  State.	  Under	  the	  regime	  of	  
the	  constitution	  of	  1886,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  was	  the	  final	  appellate	  court	  in	  civil	  matters	  
and	  judicial	  review.59	  Under	  the	  constitution	  of	  1886	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  performed	  an	  
advisory	  role	  to	  the	  executive	  with	  regards	  public	  administration.	  Also,	  the	  Council	  was	  
the	  final	  appellate	  court	  in	  cases	  involving	  the	  administrative	  process	  of	  governmental	  
agencies.60	  	  
To	  these	  two	  high	  courts,	  the	  1991	  constitutional	  reforms	  added	  the	  Colombian	  
Constitutional	  Court.	  61	  Previously,	  judicial	  review	  and	  constitutional	  litigation	  were	  
deferred	  to	  the	  constitutional	  section	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  but	  the	  constitution	  of	  
1991	  created	  a	  new,	  independent	  court	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  protecting	  the	  supremacy	  
of	  the	  constitution	  in	  the	  legal	  system.	  The	  constitution	  states:	  “The	  constitutional	  court	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Congreso	  de	  la	  Republica	  de	  Colombia,	  "Ley	  472."	  Art.	  2.	  	  
58	  Ibid.	  Art.	  5.	  
59	  Article	  151,	  Colombian	  constitution	  1886.	  	  
60	  Acto	  reformatorio	  de	  la	  constitucion,	  Septiembre	  10th,	  1914.	  	  	  
61	  Art.	  241,	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991.	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is	  responsible	  for	  keeping	  the	  integrity	  and	  supremacy	  of	  the	  constitution,	  according	  to	  
the	  strict	  application	  of	  the	  following	  rules.”62	  By	  keeping	  the	  integrity	  and	  supremacy	  of	  
the	  constitution,	  the	  Court	  holds	  considerable	  power	  in	  the	  Colombian	  legal	  system.	  
Since	  the	  Constitution	  is	  the	  supreme	  norm	  in	  the	  country,	  in	  case	  of	  a	  conflict	  between	  
the	  constitution,	  the	  statutes,	  or	  any	  other	  regulation,	  the	  Constitution	  prevails.63	  
Therefore,	  the	  interpretation	  given	  by	  the	  Court	  to	  a	  certain	  regulation	  has	  authority	  
over	  other	  organs.	  	  
	   Although	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  might	  seem	  to	  play	  the	  key	  role	  in	  enforcing	  
the	  1991	  Constitution’s	  new	  rights,	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case	  because,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  
below,	  some	  of	  the	  new	  constitutional	  rights	  are	  mainly	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  
Council	  of	  State.	  	  Thus	  the	  reforms	  expanded	  that	  court’s	  constitutional	  role,	  too.	  
The	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  also	  created	  incentives	  to	  develop	  oversight	  
associations	  related	  to	  different	  areas	  of	  policy-­‐making.	  The	  fourth	  chapter	  of	  the	  
constitution	  (Titulo	  IV)	  regulates	  the	  democratic	  participation	  and	  political	  parties.	  This	  
title	  states	  that	  the	  government	  will	  contribute	  to	  the	  organization,	  promotion,	  and	  
training	  of	  citizen	  organizations	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  strengthening	  their	  participation	  
and	  oversight	  over	  public	  administration.64	  Although	  this	  provision	  seems	  to	  encourage	  
popular	  participation	  in	  government	  it	  might	  also	  have	  other	  possible	  implications.	  For	  
instance,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  by	  authorizing	  the	  government	  to	  subsidize	  citizen	  
organizations	  it	  may	  also	  favor	  increased	  governmental	  control	  over	  lower	  levels	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Art.	  241,	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991.	  	  
63	  Art	  4,	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991.	  	  
64	  Art	  103,	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991.	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administration.	  In	  other	  words,	  by	  setting	  up	  government-­‐supported	  advocacy	  
organizations	  the	  constitution	  may	  have	  created	  the	  possibility	  of	  citizen	  organizations	  
acting	  as	  the	  government’s	  “police”	  or	  “auditors”	  over	  the	  behavior	  of	  lower-­‐level	  
administrators.	  	  
The	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  recognized	  the	  diversity	  of	  the	  regions	  by	  stating	  that	  
although	  Colombia	  will	  have	  a	  centralized	  political	  structure	  (one	  constitution,	  one	  
congress,	  and	  one	  president),	  it	  will	  be	  administratively	  decentralized.65	  Thus,	  city	  
councils	  and	  regional	  assemblies	  (the	  legislative	  bodies)	  were	  granted	  broader	  power	  
specifically	  with	  regards	  to	  budgetary	  decisions.66	  	  
	  
Administrative	  morality	  
Administrative	  morality,	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  is	  a	  legal	  concept	  created	  
by	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991.	  While	  it	  is	  an	  increasingly	  significant	  constitutional	  concept,	  
its	  legal	  definition	  remains	  somewhat	  unclear.	  At	  least	  we	  know	  that	  it	  was	  thought	  to	  
be	  a	  means	  to	  check	  bureaucratic	  corruption.	  The	  constitution	  refers	  to	  administrative	  
morality	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  the	  constitution	  states	  that	  administrative	  morality	  is	  a	  
collective	  right	  protected	  through	  popular	  actions.67	  	  Thus,	  the	  constitutional	  framers	  
seem	  to	  have	  intended	  it	  to	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  “public	  good”—a	  good	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Art	  1,	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991.	  	  
66	  Art	  300	  and	  313,	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991.	  	  
67	  Art	  88,	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991.	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people	  as	  a	  whole—but	  still	  enforceable	  by	  individual	  lawsuits.	  	  Second,	  the	  constitution	  
stated	  that	  morality	  is	  one	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  public	  administration.68	  	  
As	  to	  a	  collective	  right,	  scholars	  argue	  that	  it	  belongs	  to	  society	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  
each	  one	  of	  its	  members	  is	  entitled	  to	  claim	  for	  its	  protection.69	  This	  statement	  implies	  
that	  when	  an	  individual	  identifies	  certain	  behavior	  that,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  violates	  
standards	  of	  proper	  administrative	  behavior,	  he	  is	  entitled	  to	  file	  a	  popular	  action	  to	  
correct	  this	  behavior.	  	  As	  to	  a	  principle	  of	  public	  administration,	  statutes	  contend	  that	  
public	  administrators	  should	  guide	  their	  performance	  based	  on	  both	  legal	  regulations	  
and	  principles.70	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  these	  references	  to	  administrative	  morality	  the	  constitution	  did	  not	  
provide	  a	  definition	  of	  what	  this	  right	  encompasses.	  Judicial	  decisions	  have	  developed	  
this	  concept	  on	  a	  case-­‐to-­‐case	  basis.	  The	  courts	  with	  broadest	  jurisdiction	  over	  these	  
questions	  have	  been	  the	  administrative	  courts,	  with	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  as	  the	  superior	  
appellate	  court	  on	  administrative	  matters.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  the	  
collective	  right	  to	  administrative	  morality	  implies	  that	  public	  agents	  should	  perform	  
their	  duties	  in	  pursuit	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  and	  with	  honesty,	  loyalty,	  and	  in	  fulfillment	  
of	  the	  law.71	  In	  other	  words,	  administrative	  morality	  seems	  to	  require	  a	  high	  quality,	  
legally	  responsible	  public	  administration	  in	  pursuit	  of	  the	  public	  good.	  The	  Council	  of	  
State,	  as	  the	  final	  appellate	  court	  with	  regards	  administrative	  affairs,	  has	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Art	  209,	  Colombian	  constitution	  1991.	  Other	  principles	  of	  public	  administration	  are:	  equality,	  
effectiveness,	  economy,	  promptness,	  impartiality,	  and	  publicity.	  	  
69	  Botero,	  Acción	  Popular	  Y	  Nulidad	  De	  Actos	  Administrativos:	  Protección	  De	  Derechos	  Colectivos.	  
70	  Congreso	  de	  la	  República	  de	  Colombia,	  "Ley	  489,"	  (Bogotá1998).	  Article	  3.	  	  
71	  Ap	  151,(2001).	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developing	  the	  concept	  of	  administrative	  morality	  since	  its	  first	  case	  on	  the	  matter	  in	  
1997.	  	  
Administrative	  morality	  was	  not	  entirely	  new	  concept	  to	  the	  Constituton	  of	  
1991.	  A	  few	  journalistic	  articles	  dating	  at	  least	  to	  1957	  (and	  continuing	  through	  1990),	  
discovered	  during	  my	  research	  for	  this	  dissertation,	  refer	  to	  the	  moralization	  of	  public	  
administration	  and	  they	  refer	  to	  morality	  as	  a	  standard	  of	  governmental	  administration.	  
These	  articles	  suggest	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  administrative	  morality	  long	  pre-­‐dated	  the	  
1991	  constitutional	  reforms.	  Several	  Colombian	  legal	  experts	  interviewed	  for	  this	  
dissertation,	  particularly	  Camilo	  Orrego	  and	  Beatriz	  Londoño,	  confirmed	  this	  as	  well.72	  
According	  to	  these	  interviewees,	  the	  Colombian	  legislation	  and	  professional	  values	  of	  
public	  administrators	  had	  long	  developed	  administrative	  morality	  and	  popular	  actions	  as	  
checks	  for	  governmental	  administration.	  	  
According	  to	  Londoño	  popular	  actions	  existed	  in	  the	  Colombian	  civil	  code	  and	  
allowed	  individuals	  to	  enforce	  collective	  interests.73	  These	  legal	  mechanisms,	  first	  
established	  in	  1873,	  aimed	  to	  protect	  public	  space	  and	  the	  right	  of	  the	  collectivity	  (rights	  
of	  non-­‐determined	  individuals)	  through	  a	  civil	  action	  (articles	  1005,	  2359,	  and	  2360	  
Colombian	  Civil	  Code).	  In	  Londoño’s	  opinion	  these	  causes	  of	  action	  were	  the	  origins	  of	  
popular	  actions	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  and	  they	  pursued	  the	  same	  
purpose:	  	  facilitating	  citizen	  engagement	  to	  protect	  collective	  interests.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  "Interview	  Camilo	  Orrego,"	  	  (2012).	  "Interview	  Beatriz	  Londoño,"	  	  (2012).	  
73	  "Interview	  Beatriz	  Londoño."	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Likewise,	  Orrego	  observed	  that	  administrative	  morality	  has	  been	  understood	  as	  
a	  principle	  of	  public	  administration	  for	  a	  long	  time.74	  According	  to	  this	  lawyer,	  arguing	  
otherwise	  would	  be	  like	  suggesting	  that	  before	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991,	  Colombian	  
public	  administration	  was	  entirely	  immoral,	  and	  this	  is	  not	  plausible.	  
With	  this	  research	  I	  do	  not	  ignore	  the	  antecedents	  of	  popular	  actions	  and	  
administrative	  morality	  as	  checks	  of	  governmental	  behavior.	  In	  fact	  in	  chapter	  7	  I	  prove	  
that	  public	  administrators’	  understandings	  of	  administrative	  morality	  is	  an	  example	  of	  
legal	  pluralism.	  Different	  normative	  orders	  provide	  elements	  for	  administrators	  to	  
implement	  administrative	  morality,	  some	  of	  them	  being	  the	  civil	  code	  and	  legislation	  on	  
transparency	  of	  public	  administration	  that	  was	  in	  place	  before	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991.	  
The	  notion	  of	  “morals”	  in	  the	  Colombian	  context	  has	  been	  traditionally	  related	  
to	  Catholic-­‐Christian	  beliefs	  given	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  has	  traditionally	  
professed	  this	  religion.	  In	  fact	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1886	  was	  framed	  bythe	  assumption	  
that	  Catholicism	  was	  the	  official	  religion	  of	  the	  country	  and	  would	  be	  recognized	  as	  a	  
key	  basis	  for	  the	  social	  order.75	  The	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  assumed	  a	  different	  
understanding	  with	  regards	  religion	  by	  stating	  that	  freedom	  of	  beliefs	  would	  be	  
protected	  by	  the	  state	  and	  that	  all	  churches	  and	  beliefs	  are	  equal	  under	  the	  law.76	  
In	  spite	  of	  this	  constitutional	  change	  in	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Catholic	  religion,	  in	  the	  
debates	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  of	  1991	  some	  framers	  recognized	  the	  key	  role	  of	  
morals	  as	  an	  element	  of	  the	  Colombian	  culture.	  They	  argued	  that	  moral	  obligations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  "Interview	  Camilo	  Orrego."	  
75	  Constitution	  of	  1886,	  introduction.	  	  
76	  Constitution	  of	  1991,	  article	  19.	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provide	  support	  and	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  legal	  system.77	  	  Thus,	  administrative	  morality	  is	  a	  
concept	  that	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  Colombian	  cultural	  system	  and	  is	  related	  to	  a	  Catholic-­‐




What	  is	  “administrative	  morality”	  and	  how	  has	  it	  been	  interpreted	  and	  applied?	  
How	  have	  subsequent	  statutes	  altered	  the	  meaning	  or	  implementation	  of	  this	  right?	  	  
How	  have	  the	  courts	  interpreted	  “administrative	  morality”?	  How	  have	  government	  
agencies	  interpreted	  this	  concept?	  	  How	  have	  the	  popular	  media,	  the	  institution	  most	  
accessible	  to	  the	  mass	  public,	  interpreted	  the	  concept?	  	  
This	  dissertation	  examines	  the	  interpretations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  given	  
by	  the	  Colombian	  Council	  of	  State,	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  governmental	  documents,	  
administrators	  and	  the	  popular	  media.	  	  The	  Council	  of	  State,	  as	  the	  “supreme”	  court	  for	  
administrative	  matters,	  provides	  the	  final	  authoritative	  interpretation	  of	  the	  rules	  
governing	  Colombia’s	  administrative	  system,	  and	  its	  decisions	  on	  the	  new	  collective	  
right	  of	  administrative	  morality	  have	  developed	  the	  legal	  interpretation	  of	  this	  right.	  The	  
mass	  media	  provide	  the	  most	  accessible	  source	  of	  information	  for	  ordinary	  Colombians.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Comisión1a,	  "Derechos	  Colectivos,"	  in	  Asamblea	  Nacional	  Constituyente	  (BogotáMayo	  6	  de	  1991).	  
78	  In	  my	  interview	  with	  Marcela	  Restrepo	  from	  Transparency	  Colombia	  she	  explained	  that	  the	  way	  
administrative	  morality	  was	  framed	  it	  seemed	  like	  it	  was	  the	  application	  of	  Christian	  morals	  to	  
governmental	  performance.	  In	  her	  opinion	  this	  application	  required	  an	  in	  depth	  debate	  and	  analysis	  
that	  was	  missing	  from	  the	  debates	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Assembly.	  "Interview	  Marcela	  Restrepo,"	  	  
(2012).	  On	  the	  relationship	  between	  morals	  and	  administrative	  morality:	  Nicolás	  Polanía,	  "Moralidad	  
Administrativa"	  (Universidad	  Externado	  de	  Colombia,	  2006).	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Each	  of	  these	  institutional	  settings	  thus	  provides	  contributes	  interpretations	  of	  
“administrative	  morality,”	  but	  for	  different	  populations	  or	  audiences.	  	  	  
	  
Theoretical	  foundations	  for	  study	  of	  these	  questions	  
Can	  Constitutional	  rights	  and	  the	  judiciary	  reform	  a	  society?	  
At	  the	  broadest	  level	  my	  dissertation	  examines	  whether	  broad	  constitutional	  reform	  
of	  the	  sort	  embodied	  in	  the	  Colombian	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  can	  reform	  governmental	  
administration.	  To	  address	  this	  question,	  I	  will	  frame	  my	  analysis	  in	  light	  of	  leading	  
theories	  of	  the	  potential	  of	  law	  for	  fostering	  social	  change.	  Analysis	  of	  this	  question	  has	  
been	  developed	  the	  furthest	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  so	  my	  discussion	  draws	  especially	  
on	  theories	  of	  legal	  reform	  in	  that	  country.	  
A	  leading	  theory,	  advanced	  by	  Gerald	  Rosenberg,	  is	  that	  constitutional	  rights	  and	  
judicial	  enforcement	  of	  them	  generally	  cannot	  foster	  long-­‐term	  social	  change.79	  This	  is	  
so	  for	  several	  reasons.	  First,	  courts	  lack	  independence	  from	  the	  political	  branches	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  judges	  are	  appointed	  by	  these	  branches	  and	  thus	  typically	  are	  part	  of	  the	  
ruling	  coalition	  rather	  than	  separate	  from	  it.	  Their	  policies	  are	  generally	  consistent	  with	  
those	  of	  the	  ruling	  political	  coalition.	  Second,	  when	  courts	  defy	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  the	  
political	  branches	  generally	  can	  limit	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  rulings.	  Third,	  in	  the	  few	  cases	  
where	  courts	  defy	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  and	  are	  not	  checked	  by	  it,	  they	  lack	  the	  power	  to	  
enforce	  their	  decisions.	  They	  depend	  on	  voluntary	  cooperation.	  As	  Rosenberg	  observes,	  
however,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  courts	  never	  have	  any	  influence.	  They	  have	  influence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Gerald	  N	  Rosenberg,	  The	  Hollow	  Hope:	  Can	  Courts	  Bring	  About	  Social	  Change?	  	  (University	  of	  
Chicago	  Press,	  2008).	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when	  key	  conditions	  are	  met:	  when	  their	  decisions	  are	  supported	  by	  a	  sympathetic	  
population	  or	  sympathetic	  government	  officials.	  
Rosenberg	  illustrated	  this	  thesis	  by	  analyzing	  the	  impact	  of	  Brown	  vs.	  Board	  of	  
Education	  on	  racial	  segregation	  in	  public	  schools.	  He	  showed	  that	  school	  districts	  in	  the	  
South	  successfully	  defied	  the	  Brown	  decision	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  when	  Congress	  made	  
desegregation	  a	  condition	  for	  receiving	  federal	  education	  funding.	  He	  also	  showed	  that	  
Brown	  had	  surprisingly	  little	  effect	  on	  public	  opinion	  and	  media	  coverage	  of	  racial.80	  	  
When	  exploring	  the	  impact	  of	  Brown	  Rosenberg	  argues	  that	  the	  law	  has	  a	  
contingent	  impact	  over	  social	  behavior	  because	  there	  are	  other	  social	  forces	  that	  
produce	  stronger	  effects.	  Specifically	  Rosenberg	  argues	  that	  the	  electoral	  system	  is	  a	  
strong	  force	  to	  foster	  social	  change	  and	  that	  it	  is	  through	  elections	  that	  social	  change	  
occurs.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  power	  of	  courts	  and	  constitutional	  rights	  to	  produce	  
social	  change	  is	  relatively	  weak	  compared	  to	  the	  power	  of	  political	  majorities	  and	  the	  
political	  branches	  of	  government.81	  	  
A	  second	  stream	  of	  the	  literature	  suggests	  that	  judicial	  decisions	  on	  constitutional	  
rights	  can	  foster	  social	  change	  by	  changing	  people’s	  mentality	  of	  what	  is	  legally	  
possible.82	  In	  a	  study	  on	  pay	  equity	  reform,	  Michael	  McCann	  argues	  that	  social	  
movement	  organizers	  used	  legal	  rights	  and	  judicial	  decisions	  to	  help	  inspire	  a	  sense	  that	  
social	  reform	  was	  possible.	  This	  helped	  to	  mobilize	  a	  social	  movement	  in	  favor	  of	  pay	  
equity	  reform	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  limited	  power	  of	  courts	  to	  enforce	  their	  rulings.	  The	  social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Ibid.	  
81	  Ibid.	  
82	  Michael	  W	  McCann,	  Rights	  at	  Work:	  Pay	  Equity	  Reform	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Legal	  Mobilization	  	  
(University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1994).	  
26	  
	  
movement	  used	  judicial	  decisions	  as	  leverage	  to	  gain	  wage	  concessions	  from	  major	  
employers.	  Thus,	  although	  judicial	  decisions	  by	  themselves	  may	  have	  had	  only	  a	  limited	  
impact,	  their	  use	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  social	  movement	  organizers	  came	  to	  have	  a	  broader	  
inspirational	  force.	  In	  this	  way	  rights	  worked	  as	  cultural	  conventions	  and	  they	  fortified	  
the	  bonds	  between	  reformers	  (women	  and	  their	  allies)	  and	  they	  modified	  the	  moral	  
social	  discourse	  with	  regards	  pay	  equity.83	  
Building	  on	  McCann’s	  theory,	  a	  third	  theory	  suggests	  that	  legal	  rights	  may	  contribute	  
to	  policy	  change	  when	  several	  key	  supporting	  conditions	  are	  present.84	  Epp	  argues	  that	  
new	  legal	  rights	  changed	  policies	  and	  bureaucratic	  practices	  in	  policing,	  parks	  
administration,	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  sexual	  harassment	  norms.	  In	  these	  areas	  
policy	  reforms	  occurred	  when	  aided	  by	  the	  combined	  efforts	  of	  popular	  pressure	  for	  
reform	  and	  administrative	  officials’	  support	  for	  reform.	  In	  the	  presence	  of	  these	  two	  
supporting	  conditions,	  local	  administrative	  agencies	  have	  adopted	  administrative	  rules,	  
employee	  training,	  and	  internal	  oversight	  aimed	  at	  giving	  administrative	  effect	  to	  legal	  
rights.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  these	  supporting	  conditions,	  however,	  there	  was	  less	  
administrative	  change	  in	  these	  areas.	  A	  key	  element	  of	  these	  changes,	  Epp	  explains,	  was	  
growing	  recognition	  of	  the	  need	  to	  reform	  not	  only	  individual	  employees’	  behavior	  but	  
also	  administrative	  systems.85	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A	  fourth	  stream	  of	  the	  literature	  led	  by	  Lauren	  Edelman86	  argues	  that	  in	  cases	  of	  
ambiguous	  legal	  reforms	  professional	  administrators	  imitate	  what	  others	  are	  doing	  with	  
the	  purpose	  of	  demonstrating	  legal	  compliance.	  In	  analyzing	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  
Act	  of	  1964	  bureaucratic	  agencies	  created	  visible	  structures	  (EEO	  offices)	  and	  rules	  that	  
would	  allow	  them	  to	  verify	  compliance	  in	  case	  of	  litigation.	  This	  bureaucratic	  
interpretation	  and	  implementation	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964	  shaped	  the	  courts’	  
understadings	  of	  it.	  This	  theoretical	  frame	  indicates	  that	  professional	  administrators’	  
understandings	  of	  legal	  reforms	  shape	  the	  implementation	  process	  of	  these	  reforms	  and	  
affect	  its	  possible	  impact.	  	  
Another	  stream	  of	  the	  literature	  sustains	  that	  legislatures	  play	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  
the	  implementation	  of	  constitutional	  reforms.	  Farhang	  argues	  that	  congressional	  
statutes	  shape	  the	  institutional	  context	  in	  which	  rights	  are	  enforced	  and	  to	  that	  extent	  
the	  congress	  fulfills	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  constitutional	  rights.87	  Farhang	  
demonstrates	  that	  in	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  in	  the	  US	  the	  congress	  chose	  to	  rely	  
upon	  private	  litigation	  to	  enforce	  civil	  rights	  by	  allowing	  the	  winning	  plaintiff	  to	  get	  
attorneys	  fees	  from	  the	  defendant.88	  Thus,	  statutes	  and	  specifically	  regulations	  related	  
to	  attorneys	  fees	  played	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  and	  in	  facilitating	  
enforcement	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964.	  	  	  
Although	  these	  theories	  were	  developed	  in	  the	  US	  context	  they	  may	  aid	  in	  
understanding	  the	  role	  of	  law	  and	  legal	  reform	  in	  other	  contexts.	  Others	  have	  applied	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some	  of	  their	  insights	  to	  the	  study	  of	  legal	  reform	  in	  various	  countries.89	  This	  
dissertation	  uses	  these	  theories	  as	  possible	  lenses	  to	  see	  the	  Colombian	  context	  and	  the	  
Constitutional	  reform	  of	  1991.	  	  
	  	  
Thesis	  
	   The	  Colombian	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  brought	  high	  hopes	  to	  the	  country	  
particularly	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  placing	  checks	  on	  governmental	  authorities.	  How	  much	  
if	  these	  expectations	  have	  been	  achieved?	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  summarize	  the	  
dissertation’s	  thesis	  and	  the	  evidence	  for	  it.	  Put	  simply,	  it	  is	  my	  thesis	  that	  
administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  constitutional	  right	  may	  contribute	  to	  bureaucratic	  change	  
but	  the	  conditions	  for	  this	  to	  happen	  are	  not	  (yet)	  present	  in	  Colombia.	  
The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  analysis	  (Chapter	  2)	  focuses	  on	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  
constitutional	  right	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  This	  chapter	  gives	  particular	  attention	  to	  
the	  key	  actors	  and	  groups	  who	  favored	  particular	  constitutional	  provisions,	  and	  the	  
reasons	  they	  marshaled	  for	  why	  these	  provisions	  should	  be	  adopted.	  The	  chapter	  shows	  
that	  the	  constitutional	  framing	  process	  did	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  nor	  did	  the	  framers	  clearly	  articulate	  what	  they	  hoped	  to	  
achieve	  with	  this	  new	  right.	  Thus,	  the	  new	  right	  to	  administrative	  morality	  was	  limited	  
from	  the	  outset	  by	  deep	  ambiguity	  over	  its	  meaning	  and	  purpose.	  	  
	   In	  a	  sense	  the	  constitution-­‐framing	  process	  did	  not	  end	  in	  1991,	  however,	  as	  the	  
Colombian	  Congress	  subsequently	  has	  adopted	  several	  key	  statutes	  that	  significantly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




affect	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  collective	  right	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  As	  in	  other	  
countries,	  enabling	  legislation	  may	  be	  as	  crucial	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  as	  
are	  the	  terms	  of	  these	  rights	  themselves.	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  examine	  these	  statutes	  and	  
their	  implications	  for	  this	  new	  right.	  The	  earliest	  enabling	  legislation	  passed	  by	  the	  
Congress	  supported	  robust	  enforcement	  of	  the	  new	  right	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  
Twelve	  years	  later,	  in	  2010,	  the	  Congress	  passed	  enabling	  legislation	  that	  posed	  serious	  
restrictions	  to	  popular	  actions	  in	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  sum,	  the	  legislative	  
conditions	  for	  effective	  implementation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  administrative	  morality	  have	  
changed,	  limiting	  its	  impact.	  	  
The	  third	  part	  of	  the	  analysis	  (Chapter	  5)	  focuses	  on	  judicial	  rulings	  on	  administrative	  
morality.	  The	  Council	  of	  State,	  the	  high	  court	  with	  jurisdiction	  over	  “administrative	  
morality”	  cases,	  has	  decided	  some	  215	  popular	  actions	  on	  this	  issue	  since	  1991;	  the	  
Constitutional	  Court	  has	  decided	  9	  cases	  on	  the	  topic.	  I	  will	  show	  that	  the	  Courts	  were	  
initially	  supportive	  of	  the	  high	  aspirations	  that	  the	  constitution	  posed	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  but	  their	  support	  for	  these	  rights	  and	  these	  high	  aspirations	  
diminished	  with	  time.	  These	  courts	  also	  shifted	  from	  deciding	  high-­‐impact	  cases	  
involving	  government	  policy	  to	  focusing	  on	  lower-­‐impact	  cases	  involving	  the	  particular	  
decisions	  of	  low-­‐level	  administrative	  officials.	  This	  has	  reduced	  the	  impact	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  over	  time.	  	  	  
	   Creative	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  law	  by	  public	  administrators	  is	  shaped	  by	  
prominent	  professional	  interpretations	  of	  legal	  requirements,	  and	  these	  professional	  
interpretations	  at	  times	  vary	  considerably	  from	  a	  strictly	  legal	  interpretation.	  Chapter	  6	  
30	  
	  
shows	  that	  the	  government	  has	  not	  institutionalized	  the	  concept	  of	  administrative	  
morality.	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  that	  the	  government	  has	  provided	  no	  policy	  documents	  or	  
training	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  administrative	  morality	  to	  aid	  administrators	  in	  giving	  effect	  
to	  this	  norm.	  	  The	  result	  is	  competing,	  inconsistent	  understandings	  of	  the	  norm	  among	  
professional	  administrators.	  Administrators	  interviewed	  for	  this	  study	  claim	  to	  know	  
what	  administrative	  morality	  is,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  agree	  on	  a	  definition	  or	  on	  its	  
implications	  for	  administrative	  practice.	  	  	  
While	  it	  would	  be	  nearly	  impossible	  for	  me	  to	  conduct	  an	  adequate	  study	  of	  
popular	  understandings	  of	  “administrative	  morality”	  among	  ordinary	  Colombians,	  
coverage	  of	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  popular	  news	  media	  is	  an	  essential	  step	  toward	  
understanding	  how	  the	  new	  constitutional	  rights	  are	  popularly	  interpreted.	  In	  order	  to	  
explore	  the	  role	  of	  media	  in	  the	  development	  of	  administrative	  morality	  Chapter	  7	  uses	  
the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  Haltom	  and	  McCann	  who	  examined	  how	  the	  news	  media	  
in	  the	  United	  States	  “constructed”	  the	  popular	  meaning	  of	  tort	  law	  in	  that	  country.90	  	  
Haltom	  and	  McCann	  showed	  that	  popular	  media	  coverage	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  individual	  
actors	  rather	  than	  institutional	  processes,	  and	  on	  individual	  mistakes	  rather	  than	  
institutional	  sources	  of	  harm.	  	  Using	  this	  framework,	  in	  Chapter	  7	  I	  show	  that	  the	  
Colombian	  media	  were	  initially	  supportive	  to	  administrative	  morality	  and	  its	  potential	  
for	  changing	  bureaucratic	  behavior;	  coverage	  initially	  focused	  on	  broad	  systemic	  reform	  
and	  tended	  to	  portray	  litigation	  over	  such	  issues	  relatively	  positively.	  With	  time	  
journalistic	  articles	  became	  more	  skeptical	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  broad	  reform	  and	  more	  




critical	  of	  lawsuits	  seeking	  to	  achieve	  it.	  
	   In	  sum,	  more	  than	  twenty	  years	  after	  the	  1991	  constitutional	  reforms,	  
administrative	  morality,	  while	  widely	  discussed,	  remains	  undefined	  and	  without	  clear	  
effect.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  administrative	  morality	  has	  only	  partially	  achieved	  the	  
high	  expectations	  that	  were	  brought	  up	  by	  the	  constitutional	  framing	  process	  of	  1991.	  
While	  popular	  actions	  on	  administrative	  morality	  changed	  what	  the	  people	  thought	  it	  
was	  legally	  possible	  by	  encouraging	  them	  to	  use	  this	  cause	  of	  action	  as	  a	  check	  of	  
governmental	  performance	  its	  impact	  is	  still	  low.	  For	  administrative	  morality	  to	  achieve	  
its	  expected	  results	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  an	  institutionalization	  of	  this	  notion	  that	  
engages	  different	  social	  actors.	  The	  literature	  suggests	  that	  legal	  reforms	  do	  not	  foster	  
social	  change	  on	  its	  own	  but	  that	  it	  requires	  the	  collaboration	  of	  different	  social	  agents	  
for	  reforms	  to	  being	  effective.91	  In	  the	  Colombian	  case	  I	  argue	  that	  for	  administrative	  
morality	  to	  achieve	  its	  purpose	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  the	  legislative	  support	  in	  enabling	  
legislation	  that	  re	  instates	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  to	  sue	  and	  that	  broadens	  the	  power	  
of	  judges	  to	  enforce	  these	  actions.	  It	  would	  also	  be	  necessary	  the	  support	  of	  the	  courts	  
by	  showing	  their	  will	  to	  enforce	  these	  actions	  by	  making	  them	  effective	  checks	  of	  
governmental	  performance.	  A	  key	  part	  of	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  should	  come	  from	  the	  government	  by	  providing	  guidelines	  and	  training	  that	  
would	  allow	  professional	  administrators	  to	  enforce	  administrative	  morality.	  Finally	  it	  
would	  be	  essential	  to	  foster	  citizen	  engagement	  in	  the	  use	  of	  popular	  actions	  and	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Epp,	  Making	  Rights	  Real:	  Activists,	  Bureaucrats,	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  the	  Legalistic	  State.	  Farhang,	  The	  
Litigation	  State:	  Public	  Regulation	  and	  Private	  Lawsuits	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Edelman,	  "Legal	  
Ambiguity	  and	  Symbolic	  Structures:	  Organizational	  Mediation	  of	  Civil	  Rights	  Law;	  Rosenberg,	  The	  
Hollow	  Hope:	  Can	  Courts	  Bring	  About	  Social	  Change;	  McCann,	  Rights	  at	  Work:	  Pay	  Equity	  Reform	  and	  
the	  Politics	  of	  Legal	  Mobilization.	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potential	  to	  impact	  governmental	  performance.	  These	  factors	  combined	  could	  provide	  
effectiveness	  to	  popular	  actions	  in	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
	  
Data	  
This	  dissertation	  relies	  on	  several	  types	  of	  data.	  The	  first	  category	  is	  historical	  
documents	  on	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  1991	  Constitution.	  I	  have	  gathered	  the	  minutes	  of	  
discussion	  sessions	  and	  drafts	  of	  constitutional	  documents,	  with	  particular	  attention	  to	  
the	  documents	  relevant	  to	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  “administrative	  morality”	  right.	  	  These	  
documents	  are	  available	  in	  the	  national	  archives,	  and	  I	  gathered	  the	  key	  minutes	  and	  
documents	  during	  a	  trip	  to	  Colombia	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2012.	  
The	  second	  category	  of	  data	  consists	  of	  the	  universe	  of	  cases	  involving	  
administrative	  morality	  decided	  by	  the	  Colombian	  Council	  of	  State	  and	  the	  
Constitutional	  Court	  from	  1997	  to	  the	  present.	  The	  relevant	  period	  begins	  in	  1997	  
because	  since	  that	  year	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  has	  decided	  cases	  as	  an	  appellate	  court	  and	  
has	  started	  exerting	  functions	  of	  judicial	  review	  in	  administrative	  affairs.	  Between	  1997	  
and	  2011	  the	  Council	  has	  decided	  215	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  addition,	  the	  
Constitutional	  Court	  decided	  9	  of	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality	  during	  the	  study	  
period.	  I	  coded	  these	  cases	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  and	  Constitutional	  Court	  on	  a	  number	  
of	  relevant	  dimensions.	  .	  	  	  
	   A	  third	  type	  of	  data	  consists	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  a	  number	  of	  key	  
officials.	  I	  interviewed	  justices	  and	  clerks	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  State;	  scholars	  whose	  
research	  has	  examined	  the	  new	  right	  to	  administrative	  morality;	  prominent	  lawyers	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whose	  work	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  administrative	  morality;	  officials	  within	  the	  government	  
whose	  work	  has	  focused	  on	  improving	  Colombian	  public	  administration;	  and	  
representatives	  of	  several	  two	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  whose	  work	  has	  
focused	  on	  improving	  Colombian	  public	  administration.	  In	  all	  I	  conducted	  13	  interviews.	  	  
Fourth,	  I	  have	  gathered	  official	  guidances	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  administrative	  
morality,	  particularly	  official	  publications	  of	  the	  National	  Direction	  for	  Planning	  and	  the	  
Superior	  School	  of	  Administration	  as	  described	  above.	  	  	  
The	  final	  type	  of	  data	  consists	  of	  a	  coding	  of	  all	  journalistic	  articles	  that	  address	  
administrative	  morality	  published	  by	  two	  national	  printed	  media,	  one	  newspaper	  and	  
one	  magazine.92	  I	  chose	  these	  sources	  because	  they	  are	  two	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  media	  
sources	  in	  the	  country	  with	  national	  coverage,	  and	  one	  is	  generally	  regarded	  as	  
conservative	  while	  the	  other	  is	  regarded	  as	  liberal.	  These	  sources	  provide	  access	  to	  
online	  information,	  and	  using	  this	  online	  data-­‐base	  I	  have	  gathered	  the	  universe	  of	  
articles	  published	  since	  1991	  that	  refer	  to	  “administrative	  morality.”	  	  My	  database	  
consists	  of	  199	  articles	  published	  from	  1990	  to	  2011.	  The	  majority	  of	  articles	  in	  the	  
database	  were	  published	  in	  the	  time	  frame	  of	  2003	  to	  2011	  (103	  articles),	  while	  during	  
the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991,	  89	  articles	  were	  published.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
In	  sum,	  this	  dissertation	  examines	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Colombian	  constitutional	  
right	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  First,	  by	  exploring	  the	  origins	  of	  this	  legal	  mechanism	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  The	  newspaper	  “El	  Tiempo”	  and	  the	  magazine	  “Semana”.	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and	  the	  reasons	  why	  it	  was	  included	  in	  the	  constitution,	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  identify	  the	  
original	  purpose	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  its	  goals	  with	  regards	  the	  Colombian	  
public	  administration.	  Second,	  the	  analysis	  of	  judicial	  decisions	  will	  provide	  evidence	  
about	  the	  evolution	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  the	  current	  characterization	  of	  this	  
collective	  right.	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  and	  the	  parties	  that	  
have	  intervened	  in	  popular	  actions	  will	  also	  reveal	  the	  different	  forces	  and	  parties	  that	  
have	  shaped	  the	  evolution	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
Ultimately,	  by	  studying	  the	  evolution	  of	  judicial	  decisions	  on	  administrative	  
morality,	  high-­‐level	  professional	  administrative	  interpretation	  of	  this	  right,	  and	  popular	  
media	  coverage	  of	  this	  right,	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  analyze	  whether	  and	  how	  the	  
promises	  of	  the	  Colombian	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  are	  being	  met.	  These	  promises	  
centered	  on	  guaranteeing	  new	  rights	  against	  governmental	  abuse	  and	  new	  checks	  on	  






Chapter	  2:	  Administrative	  morality	  in	  the	  debates	  of	  the	  Colombian	  Constitutional	  
Assembly	  of	  1991	  
	  
	   Administrative	  morality	  was	  created	  by	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  as	  a	  collective	  
right	  and	  a	  principle	  of	  public	  administration.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  
where	  democratic	  participation	  was	  a	  core	  goal,	  the	  framers	  created	  judicial	  actions	  that	  
entitle	  any	  person	  in	  the	  country	  to	  protect	  not	  only	  individual	  rights	  but	  also	  rights	  to	  
protect	  collective	  interests.	  How	  were	  collective	  rights	  and	  administrative	  morality?	  
Given	  that	  the	  constitutional	  reforms	  of	  1991	  originated	  as	  an	  initiative	  of	  popular	  social	  
movements,	  93	  to	  what	  extent	  did	  leaders	  of	  these	  movements	  play	  a	  role	  in	  framing	  the	  
provisions	  regarding	  administrative	  morality?	  What	  was	  the	  constitutional	  framers’	  
purpose	  for	  including	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  check	  for	  governmental	  
performance?	  What	  was	  the	  framers’	  understanding	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  these	  concepts?	  
This	  chapter	  addresses	  these	  questions.	  	  
Traditionally	  the	  checks	  for	  governmental	  performance	  have	  been	  based	  on	  the	  
law:	  whether	  governmental	  agents	  comply	  with	  their	  legal	  duties	  or	  not.	  This	  principle	  is	  
stated	  in	  article	  6	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991.94	  By	  introducing	  the	  language	  of	  
“morality,”	  the	  concept	  of	  administrative	  morality	  seems	  to	  add	  a	  requirement	  to	  act	  
beyond	  simple	  compliance	  with	  legal	  duties.	  What	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  additional	  
dimension	  is	  a	  key	  theme	  in	  this	  chapter.	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  Fernando	  Carillo,	  Constitucionalizar	  La	  Democracia	  Social.	  El	  Proceso	  Constituyente	  De	  1991	  Y	  
América	  Latina,	  ed.	  Editorial	  Temis	  (Bogotá2011).	  
94	  “Individuals	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  are	  only	  responsible	  for	  violating	  the	  constitution	  and	  the	  law.	  
Governmental	  agents	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  and	  for	  violating	  or	  omitting	  their	  
functions.”	  Art.	  6	  Colombian	  Constitution.	  	  	  
36	  
	  
My	  sources	  for	  this	  chapter	  consist	  of	  the	  transcripts	  of	  the	  debates	  of	  the	  
Constitutional	  Assembly.	  The	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  organized	  their	  work	  on	  
commissions	  that	  specialized	  by	  topics.	  These	  commissions	  had	  the	  goal	  of	  debating	  and	  
analyzing	  their	  topics	  and	  crafting	  a	  first	  draft	  of	  the	  new	  constitutional	  norms.	  
Commissions	  presented	  these	  drafts	  to	  the	  entire	  Assembly	  and	  the	  Assembly	  had	  the	  
authority	  of	  approving	  the	  constitution.	  After	  the	  Assembly’s	  approval	  the	  commission	  
for	  coding	  would	  analyze	  the	  entire	  text	  to	  guarantee	  that	  it	  was	  a	  harmonic	  and	  
coherent	  document.95	  	  
	  
The	  Structure	  and	  Process	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  
On	  February	  6th	  of	  1991	  the	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  assigned	  topics	  to	  five	  
specialized	  commissions.	  The	  first	  commission	  specialized	  on	  constitutional	  rights,	  
constitutional	  principles,	  constitutional	  duties,	  and	  individual	  freedoms.	  The	  second	  
commission	  focused	  on	  urban	  planning,	  regional	  and	  local	  autonomy.	  The	  third	  
commission	  analyzed	  the	  regulation	  for	  the	  government	  and	  the	  congress,	  the	  military	  
and	  police,	  international	  relations,	  and	  exceptional	  circumstances	  (war	  and	  internal	  
crisis).	  The	  fourth	  commission	  focused	  on	  regulations	  for	  the	  judiciary	  and	  oversight	  
agencies.	  The	  fifth	  commission	  analyzed	  economic,	  social,	  and	  ecologic	  issues.96	  
The	  constitution	  of	  1991	  develops	  the	  concept	  of	  administrative	  morality	  in	  two	  
articles.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  article	  88	  refers	  to	  popular	  actions	  as	  a	  judicial	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Hernán	  Alejandro	  	  Olano,	  Constitución	  Política	  De	  Colombia.	  Con	  Estudio	  Preliminar.	  (Librería	  




mechanism	  to	  enforce	  collective	  rights,	  one	  of	  them	  being	  administrative	  morality.	  This	  
article	  deferred	  to	  the	  Congress	  the	  regulation	  of	  popular	  actions	  to	  protect	  collective	  
rights	  such	  as	  public	  funds,	  public	  space,	  public	  security,	  public	  health,	  administrative	  
morality,	  a	  healthy	  environment,	  free	  economic	  competition,	  and	  other	  rights	  defined	  
by	  the	  legislation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  article	  209	  of	  the	  constitution	  states	  the	  principles	  
that	  are	  to	  guide	  the	  Colombian	  public	  administration.	  According	  to	  this	  article,	  public	  
administration	  is	  to	  be	  based	  on	  principles	  of	  equality,	  morality,	  efficiency,	  economy,	  
celerity,	  impartiality,	  and	  publicity.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  focus	  especially	  on	  the	  framing	  of	  articles	  88	  and	  209.	  I	  focus	  
on	  the	  debates	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  National	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  while	  they	  were	  
crafting	  these	  articles.	  The	  transcriptions	  of	  the	  debates	  allow	  me	  to	  identify	  the	  
reasons	  why	  the	  framers	  created	  the	  new	  constitutional	  right	  to	  administrative	  morality	  
and	  the	  purposes	  they	  pursued	  with	  this	  mechanism.	  I	  analyze	  debates	  that	  took	  place	  
in	  different	  sub	  commissions	  of	  the	  Assembly	  and	  also	  debates	  that	  included	  the	  entire	  
constitutional	  Assembly.	  
Administrative	  morality	  was	  discussed	  by	  commissions	  first,	  fifth,	  and	  the	  
commission	  for	  coding	  and	  compiling.97	  	  Each	  of	  these	  commissions	  considered	  an	  initial	  
draft	  and	  discussed	  whether	  or	  how	  the	  draft	  should	  be	  modified.	  Once	  the	  
commissions	  finished	  their	  preliminary	  analysis	  the	  entire	  Assembly	  discussed	  the	  
proposed	  language	  and	  approved	  final	  texts.	  Finally,	  the	  commission	  for	  coding	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Article	  88	  was	  debated	  in	  commissions	  fifth	  and	  first	  before	  the	  debate	  and	  approval	  by	  the	  whole	  
Assembly.	  Last	  revisions	  were	  made	  by	  the	  commission	  responsible	  for	  compiling	  and	  coding	  the	  
constitution.	  Article	  209	  was	  debated	  in	  commission	  third	  before	  the	  debate	  and	  approval	  by	  the	  
entire	  Assemble.	  In	  Appendix	  A	  I	  include	  a	  list	  of	  debates	  of	  these	  articles.	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compiling	  completed	  final	  revisions	  to	  grant	  cohesion	  and	  structure	  to	  the	  constitution.	  	  
The	  Constitution	  was	  also	  revised	  be	  the	  Institute	  Caro	  y	  Cuervo98	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  
improving	  the	  grammar,	  syntax,	  and	  use	  of	  language	  in	  the	  document.	  
	  
The	  framer	  Augusto	  Ramirez	  Ocampo	  described	  the	  process	  in	  this	  way:	  	  
	  
“The	  Assembly	  was	  such	  a	  diverse	  and	  representative	  group	  as	  Colombia	  hasn’t	  
ever	  seen	  again.	  Political	  and	  academic	  arguments	  were	  mixed	  with	  popular	  
wisdom,	  the	  indigenous	  understanding	  of	  the	  world,	  social	  struggles,	  former	  
guerrilla	  members,	  youth,	  and	  different	  regions…	  The	  Assembly	  also	  gathered	  
the	  results	  of	  team	  groups	  from	  all	  over	  the	  Colombian	  territory.	  Thus,	  debates	  
began,	  we	  organized	  framers	  in	  commissions,	  and	  drafts	  were	  crafted.	  Debates	  
were	  flowing	  and	  the	  will	  to	  concur	  lead	  to	  reaching	  consensus	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  
historical	  disagreements	  between	  framers.	  With	  big	  efforts	  of	  synthesis	  the	  final	  
text	  was	  coming	  along.	  The	  essence	  started	  showing	  up	  and	  each	  piece	  of	  the	  
country	  represented	  in	  the	  Assembly	  was	  added	  and	  crafted	  carefully	  to	  give	  
birth	  to	  this	  big	  political,	  legal,	  and	  cultural	  project	  called	  the	  Constitution.”99	  	  
	  
Although	  this	  is	  a	  somewhat	  idealized	  description,	  Ocampo’s	  observation	  
illustrates	  the	  unprecedented	  breadth	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  National	  Constitutional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  http://www.caroycuervo.gov.co/es?language=es.	  The	  Institute	  Caro	  y	  Cuervo	  is	  the	  governmental	  
agency	  responsible	  for	  promoting	  and	  developing	  research,	  teaching,	  and	  promotion	  of	  the	  
Colombian	  languages	  and	  literature.	  	  
99	  Gabriel.	  	  Bustamante,	  "La	  Anécdota	  De	  La	  Redacción	  De	  La	  Constitución,"	  Semana,	  Julio	  2	  2011.	  In	  
this	  article	  framer	  Ocampo	  also	  refers	  to	  an	  anecdote	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  final	  version	  of	  the	  
constitution	  that	  got	  lost	  in	  a	  computer	  with	  an	  encryption	  that	  nobody	  could	  get	  access	  to.	  Once	  the	  
final	  draft	  of	  the	  constitution	  was	  finished	  the	  framers	  saved	  the	  constitution	  in	  a	  computer.	  Former	  
guerrilla	  members	  of	  the	  group	  M-­‐19	  had	  brought	  a	  specialist	  in	  computer	  sciences	  and	  they	  
suggested	  the	  encryption	  of	  the	  file	  to	  protect	  the	  information	  while	  it	  was	  officially	  published.	  Once	  
it	  was	  encrypted	  nobody	  could	  have	  access	  to	  the	  file	  again.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  efforts	  of	  experts	  
(Colombian	  and	  American	  experts)	  nobody	  could	  break	  the	  encryption	  and	  so	  the	  framers	  thought	  
about	  requesting	  an	  extension	  of	  six	  months	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  document.	  At	  the	  end,	  the	  Assembly	  
did	  not	  request	  an	  extension	  and	  the	  framers	  put	  together	  a	  new	  document	  based	  on	  what	  they	  could	  
remember	  of	  debates	  and	  discussions:	  “…	  each	  framer	  ended	  up	  bringing	  back	  notes,	  recalling	  
debates	  and	  discussions	  by	  using	  personal	  notebooks,	  journals,	  and	  even	  napkins	  with	  drafts	  of	  the	  
constitution.	  Thus,	  we	  were	  able	  to	  finish	  the	  constitution	  and	  I	  think	  that	  the	  original	  document	  is	  
still	  encrypted	  in	  that	  computer.”	  	  
39	  
	  
Assembly	  of	  1991.	  The	  final	  constitutional	  language	  emerged	  from	  drafts	  and	  debates	  
that	  included	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  groups	  and	  sectors	  of	  the	  population.	  This	  chapter	  
analyzes	  the	  evolution	  of	  these	  drafts	  in	  relation	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
	  	  
The	  Context	  of	  Administrative	  Morality:	  	  The	  Stated	  Purpose	  of	  Constitutional	  Reform	  
and	  Article	  88’s	  Declaration	  of	  Collective	  Rights	  
There	  were	  several	  drafts	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991,	  all	  of	  them	  crafted	  by	  
different	  individuals,	  social	  groups,	  or	  members	  of	  the	  Assembly.	  The	  government	  of	  
President	  César	  Gaviria	  Trujillo	  developed	  one	  draft	  with	  six	  chapters:	  first,	  to	  bring	  a	  
new	  type	  of	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  government	  through	  participative	  democracy;	  second,	  to	  
create	  a	  new	  bill	  of	  rights	  for	  the	  country	  and	  to	  foster	  the	  campaign	  against	  injustice	  
and	  the	  search	  of	  peace;	  third,	  to	  foster	  stronger	  institutions,	  capable	  of	  solving	  current	  
problems;	  fourth,	  to	  restructure	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  so	  as	  to	  improve	  efficiency	  
and	  accountability	  in	  government;	  fifth,	  to	  take	  steps	  toward	  federalism	  by	  enhancing	  
the	  autonomy	  of	  regional	  governments;	  and	  sixth,	  to	  	  modernize	  the	  economy	  by	  
enhancing	  	  transparency	  and	  social	  fairness	  and	  thereby	  increase	  productivity.100	  	  
This	  draft	  was	  developed	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  constitution	  should	  
keep	  some	  of	  the	  legal	  principles	  that	  guided	  former	  constitutional	  documents	  but	  that	  
should	  include	  new	  key	  principles	  that	  seemed	  to	  be	  essential	  for	  the	  country	  in	  1991.	  
Specifically	  this	  draft	  referred	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  equality	  and	  solidarity	  as	  key	  aspects	  
of	  the	  new	  constitutional	  order:	  “Currently,	  one	  century	  after	  the	  constitution	  of	  1886	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  Presidencia	  de	  la	  República,	  "Exposición	  De	  Motivos	  Al	  Proyecto	  De	  Reforma	  Constitucional.	  
Apartes	  Del	  Primer	  Borrador,"	  (Bogotá1991).	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was	  framed,	  we	  should	  keep	  principles	  like	  justice,	  freedom,	  and	  peace	  but	  we	  could	  
enrich	  them	  with	  a	  new	  horizon.	  A	  new	  horizon	  that	  would	  be	  equality	  and	  solidarity…	  it	  
is	  necessary	  to	  demand	  solidarity	  among	  the	  Colombian	  people	  and	  the	  respect	  among	  
each	  other	  as	  an	  essential	  and	  simple	  condition	  for	  the	  development	  of	  our	  nation.”101	  
In	  the	  new	  constitutional	  structure	  the	  principle	  of	  solidarity	  aims	  to	  bring	  together	  
governmental	  efforts	  and	  the	  private	  efforts	  to	  achieve	  the	  public	  good.102	  
According	  to	  the	  governmental	  draft	  of	  the	  constitution,	  the	  various	  
constitutions	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  Colombian	  history	  have	  responded	  to	  different	  
historical	  needs.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1886	  focused	  on	  unity	  as	  a	  core	  value,	  
necessary	  for	  strengthening	  a	  centralist	  political	  system.	  The	  Constitution	  of	  1957	  
focused	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  political	  agreements	  among	  parties	  that	  led	  to	  the	  
end	  of	  a	  violent	  stage	  in	  the	  Colombian	  history.	  In	  1991,	  the	  government	  referred	  to	  
equality	  and	  solidarity	  as	  principles	  that	  could	  steer	  the	  country	  towards	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  country.103	  It	  is	  relevant	  that	  this	  preliminary	  document	  highlighted	  
the	  importance	  of	  solidarity	  as	  a	  key	  value	  of	  the	  new	  constitutional	  order.	  During	  the	  
debates	  of	  the	  National	  Constitutional	  Assembly,	  solidarity	  was	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  
development	  of	  collective	  rights	  such	  as	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
In	  the	  government’s	  draft,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Constitution	  states	  that	  the	  
authority	  resides	  in	  the	  people	  who	  invoke	  God’s	  protection.	  According	  to	  this	  
document,	  by	  invoking	  God’s	  protection	  the	  draft	  is	  acknowledging	  the	  religious	  beliefs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  Ibid.	  
102	  C	  215,(1999).	  
103	  "Exposición	  De	  Motivos	  Al	  Proyecto	  De	  Reforma	  Constitucional.	  Apartes	  Del	  Primer	  Borrador,"	  90.	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of	  the	  majority	  Colombian	  population	  who	  believe	  in	  God,	  with	  no	  reference	  to	  a	  
specific	  religion.104	  This	  may	  be	  related	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  administrative	  morality	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  the	  Constitution	  recognizes	  the	  religious	  values	  embedded	  in	  the	  population	  
and	  consequently	  morals	  are	  valid	  criteria	  to	  measure	  governmental	  accountability.	  	  
When	  referring	  to	  collective	  rights,	  the	  draft	  of	  the	  government	  declares	  that	  
collective	  rights	  belong	  to	  a	  collectivity	  and	  due	  to	  their	  nature	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  
satisfy	  them	  individually.105	  Also,	  when	  one	  of	  these	  rights	  is	  violated	  all	  members	  of	  the	  
collectivity	  suffer	  damage	  not	  as	  individuals	  but	  as	  members	  of	  the	  collectivity.	  When	  
referring	  to	  specific	  collective	  rights	  like	  a	  healthy	  environment	  and	  the	  right	  of	  
consumers	  and	  users	  the	  draft	  emphasized	  on	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  people	  for	  
protecting	  them.	  For	  instance	  with	  regards	  the	  protection	  of	  a	  healthy	  environment	  this	  
draft	  explained:	  “The	  exercise	  of	  this	  right	  demands	  not	  only	  governmental	  intervention	  
but	  also	  community’s	  action	  to	  preserve	  it	  and	  defend	  it.”106	  It	  is	  noticeable	  that	  this	  
draft	  did	  not	  include	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  collective	  right.	  	  
Another	  draft	  of	  article	  88	  was	  crafted	  by	  three	  framers	  (Guillermo	  Perry,	  
Horacio	  Serpa,	  and	  Eduardo	  Verano,	  three	  members	  of	  the	  liberal	  party)	  who	  
participated	  actively	  on	  the	  debates	  of	  this	  norm	  on	  the	  fifth	  commission.107	  This	  
document	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  previous	  constitution	  had	  collective	  rights	  as	  part	  




107	  Guillermo	  Perry,	  Horacio	  Serpa,	  and	  Eduardo.	  	  Verano,	  "Derechos	  Colectivos,	  Medio	  Ambiente	  Y	  
Acciones	  Populares	  "	  in	  Proyecto	  62,	  Asamblea	  Nacional	  Constituyente	  (Bogotá1991),	  10.	  	  
This	  document	  makes	  reference	  to	  another	  draft	  of	  article	  88	  although	  they	  are	  part	  of	  the	  
constitutional	  collection	  in	  the	  archive	  of	  the	  Colombian	  Public	  Library	  Luis	  Angel	  Arango.	  Another	  
project,	  although	  significantly	  shorter	  and	  less	  detailed,	  was	  crafted	  by	  framers	  Ivan	  Marulanda,	  
Guillermo	  Perry,	  Jaime	  Benitez,	  Angelino	  Garzon,	  Tulio	  Cuevas,	  and	  Guillermo	  Guerrero.	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of	  the	  bill	  of	  rights.	  For	  instance,	  although	  the	  constitution	  of	  1936	  referred	  to	  the	  
existence	  of	  certain	  “social	  obligations”	  from	  the	  government	  to	  the	  people,	  collective	  
rights	  did	  not	  receive	  protection.	  Thus,	  developing	  the	  concept	  of	  “social	  obligations”	  as	  
entitlements	  of	  the	  people,	  the	  framers	  of	  1991	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  grant	  
protection	  to	  collective	  rights	  as	  a	  means	  to	  protect	  multiple	  individuals	  in	  the	  
collectivity.	  When	  collective	  rights	  are	  harmed	  it	  is	  not	  only	  the	  individual	  victim	  who	  
suffers	  the	  negative	  consequences	  but	  many	  others	  as	  well.	  For	  instance	  the	  document	  
by	  Perry,	  Serpa,	  and	  Verano	  refers	  to	  public	  health	  and	  public	  security	  and	  explains	  that	  
every	  individual	  is	  entitled	  to	  live	  free	  public	  dangers	  and	  risks.	  According	  to	  these	  
framers	  in	  cases	  of	  natural	  disasters	  (they	  mentioned	  the	  tragedy	  of	  the	  eruption	  of	  the	  
Nevado	  del	  Ruiz)	  individuals	  are	  entitled	  to	  receive	  protection	  for	  the	  government	  not	  
only	  as	  individuals	  but	  also	  as	  members	  of	  a	  collectivity	  that	  is	  suffering	  harm.	  In	  cases	  
like	  this,	  the	  damage	  has	  identical	  and	  homogeneous	  characteristics	  for	  all	  individuals	  in	  
the	  collectivity.108	  
This	  document	  acknowledges	  some	  obstacles	  in	  the	  definition	  and	  protection	  of	  
collective	  rights.	  It	  states	  that	  although	  the	  mere	  existence	  of	  collective	  rights	  is	  not	  in	  
doubt,	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  provide	  a	  definition	  of	  what	  these	  rights	  entitle	  since	  the	  
“people”	  or	  the	  “collectivity”	  are	  not	  subject	  of	  law.	  Traditionally	  rights	  belong	  to	  
individuals	  or	  corporations,	  not	  the	  “people”	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  consequently	  the	  “people”	  
were	  not	  capable	  of	  exercising	  rights.	  “The	  definition	  if	  this	  notion	  [collective	  rights]	  is	  
not	  easy	  because	  a	  right	  always	  assumes	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  subject	  of	  law.	  The	  




collectivity	  is	  not	  subject	  of	  law	  and	  therefore	  is	  not	  entitle	  to	  rights.”109	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  
difficulty	  the	  draft	  by	  Perry,	  Serpa,	  and	  Verano	  insists	  that	  individuals	  and	  businesses	  
would	  be	  entitled	  to	  file	  a	  popular	  action	  to	  protect	  a	  collective	  right	  that	  benefits	  the	  
members	  of	  the	  collectivity.110	  	  
In	  this	  draft	  Perry,	  Serpa,	  and	  Verano	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  draft	  of	  crafted	  by	  the	  
government	  the	  protection	  was	  focused	  on	  a	  right	  to	  a	  healthy	  environment	  and	  the	  
rights	  of	  consumers	  and	  users.	  In	  their	  opinion	  this	  protection	  should	  be	  broadened	  to	  
other	  rights	  that	  are	  essential	  to	  social	  life	  like	  the	  right	  to	  public	  security	  and	  public	  
health,	  the	  right	  to	  the	  use	  of	  public	  goods	  and	  public	  space,	  and	  free	  economic	  
competition.	  111	  
Regarding	  the	  crucial	  question	  of	  enforcing	  collective	  rights,	  this	  draft	  by	  Perry,	  
Serpa,	  and	  Verano	  authorizes	  “popular	  actions”	  as	  a	  means	  of	  enforcement.	  “Popular	  
actions”	  are	  legal	  causes	  of	  action	  that	  entitle	  any	  person	  to	  file	  a	  suit	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  
a	  group	  that	  he	  is	  part	  of.	  This	  draft	  summarized	  what	  apparently	  was	  a	  general	  
understanding	  of	  the	  framers	  in	  1991:	  “Almost	  all	  the	  projects	  of	  a	  general	  
constitutional	  reform	  include	  popular	  actions	  as	  a	  collective	  remedy	  for	  public	  damages,	  
it	  is	  the	  right	  of	  the	  collectivity	  to	  defend	  itself.”	  	  Thus,	  popular	  actions	  were	  at	  the	  core	  
of	  the	  constitutional	  reform	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  them	  being	  a	  new	  mechanism	  that	  allowed	  
the	  collectivity	  to	  protect	  its	  interests.	  About	  the	  origins	  of	  popular	  actions	  this	  
document	  refers	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  different	  countries	  on	  this	  matter.	  Popular	  actions	  






had	  been	  developed	  by	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  countries	  but	  they	  were	  adopted	  in	  countries	  like	  
Spain,	  Brazil,	  Italy,	  and	  Argentina.	  In	  these	  countries	  popular	  actions	  were	  used	  to	  
protect	  the	  environment,	  consumers’	  rights,	  in	  cases	  of	  public	  calamities	  due	  to	  
negligence,	  and	  in	  cases	  of	  urban	  planning,	  among	  others.112	  
The	  draft	  by	  Perry,	  Serpa,	  and	  Verano	  concludes	  by	  asserting	  that	  popular	  
actions	  are	  an	  improvement	  towards	  developing	  a	  new	  legal	  system	  based	  on	  solidarity.	  
This	  new	  approach	  to	  law	  seemed	  to	  respond	  to	  new	  challenges	  in	  society	  such	  as	  
environmental	  damages,	  consumers’	  damages,	  and	  various	  threats	  against	  the	  physical	  
and	  economic	  integrity	  of	  communities.113	  	  
The	  various	  drafts	  described	  above	  were	  analyzed	  in	  a	  first	  debate	  by	  the	  fifth	  
commission	  of	  the	  National	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  on	  April	  12th	  of	  1991.	  The	  members	  
of	  this	  commission	  had	  different	  opinions	  of	  whether	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  for	  the	  
congress	  and	  judges	  to	  create	  new	  collective	  rights	  or	  if	  collective	  rights	  would	  be	  
limited	  exclusively	  to	  those	  defined	  in	  article	  88.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  some	  framers	  like	  
Helena	  Herrán	  de	  Montoya,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  liberal	  party,	  argued	  that	  to	  grant	  
protection	  to	  certain	  rights	  (individual	  or	  collective	  rights)	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  list	  them	  
or	  at	  least	  to	  provide	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  what	  these	  rights	  meant.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  
framers	  like	  Guillermo	  Perry	  argued	  that	  the	  definition	  of	  collective	  rights	  was	  a	  process	  
in	  progress	  and	  consequently	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  allow	  the	  congress	  and	  judges	  to	  
create	  new	  rights	  in	  the	  future.	  Although	  this	  topic	  was	  analyzed	  and	  debated	  the	  
commission	  did	  not	  make	  a	  decision	  on	  it.	  	  





In	  this	  first	  debate	  on	  April	  12th	  of	  1991	  the	  framer	  Jesus	  Perez	  Gonzalez	  Rubio,	  a	  
lawyer	  and	  scholar	  who	  belonged	  to	  the	  liberal	  party	  with	  experience	  in	  the	  public	  
sector114	  suggested	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  new	  collective	  right	  that	  was	  in	  his	  opinion	  the	  
most	  important	  one:	  the	  right	  to	  demand	  from	  authorities	  compliance	  of	  the	  law.	  
According	  to	  this	  framer	  by	  creating	  this	  collective	  right	  the	  people	  would	  have	  key	  legal	  
mechanism	  to	  strengthen	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  a	  peaceful	  society.	  According	  to	  framer	  
Perez:	  “In	  my	  draft	  I	  also	  propose	  that	  popular	  actions	  could	  be	  applicable	  to	  compel	  
authorities	  to	  comply	  with	  its	  duty	  through	  a	  judicial	  injunction;	  this	  would	  be	  a	  
mechanism	  to	  enforce	  the	  law	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  violations	  against	  constitutional	  
norms.”115	  
Although	  administrative	  morality	  did	  not	  exist	  as	  a	  collective	  right	  at	  this	  point	  
the	  right	  to	  demand	  legal	  compliance	  from	  authorities	  may	  be	  at	  its	  origin.	  The	  debate	  
about	  the	  inclusion	  of	  this	  new	  collective	  right	  was	  not	  profound	  or	  long	  but	  it	  reveals	  
that	  the	  framers’	  idea	  was	  to	  create	  a	  guarantee	  that	  allowed	  citizens	  to	  keep	  
authorities	  accountable	  for	  their	  legal	  behavior	  as	  a	  means	  to	  protect	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  
Framers	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  syntax	  of	  the	  document	  was	  not	  optimum	  and	  they	  
deferred	  to	  a	  sub-­‐commission	  the	  job	  of	  improving	  it.	  Although	  syntax	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  
problem,	  framers	  summarized	  the	  structure	  of	  this	  norm	  by	  stating	  that	  the	  first	  part	  
the	  article	  would	  include	  a	  list	  of	  collective	  rights	  and	  the	  consequences	  for	  those	  who	  
harmed	  those	  rights.	  In	  the	  second	  part	  the	  norm	  would	  state	  the	  most	  important	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  "Los	  Constituyentes	  De	  Colombia	  En	  1991,"	  Semana,	  Abril	  7	  2011.	  "Plantea	  Jesús	  Pérez	  González-­‐
Rubio	  Constitución	  Para	  La	  Igualdad	  Ante	  La	  Ley,"	  El	  Tiempo,	  Diciembre	  8	  1990.	  
115	  Comisión	  5a,	  "Derechos	  Colectivos,"	  in	  Asamblea	  Nacional	  Constituyente	  (BogotáAbril	  12	  de	  1991).	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elements	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  a	  healthy	  environment,	  the	  rights	  of	  consumers,	  and	  the	  
right	  to	  public	  space.	  In	  the	  third	  section	  the	  article	  would	  authorize	  popular	  actions	  as	  
mechanism	  for	  enforcing	  collective	  rights.116	  
On	  the	  second	  debate	  on	  April	  16th	  of	  1991	  the	  fifth	  commission	  debated	  on	  
three	  aspects	  of	  collective	  rights	  and	  popular	  actions:	  its’	  origins,	  what	  do	  collective	  
rights	  and	  popular	  actions	  entitle	  and	  its’	  possible	  impact	  on	  the	  Colombian	  society,	  and	  
some	  possible	  challenges	  of	  these	  legal	  mechanisms.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  origins	  of	  
collective	  rights	  and	  popular	  actions,	  the	  framer	  Carlos	  Rodado	  contended:	  “…	  I	  think	  
that	  what	  is	  important	  in	  this	  article	  is	  not	  the	  rhetorical	  enunciation	  of	  certain	  rights	  
but	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  mechanism	  that	  Anglo	  Saxons	  call	  injunction	  which	  is	  the	  right	  of	  a	  
citizen	  to	  demand	  from	  the	  government	  the	  compliance	  with	  certain	  duties…”117	  
According	  to	  framer	  Rodado,	  popular	  actions	  are	  judicial	  injunctions	  to	  demand	  from	  
the	  government	  compensation	  when	  it	  failed	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights.	  It	  is	  noticeable	  
the	  reference	  to	  a	  mechanism	  of	  the	  common	  law	  (judicial	  injunctions)	  as	  the	  origins	  of	  
popular	  actions.	  In	  several	  debates	  of	  the	  Assembly	  various	  framers	  referred	  to	  foreign	  
legislations,	  including	  the	  common	  law,	  as	  the	  inspiration	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  collective	  
rights	  and	  popular	  actions.118	  
Other	  framers	  in	  the	  same	  debate	  of	  April	  16th	  argued	  that	  the	  origins	  of	  
collective	  rights	  and	  popular	  actions	  were	  old	  mechanisms	  already	  known	  in	  the	  
Colombian	  legislation.	  Framer	  Jesus	  Perez	  Gonzalez	  Rubio	  argued:	  “It	  is	  incredible	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  Ibid.	  
117	  "Derechos	  Colectivos,"	  in	  Asamblea	  Nacional	  Constituyente	  (BogotáAbril	  16	  de	  1991),	  12.	  
118	  Although	  popular	  actions	  were	  new	  to	  the	  Colombian	  legal	  system,	  the	  ordinary	  administrative	  
regulations	  had	  developed	  legal	  mechanisms	  to	  keep	  the	  government	  accountable.	  What	  was	  new	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  popular	  actions	  was	  the	  compensation	  for	  collective	  rights.	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this	  is	  [based]	  on	  article	  2359	  of	  our	  Civil	  Code,	  the	  one	  that	  was	  written	  last	  century:	  
‘general	  rule,	  the	  action	  is	  granted…’	  and	  it	  refers	  to	  popular	  actions…”119	  Framer	  Perez	  
Gonzalez	  Rubio	  quoted	  the	  Colombian	  Civil	  Code	  to	  argue	  that	  popular	  actions	  were	  not	  
a	  new	  mechanism	  in	  the	  Colombian	  legislation	  since	  it	  existed	  in	  a	  code	  for	  over	  a	  
hundred	  years.	  During	  the	  same	  debate,	  some	  framers	  (who	  are	  not	  identified	  by	  the	  
transcript)	  offered	  a	  different	  opinion:	  they	  contended	  that	  Civil	  Code	  regulations	  were	  
not	  applicable	  to	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  government	  and	  citizens	  and	  so	  that	  popular	  
actions	  should	  be	  included	  in	  the	  new	  Constitution	  of	  1991:	  “I	  am	  very	  sorry	  but	  one	  is	  
the	  relationship	  of	  the	  civil	  code	  among	  people	  and	  another	  thing	  is	  the	  relationship	  
between	  individuals	  and	  the	  government…	  I	  am	  just	  trying	  to	  avoid	  that	  those	  who	  are	  
governing	  this	  country	  would	  not	  drown	  in	  lawsuits…”120	  In	  sum,	  there	  are	  two	  main	  
streams	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  origins	  of	  popular	  actions,	  one	  of	  them	  focusing	  on	  foreign	  
legislation	  (injunctions	  in	  the	  Common	  law)	  and	  the	  second	  one	  focusing	  on	  existent	  
legislation	  in	  Colombia	  (the	  Colombian	  civil	  code).	  	  
On	  the	  same	  session	  of	  April	  16th	  the	  fifth	  commission	  also	  debated	  about	  the	  
concept	  of	  collective	  rights	  and	  popular	  actions	  and	  their	  possible	  impact.	  Framer	  Alvaro	  
Cala	  from	  the	  political	  party	  called	  “Movement	  for	  National	  Salvation”121	  argued	  that	  
collective	  rights	  could	  improve	  the	  Colombian	  society	  by	  motivating	  the	  people	  to	  go	  
beyond	  their	  own	  interests.	  These	  mechanisms	  would	  allow	  the	  people	  to	  protect	  the	  
needs	  of	  a	  bigger	  part	  of	  the	  population	  by	  allowing	  them	  to	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  group.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  Comisión	  5a,	  "Derechos	  Colectivos,"	  5.	  
120	  Ibid.	  
121	  This	  political	  party	  was	  founded	  in	  1990	  and	  it	  tended	  to	  provide	  a	  new	  perspective	  to	  
conservative	  ideals.	  Olano,	  Constitución	  Política	  De	  Colombia.	  Con	  Estudio	  Preliminar.	  .	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Individuals	  are	  entitled	  to	  file	  a	  lawsuit	  to	  protect	  the	  group	  instead	  of	  demanding	  
individual	  actions	  or	  the	  participation	  of	  all	  members	  of	  the	  group.122	  Thus	  this	  norm	  
would	  strengthen	  solidarity	  in	  the	  Colombian	  society.	  	  
Another	  possible	  purpose	  of	  article	  88	  was	  to	  foster	  a	  greater	  respect	  for	  life,	  as	  
opposed	  to	  a	  fatalism	  that	  accidents	  and	  abuses	  are	  inevitable.	  	  According	  to	  framer	  
Iván	  Marulanda,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  liberal	  party,	  in	  Commission	  fifth,	  in	  other	  cultures	  
such	  as	  in	  Anglo	  Saxon	  countries	  or	  in	  France,	  there	  is	  a	  “cult	  to	  protect	  life”	  that	  
motivates	  preventive	  actions	  of	  the	  government	  to	  reduce	  possible	  life	  threats	  of	  the	  
population.	  Framer	  Marulanda	  argued	  that	  in	  Latin	  countries	  culture	  leans	  towards	  
fatalism	  and	  it	  is	  not	  until	  disasters	  happen	  and	  people	  die	  when	  the	  government	  and	  
the	  people	  take	  action	  to	  improve	  certain	  situations.	  Consequently,	  Latin	  American	  
countries	  should	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  model	  of	  foreign	  countries	  and	  try	  to	  
reduce	  known	  risks	  to	  personal	  safety.123	  	  Specifically,	  framer	  Marulanda	  hoped	  that	  this	  
article	  could	  foster	  cultural	  change	  to	  overcome	  a	  cultural	  fatalism.	  
In	  order	  to	  achieve	  this	  impact	  framer	  Carlos	  Lemos,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  liberal	  
party,	  thought	  that	  the	  writing	  style	  of	  the	  Constitution	  should	  be	  easily	  understandable	  
to	  everybody:	  “…	  the	  Constitution	  should	  be	  clear	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  any	  person	  who	  reads	  
it	  understands	  its’	  meaning;	  that	  it	  wouldn’t	  be	  necessary	  to	  call	  a	  lawyer	  to	  explain	  
what	  contingent	  damage	  means;	  I	  know	  that	  this	  is	  a	  legal	  term	  but,	  if	  we	  go	  to	  the	  
street	  and	  we	  ask	  let’s	  say	  not	  just	  any	  citizen	  walking	  by	  the	  street	  but	  a	  journalist	  what	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  Comisión	  5a,	  "Derechos	  Colectivos,"	  9.	  
123	  Ibid.,	  10.	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contingent	  damage	  is,	  well,	  I	  think	  it	  won’t	  be	  understandable.”124	  Framer	  Lemos’	  
concern	  about	  drafting	  the	  Constitution	  with	  accurate	  terms	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
making	  it	  understandable	  to	  any	  citizen	  in	  the	  country	  so	  the	  Constitution	  seemed	  to	  be	  
an	  important	  part	  of	  ensuring	  its’	  social	  impact.	  Also,	  it	  is	  relevant	  that	  the	  standard	  to	  
measure	  clarity	  of	  the	  document	  used	  by	  the	  framers	  was	  not	  to	  make	  it	  
understandable	  to	  any	  citizen	  walking	  on	  the	  street	  but	  to	  a	  journalist.	  This	  reference	  to	  
journalists	  as	  a	  primary	  audience	  is	  significant.	  It	  is	  consistent	  with	  this	  dissertation’s	  
premise	  that	  public	  interpretation	  of	  constitutional	  principles	  occurs	  in	  the	  news	  media	  
as	  well	  as	  in	  court.	  	  How	  journalists	  understand	  the	  constitution	  and	  its	  key	  rights	  is	  
likely	  to	  influence	  public	  understanding	  of	  these	  things.	  Chapter	  6	  develops	  an	  analysis	  
of	  media	  analysis	  in	  relation	  to	  administrative	  morality	  in	  Colombia.	  	  
The	  second	  debate	  of	  article	  88	  that	  took	  place	  in	  April	  16th	  also	  analyzed	  the	  
characteristics	  of	  collective	  rights.	  In	  this	  debate	  framer	  Alvaro	  Cala,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
political	  party	  “Movement	  for	  National	  Salvation”,	  referred	  to	  two	  types	  of	  collective	  
rights:	  those	  with	  a	  social	  and	  economic	  content	  and	  those	  without	  a	  social	  and	  
economic	  content.	  Framer	  Cala	  explained	  that	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  drafts	  on	  this	  topic	  
all	  collective	  rights	  had	  a	  social	  and	  economic	  content.125	  Although	  framer	  Cala	  did	  not	  
provide	  examples	  of	  this	  type	  of	  rights	  one	  could	  think	  that	  rights	  of	  consumers	  and	  
users	  or	  the	  collective	  right	  to	  a	  healthy	  environment	  have	  a	  social	  and	  economic	  
content.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




With	  regards	  collective	  rights	  with	  no	  social	  and	  economic	  Cala	  referred	  to	  the	  
initiative	  of	  framer	  Jesus	  Perez	  Gonzalez	  Rubio:	  	  
	  
“…	  in	  the	  last	  discussion	  doctor	  Jesus	  Perez	  showed	  us	  that	  there	  are	  also	  other	  
collective	  rights	  that	  do	  not	  have	  a	  social	  or	  economic	  content,	  like	  the	  right	  to	  
legal	  compliance	  by	  governmental	  authorities,	  because	  they	  affect	  all	  citizens,	  I	  
mean,	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  their	  legal	  duties	  and	  that’s	  why,	  in	  
spite	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  this	  right	  may	  not	  be	  specific	  to	  our	  topic	  of	  
discussion,	  we	  thought	  that	  doctor	  Perez	  was	  right	  and	  that	  we	  should	  define	  
collective	  rights	  in	  a	  broader	  way…”126	  	  
	  
At	  this	  point	  of	  the	  constitutional	  framing	  process	  the	  right	  to	  administrative	  
morality	  was	  not	  part	  of	  the	  catalog	  of	  collective	  rights;	  it	  was	  not	  even	  mentioned	  in	  
the	  discussions	  but	  since	  early	  stages	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  the	  initiative	  of	  framer	  Jesus	  
Perez	  Gonzalez	  Rubio	  to	  include	  the	  collective	  right	  to	  legal	  compliance	  of	  governmental	  
authorities.	  The	  relevance	  of	  the	  collective	  right	  to	  legal	  compliance	  is	  that	  in	  later	  
debates	  it	  disappears	  while	  administrative	  morality	  takes	  its	  place.	  I	  will	  discuss	  this	  
modification	  in	  depth	  in	  the	  next	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Therefore,	  the	  collective	  right	  
to	  legal	  compliance	  of	  governmental	  authorities	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  fifth	  commission	  
as	  a	  collective	  right	  without	  a	  social	  and	  economic	  content.	  	  
A	  striking	  characteristic	  of	  collective	  rights	  is	  that	  they	  apply	  not	  only	  to	  public	  
authorities	  but	  to	  private	  authorities	  as	  well.	  In	  some	  cases,	  like	  when	  a	  healthy	  
environment	  is	  under	  threat,	  citizens	  could	  also	  be	  responsible	  for	  violations	  and	  
compensation	  of	  violations	  of	  collective	  rights.127	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




In	  this	  debate	  of	  article	  88	  that	  took	  place	  on	  April	  16th	  framers	  like	  Carlos	  
Rodado,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  conservative	  party,	  argued	  against	  collective	  rights.	  They	  
offered	  three	  objections:	  this	  norm	  could	  be	  only	  a	  repetition	  of	  what	  was	  already	  said	  
in	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  constitution,	  it	  could	  be	  too	  vague,	  and	  it	  could	  be	  too	  onerous	  
to	  the	  government.	  One	  of	  the	  framers	  (who	  is	  not	  identified	  by	  the	  transcript)	  argued:	  
“The	  government	  has	  to	  have	  an	  immense	  capacity,	  almost	  by	  using	  futurology,	  to	  know	  
when	  somebody	  is	  going	  to	  have	  an	  improper	  thought,	  if	  we	  bring	  this	  to	  its’	  extreme	  
consequences,	  I	  believe	  that	  it’s	  a	  norm	  that	  forces	  government	  in	  a	  situation	  with	  no	  
defense,	  in	  a	  country	  in	  which	  everybody	  wants	  to	  take	  advantage	  out	  of	  the	  
government…”128	  	  
According	  to	  this	  stream	  of	  framers,	  collective	  rights	  are	  developed	  in	  several	  
other	  norms	  of	  the	  constitution.	  Specifically	  they	  referred	  to	  legal	  compliance	  from	  
government	  authorities	  as	  a	  logical	  demand	  that	  should	  not	  be	  necessarily	  included	  in	  
the	  catalog	  of	  collective	  rights.	  One	  framer,	  who	  was	  not	  identified,	  insisted	  that	  these	  
obligations	  are	  embedded	  in	  other	  constitutional	  rights.129	  Some	  framers	  also	  argued	  
that	  article	  88	  was	  very	  generic	  and	  broad	  since	  the	  article	  did	  not	  provide	  definitions	  of	  
what	  these	  rights	  entitle.	  Given	  this	  vagueness	  any	  type	  of	  interpretation	  could	  be	  
acceptable	  and	  this	  could	  be	  problematic	  for	  the	  ones	  responsible	  of	  implementation	  
and	  interpretation.	  Broad	  norms	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  vulnerable	  government	  that,	  at	  the	  end,	  
would	  be	  responsible	  for	  everything	  that	  happens	  in	  the	  country.130	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  Ibid.	  
129	  Ibid.,	  6.	  
130	  Ibid.,	  7.	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In	  sum,	  the	  second	  debate	  of	  April	  16th	  of	  1991	  developed	  some	  elements	  of	  
collective	  rights	  and	  popular	  actions.	  It	  also	  pointed	  out	  to	  some	  of	  the	  risks	  that	  
interpreters	  and	  implementers	  could	  find	  with	  this	  norm.	  	  	  
The	  draft	  of	  article	  88	  was	  approved	  not	  only	  by	  the	  fifth	  commission	  but	  also	  by	  
the	  first	  commission	  (responsible	  for	  drafting	  sections	  on	  fundamental	  rights).	  The	  First	  
Commission	  debated	  the	  draft	  of	  article	  88	  on	  May	  6th	  of	  1991	  and	  in	  this	  debate	  
framers	  in	  commission	  first	  agreed	  with	  the	  content	  of	  the	  norm	  passed	  in	  the	  fifth	  
commission	  but	  they	  insisted	  on	  improving	  the	  syntax	  of	  the	  document,	  by	  working	  on	  a	  
sub-­‐commission	  with	  members	  of	  both	  commissions.131	  	  During	  this	  debate	  the	  article	  
was	  not	  modified	  substantially.132	  	  
In	  a	  debate	  of	  June	  10th,	  the	  entire	  Assembly	  debated	  over	  the	  three	  articles	  on	  
collective	  rights	  and	  popular	  actions	  that	  were	  approved	  by	  the	  fifth	  and	  first	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  The	  topics	  of	  disagreement	  between	  commissions	  referred	  to	  whether	  contingent	  damage	  should	  
be	  included	  in	  the	  norm,	  whether	  the	  list	  of	  collective	  rights	  was	  restricted	  by	  the	  enunciation	  in	  the	  
norm,	  and	  the	  type	  of	  guilt	  from	  the	  subject	  who	  violates	  collective	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  complain	  
compensation.	  Comisión1a,	  ibid.	  (Mayo	  6	  de	  1991).	  
132	  During	  this	  debate	  commission	  first	  analyzed	  the	  principle	  of	  “good	  faith”	  and	  its’	  inclusion	  in	  the	  
constitution.	  During	  this	  debate	  Commission	  first	  debated	  on	  certain	  aspects	  of	  relationship	  between	  
law	  and	  morals.	  According	  to	  framers	  in	  Commission	  first,	  good	  faith	  is	  a	  principle	  that	  the	  legal	  
system	  was	  “forced”	  to	  adopt	  in	  order	  to	  grant	  with	  moral	  reinforcement	  the	  legal	  duties.	  	  According	  
to	  this	  debate,	  morals	  add	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  legal	  system	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  framers	  and	  legislators	  
had	  chosen	  to	  incorporate	  moral-­‐based	  mechanisms	  to	  bring	  meaning	  to	  legal	  institutions:	  “…	  I	  think	  
that	  no	  right	  could	  exist	  or	  could	  be	  effective	  without	  good	  faith.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  principles	  that	  in	  
the	  evolution	  of	  legal	  systems	  has	  been	  adopted	  as	  a	  pillar,	  it	  is	  a	  moral	  principle	  that	  law	  has	  had	  to	  
adopt	  to	  grant	  moral	  guarantee	  to	  the	  legal	  system	  itself”	  ibid.,	  17.	  According	  to	  the	  framers,	  it	  is	  hard	  
to	  provide	  a	  definition	  of	  all	  moral	  concepts,	  like	  good	  faith.	  Thus,	  the	  judge	  is	  responsible	  for	  
developing	  a	  definition,	  based	  on	  notions	  like	  his	  own	  individual	  criteria.	  Ibid.	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  framers	  assumed	  that	  the	  legal	  system	  is	  built	  upon	  moral	  concepts	  and	  morals	  are	  a	  
vague	  concept,	  hard	  to	  define.	  The	  responsibility	  of	  defining	  moral	  concepts	  falls	  on	  judges	  by	  using	  
their	  own	  criteria.	  It	  seems	  that	  members	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  (some	  of	  them	  at	  least)	  
agreed	  on	  moral	  concepts	  as	  ideas	  that	  could	  strengthen	  the	  Colombian	  society:	  “…	  this	  is	  a	  beautiful	  
proposal	  –the	  one	  about	  good	  faith-­‐	  that	  could	  reconcile	  the	  Colombian	  population,	  nowadays	  seems	  
to	  be	  necessary,	  and	  essential	  for	  the	  renovation	  of	  the	  country;	  it	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  come	  back	  to	  
our	  origins	  what	  Colombia	  is.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  go	  back	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  Colombia	  as	  a	  moral	  power	  
mentioned	  by	  Luis	  Lopez	  de	  Mesa,	  it	  is	  the	  spirit	  of	  this	  Assembly	  and	  therefore	  of	  the	  framers	  that	  
have	  participated	  in	  this	  debate,	  and	  with	  whom	  I	  very	  much	  agree…”	  ibid.,	  19.	  
53	  
	  
commission.	  The	  first	  article	  included	  the	  list	  of	  collective	  rights,	  the	  second	  article	  on	  
popular	  actions,	  and	  the	  third	  article	  on	  the	  most	  important	  collective	  right	  that	  is	  the	  
right	  of	  consumers.133	  When	  explaining	  the	  draft	  the	  framer	  Guillermo	  Perry	  Rubio,	  a	  
member	  of	  the	  liberal	  party,	  argued	  that	  the	  origins	  of	  these	  norms	  were	  found	  on	  
foreign	  legislation	  (Anglo	  Saxon	  legal	  systems,	  Brazil,	  Portugal,	  Span,	  besides	  others),	  in	  
the	  Roman	  legal	  system,	  and	  in	  the	  Colombian	  Civil	  Code.134	  	  
Administrative	  morality	  was	  not	  in	  the	  list	  of	  collective	  rights	  but	  the	  right	  to	  
demand	  from	  authorities	  compliance	  with	  legal	  duties	  was	  part	  of	  the	  list.	  Framers	  
contended	  that	  the	  collective	  right	  to	  demanding	  compliance	  of	  legal	  duties	  from	  
authorities	  was	  a	  mechanism	  to	  enforce	  the	  rule	  of	  law:	  “…	  we	  are	  providing	  the	  people,	  
the	  citizens,	  with	  a	  tool	  applicable	  to	  all	  laws,	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  enforcing	  the	  
Constitution	  and	  the	  law	  in	  presence	  of	  the	  authorities	  in	  all	  cases,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
popular	  actions.”135	  
Although	  in	  previous	  debates	  framers	  argued	  that	  the	  most	  important	  collective	  
right	  was	  a	  healthy	  environment,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  right	  of	  consumers	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  
core	  piece	  of	  the	  debate.	  According	  to	  the	  framers	  in	  the	  debate	  of	  June	  10th,	  individual,	  
small	  damages	  suffered	  by	  consumers	  add	  up	  into	  an	  enormous	  damage	  to	  the	  
collectivity	  and	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  create	  a	  mechanism	  that	  allowed	  compensating	  
these	  damages.136	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In	  relation	  to	  popular	  actions,	  the	  framers	  emphasized	  that	  popular	  actions	  shall	  
be	  open	  to	  any	  person	  who	  would	  be	  interested	  in	  filing	  a	  claim	  for	  a	  violation	  of	  
collective	  rights.137	  According	  to	  the	  constitution	  an	  oversight	  agency	  called	  “Defensoria	  
del	  Pueblo”	  has	  the	  responsibility	  of	  collaborating	  with	  the	  protection	  of	  collective	  rights	  
and	  this	  agency	  is	  entitled	  to	  file	  a	  popular	  action	  but	  the	  entitlement	  to	  file	  this	  action	  
is	  not	  restricted	  to	  the	  “Defensoría	  del	  pueblo”.	  According	  to	  the	  debate,	  popular	  
actions	  should	  be	  available	  to	  any	  person	  representing	  the	  collectivity.	  	  
Introduction	  of	  “administrative	  morality”	  as	  a	  collective	  right	  
After	  this	  debate,	  on	  June	  14th,	  the	  entire	  Assembly	  approved	  the	  final	  text	  for	  
article	  88.	  In	  this	  final	  version	  of	  the	  norm,	  administrative	  morality	  is	  mentioned	  as	  a	  
collective	  right	  while	  the	  right	  to	  demand	  compliance	  from	  authorities	  disappeared.	  
According	  to	  the	  document	  that	  was	  read	  and	  analyzed	  during	  this	  debate,	  article	  88	  
stated:	  “The	  legislation	  will	  regulate	  popular	  actions	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights	  and	  
interests	  in	  relation	  to	  public	  funds,	  administrative	  morality,	  the	  environment,	  public	  
space	  and	  public	  health,	  free	  economic	  competition,	  and	  others	  similar	  that	  are	  defined	  
by	  the	  law…”138	  
It	  is	  striking	  that	  this	  is	  the	  first	  appearance	  of	  the	  term	  “administrative	  
morality.”	  There	  is	  no	  indication	  of	  why	  did	  the	  term	  was	  included	  in	  the	  draft.	  During	  
this	  debate	  framers	  did	  not	  analyze	  administrative	  morality	  but	  focused	  on	  other	  
aspects	  of	  the	  norm.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session	  the	  Assembly	  approved	  the	  articles	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  Colectivos,"	  in	  Asamblea	  Nacional	  Constituyente	  (BogotáJunio	  14	  de	  1991).	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related	  to	  collective	  rights,	  including	  administrative	  morality,	  including	  administrative	  
morality.139	  
The	  record	  provides	  very	  little	  information	  as	  to	  why	  the	  framers	  introduced	  the	  
concept	  of	  “administrative	  morality,”	  or	  even	  who	  favored	  it	  and	  what	  they	  intended.	  
There	  is	  no	  previous	  mention	  of	  the	  concept	  on	  the	  debates	  of	  the	  fifth	  and	  first	  
commission,	  neither	  administrative	  morality	  is	  mentioned	  during	  the	  first	  debate	  of	  the	  
entire	  Assembly.	  	  
After	  the	  Assembly	  approved	  the	  document,	  the	  Commission	  for	  coding	  worked	  
on	  compiling	  and	  organizing	  the	  document	  that	  the	  Assembly	  had	  approved.	  On	  June	  
22nd	  the	  Commission	  for	  coding	  debated	  about	  whether	  it	  was	  convenient	  to	  eliminate	  
administrative	  morality	  for	  being	  a	  vague	  concept	  and	  not	  related	  to	  collective	  rights.	  
The	  Commission	  also	  debated	  on	  whether	  article	  88	  was	  a	  repetition	  of	  concepts	  and	  
rights	  that	  are	  already	  developed	  in	  different	  sections	  of	  the	  constitution.140	  	  
Several	  framers	  of	  the	  Commission	  for	  coding	  expressed	  concern	  on	  the	  debate	  
of	  June	  22nd	  with	  regards	  administrative	  morality	  for	  being	  a	  vague	  concept.	  (In	  the	  
following	  discussion	  I	  will	  generally	  not	  identify	  the	  names	  of	  those	  who	  contributed	  to	  
the	  debate	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  the	  transcripts	  do	  not	  identify	  the	  names	  of	  
speakers.)	  	  Various	  framers	  suggested	  that	  since	  “administrative	  morality”	  is	  a	  vague	  
and	  broad	  term,	  it	  would	  allow	  people	  to	  file	  lawsuits	  for	  any	  reason,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  not	  
always	  desirable.	  When	  debating	  on	  this	  concern,	  several	  framers	  compared	  
administrative	  morality	  to	  the	  right	  to	  public	  funds,	  since	  both	  of	  them	  are	  concepts	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  codificadora,	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  (Junio	  22	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that	  entitle	  the	  people	  to	  sue	  the	  government	  for	  almost	  any	  reason.141	  	  This	  concern	  
echoed	  earlier	  debates	  in	  the	  Commission	  fifth	  when	  some	  framers	  contended	  that	  with	  
popular	  actions	  the	  government	  could	  be	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  inferiority	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
people,	  and	  that	  it	  would	  be	  too	  demanding	  to	  the	  government.	  	  
Another	  critique	  of	  the	  Commission	  for	  coding	  on	  June	  22nd	  was	  that	  
administrative	  morality	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  connection	  to	  other	  collective	  
rights	  and	  that	  it	  was	  regulated	  in	  several	  other	  norms	  in	  the	  constitution.	  “And	  
administrative	  morality,	  what	  do	  you	  say	  huh?	  This	  concept	  is	  so	  abstract…	  Well,	  about	  
administrative	  morality,	  I	  would	  think…	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  statute	  for	  public	  employees	  and	  
in	  the	  draft	  by	  [framer]	  Juan	  Carlos	  Esguerra	  about	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  government	  
and	  public	  employees…	  I	  don’t	  know	  if	  this	  is	  related	  to	  this	  topic	  [to	  collective	  rights]	  …	  
I	  think	  that	  we	  could	  leave	  this	  out	  because	  it	  is	  included	  like	  in	  other	  two	  or	  three	  
articles.”142	  Thus,	  the	  framers	  perceived	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  noble	  interest,	  but	  
not	  necessarily	  a	  collective	  right.	  	  
The	  Commission	  for	  coding	  analyzed	  the	  list	  of	  collective	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  clarify	  
whether	  they	  are	  rights	  or	  interests.143	  Framers	  in	  this	  commission	  argued	  that	  
Commission	  fifth	  had	  addressed	  this	  key	  issue	  with	  regard	  to	  who	  possesses	  collective	  
rights.	  These	  framers	  suggested	  that	  since	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  determine	  who	  possesses	  
these	  collective	  rights,	  it	  is	  better	  to	  call	  them	  “interests.”	  	  Pursuant	  to	  that	  discussion,	  
some	  of	  the	  framers	  in	  the	  Commission	  for	  coding	  asserted	  that	  “interests”	  seemed	  to	  






be	  a	  better	  term	  for	  values	  such	  as	  public	  security	  or	  administrative	  morality.	  They	  
asserted	  that	  these	  things	  are	  not	  “rights.”	  At	  the	  same	  time	  they	  suggested	  that	  
categories	  like	  free	  economic	  competition	  and	  public	  space	  are	  rights	  and	  consequently	  
the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “rights”	  in	  relation	  to	  them	  was	  justified.	  A	  consequence	  of	  this	  
debate	  was	  to	  describe	  administrative	  morality	  as	  both	  a	  right	  and	  an	  interest.144	  	  
Whether	  administrative	  morality	  is	  a	  right	  or	  merely	  an	  “interest”	  seems	  to	  have	  
important	  legal	  implications.	  If	  it	  is	  a	  “right,”	  it	  seems	  to	  merit	  judicial	  protection,	  even	  
against	  the	  actions	  of	  legislatures	  or	  high	  government	  agencies.	  If	  it	  is	  merely	  an	  
interest,	  then	  it	  seems	  properly	  subject	  to	  legislative	  or	  administrative	  authority.	  	  
Remarkably,	  framers	  in	  the	  Commission	  for	  coding	  did	  not	  answer	  these	  questions	  but	  
they	  asserted	  that	  in	  the	  list	  of	  collective	  rights	  provided	  by	  article	  88	  there	  are	  two	  
different	  categories:	  rights	  and	  interests.	  They	  seemed	  to	  relate	  to	  different	  legal	  
constructs.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  Commission	  for	  coding	  authorized	  enforcement	  of	  both	  
rights	  and	  interests	  through	  the	  mechanism	  of	  popular	  actions.	  	  
Given	  these	  doubts	  about	  the	  characteristics	  of	  administrative	  morality,	  some	  
framers	  in	  the	  Commission	  for	  coding	  considered	  as	  an	  option	  the	  elimination	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  from	  the	  list	  of	  collective	  rights.	  They	  argued	  that	  although	  the	  
document	  was	  already	  approved	  by	  the	  Assembly,	  the	  Commission	  for	  coding	  had	  the	  
authority	  for	  recommending	  changes	  to	  the	  document.	  In	  order	  to	  recommend	  changes,	  
the	  Commission	  should	  find	  strong	  arguments	  to	  do	  so,	  otherwise	  those	  who	  had	  been	  
working	  on	  previous	  drafts	  could	  be	  offended	  by	  the	  modification:	  “…we	  have	  to	  work	  




together…	  everybody	  has	  his	  own	  words	  or	  expressions	  and	  in	  a	  century	  people	  would	  
say	  it	  was	  my	  grandpa	  who	  included	  administrative	  morality,	  and	  that	  is	  part	  of	  the	  
history	  of	  our	  family,	  and	  so	  if	  we	  decide	  to	  take	  it	  our	  of	  the	  article	  we	  need	  to	  use	  
strong	  arguments…”145	  At	  this	  point,	  in	  the	  session	  of	  June	  22nd	  the	  debate	  did	  not	  seem	  
to	  be	  about	  the	  content	  of	  the	  article	  or	  the	  characteristics	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  It	  
seemed	  to	  be	  about	  finding	  strong	  arguments	  to	  support	  the	  elimination	  of	  this	  right	  
from	  the	  document	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  possible	  conflicts	  with	  other	  framers	  in	  the	  general	  
Assembly.	  	  
On	  June	  22nd	  the	  Commission	  approved	  the	  draft	  by	  eliminating	  the	  list	  of	  
collective	  rights	  and	  interests,	  just	  stating	  that	  the	  Congress	  would	  regulate	  popular	  
actions	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights	  and	  interests	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Constitution	  and	  
other	  similar	  rights	  defined	  by	  law.	  The	  entire	  Assembly	  reviewed	  this	  draft	  and	  decided	  
to	  include	  in	  the	  final	  draft	  the	  full	  list	  of	  collective	  rights	  and	  interests,	  including	  
administrative	  morality.146	  	  
In	  the	  end,	  then,	  the	  final	  draft	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  included	  a	  right	  to	  
administrative	  morality,	  but	  neither	  the	  Constitution	  nor	  the	  debates	  over	  this	  right	  
offered	  any	  clarification	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  this	  key	  right.	  
	  
Morality	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  administrative	  function:	  Article	  209	  
The	  second	  norm	  in	  the	  constitution	  that	  regulates	  administrative	  morality	  is	  
article	  209.	  This	  article	  refers	  to	  the	  principles	  that	  guide	  the	  Colombian	  public	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  Ibid.	  
146	  Plenaria,	  ibid.	  (Junio	  29	  de	  1991).	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administration.	  The	  first	  debate	  of	  Article	  209	  of	  the	  constitution	  took	  place	  in	  the	  third	  
commission	  in	  which	  framers	  analyzed	  this	  draft:	  “About	  the	  administrative	  activity.	  
Article	  135.	  The	  administrative	  activity	  will	  be	  performed	  by	  following	  principles	  of	  
morality,	  efficacy,	  economy,	  solidarity,	  and	  impartiality	  by	  using	  mechanisms	  of	  
decentralization,	  delegation,	  and	  desconcentration...”147	  	  
The	  Article	  209	  was	  debated	  in	  fourth	  sessions	  (one	  of	  them	  in	  the	  third	  
commission	  and	  the	  rest	  with	  the	  entire	  Assembly)	  and	  in	  any	  of	  these	  sessions	  morality	  
was	  specifically	  analyzed.148	  During	  this	  first	  debate	  the	  commission	  did	  not	  modify	  the	  
draft.149	  During	  the	  second	  debate150	  on	  May	  22nd	  the	  speaker,	  framer	  Carlos	  Lleras	  de	  la	  
Fuente	  explained	  that	  article	  209	  provides	  a	  general	  definition	  of	  what	  the	  
administrative	  activity	  entitles	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  performs	  its’	  duties.	  In	  this	  
debate	  the	  framers	  did	  not	  analyze	  the	  content	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  administrative	  
activity	  and	  did	  not	  modify	  significantly	  the	  draft	  of	  this	  article.	  	  
In	  the	  third	  and	  fourth	  debates	  (May	  30th	  and	  June	  30th	  respectively)	  the	  
Assembly	  debated	  on	  topics	  like	  whether	  the	  enunciation	  of	  principles	  in	  article	  209	  was	  
exclusive	  or	  if	  there	  were	  other	  principles	  applicable	  to	  the	  administrative	  activity.151	  	  
Another	  topic	  of	  analysis	  was	  whether	  the	  administrative	  function	  was	  the	  best	  term	  to	  
refer	  to	  the	  Colombian	  public	  administration.	  The	  Assembly	  decided	  to	  keep	  
administrative	  function	  as	  the	  title	  of	  this	  chapter	  of	  the	  constitution	  and	  consequently	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Comisión3a,	  "De	  La	  Actividad	  Administrativa,"ibid.	  (Mayo	  15	  de	  1991).	  
148	  These	  debates	  took	  place	  on	  May	  15th,	  May	  22nd,	  May	  30th,	  and	  June	  30th	  of	  1991.	  	  
149	  Comisión3a,	  "De	  La	  Actividad	  Administrativa."	  
150	  Plenaria,	  ibid.	  (Mayo	  22	  de	  1991).	  
151	  "De	  La	  Actividad	  Administrativa,"	  in	  Asamblea	  Nacional	  Constituyente	  (BogotáMayo	  30	  de	  1991).	  
Although	  the	  Assembly	  did	  not	  make	  a	  final	  decision	  on	  this	  point,	  the	  framers	  decided	  to	  include	  two	  
more	  principles:	  publicity	  and	  equality.	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the	  article	  209	  refers	  to	  the	  administrative	  function.152	  In	  sum,	  framers	  did	  not	  analyze	  
extensively	  Article	  209	  and	  when	  they	  analyzed	  it	  they	  did	  not	  focus	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  
morality	  as	  a	  principle	  of	  the	  administrative	  function.	  	  
There	  is	  no	  reference	  in	  the	  article	  or	  in	  the	  debates	  to	  popular	  actions	  or	  to	  
whether	  the	  principle	  of	  morality	  is	  the	  same	  notion	  that	  was	  developed	  as	  the	  
collective	  right	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  Given	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  my	  research	  is	  to	  
explore	  the	  development	  of	  litigation	  in	  administrative	  morality	  by	  different	  actors	  since	  
1991	  I	  will	  mainly	  explore	  elements	  related	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  popular	  actions	  
and	  administrative	  morality	  as	  it	  is	  stated	  in	  article	  88	  of	  the	  constitution.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
The	  terms	  “morality”	  and	  “administrative	  morality”	  were	  included	  in	  the	  
Colombian	  constitution	  in	  two	  articles:	  Article	  209	  and	  Article	  88.	  When	  analyzing	  the	  
debates	  of	  these	  two	  articles	  it	  is	  notable	  that	  the	  framers	  did	  not	  focus	  on	  the	  concept	  
of	  morality	  and	  its	  possible	  impact	  on	  Colombian	  public	  administration.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
article	  209	  framers	  did	  not	  analyze	  “morality”	  at	  all,	  while	  in	  the	  case	  of	  article	  88	  the	  
concept	  of	  “administrative	  morality”	  only	  appeared	  in	  the	  final	  three	  debates,	  and	  even	  
there	  it	  remained	  largely	  undefined.	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  a	  profound	  debate	  and	  conceptual	  clarity	  regarding	  	  “morality”	  and	  
“administrative	  morality”	  in	  the	  Constitution	  Assembly	  could	  be	  due	  to	  the	  framers’	  
assumption	  that	  everybody	  would	  understand	  these	  concepts.	  If	  so,	  in	  retrospect	  that	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  "De	  La	  Actividad	  Administrativa,"	  in	  Asamblea	  Nacional	  Constituyente	  (BogotáJunio	  30	  de	  1991).	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surely	  seems	  like	  a	  naïve	  assumption.	  During	  the	  last	  debate	  of	  article	  88	  framers	  in	  the	  
Commission	  of	  compiling	  and	  coding	  were	  uncertain	  about	  the	  reasons	  to	  include	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  the	  possible	  negative	  implications	  (if	  they	  were	  some)	  it	  
could	  have	  for	  the	  Colombian	  public	  administration.	  It	  may	  be	  possible	  that	  framers	  in	  
commission	  fifth	  and	  the	  entire	  Assembly	  were	  more	  confident	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  
concept	  and	  its	  positive	  implications.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  article	  88	  about	  collective	  rights,	  administrative	  morality	  seems	  to	  
be	  a	  further	  development	  of	  the	  collective	  right	  to	  demand	  from	  authorities	  compliance	  
of	  legal	  duties.	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  in	  the	  transcriptions	  about	  how	  did	  the	  
right	  to	  demand	  compliance	  from	  authorities	  evolved	  into	  the	  notion	  of	  administrative	  
morality,	  the	  first	  right	  disappeared	  from	  the	  drafts	  once	  administrative	  morality	  was	  
included.	  Because	  of	  this	  apparent	  substitution,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  understand	  the	  original	  
meaning	  of	  administrative	  morality	  as	  somehow	  related	  to,	  or	  even	  a	  substitution	  for,	  
the	  a	  right	  to	  demand	  governmental	  compliance	  with	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  If	  so,	  however,	  it	  is	  
not	  clear	  whether	  the	  substitution	  was	  meant	  to	  make	  this	  right	  to	  demand	  compliance	  
more	  clear	  or	  more	  ambiguous.	  On	  the	  surface,	  the	  substitution	  “administrative	  
morality”	  seems	  less	  clear	  but	  also	  broader	  in	  its	  implications	  than	  mere	  compliance	  
with	  legality.	  
Finally,	  it	  is	  noticeable	  that	  through	  the	  debates	  there	  was	  one	  framer	  who	  
insisted	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  collective	  right	  to	  demand	  legal	  compliance	  from	  
authorities.	  Framer	  Jesus	  Perez	  Gonzalez	  Rubio	  participated	  in	  different	  debates	  of	  
article	  88	  arguing	  that	  this	  collective	  right	  was	  the	  most	  important	  and	  basic	  of	  all	  since	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it	  would	  allow	  people	  to	  enforce	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  consequently	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  
achievement	  of	  peace	  in	  the	  country.	  But	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  indicate	  whether	  this	  
framer	  supported	  the	  inclusion	  of	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  collective	  right	  and	  its	  
final	  approval	  by	  the	  Assembly.	  	  
Why	  the	  framers	  introduced	  the	  concept	  of	  “morality”	  in	  relation	  to	  compliance	  
with	  public	  administrative	  duties	  remains	  unclear.	  During	  the	  last	  debates	  some	  framers	  
raised	  concern	  about	  the	  vagueness	  of	  the	  concept	  and	  whether	  it	  was	  a	  repetition	  of	  
other	  constitutional	  norms.	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  none	  of	  the	  framers	  objected	  the	  including	  
references	  to	  morality.	  There	  are	  just	  a	  few	  references	  to	  morals	  and	  its’	  relationship	  
with	  the	  legal	  system	  in	  these	  debates	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Assembly.153	  	  According	  to	  
these	  references	  morals	  are	  part	  of	  the	  Colombian	  culture	  and	  they	  bring	  meaning	  to	  
the	  legal	  system.	  The	  legal	  system	  is	  built	  upon	  moral	  obligations,	  it	  was	  said,	  and	  so	  
morals	  improve	  the	  legal	  system’s	  legitimacy.154	  	  To	  this	  extent,	  administrative	  morality	  
could	  refer	  to	  morals	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  legal	  duties	  and	  authorities	  in	  the	  country	  should	  
comply	  with	  these	  duties.	  	  
	  In	  sum,	  the	  framing	  debates	  leave	  much	  that	  is	  unclear	  about	  the	  original	  
understanding	  of	  “administrative	  morality.”	  This	  key	  right	  may	  be	  a	  version	  of	  an	  earlier	  
requirement	  for	  the	  government	  to	  comply	  with	  legal	  duties.	  But	  it	  also	  may	  be	  
something	  broader.	  The	  framing	  debates	  leave	  its	  implications	  for	  Colombian	  public	  
administration	  unclear.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  Comisión1a,	  "Derechos	  Colectivos,"ibid.	  (Mayo	  6	  de	  1991).	  Presidencia	  de	  la	  República,	  
"Exposición	  De	  Motivos	  Al	  Proyecto	  De	  Reforma	  Constitucional.	  Apartes	  Del	  Primer	  Borrador."	  
154	  Comisión1a,	  "Derechos	  Colectivos."	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Chapter	  3:	  	  Authorizing	  and	  then	  Eliminating	  Incentives	  to	  Employ	  Popular	  
Actions.	  	  
	  
This	  chapter	  examines	  the	  Colombian	  legislative	  statute	  that	  established	  
procedures	  for	  popular	  actions	  and	  group	  actions.	  When	  the	  constitution	  regulated	  
popular	  actions	  and	  collective	  rights	  it	  also	  deferred	  to	  the	  Congress	  the	  definition	  of	  
the	  elements	  and	  procedures	  for	  implementing	  these	  notions.155	  In	  1998	  the	  Congress	  
passed	  the	  statute	  for	  popular	  actions	  (Law	  472	  of	  1998)	  and	  set	  the	  elements	  for	  filing	  
lawsuits	  and	  the	  procedures	  followed	  by	  the	  courts.	  The	  statute	  also	  aimed	  to	  develop	  
the	  purpose	  of	  the	  framers	  and	  included	  mechanisms	  to	  motivate	  citizen	  engagement.	  A	  
fundamental	  reform	  to	  the	  statute	  was	  approved	  in	  2010	  when	  the	  government	  
promoted	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  monetary	  incentive.	  Thus,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  study	  
these	  two	  key	  pieces	  of	  legislation:	  the	  statute	  of	  popular	  actions	  of	  1998	  (law	  472)	  and	  
its’	  fundamental	  reform	  of	  2010	  (law	  1425).	  In	  examining	  these	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  my	  
analysis	  will	  focus	  specifically	  on	  the	  legislature’s	  attempt	  to	  give	  practical	  meaning	  to	  
the	  broad	  language	  in	  the	  1991	  Constitution.	  	  
These	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  are	  highly	  relevant	  for	  the	  development	  of	  popular	  
actions	  and	  administrative	  morality	  because	  they	  are	  the	  guidelines	  that	  plaintiffs,	  
defendants,	  and	  courts	  follow	  when	  implementing	  them.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
Colombian	  legislation	  the	  statute	  for	  popular	  actions	  represented	  a	  major	  development	  
because	  it	  was	  the	  first	  time	  that	  the	  Congress	  studied	  and	  passed	  legislation	  on	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  Art.	  88,	  Colombian	  Constitution	  1991.	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collective	  rights	  as	  a	  new	  category	  of	  constitutional	  rights.	  As	  the	  House	  Representative	  
Viviane	  Morales	  explained	  in	  one	  of	  the	  drafts	  to	  the	  statute:	  	  
	  
“Though,	  the	  novelty	  of	  the	  topic	  [popular	  actions]	  and	  its’	  special	  characteristics	  
bring	  considerable	  challenges	  to	  legal	  studies	  in	  terms	  of	  renewing	  and	  adjusting	  
some	  of	  our	  traditional	  institutions.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  modify	  the	  
perception	  that	  since	  collective	  rights	  don’t	  belong	  to	  a	  specific	  person	  they	  end	  
up	  being	  something	  that	  belongs	  to	  nobody.	  So	  this	  is	  where	  the	  profound	  social	  
and	  political	  implications	  of	  popular	  actions	  rest.	  These	  actions	  imply	  the	  
awakening	  of	  citizen	  solidarity	  so	  the	  public	  interest	  wouldn’t	  only	  concern	  the	  
government	  or	  bureaucrats.”156	  
	  
In	  the	  legislative	  process	  of	  the	  statute	  Congress	  members	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  
possible	  social	  and	  political	  implications	  that	  this	  norm	  could	  bring	  to	  the	  Colombian	  
context.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  legislative	  process	  of	  the	  statute	  and	  the	  
modification	  of	  2010.	  I	  will	  address	  the	  following	  questions:	  What	  are	  the	  origins	  of	  
these	  pieces	  of	  legislation?	  Who	  were	  the	  stakeholders	  that	  participated	  in	  the	  
legislative	  debates	  and	  which	  were	  their	  interests?	  Do	  these	  statutory	  provisions	  
facilitate	  or	  provide	  incentives	  for	  citizen	  engagement?	  	  
In	  order	  to	  answer	  these	  questions	  I	  study	  legislative	  and	  governmental	  
documents	  related	  to	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  statute	  and	  its	  2010	  reform.	  I	  also	  analyze	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  (Bogotá1995).	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interviews	  with	  key	  actors	  related	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  these	  pieces	  of	  legislation:	  
one	  auxiliary	  justice	  at	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  (Fabián	  Marín),	  two	  administrators	  (Camilo	  
Orrego	  and	  Eduardo	  Arce),	  two	  scholars	  and	  practitioners	  (Luis	  Felipe	  Botero	  and	  
Nicolás	  Polanía),	  and	  one	  scholar	  who	  participated	  of	  the	  legislative	  process	  of	  the	  
statute	  (Beatriz	  Londoño)157.	  
The	  statute	  of	  popular	  actions	  and	  group	  actions	  develops	  the	  procedure	  of	  these	  
actions	  and	  it	  provides	  indications	  related	  to	  the	  judicial	  enforcement	  of	  collective	  
rights.	  The	  statute	  has	  six	  chapters	  and	  it	  includes	  norms	  related	  to	  the	  process	  in	  
popular	  actions	  and	  group	  actions,	  funds	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  collective	  rights,	  and	  
evidence.158	  The	  statute	  refers	  to	  popular	  actions	  and	  group	  actions	  since	  the	  article	  88	  
of	  the	  constitution	  created	  both	  of	  them	  as	  new	  judicial	  procedures	  that	  the	  people	  
could	  use	  to	  protect	  interests	  of	  the	  community.	  While	  popular	  actions	  focus	  on	  
violations	  or	  threats	  against	  collective	  rights,	  group	  actions	  target	  violations	  against	  
individual	  rights	  suffered	  by	  a	  group	  of	  people	  under	  similar	  circumstances.	  Group	  
actions	  pursue	  economic	  compensation	  for	  the	  victims	  by	  clustering	  individual	  claims	  
under	  one	  judicial	  process.159	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  popular	  actions	  given	  that	  they	  are	  the	  
judicial	  action	  that	  enforces	  collective	  rights,	  one	  of	  them	  being	  administrative	  morality.	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  Londoño	  is	  also	  a	  professor	  and	  researcher	  in	  popular	  actions	  and	  an	  advisor	  at	  the	  legal	  clinic	  
that	  provides	  support	  to	  citizens	  who	  want	  to	  file	  constitutional	  actions,	  including	  popular	  actions.	  
She	  worked	  at	  an	  oversight	  agency	  (Defensoría	  de	  pueblo)	  that	  promoted	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  statute	  
in	  1998.	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  "Ley	  472."	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  National	  Press,	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  207."	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Theoretical	  conceptions	  of	  the	  legislative	  development	  and	  mobilization	  of	  
constitutional	  rights	  	  
It	  is	  widely	  recognized	  that	  constitutional	  rights	  are	  not	  self-­‐enforcing.	  They	  
depend	  on	  mobilization	  by	  individuals	  and	  groups.	  Yet	  the	  individuals	  and	  groups	  who	  
are	  aggrieved	  by	  abuses	  or	  problems	  typically	  do	  not	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  hire	  lawyers	  
and	  bring	  cases.	  Thus	  it	  is	  common	  to	  establish	  monetary	  and	  other	  incentives	  to	  lower	  
the	  cost	  of	  bringing	  these	  suits.	  	  
Farhang	  argues	  that	  congressional	  statutes	  shape	  the	  institutional	  context	  in	  
which	  rights	  are	  enforced	  and	  to	  that	  extent	  the	  congress	  fulfills	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  
implementation	  of	  constitutional	  rights.160	  	  According	  to	  Farhang	  in	  the	  civil	  rights	  
movement	  in	  the	  US	  the	  congress	  chose	  to	  rely	  upon	  private	  litigation	  to	  enforce	  civil	  
rights.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  effective	  private	  litigation	  as	  an	  efficient	  mechanism	  for	  rights’	  
enforcement	  the	  United	  States	  Congress	  allowed	  the	  winning	  plaintiff	  to	  get	  attorneys	  
fees	  from	  the	  defendant.161	  Thus,	  statutes	  and	  specifically	  regulations	  related	  to	  
attorneys	  fees	  played	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  and	  in	  facilitating	  
enforcement	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1964.	  	  Farhang	  has	  argued	  that	  without	  these	  
attorney-­‐fee	  provisions,	  there	  would	  be	  considerably	  less	  civil	  rights	  litigation	  in	  the	  
United	  States.	  
Epp	  also	  argues	  that	  the	  US	  rights’	  revolution	  grew	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  
pressure	  exerted	  by	  rights	  advocates	  in	  a	  deliberate,	  strategic,	  and	  organized	  way.162	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  Farhang,	  The	  Litigation	  State:	  Public	  Regulation	  and	  Private	  Lawsuits	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  
161	  Ibid.	  
162	  Charles	  R	  Epp,	  The	  Rights	  Revolution:	  Lawyers,	  Activists,	  and	  Supreme	  Courts	  in	  Comparative	  
Perspective	  	  (Cambridge	  Univ	  Press,	  1998).	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The	  pressure	  of	  rights	  advocates	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  development	  of	  a	  support	  
structure	  for	  legal	  mobilization.	  This	  support	  structure	  consisted	  of	  rights-­‐advocacy	  
organizations,	  rights-­‐advocacy	  lawyers,	  and	  sources	  of	  financing.	  According	  to	  Epp	  this	  
support	  structure	  was	  essential	  in	  the	  US	  rights	  revolution	  given	  that	  the	  enforcement	  
of	  constitutional	  rights	  through	  the	  courts	  is	  a	  costly	  and	  slow	  process.	  Especially	  Epp	  
highlights	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  financial	  support	  to	  private	  litigation	  in	  order	  to	  make	  
court-­‐based	  reform	  operative.163	  	  
I	  use	  these	  theories	  as	  frames	  to	  explain	  the	  role	  of	  the	  enabling	  legislation	  on	  
popular	  actions	  in	  the	  development	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  The	  statute	  of	  1998	  was	  
the	  first	  norm	  that	  set	  the	  rules	  for	  litigation	  on	  administrative	  morality.	  Thus,	  
understanding	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  statute,	  the	  parties	  that	  participated	  in	  
legislative	  debates,	  and	  the	  element	  of	  the	  statute	  is	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  in	  the	  development	  
of	  litigation	  in	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
With	  regards	  the	  costs	  of	  litigation,	  the	  statute	  regulated	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  
for	  plaintiffs	  when	  the	  action	  is	  granted.	  The	  statute	  also	  created	  the	  Fund	  for	  the	  
defense	  of	  collective	  rights	  with	  funds	  of	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  to	  provide	  
financial	  support	  to	  low-­‐income	  plaintiffs.	  These	  mechanisms	  could	  be	  the	  support	  
structure	  for	  litigation,	  following	  Epp’s	  frame,	  and	  they	  fulfill	  a	  fundamental	  part	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  popular	  actions.	  This	  chapter	  analyzes	  the	  legislative	  development	  of	  
the	  monetary	  incentive	  and	  the	  Fund	  for	  the	  defense	  of	  collective	  rights	  as	  elements	  of	  
the	  statute	  of	  popular	  actions	  and	  its’	  reform	  of	  2010.	  	  




Statute	  of	  popular	  actions:	  motivating	  citizen	  participation	  	  
Legislative	  approval	  of	  the	  Statute	  
Although	  popular	  actions	  were	  created	  by	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  it	  was	  only	  seven	  
years	  later	  when	  the	  Congress	  passed	  the	  Statute	  for	  popular	  actions.	  The	  first	  time	  the	  
Congress	  analyzed	  a	  draft	  of	  this	  statute	  was	  in	  1993	  when	  the	  Defensor	  del	  Pueblo	  and	  
a	  member	  of	  the	  Congress	  presented	  projects	  for	  debates.	  These	  drafts	  and	  others	  in	  
the	  following	  years	  were	  presented	  but	  they	  did	  not	  finish	  the	  entire	  congressional	  
process	  in	  one	  legislature	  and	  so	  the	  Statute	  did	  not	  pass	  the	  statute	  until	  1998.	  	  
According	  to	  the	  legislative	  documents,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  Congress	  these	  
drafts	  did	  not	  reach	  all	  necessary	  approvals	  in	  the	  time	  that	  the	  statute	  of	  the	  Congress	  
requires	  but	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  as	  to	  why	  did	  the	  procedure	  was	  not	  fulfilled	  in	  time:	  
“In	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  demand	  of	  the	  article	  88	  of	  the	  constitution	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  
regulating	  popular	  and	  group	  actions	  there	  have	  been	  several	  drafts	  and	  projects	  to	  
fulfill	  this	  constitutional	  demand…	  Unfortunately	  in	  spite	  of	  receiving	  a	  first	  approval	  at	  
the	  first	  commission	  of	  the	  Senate	  the	  project	  did	  not	  make	  it	  on	  time,	  which	  implied	  
that	  the	  project	  was	  not	  enacted…”164	  
In	  the	  second	  semester	  of	  1995	  three	  more	  projects	  were	  presented	  (two	  by	  
members	  of	  the	  Congress	  and	  a	  third	  one	  by	  the	  Defensor	  del	  Pueblo)	  and	  the	  Congress	  
passed	  the	  Statute	  of	  popular	  actions.165	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  National	  Press,	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  207."	  
165	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  498,"	  in	  Ponencia	  para	  primer	  debate	  sobre	  los	  proyectos	  de	  ley	  numeros	  
005	  de	  1995,	  024	  de	  1995	  y	  084	  de	  1995	  cámara	  acumulados,	  número	  10	  de	  1996	  senado	  




Several	  social	  groups	  participated	  in	  the	  debates	  of	  the	  statute.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  
report	  for	  second	  debate	  in	  the	  Senate	  the	  speaker	  referred	  to	  the	  opinions	  of	  the	  
Defensoria	  del	  Pueblo,	  NGOs	  like	  Fundepublico166,	  legal	  scholars,	  and	  interest	  groups	  
like	  the	  National	  Business	  Association.167	  	  This	  demonstrates	  vibrant	  interest	  from	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  groups	  and	  provides	  evidence	  of	  the	  initial	  expectations	  that	  different	  
stakeholders	  had	  on	  the	  possible	  impact	  of	  popular	  actions.	  These	  stakeholders	  
represent	  different	  types	  of	  social	  interests	  and	  all	  of	  them	  were	  represented	  in	  
legislative	  discussion	  of	  the	  statute.168	  
During	  the	  debates	  of	  the	  statute	  the	  Congress	  analyzed	  elements	  of	  popular	  actions	  
and	  collective	  rights,	  and	  highlighted	  some	  of	  their	  characteristics	  that	  were	  to	  be	  
developed	  by	  the	  Statute.	  The	  Congress	  emphasized	  that	  popular	  actions	  were	  meant	  to	  
be	  mechanisms	  of	  participation	  that	  could	  facilitate	  and	  motivate	  citizen	  engagement.	  
The	  constitution	  of	  1991	  stated	  innovative	  political	  and	  legal	  mechanisms	  that	  could	  
improve	  equality,	  citizen	  participation,	  and	  civil	  rights	  but	  focusing	  on	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  
rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  the	  individual.	  In	  this	  context	  popular	  actions	  are	  the	  best	  
mechanism	  since	  it	  allows	  individuals	  to	  file	  one	  lawsuit	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights.169	  	  
During	  the	  debates	  the	  Congress	  took	  into	  consideration	  that	  although	  popular	  
actions	  were	  constitutionalized	  only	  in	  1991	  they	  were	  not	  completely	  new	  to	  the	  
Colombian	  legal	  system.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Civil	  Code	  included	  actions	  to	  protect	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166	  According	  to	  media	  reports	  this	  NGO	  was	  an	  active	  participant	  in	  the	  first	  stages	  of	  the	  
implementation	  of	  popular	  actions.	  	  
167	  National	  Press,	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  167,"	  (Bogotá1997).	  
168	  Ibid.	  
169	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  198,"	  in	  Ponencia	  para	  segundo	  debate	  a	  los	  proyectos	  de	  ley	  numeros	  05,	  
024	  y	  	  084	  de	  1995	  de	  Cámara,	  acumulados	  (Bogotá1996).	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public	  patrimony	  and	  to	  avoid	  contingent	  damage.	  Other	  laws	  also	  created	  entitlements	  
for	  individuals	  to	  file	  actions	  in	  protection	  of	  social	  interests.170	  The	  speakers	  at	  the	  first	  
debate	  at	  the	  House,	  representatives	  Yolima	  Espinosa,	  Viviane	  Morales,	  and	  Dario	  
Martinez,	  explained	  that	  the	  framers	  acknowledged	  the	  importance	  of	  popular	  actions	  
and	  they	  chose	  to	  constitutionalize	  this	  mechanism	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  protection	  
that	  already	  existed	  in	  the	  Colombian	  legislation.171	  
In	  my	  interviews	  with	  administrators	  Eduardo	  Arce	  and	  Camilo	  Orrego	  they	  also	  
referred	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  popular	  actions	  were	  not	  new	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  
because	  the	  Colombian	  legal	  system	  already	  had	  mechanisms	  that	  allow	  individuals	  to	  
protect	  and	  enforce	  social	  interests.172	  Specifically	  with	  regards	  administrative	  morality	  
Camilo	  Orrego,	  former	  head	  legal	  counsel	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Bogotá	  and	  current	  expert	  at	  the	  
National	  Agency	  for	  Legal	  Defense	  of	  the	  Government,	  explained	  that	  administrative	  
morality	  implies	  that	  the	  government	  should	  perform	  focusing	  on	  the	  public	  interest	  
and	  that	  consequently	  administrative	  morality	  was	  not	  born	  with	  the	  constitution	  of	  
1991:	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  493,"	  (Bogotá1995),	  2.	  The	  speaker	  referred	  to	  actions	  like	  the	  actions	  to	  
protect	  the	  rights	  of	  consumers,	  the	  action	  to	  prevent	  the	  danger	  related	  to	  constructions	  or	  trees,	  
actions	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  environment,	  and	  actions	  to	  protect	  banking	  from	  unfair	  
competition.	  	  
171	  Ibid.	  
172	  "Interview	  Eduardo	  Arce,"	  	  (2012).	  "Interview	  Camilo	  Orrego."	  This	  argument	  was	  also	  supported	  
by	  auxiliary	  justice	  Fabián	  Marín	  and	  professor	  Beatriz	  Londoño.	  "Interview	  Fabian	  Marín,"	  	  (2010).	  
"Interview	  Beatriz	  Londoño."	  Also	  with	  regards	  media	  coverage	  I	  identified	  media	  reports	  previous	  
to	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  referring	  to	  the	  moralization	  of	  the	  Colombian	  public	  administration.	  
These	  references	  in	  media	  reports	  could	  imply	  that	  there	  was	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  concept	  of	  
morals	  and	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  transparent	  and	  efficient	  public	  administration	  in	  Colombia	  even	  
before	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991.	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“Admitting	  that	  it	  [administrative	  morality]	  is	  something	  new	  would	  be	  as	  much	  
as	  admitting	  that	  governmental	  agents	  before	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  privileged	  
individual	  interests	  over	  the	  public	  good.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  this	  is	  true	  
because	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  1886	  it	  is	  clearly	  stated	  that	  governmental	  agents	  
should	  serve	  the	  public	  interest,	  and	  that	  is	  our	  rule	  of	  law,	  that	  is	  our	  
tradition.”173	  	  
	   	  
Orrego	  emphasized	  that	  the	  developments	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991,	  especially	  
administrative	  morality,	  are	  rooted	  in	  the	  Colombian	  legal	  tradition	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  
Orrego	  perceives	  as	  particularly	  relevant	  that	  the	  public	  interest	  as	  the	  core	  of	  the	  
Colombian	  public	  administration	  tradition.	  
When	  passing	  the	  statute	  the	  Congress	  also	  took	  into	  consideration	  that	  popular	  
actions	  had	  been	  implemented	  in	  several	  countries	  around	  the	  world.	  In	  five	  out	  of	  the	  
six	  reports	  for	  debates	  speakers	  made	  reference	  to	  foreign	  experiences	  with	  these	  
actions.	  Specifically	  speakers	  mentioned	  legislation	  in	  countries	  like	  the	  US,	  Canada,	  
Brazil,	  Portugal,	  France,	  Germany,	  and	  Argentina.174	  	  According	  to	  the	  reports	  for	  
debate,	  these	  legislation	  adopted	  popular	  actions	  in	  different	  ways.	  Some	  countries,	  like	  
France,	  have	  used	  popular	  actions	  to	  protect	  rights	  of	  consumers.	  Other	  countries	  chose	  
to	  grant	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  protection	  to	  popular	  actions.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Germany,	  
Italy,	  Brazil,	  the	  US,	  and	  Canada.	  The	  reports	  mention	  that	  	  Argentina	  and	  Brazil	  had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	  "Interview	  Camilo	  Orrego."	  
174	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  277,"	  (Bogotá1995).	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  493."	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  
207."	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  498."	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  198."	  
72	  
	  
successful	  experiences	  with	  popular	  actions	  to	  protect	  the	  environment	  and	  the	  rights	  
of	  consumers.175	  In	  other	  countries	  like	  Japan	  the	  legislation	  entitled	  specific	  
organizations	  or	  associations	  to	  promote	  and	  file	  actions	  when	  collective	  rights	  are	  
violated.	  Also,	  countries	  like	  Argentina	  and	  México,	  Spain,	  and	  Brazil	  stated	  actions	  so	  
the	  people	  could	  sue	  the	  government	  or	  private	  businesses	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights.	  	  
In	  these	  cases,	  similarly	  to	  popular	  actions	  in	  Colombia,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  entitlement	  
was	  to	  protect	  society	  in	  circumstances	  where	  the	  people	  appear	  to	  be	  subordinate	  to	  
strong	  organizations	  such	  as	  corporations	  or	  the	  government.176	  	  
In	  the	  reports	  for	  debate	  speakers	  referred	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  making	  the	  action	  
accessible	  to	  all	  individuals	  which	  implied	  setting	  an	  easy	  procedure	  and	  simple	  
requirements	  to	  file	  the	  suit.177	  For	  instance,	  plaintiffs	  are	  not	  required	  to	  file	  the	  suit	  at	  
the	  administrative	  court,	  which	  usually	  implies	  going	  to	  a	  main	  city.	  Instead,	  the	  plaintiff	  
could	  file	  the	  suit	  at	  the	  local	  court	  and	  this	  court	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  sending	  it	  to	  
the	  specialized	  judge.178	  Also,	  the	  statute	  entitled	  the	  people	  to	  get	  counsel	  from	  the	  
Defensoria	  del	  Pueblo	  or	  the	  Personeria	  municipal	  when	  necessary	  to	  file	  the	  lawsuit.179	  
Another	  mechanism	  to	  facilitate	  people’s	  use	  of	  popular	  actions	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  
the	  “Fund	  for	  the	  defense	  of	  collective	  rights”	  and	  interests.	  This	  Fund	  was	  created	  to	  
support	  the	  claims	  filed	  by	  lower	  income	  plaintiffs	  based	  on	  criteria	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
harm	  to	  collective	  rights,	  salience	  of	  the	  action,	  social	  relevance,	  and	  the	  economic	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  "Congressional	  Gazette	  277."	  
176	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  207."	  
177	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  498."	  




situation	  of	  the	  plaintiff.180	  With	  regards	  the	  creation	  of	  this	  Fund	  the	  draft	  for	  first	  
debate	  at	  the	  Senate	  explained	  that	  taking	  into	  consideration	  that	  low-­‐income	  citizens	  
would	  expected	  to	  be	  frequent	  plaintiffs	  in	  these	  processes	  the	  Fund	  for	  the	  defense	  
pursued	  two	  purposes:	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  it	  would	  be	  a	  motivator	  for	  low-­‐income	  citizens	  
to	  file	  these	  suits	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  could	  ensure	  equal	  access	  to	  popular	  actions	  
and	  group	  actions.181	  According	  to	  the	  statute	  this	  Fund	  would	  be	  managed	  by	  the	  
Defensoría	  del	  Pueblo	  (oversight	  agency)	  and	  it	  would	  provide	  economic	  support	  to	  
claims	  based	  on	  criteria	  like	  impact	  of	  the	  harm	  related	  to	  the	  suit,	  public	  interest,	  
salience	  of	  the	  collective	  right	  under	  threat,	  and	  the	  economic	  need	  of	  the	  plaintiffs.182	  
The	  article	  70	  of	  the	  statute	  lists	  seven	  funding	  sources	  for	  the	  Fund:	  funds	  from	  the	  
national	  government,	  donations	  from	  private	  organizations	  (Colombian	  or	  foreign	  
organizations),	  10%	  of	  the	  economic	  compensations	  that	  are	  obtained	  as	  a	  consequence	  
of	  suits	  funded	  by	  the	  Fund,	  and	  the	  fees	  that	  judges	  impose	  over	  the	  parties	  in	  popular	  
actions	  and	  group	  actions.183	  
During	  the	  legislative	  debates	  several	  members	  of	  the	  Congress	  emphasized	  the	  
value	  of	  ensuring	  the	  informality	  and	  flexibility	  in	  the	  procedure	  of	  popular	  actions.	  
Anybody	  is	  entitled	  to	  file	  a	  suit	  and	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  not	  required	  to	  follow	  strict	  
regulations	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  evidence	  he	  needs	  to	  present	  with	  the	  suit.	  Furthermore,	  
the	  judge	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  require	  the	  proofs	  he	  thinks	  that	  are	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  
make	  his	  ruling.	  Also,	  the	  judge	  has	  the	  faculty	  of	  make	  temporary	  decision	  that	  could	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  "Congressional	  Gazette	  207."	  
181	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  498."	  
182	  Congreso	  de	  la	  Republica	  de	  Colombia,	  "Ley	  472."	  Articles	  71	  and	  72.	  	  
183	  Ibid.	  Art.	  70.	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protect	  the	  collective	  right	  from	  violation	  while	  the	  process	  is	  decided.	  These	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  action	  demanded	  a	  new	  role	  from	  the	  judiciary.	  Since	  formalities	  
were	  reduced	  in	  this	  type	  of	  actions	  the	  judge’s	  discretion	  acquire	  a	  wider	  range	  during	  
the	  process:	  “Therefore,	  the	  judge	  or	  justice	  shall	  use	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  discretion,	  which	  
is	  a	  feature	  that	  completely	  departs	  from	  our	  judicial	  tradition,	  by	  giving	  the	  judge	  a	  
new	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  collective	  justice”.184	  	  
In	  popular	  actions	  related	  to	  administrative	  morality	  the	  statute	  grants	  power	  to	  
judge	  to	  make	  temporary	  rulings	  to	  protect	  this	  collective	  right.	  The	  judge	  is	  required	  to	  
notify	  the	  Procuraduria	  (national	  agency	  for	  disciplinary	  control)	  about	  the	  suit	  so	  this	  
oversight	  agency	  could	  also	  start	  a	  disciplinary	  process	  when	  necessary.	  According	  to	  
the	  statute	  when	  a	  popular	  action	  is	  in	  course	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  start	  a	  criminal	  trial	  
when	  there	  are	  felonies	  involved	  in	  the	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality.185	  
In	  relation	  to	  administrative	  morality	  in	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  legislative	  process	  the	  
Congress	  analyzed	  the	  possibility	  of	  defining	  this	  collective	  right	  but	  during	  the	  debates	  
members	  of	  the	  NGO	  Fundepublico	  suggested	  to	  eliminate	  the	  definition.	  According	  to	  
the	  documentary	  records	  administrative	  morality	  was	  defined	  as	  “Administrative	  
morality	  and	  prevention	  of	  any	  corrupt	  behavior.	  Administrative	  morality	  is	  the	  right	  of	  
the	  community	  to	  a	  legal	  management	  of	  public	  funds,	  by	  following	  criteria	  of	  diligence	  
and	  due	  care,	  and	  by	  following	  the	  standard	  of	  a	  good	  public	  servant.”186	  Although	  this	  
concept	  was	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  the	  debates	  the	  Congress	  accepted	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  National	  Press,	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  493."	  
185	  "Ley	  472."	  
186	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  493."	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Fundepublico’s	  suggestion	  and	  in	  the	  definite	  version	  of	  the	  statute	  administrative	  
morality	  is	  undefined.187	  The	  reports	  did	  not	  provide	  information	  about	  the	  arguments	  
of	  Fundepublico	  to	  eliminate	  the	  definition.	  	  
The	  definition	  included	  in	  the	  drafts	  related	  administrative	  morality	  to	  an	  anti-­‐
corruption	  mechanism	  and	  related	  it	  to	  public	  finance.	  In	  terms	  of	  this	  definition	  a	  moral	  
behavior	  would	  be	  the	  one	  that	  takes	  into	  consideration	  diligence,	  due	  care,	  and	  follows	  
the	  standard	  of	  a	  good	  public	  servant.	  These	  concepts	  are	  vague	  and	  if	  the	  definition	  
had	  remained	  in	  the	  statute	  they	  would	  have	  been	  for	  the	  judge	  to	  implement.	  	  Notions	  
like	  the	  “good	  public	  servant”	  are	  not	  new	  to	  the	  Colombian	  legislation.	  In	  the	  Civil	  Code	  
the	  notion	  of	  the	  “good	  father	  of	  the	  family”	  is	  used	  as	  a	  standard	  of	  a	  reasonable	  
person	  who	  behaves	  with	  due	  diligence	  and	  care.188	  Also,	  in	  the	  Commercial	  legislation	  
refers	  to	  the	  “good	  business	  man”	  as	  a	  similar	  standard.189	  Thus,	  the	  standard	  of	  the	  
“good	  public	  servant”	  was	  not	  rare	  to	  the	  Colombian	  legal	  tradition	  but	  it	  has	  not	  been	  
used	  as	  a	  standard	  for	  governmental	  behavior.	  In	  the	  final	  version	  of	  the	  Statute	  
administrative	  morality	  was	  left	  undefined.	  	  
In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  statute.	  	  
	  
Elements	  of	  the	  statute	  of	  popular	  actions	  
According	  to	  the	  statute	  popular	  actions	  are	  judicial	  actions	  to	  protect	  collective	  
rights	  and	  interests.	  The	  purpose	  of	  these	  actions	  is	  to	  avoid	  a	  contingent	  harm,	  to	  stop	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  "Congressional	  Gazette	  167."	  
188	  Congreso	  de	  la	  República	  de	  Colombia,	  "Código	  Civil	  Colombiano,"	  (Bogotá1887).	  Art	  63.	  	  
189	  Congreso	  de	  la	  República	  de	  Colombia,	  "Ley	  222,"	  (Bogotá1995).	  Art	  23.	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the	  threat,	  danger,	  or	  harm	  over	  collective	  rights	  and	  to	  restore	  things	  to	  the	  way	  they	  
were	  before	  the	  violation.190	  	  When	  a	  popular	  action	  is	  initiated	  to	  stop	  the	  contingent	  
harm	  or	  danger	  against	  a	  collective	  right,	  the	  judge	  is	  required	  to	  process	  it	  over	  any	  
other	  type	  of	  process,	  with	  exception	  of	  Habeas	  Corpus,	  actions	  for	  tutelage,	  and	  the	  
action	  for	  compliance.191	  	  
The	  statute	  lists	  some	  collective	  rights	  but	  it	  leaves	  an	  open	  possibility	  for	  other	  
norms	  to	  define	  collective	  rights.192	  This	  norm	  answers	  the	  debate	  started	  by	  the	  
members	  of	  the	  constitutional	  assembly	  in	  1991	  in	  relation	  to	  whether	  the	  list	  of	  
collective	  rights	  shall	  be	  exclusive	  (only	  the	  collective	  rights	  listed	  in	  the	  constitution	  or	  
the	  statute	  would	  be	  considered	  collective	  rights)	  or	  if	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  for	  other	  
regulations	  or	  authorities	  to	  state	  other	  collective	  rights.	  According	  to	  the	  statute,	  
collective	  rights	  could	  also	  be	  stated	  by	  the	  Constitution	  or	  other	  norms	  approved	  by	  
the	  Congress	  such	  as	  laws,	  statutes,	  and	  international	  treaties.	  Thus,	  this	  statute	  did	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  "Ley	  472,"	  Art.	  2.	  .	  This	  norm	  states	  that	  the	  Constitution,	  other	  statutes,	  and	  International	  treaties	  
can	  also	  define	  collective	  rights	  that	  could	  be	  enforceable	  through	  popular	  actions.	  The	  Constitutional	  
Assembly	  debated	  over	  whether	  collective	  rights	  shall	  be	  defined	  exclusively	  but	  the	  constitution.	  
The	  Assembly	  allowed	  the	  Congress	  to	  create	  new	  collective	  rights.	  The	  statute	  confirms	  this	  choice	  
by	  allowing	  other	  constitutional	  or	  legislative	  norms	  in	  the	  future	  to	  create	  other	  collective	  rights.	  	  
191	  Ibid.,	  Art.	  3.	  .	  The	  actions	  mentioned	  in	  this	  article	  are	  constitutional	  actions	  that	  involve	  essential	  
rights	  such	  as	  life,	  freedom,	  and	  other	  constitutional	  rights	  in	  situations	  of	  danger.	  	  Thus,	  judges	  
should	  privilege	  in	  first	  place	  these	  constitutional	  actions,	  in	  second	  place	  he	  shall	  rule	  in	  cases	  of	  
popular	  actions	  to	  stop	  contingent	  damage	  or	  danger	  against	  collective	  rights,	  and	  in	  third	  place	  he	  
shall	  decide	  any	  other	  type	  of	  action.	  This	  hierarchy	  aims	  to	  focus	  judges’	  efforts	  on	  rights	  going	  from	  
the	  most	  essentials	  to	  the	  ones	  that	  are	  less	  related	  to	  people’s	  life	  and	  integrity.	  	  
192	  The	  article	  4	  of	  the	  Statute	  lists	  the	  following	  rights:	  a	  healthy	  environment,	  administrative	  
morality,	  ecologic	  equilibrium	  and	  the	  sustainable	  exploitation	  of	  natural	  resources,	  public	  space,	  
public	  funds	  –	  public	  patrimony,	  cultural	  patrimony	  of	  the	  country,	  public	  security	  and	  public	  health,	  
access	  to	  infrastructure	  that	  guarantees	  public	  health,	  free	  economic	  competition,	  access	  to	  public	  
services	  and	  the	  right	  to	  efficient	  and	  timely	  granted	  public	  services,	  banned	  production,	  import,	  
possession,	  and	  use	  of	  chemical,	  biological,	  and	  nuclear	  weapons,	  the	  right	  to	  security	  and	  prevention	  
of	  disasters,	  the	  development	  of	  constructions	  according	  to	  urban	  planning	  regulations,	  and	  the	  
rights	  of	  users	  and	  consumers.	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allow	  courts	  to	  create	  other	  collective	  rights,	  which	  was	  one	  of	  the	  options	  analyzed	  by	  
the	  constitutional	  assembly.	  	  
When	  regulating	  the	  elements	  of	  popular	  actions,	  the	  statute	  refers	  to	  the	  parties	  
who	  are	  entitled	  to	  file	  one,	  when	  can	  they	  do	  it,	  and	  against	  whom.	  According	  to	  the	  
statute,	  all	  individuals	  and	  businesses	  are	  entitled	  to	  popular	  actions.	  Also,	  NGO’s	  
popular	  and	  civic	  organizations,	  and	  other	  civil	  society	  organizations	  are	  entitled	  to	  file	  a	  
popular	  action.	  The	  statute	  also	  refers	  to	  public	  agencies	  performing	  oversight	  
functions193,	  specifically	  the	  Procurador	  General	  de	  la	  Nación,	  el	  Defensor	  del	  Pueblo	  
and	  Personeros	  Distritales	  and	  municipales,	  each	  one	  of	  them	  in	  their	  own	  jurisdiction,	  
would	  be	  entitled	  to	  act	  as	  plaintiffs	  in	  popular	  actions.	  Other	  public	  agents	  who	  do	  not	  
perform	  oversight	  functions	  but	  who	  are	  responsible	  for	  promoting	  collective	  rights	  are	  
also	  entitled	  to	  file	  a	  popular	  action.194	  	  
	  Popular	  actors	  could	  sue	  a	  public	  or	  a	  private	  authority	  when	  the	  authority’s	  
behavior	  (action	  or	  omission)	  violates	  or	  endangers	  collective	  rights	  and	  interests.	  
According	  to	  the	  statute,	  in	  order	  to	  file	  this	  lawsuit	  popular	  actors	  are	  not	  required	  to	  
follow	  ordinary	  administrative	  procedures,	  such	  as	  formally	  requesting	  the	  authority	  to	  
protect	  collective	  rights,	  prior	  to	  initiating	  an	  action	  in	  court.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  plaintiff	  
could	  file	  a	  popular	  action	  without	  previously	  contacting	  the	  authority	  that	  caused	  the	  
violation	  or	  threat.195	  This	  norm	  aimed	  to	  facilitate	  the	  protection	  of	  collective	  rights,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193	  The	  article	  entitles	  agencies	  that	  exert	  control,	  intervention,	  or	  oversight	  over	  other	  
administrative	  agencies	  to	  file	  popular	  actions	  in	  protection	  of	  collective	  rights.	  The	  exception	  to	  this	  
entitlement	  is	  when	  the	  violation	  of	  collective	  rights	  has	  been	  caused	  by	  the	  same	  oversight	  agency.	  
In	  that	  event	  such	  agency	  is	  not	  entitled	  to	  file	  a	  suit.	  "Ley	  472."	  Article	  12,	  num	  3.	  	  
194	  Ibid.,	  Article	  12.	  
195	  Ibid.,	  10.	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especially	  in	  those	  cases	  when	  there	  was	  an	  imminent	  threat	  of	  a	  violation	  and	  the	  
ordinary	  administrative	  procedures	  could	  imply	  a	  higher	  risk	  for	  the	  collective	  right.	  	  
Also,	  this	  norm	  eased	  the	  requirements	  to	  file	  a	  popular	  action	  and	  ideally	  it	  would	  
encourage	  citizens	  to	  participate	  through	  these	  judicial	  mechanisms.	  Administrative	  
procedures	  are	  frequently	  formal	  and	  they	  require	  attorney	  representation	  while	  any	  
individual	  could	  file	  popular	  actions.196	  	  
The	  new	  administrative	  code,	  adopted	  in	  2011,	  reversed	  this	  provision	  of	  the	  1998	  
statute	  by	  requiring	  	  	  those	  seeking	  to	  file	  a	  popular	  action	  to	  file	  a	  complaint	  against	  the	  
authority	  before	  filing	  a	  popular	  action.197	  Since	  the	  administrative	  code	  only	  started	  
operating	  in	  July	  of	  2012	  it	  is	  too	  soon	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  reform	  on	  popular	  
actions.	  However	  it	  would	  be	  expected	  that	  this	  additional	  requirement	  would	  
discourage	  some	  popular	  actors	  who	  have	  no	  legal	  training	  or	  limited	  funds.	  	  
The	  article	  17	  of	  the	  statute	  refers	  to	  the	  mechanisms	  for	  supporting	  plaintiffs	  in	  
order	  to	  motivate	  the	  use	  of	  popular	  actions.	  This	  norm	  refers	  to	  three	  types	  of	  support	  
that	  plaintiffs	  could	  receive.	  First,	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  entitled	  to	  receive	  help	  from	  oversight	  
agencies	  such	  as	  the	  Personeria	  Distrital	  or	  the	  Defensoria	  when	  filing	  the	  lawsuit.	  This	  
help	  could	  focus	  on	  writing	  the	  claim	  or	  petition,	  especially	  in	  those	  cases	  when	  it	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196	  According	  to	  this	  article	  plaintiffs	  could	  file	  a	  popular	  action	  with	  or	  without	  legal	  representation.	  
When	  the	  plaintiff	  files	  the	  action	  directly	  (without	  legal	  representation)	  the	  Defensoria	  del	  pueblo	  
could	  be	  part	  of	  the	  process.	  Ibid.	  Article	  13.	  The	  Defensoria	  del	  Pueblo	  is	  responsible	  for	  promoting,	  
communicating,	  and	  protecting	  civil	  rights	  (Art.	  281	  of	  the	  Constitution).	  In	  development	  of	  these	  
functions	  the	  Defensoria	  is	  entitled	  by	  the	  constitution	  to	  file	  popular	  actions	  in	  protection	  of	  
collective	  rights.	  	  
The	  constitutional	  court	  analyzed	  in	  judicial	  review	  articles	  12	  and	  13	  of	  the	  statute.	  According	  to	  the	  
Court	  these	  articles	  fulfill	  constitutional	  mandates	  and	  consequently	  they	  are	  constitutional.	  C	  215.	  
197	  Congreso	  de	  la	  República	  de	  Colombia,	  "Código	  De	  Procedimiento	  Administrativo	  Y	  De	  Lo	  
Contencioso,"	  in	  Law	  1437	  (Bogotá2011).	  According	  to	  the	  current	  Administrative	  code	  the	  plaintiff	  
shall	  request	  from	  the	  authority	  to	  protect	  the	  collective	  right	  before	  filing	  a	  popular	  action.	  This	  
requirement	  could	  be	  waived	  when	  collective	  rights	  are	  under	  an	  imminent	  threat.	  Art.	  144.	  	  
79	  
	  
urgent	  to	  protect	  the	  collective	  right	  or	  when	  the	  plaintiff	  does	  not	  know	  how	  to	  write.	  
Second,	  the	  norm	  allows	  plaintiffs	  to	  file	  the	  suit	  at	  any	  municipal	  court	  (even	  civil	  or	  
criminal	  court)	  when	  there	  is	  not	  an	  administrative	  court	  in	  the	  city	  or	  region	  where	  the	  
plaintiffs	  lives.	  This	  aid	  aims	  to	  facilitate	  citizens’	  use	  of	  popular	  actions	  because	  it	  does	  
not	  require	  from	  an	  individual	  to	  travel	  to	  a	  main	  city	  to	  file	  the	  suit	  at	  the	  
administrative	  court.	  Third,	  once	  the	  judge	  receives	  the	  suit	  he	  is	  authorized	  to	  make	  
precautionary	  decisions	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights	  when	  they	  are	  under	  a	  serious	  
threat.198	  These	  three	  mechanisms	  intend	  to	  enable	  individuals	  to	  file	  popular	  actions	  by	  
facilitating	  the	  access	  to	  judges	  and	  the	  elaboration	  of	  the	  claim.	  This	  norm	  attempted	  
to	  facilitate	  popular	  actions	  even	  in	  small	  towns	  that	  are	  distant	  from	  main	  cities	  in	  the	  
country.	  	  
Regarding	  who	  may	  be	  the	  target	  of	  these	  lawsuits,	  article	  14	  authorizes	  popular	  
actors	  to	  file	  a	  suit	  against	  individuals,	  businesses,	  or	  public	  authorities	  that	  had	  
developed	  a	  behavior	  that	  threatens	  or	  violates	  collective	  rights.	  This	  behavior	  could	  be	  
an	  action	  or	  an	  omission	  against	  a	  collective	  right.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  sue	  an	  unknown	  
defendant	  when	  it	  is	  unclear	  who	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  violation.	  In	  this	  case,	  
according	  to	  the	  article	  14	  it	  would	  be	  the	  judge’s	  responsibility	  to	  identify	  it.	  	  
According	  to	  the	  statute,	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  and	  subordinate	  administrative	  courts	  
are	  responsible	  for	  ruling	  in	  cases	  of	  popular	  actions	  when	  the	  defendant	  is	  a	  public	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198	  These	  are	  decisions	  that	  the	  judge	  can	  make	  at	  any	  stage	  of	  the	  process	  but	  especially	  in	  early	  
stages	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  providing	  provisionary	  protection	  to	  the	  rights	  or	  interests	  that	  are	  object	  
to	  litigation.	  These	  are	  temporary	  mechanisms	  of	  protection	  aimed	  to	  avoid	  permanent	  harm	  to	  the	  
rights	  and	  interests.	  Some	  examples	  of	  precautionary	  decisions	  are:	  suspending	  the	  effects	  of	  




agency	  or	  a	  private	  contractor.	  In	  other	  cases	  civil	  judges	  would	  have	  jurisdiction.199	  
Within	  the	  administrative	  jurisdiction	  the	  statute	  defined	  that	  administrative	  judges	  
would	  make	  the	  first	  level	  ruling	  and	  that	  the	  Tribunals	  would	  be	  the	  appellate	  court.	  
The	  plaintiff	  could	  choose	  to	  file	  the	  suit	  at	  the	  residence	  of	  the	  defendant	  or	  at	  the	  
place	  where	  the	  facts	  happened.200	  Based	  on	  this	  attribution	  of	  competences	  it	  is	  
possible	  that	  civil	  judges,	  ruling	  in	  cases	  of	  private	  parties,	  could	  use	  some	  criteria	  
different	  from	  the	  ones	  used	  by	  administrative	  judges.	  	  
The	  statute	  requires	  the	  judge	  hearing	  a	  popular	  action	  to	  make	  his	  or	  her	  ruling	  
within	  20	  days	  after	  the	  parties	  have	  presented	  closing	  arguments.	  When	  the	  ruling	  is	  
favorable	  to	  the	  plaintiff’s	  claims,	  the	  judge	  is	  authorized	  to	  demand	  from	  the	  defendant	  
a	  certain	  behavior	  or	  to	  stop	  certain	  behavior.	  The	  judge	  may	  also	  require	  the	  defendant	  
to	  do	  what	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  restore	  situations	  to	  the	  way	  they	  were	  before	  the	  
violation	  took	  place.	  The	  ruling	  could	  also	  demand	  economic	  compensation	  in	  favor	  of	  
the	  administrative	  agency	  responsible	  of	  enforcing	  the	  collective	  right,	  only	  if	  this	  
agency	  is	  not	  responsible	  for	  violating	  the	  collective	  right.	  The	  statute	  requires	  the	  ruling	  
to	  be	  precise	  and	  to	  set	  the	  timeframe	  in	  which	  the	  responsible	  party	  must	  comply	  with	  
these	  demands.	  The	  judge	  is	  to	  state	  all	  the	  behaviors	  that	  should	  be	  avoided	  in	  order	  to	  
prevent	  future	  violations	  to	  the	  collective	  right.201	  	  
The	  statute	  allows	  the	  judge	  to	  keep	  its	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  case	  until	  the	  term	  for	  
complying	  with	  the	  ruling	  expires.	  During	  this	  time	  the	  judge	  has	  the	  competence	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199	  "Ley	  472."	  Art	  14.	  	  
200	  Ibid.	  Art	  16.	  	  
201	  Ibid.	  Art	  34.	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make	  decisions	  to	  guarantee	  that	  the	  ruling	  will	  be	  implemented.	  Also,	  the	  judge	  is	  
authorized	  to	  create	  a	  committee	  for	  verifying	  compliance.	  In	  this	  committee	  could	  take	  
part	  the	  judge,	  the	  parties	  of	  the	  suit,	  the	  public	  agency	  responsible	  for	  protecting	  the	  
collective	  right,	  members	  of	  oversight	  agencies,	  and	  NGOs.202	  	  
The	  committee	  for	  verifying	  ruling	  compliance	  offers	  a	  valuable	  opportunity	  of	  
collaboration	  between	  different	  parties	  to	  protect	  a	  collective	  right.	  In	  the	  committee	  
public	  servants,	  plaintiffs,	  civil	  society	  organizations,	  oversight	  agencies,	  and	  the	  judge	  
join	  resources	  to	  share	  perspectives	  and	  protect	  collective	  rights.	  By	  participating	  in	  the	  
committee,	  stakeholders	  may	  also	  gain	  awareness	  of	  their	  own	  responsibility	  in	  the	  
promotion	  and	  enforcement	  of	  collective	  rights.	  	  
Although	  the	  committee	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  good	  opportunity	  for	  the	  parties	  to	  
collaborate	  the	  experience	  of	  plaintiffs	  seems	  to	  be	  different.	  In	  my	  interviews,	  	  one	  
plaintiff	  in	  popular	  actions	  (Juan	  Carlos	  Garcia)	  and	  one	  law	  professor	  and	  legal	  
consultant	  (Beatriz	  Londoño)	  expressed	  doubts	  regarding	  the	  possible	  impact	  of	  the	  
committee.	  Garcia	  referred	  specifically	  to	  one	  popular	  action	  when	  he	  got	  very	  
disappointed	  because	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  process	  the	  Tribunal	  ruled	  that	  the	  collective	  
right	  was	  not	  under	  threat	  anymore	  although	  in	  his	  view	  this	  was	  not	  entirely	  true.	  As	  a	  
consequence,	  he	  said	  that	  he	  had	  lost	  all	  interest	  in	  participating	  in	  the	  committee	  
because,	  he	  thought,	  it	  was	  going	  to	  be	  a	  scenario	  for	  the	  governmental	  agency	  to	  
praise	  itself	  rather	  than	  recognizing	  a	  problematic	  situation	  that	  needed	  solution.203	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  Ibid.	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  "Interview	  Juan	  Carlos	  Garcia,"	  	  (2012).	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Professor	  Londoño	  argued	  that	  judges	  constitute	  committees	  in	  just	  a	  few	  cases	  and	  
that	  in	  these	  cases	  their	  possible	  impact	  is	  reduced	  because	  the	  defendant	  do	  not	  
comply	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  ruling	  and	  the	  committee	  did	  not	  enforce	  compliance.	  
Londoño	  observed:	  	  
“For	  instance,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Machetá	  …	  the	  purpose	  was	  to	  depollute	  a	  field	  
from	  toxic	  residues.	  Legally	  it	  worked	  fine.	  	  The	  judge	  conformed	  the	  committee.	  
In	  that	  case	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  a	  farmer	  and	  we	  [the	  law	  school]	  supported	  the	  
action.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  judge	  invited	  the	  farmer,	  the	  oversight	  agency,	  the	  
administrative	  agency	  to	  participate	  of	  the	  committee	  for	  verifying	  compliance…	  
and	  so	  what	  happened	  was	  that	  the	  administrative	  agency	  said	  that	  they	  have	  
done	  everything	  perfectly	  well,	  it	  is	  like	  a	  self-­‐compliment	  of	  the	  administration.	  
We	  have	  been	  to	  that	  place	  several	  times	  and	  the	  farmer	  is	  aware	  of	  it.	  He	  says,	  
look,	  I	  received	  the	  economic	  incentive	  but	  the	  situation	  has	  not	  improved…	  
Thus,	  this	  was	  a	  ruling	  that	  seems	  very	  pretty	  in	  the	  paper	  but	  it	  did	  not	  change	  a	  
thing.”204	  	  
	  
According	  to	  Londoño	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  gap	  between	  the	  rulings	  and	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  rulings	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  violation	  of	  collective	  rights	  
remained.	  Also,	  the	  committee	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  place	  where	  the	  administration	  has	  a	  
privileged	  position	  and	  the	  committee	  does	  not	  effectively	  oversee	  a	  full	  
implementation	  of	  the	  ruling.	  	  
Garcia	  expressed	  disappointment	  on	  what	  could	  be	  a	  mechanism	  of	  collaboration	  
between	  different	  stakeholders.	  He	  also	  argued	  that	  he	  lost	  interest	  in	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  ruling	  and	  consequently	  he	  did	  not	  try	  to	  engage	  in	  any	  follow	  up	  
activity	  related	  to	  the	  ruling.	  The	  plaintiff’s	  interest	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  highly	  relevant	  factor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204	  "Interview	  Beatriz	  Londoño."	  Professor	  Londoño	  refers	  to	  the	  mechanism	  of	  collaboration	  by	  
which	  any	  individual	  or	  business	  could	  support	  a	  plaintiff’s	  claim	  at	  any	  time	  during	  the	  process	  
before	  the	  judge	  makes	  a	  decision.	  NGOs	  and	  other	  civil	  society	  organizations	  as	  well	  as	  oversight	  
agencies,	  and	  administrative	  agencies	  responsible	  of	  promoting	  collective	  rights	  could	  also	  support	  
the	  plaintiff’s	  claims.	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in	  relation	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  committee.	  Professor	  Londoño	  argued	  that	  promoting	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  committee	  requires	  individual	  commitment	  because	  these	  committees	  have	  
no	  funding	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  rulings	  is	  expensive.	  Thus,	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  
individual	  commitment	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  committee	  the	  possible	  impact	  that	  they	  
could	  cause.	  	  
	  
Eliminating	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  for	  popular	  actors:	  law	  1425	  of	  2010	  
The	  right	  to	  gain	  compensation	  for	  violations	  of	  rights	  is	  well-­‐established	  in	  
American	  law	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  private	  enforcement	  of	  public	  law.205	  It	  is	  thought	  
that	  without	  this	  incentive	  key	  public	  rights	  would	  go	  largely	  unenforced	  because	  most	  
ordinary	  individuals	  do	  not	  have	  the	  means	  to	  pay	  for	  an	  attorney.	  The	  statute	  of	  1998	  
contemplated	  a	  monetary	  incentive	  for	  plaintiffs	  when	  the	  judges	  grant	  the	  action.206	  	  
According	  to	  the	  original	  text	  of	  the	  statute	  the	  plaintiff	  in	  a	  popular	  action	  was	  
entitled	  to	  receive	  an	  incentive	  that	  judge	  estimates	  within	  the	  range	  of	  10	  and	  150	  
times	  a	  minimum	  monthly	  wage.	  Whether	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  a	  private	  party	  or	  a	  
governmental	  agency	  this	  party	  is	  entitled	  to	  the	  incentive.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  governmental	  
agencies,	  the	  incentive	  would	  go	  to	  a	  special	  fund	  created	  by	  the	  statute,	  the	  “Fund	  for	  
the	  defense	  of	  collective	  rights.”207	  	  The	  statute	  also	  included	  a	  specific	  norm	  about	  
the	  incentive	  in	  cases	  related	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  plaintiff	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  Epp,	  The	  Rights	  Revolution:	  Lawyers,	  Activists,	  and	  Supreme	  Courts	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective.	  
Farhang,	  The	  Litigation	  State:	  Public	  Regulation	  and	  Private	  Lawsuits	  in	  the	  United	  States.	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  "Ley	  472,"	  Art	  34.	  
207	  Ibid.,	  Art.	  39.	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would	  be	  entitled	  to	  an	  incentive	  equal	  to	  the	  15%	  of	  the	  funds	  that	  the	  governmental	  
agencies	  recuperate	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  suit.208	  	  
The	  impact	  of	  monetary	  incentive	  for	  plaintiffs	  was	  broadly	  debated	  in	  2009	  
when	  the	  government	  motivated	  a	  reform	  for	  the	  statute.209	  Some	  argued	  that	  
plaintiffs	  should	  not	  receive	  economic	  compensation	  for	  complying	  with	  their	  civic	  duty	  
of	  protecting	  collective	  rights.	  Others	  argued	  that	  the	  economic	  compensation	  
motivated	  plaintiffs	  to	  filing	  frivolous	  claims	  just	  to	  obtain	  monetary	  compensation	  and	  
consequently	  that	  it	  had	  worsened	  the	  problem	  of	  congestion	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  Others	  
claimed	  that	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  was	  a	  fair	  compensation	  for	  the	  expenses	  and	  
burdens	  related	  to	  filing	  a	  lawsuit	  and	  that	  although	  protecting	  collective	  rights	  pertains	  
everybody	  in	  society	  the	  plaintiff	  deserves	  an	  economic	  reward	  for	  his	  actions.	  	  
In	  2009,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  and	  Justice	  first	  promoted	  the	  initiative	  for	  
eliminating	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  for	  plaintiffs.210	  The	  Ministry	  argued	  that	  popular	  
actions	  had	  grown	  in	  number	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  plaintiffs	  had	  pursued	  making	  profit	  as	  
the	  goal	  of	  filing	  these	  suits.	  Consequently	  considerable	  governmental	  funds,	  specifically	  
funds	  of	  regions	  and	  cities,	  had	  been	  wasted	  in	  paying	  popular	  actors.	  According	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208	  Ibid.,	  Art.	  40.	  This	  article	  also	  states	  that	  in	  cases	  of	  public	  contracting	  the	  attorney	  of	  the	  
governmental	  agency	  and	  the	  attorney	  of	  the	  contractor	  would	  be	  obliged	  to	  pay	  all	  the	  money	  that	  
the	  governmental	  agency	  lost	  for	  the	  violation	  against	  administrative	  morality.	  This	  article	  assumes	  a	  
connection	  between	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  cases	  of	  corruption.	  Consequently	  a	  
lawsuit	  to	  enforce	  administrative	  morality	  could	  lead	  to	  recover	  public	  funds	  that	  had	  been	  wasted	  in	  
corruption.	  	  
Also,	  this	  norm	  entitles	  citizens	  to	  request	  copies	  of	  documents	  related	  to	  contracting	  out	  processes	  
in	  order	  to	  have	  access	  to	  the	  information	  that	  they	  could	  need	  to	  initiate	  the	  suit.	  This	  article	  aimed	  
to	  strengthen	  popular	  actions	  by	  giving	  citizens	  the	  access	  to	  the	  information	  they	  could	  use	  to	  exert	  
oversight	  over	  bureaucratic	  behavior	  and	  to	  identify	  immoral	  behavior	  when	  that	  is	  the	  case.	  	  
209	  National	  Press,	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  680,"	  in	  Ponencia	  para	  Segundo	  Debate	  al	  Proyecto	  de	  Ley	  
056	  de	  2009	  Cámara.	  Por	  medio	  de	  la	  cual	  se	  derogan	  algunos	  artículos	  de	  la	  Ley	  472	  de	  1998-­acciones	  
populares	  y	  de	  grupo	  (Bogotá2010).	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  885,"	  (Bogotá2010).	  
210	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  622,"	  (Bogotá2009).	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Ministry	  citizens	  have	  the	  responsibility	  of	  protecting	  collective	  rights	  and	  it	  should	  not	  
be	  necessary	  to	  offer	  any	  type	  of	  reward	  for	  complying	  with	  one’s	  responsibility.	  Based	  
on	  these	  considerations	  the	  Ministry	  proposed	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  monetary	  
incentive	  to	  popular	  actors.211	  	  
In	  the	  document	  presented	  at	  the	  Congress	  in	  2009	  the	  Ministry	  argued:	  
“Currently	  in	  Colombia	  the	  use	  of	  popular	  actions	  has	  had	  a	  considerable	  growth	  which,	  
according	  to	  our	  analysis,	  has	  been	  motivated	  by	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  of	  
receiving	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  stated	  by	  the	  Law	  472	  of	  1998	  [statute	  of	  popular	  
actions]	  to	  those	  who	  engage	  in	  a	  judicial	  process	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights.”212	  It	  is	  
noticeable	  that	  neither	  in	  this	  document	  nor	  in	  other	  documents	  related	  to	  the	  debates	  
of	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  incentive	  the	  Ministry	  presented	  data	  relating	  the	  monetary	  
incentive	  and	  the	  increase	  of	  popular	  actions.	  Even	  more,	  the	  draft	  of	  the	  law	  that	  
eliminated	  the	  incentive	  assumed	  that	  the	  growth	  in	  popular	  actions	  was	  negative	  for	  
the	  Colombian	  public	  administration,	  but	  neither	  the	  Ministry	  nor	  any	  member	  of	  
Congress	  provided	  any	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  this	  assertion.	  	  
The	  House	  of	  Representatives	  supported	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  incentive	  based	  
on	  considerations	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  representativeness	  of	  popular	  actions,	  the	  opinion	  of	  
different	  social	  organizations	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  need	  of	  regulation	  to	  the	  incentive,	  and	  
the	  situation	  of	  congestion	  and	  delay	  in	  the	  administrative	  jurisdiction,	  and	  the	  power	  of	  
the	  Congress	  to	  legislate	  over	  these	  issues.	  According	  to	  representatives	  Adriana	  Franco	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Castaño,	  Rosmery	  Martínez	  Rosales,	  Carlos	  Arturo	  Correa	  Mojica,	  and	  Fernando	  de	  la	  
Peña	  Márquez	  speakers	  of	  the	  draft	  for	  second	  debate	  in	  the	  House,	  the	  monetary	  
incentive	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  principle	  of	  solidarity	  and	  the	  
economic	  motivation	  of	  plaintiffs	  when	  filing	  a	  suit	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights.213	  The	  
speakers	  argue	  that	  in	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  solidarity	  plaintiffs’	  motivation	  
should	  mainly	  be	  the	  protection	  of	  collective	  rights	  out	  of	  concern	  for	  social	  well-­‐being.	  
This	  altruistic	  motivation	  differs	  from	  the	  selfish	  economic	  motivation	  that,	  according	  to	  
the	  speakers,	  has	  led	  the	  plaintiffs.214	  
	  	  After	  debate,	  Congress	  passed	  a	  law	  in	  2010	  eliminating	  the	  monetary	  
compensation	  for	  plaintiffs.215	  	  
In	  my	  interviews	  I	  found	  different	  opinions	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  monetary	  incentive.	  
Two	  of	  the	  interviewees	  had	  been	  plaintiffs	  in	  popular	  actions	  and	  both	  of	  them	  
supported	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  as	  a	  fair	  reward	  for	  the	  expenses	  related	  to	  the	  
suit.216	  In	  both	  interviews	  funding	  was	  a	  core	  concern	  when	  referring	  to	  their	  role	  as	  
popular	  actors.	  One	  of	  the	  interviewees	  (prof.	  Londoño)	  works	  as	  a	  researcher	  in	  a	  
private	  university	  and	  this	  institution	  provides	  funding	  for	  popular	  actions.	  The	  second	  
plaintiff	  (García)	  is	  an	  attorney	  who	  was	  more	  insistent	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  negative	  
stereotype	  that	  plaintiffs	  have	  received	  due	  to	  the	  monetary	  compensation.217	  García	  
argued:	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“I	  think	  that	  the	  instrument	  [popular	  actions]	  is	  valuable	  but	  unfortunately	  it	  has	  
been	  condemned	  as	  evil.	  I	  mean,	  here	  the	  biggest	  concern	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  the	  
monetary	  compensation,	  although	  it	  is	  the	  least	  relevant	  but	  it	  ended	  up	  being	  
the	  most	  highlighted…	  I	  mean,	  I	  don’t	  know,	  there	  was	  a	  stereotype...	  like	  the	  
lawyer	  who	  decides	  to	  file	  a	  popular	  action	  is	  a	  guy	  with	  no	  money,	  with	  nothing	  
else	  to	  do,	  and	  so	  to	  catch	  a	  penny	  he	  just	  identifies	  a	  possible	  violation	  of	  
collective	  rights	  and	  he	  copies	  and	  pastes	  that	  thing	  like	  a	  thousand	  times.	  That	  
was	  not	  the	  point…”218	  
	  
According	  to	  this	  plaintiff,	  popular	  actors	  are	  depicted	  by	  the	  media	  and	  even	  by	  
the	  courts	  as	  people	  who	  are	  virtually	  unemployed	  and	  who	  want	  to	  make	  a	  living	  out	  of	  
suing	  the	  government.	  This	  depiction	  seemed	  to	  be	  embedded	  in	  his	  understanding	  of	  
popular	  actions	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  when	  he	  started	  explaining	  his	  motivations	  to	  file	  a	  
popular	  action	  he	  was	  almost	  apologizing	  for	  pursuing	  such	  endeavor:	  “It	  was	  a	  nice	  
experience	  but	  it	  was	  very	  disappointing…	  We	  chose	  to	  file	  popular	  actions	  with	  high	  
impact;	  I	  mean	  that’s	  what	  we	  wanted	  to	  do.	  Obviously,	  yes,	  we	  were	  looking	  for	  an	  
economic	  compensation	  but	  we	  wanted	  to	  do	  so	  with	  a	  nice	  topic	  and	  the	  answer	  of	  the	  
Tribunals	  was	  unfair…”219	  When	  referring	  to	  a	  “nice	  topic”	  he	  described	  cases	  of	  popular	  
actions	  with	  high	  potential	  impact	  in	  terms	  of	  protecting	  a	  healthy	  environment,	  public	  
funds,	  and	  administrative	  morality.	  He	  insisted	  that	  he	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  
country’s	  social	  well-­‐being	  and	  that	  the	  economic	  compensation	  was	  simply	  a	  means	  for	  
covering	  the	  expenses	  related	  to	  the	  lawsuit.	  	  
Similar	  kinds	  of	  allegations	  of	  litigants	  being	  irresponsible	  actors	  have	  been	  
depicted	  by	  media	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Haltom	  and	  McCann	  analyzed	  media	  coverage	  





of	  tort	  litigation	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and,	  according	  to	  these	  scholars,	  the	  American	  
media	  have	  consistently	  portrayed	  tort	  litigants	  in	  unflattering,	  self-­‐interested	  terms.220	  
The	  widespread	  perception	  conveyed	  by	  the	  popular	  media	  is	  that	  litigants	  are	  
irresponsibly	  seeking	  large	  damage	  awards	  simply	  to	  enrich	  themselves.221	  	  	  
Other	  interviewees	  were	  more	  cautious	  about	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  by	  
acknowledging	  the	  abuses	  of	  plaintiffs	  when	  filing	  superfluous	  popular	  actions	  and	  
contributing	  to	  congestion	  in	  the	  jurisdiction.	  Botero,	  one	  of	  the	  interviewees,	  is	  a	  law	  
professor	  and	  a	  legal	  consultant	  for	  private	  businesses.	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  “tsunami”	  of	  
lawsuits	  generated	  by	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  led	  to	  low-­‐quality	  popular	  actions	  and	  to	  
processes	  with	  different	  purposes	  from	  the	  ones	  pursued	  by	  the	  constitution.222	  In	  
another	  interview	  a	  law	  professor	  and	  legal	  consultant	  (Polania)	  also	  acknowledged	  the	  
abuses	  of	  plaintiffs	  when	  filing	  numerous	  and	  superfluous	  popular	  actions	  but,	  in	  his	  
opinion,	  the	  solution	  was	  not	  to	  eliminate	  the	  monetary	  incentive.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  
economic	  incentive	  was	  a	  fair	  compensation	  for	  the	  plaintiff’s	  role	  and	  on	  the	  other	  
hand	  in	  cases	  of	  frivolous	  litigation	  the	  judge	  had	  other	  alternatives	  to	  discourage	  this	  
behavior.223	  	  
Botero	  also	  suggested	  that	  elimination	  of	  the	  incentive	  would	  have	  a	  negative	  
impact.	  In	  his	  opinion,	  popular	  actions	  had	  a	  valuable	  impact	  by	  giving	  visibility	  to	  
problems	  that	  were	  hidden	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  legal	  mechanism	  that	  could	  put	  them	  
into	  the	  judicial	  agenda.	  This	  attorney	  argued	  that	  popular	  actions	  are	  public	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mechanisms	  that	  ensured	  citizens	  the	  access	  to	  the	  jurisdiction	  in	  order	  to	  solve	  
conflicts	  pertaining	  to	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole.224	  This	  interviewee	  referred	  to	  the	  
importance	  of	  popular	  actions	  as	  a	  legal	  mechanism	  that	  entitled	  the	  people	  to	  improve	  
social	  problems.	  He	  suggested	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  popular	  actions	  made	  citizens	  more	  
aware	  of	  their	  collective	  problems	  once	  they	  realized	  that	  there	  was	  a	  legal	  mechanism	  
that	  entitled	  them	  to	  solve	  them.	  
According	  to	  Botero,	  three	  types	  of	  concerns	  led	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  monetary	  
incentive:	  the	  economic	  impact	  for	  the	  government,	  congestion	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  the	  
interest	  of	  private	  businesses.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  economic	  impact	  of	  the	  incentive	  he	  
argued	  that	  it	  was	  foreseeable.	  When	  the	  statute	  entitled	  individuals	  to	  receive	  a	  
monetary	  compensation	  for	  filing	  popular	  actions	  an	  economic	  impact	  was	  expected	  
and	  the	  possibility	  of	  abuses	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  action	  was	  expected	  too.225	  	  
The	  Senate	  analyzed	  the	  economic	  impact	  of	  the	  monetary	  incentive.	  In	  the	  
report	  for	  second	  debate	  the	  speaker	  argued:	  “Apparently	  [the	  monetary	  incentive]	  
does	  not	  produce	  a	  significant	  negative	  effect	  over	  public	  funds	  but	  what	  causes	  a	  
serious	  harm	  is	  specifically	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  stated	  in	  article	  40	  [of	  the	  statute]	  
related	  to	  administrative	  morality.”226	  The	  speaker	  argued	  that	  the	  economic	  impact	  of	  
the	  incentive	  over	  public	  funds	  is	  not	  significant	  but	  in	  congressional	  documents	  there	  is	  
no	  empirical	  data	  supporting	  this	  assertion.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224	  "Interview	  Luis	  Felipe	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  National	  Press,	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  885."	  The	  senator	  refers	  to	  articles	  39	  and	  40	  of	  the	  
statute.	  According	  to	  former	  article	  39	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  entitled	  to	  an	  economic	  incentive	  that	  the	  
judge	  would	  estimate	  in	  an	  amount	  that	  goes	  between	  10	  and	  150	  minimum	  wages.	  According	  to	  
article	  40	  in	  popular	  actions	  related	  to	  administrative	  morality	  the	  incentive	  up	  to	  15%	  of	  the	  
amount	  that	  the	  public	  agency	  retrieves	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  action.	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When	  referring	  to	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  in	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality	  
Senator	  Roberto	  Gerlein	  in	  the	  draft	  for	  the	  second	  debate	  at	  the	  Senate	  in	  2010	  argued	  
that	  unscrupulous	  plaintiffs	  had	  used	  the	  action	  selfishly,	  suing	  the	  government	  in	  cases	  
where	  big	  amounts	  of	  money	  are	  involved,	  and	  consequently	  gaining	  a	  considerable	  
incentive.227	  In	  Senator	  Gerlein’s	  critique,	  the	  plaintiff’s	  motivation	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
reproach	  specifically	  by	  using	  expressions	  like	  “unscrupulous	  plaintiffs”	  and	  their	  
“selfish”	  motivation.	  Gerlein	  did	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  facts	  that	  could	  have	  originated	  the	  suit	  
or	  that	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  could	  be	  the	  wrongful	  behavior	  of	  the	  
administration	  when	  violating	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  speaker	  did	  
not	  take	  into	  consideration	  that	  if	  plaintiffs	  had	  gained	  considerable	  sums	  of	  money	  
(although	  there	  is	  no	  estimate	  of	  this	  amount)	  it	  was	  because	  judges	  had	  ruled	  in	  favor	  
of	  popular	  actors.	  In	  these	  rulings	  judges	  recognize	  violations	  against	  administrative	  
morality,	  identify	  the	  responsible	  of	  the	  immoral	  behavior,	  and	  consequently	  recover	  
public	  funds	  that	  were	  lost	  due	  to	  the	  wrongful	  behavior.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  economic	  impact	  of	  the	  monetary	  incentive,	  the	  elimination	  of	  
the	  incentive	  seemed	  aimed	  to	  address	  two	  additional	  issues:	  congestion	  in	  the	  judiciary	  
and	  the	  impact	  over	  businesses.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  impact	  over	  businesses,	  popular	  
actions	  forced	  private	  firms	  to	  change	  their	  procedures.	  During	  my	  interviews	  professor	  
Botero	  argued:	  “The	  decision	  of	  the	  Congress	  ultimately	  legitimized	  two	  types	  of	  
interests	  over	  citizens’	  interests:	  interests	  of	  businesses	  to	  cut	  that	  stream	  because	  they	  
were	  pointed	  out	  for	  doing	  wrong	  things	  and	  they	  were	  on	  the	  spot	  in	  a	  bunch	  of	  cases	  




…	  And	  the	  second	  type	  of	  interest	  is	  related	  to	  congestion	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  a	  mantra	  by	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  and	  Justice.	  Let’s	  be	  more	  efficient	  they	  said,	  let’s	  be	  so	  and	  so	  
they	  said…	  and	  one	  of	  the	  poorest	  alternatives	  they	  found	  to	  improve	  judiciary	  
efficiency	  was	  to	  cut	  causes	  of	  action…”228	  Businesses’	  interests	  were	  evident	  in	  
Congressional	  debates	  since	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  Colombian	  business	  associations	  
(FENALCO)	  intervened	  by	  supporting	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  incentive.	  According	  to	  
FENALCO	  by	  eliminating	  the	  incentive,	  popular	  actions	  would	  return	  to	  being	  a	  worthy	  
mechanism	  for	  rights’	  protection	  rather	  than	  a	  source	  of	  profit.	  FENALCO	  argued	  that	  
several	  lawyers	  had	  harassed	  public	  and	  private	  institutions	  that	  are	  trying	  to	  make	  a	  
living	  by	  suing	  them	  in	  popular	  actions	  that	  are	  commonly	  reckless	  just	  to	  gain	  the	  
monetary	  incentive.229	  	  
Botero’s	  observations	  are	  based	  on	  his	  experience	  as	  a	  legal	  consultant	  for	  this	  
type	  of	  firms.	  In	  this	  role	  he	  noticed	  that	  businesses	  had	  to	  adapt	  their	  behavior	  and	  
procedures	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  popular	  actions.	  Some	  lawsuits,	  he	  argued,	  highlighted	  
mistakes	  caused	  by	  faulty	  procedures	  and	  consequently	  businesses	  were	  forced	  to	  
improve.230	  	  
Congestion	  in	  the	  judiciary	  was	  one	  of	  the	  elements	  analyzed	  by	  the	  Congress	  
when	  passing	  the	  law	  for	  eliminating	  the	  monetary	  incentive.	  In	  the	  report	  for	  second	  
debate	  of	  the	  House	  congestion	  in	  the	  judiciary	  was	  described	  by	  presenting	  some	  
statistics	  from	  the	  Superior	  Council	  for	  the	  Judiciary.	  According	  to	  these	  statistics	  in	  the	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year	  2009-­‐	  2010	  a	  total	  of	  51.361	  constitutional	  actions	  were	  filed,	  and	  23.997	  of	  those	  
were	  popular	  actions.	  The	  congress	  requested	  an	  inventory	  of	  the	  number	  of	  popular	  
actions	  that	  were	  specifically	  under	  study	  of	  the	  administrative	  jurisdiction.	  According	  to	  
this	  inventory	  for	  the	  same	  time	  frame	  the	  administrative	  jurisdiction	  had	  232,889	  cases	  
under	  study	  and	  19,384	  cases	  were	  popular	  actions.231	  	  
After	  reviewing	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  in	  the	  administrative	  jurisdiction	  
representatives	  Adriana	  Franco	  Castaño,	  Rosmery	  Martínez	  Rosales,	  Carlos	  Arturo	  
Correa	  Mojica,	  and	  Fernando	  de	  la	  Peña	  Márquez	  speakers	  of	  the	  draft	  for	  second	  
debate	  in	  the	  House	  concluded:	  	  
	  
“From	  these	  statistics	  the	  only	  possible	  conclusion	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  high	  load	  of	  
litigation	  of	  popular	  actions	  in	  relation	  to	  group	  actions	  which,	  logically,	  reveals	  
the	  perverse	  effect	  of	  the	  economic	  incentive	  as	  a	  legal	  mechanism	  known	  by	  
the	  plaintiffs	  in	  an	  action	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  based	  on	  solidarity	  to	  protect	  
collective	  rights.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  state	  better	  regulations	  that	  could	  
prevent	  or	  at	  least	  reduce	  the	  use	  of	  the	  economic	  incentive	  as	  a	  mechanism	  
that	  could	  diminish	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  lawsuits,	  given	  that	  some	  individuals	  do	  
not	  file	  lawsuits	  out	  of	  a	  social	  concern.”232	  	  
	  
In	  this	  argument	  the	  speaker	  of	  the	  House	  argued	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  were	  
more	  popular	  actions	  than	  group	  actions	  was	  due	  exclusively	  to	  the	  monetary	  incentive.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The	  speaker	  offered	  no	  empirical	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  this	  assertion.	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  
striking	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  speaker’s	  analysis	  is	  on	  whether	  the	  plaintiff	  had	  an	  
honorable	  or	  self-­‐interested	  motive	  rather	  than	  on	  whether	  the	  action	  or	  court	  rulings	  
contributed	  to	  identifying	  and	  addressing	  problems.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  the	  
Congressional	  debate	  it	  seemed	  to	  be	  more	  relevant	  whether	  the	  plaintiff’s	  motivation	  
was	  to	  help	  rather	  than	  the	  actual	  impact	  that	  the	  action	  had.	  This	  focus	  on	  purity	  of	  
motive	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  sharp	  departure	  from	  the	  monetary	  incentive’s	  original	  purpose,	  
which	  was	  to	  improve	  the	  public	  service.	  
The	   Colombian	   Congress	   also	   took	   into	   consideration	   the	   opinion	   of	   NGOs	   in	  
relation	   to	   the	   incentive.	   The	   Corporation	   for	   the	   Excellence	   on	   Justice	   argued	   that	  
although	  the	  monetary	   incentive	  had	  a	  positive	  effect	   it	  was	  necessary	  to	  regulate	  the	  
criteria	  for	  estimating	  the	  sum	  that	  the	  plaintiffs	  received.	   In	  relation	  to	  the	  monetary	  
incentive	  in	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality	  the	  Corporation	  argued	  plaintiffs	  could	  be	  
motivated	   to	   file	   frivolous	   suits	   just	   to	   receive	   an	   economic	   incentive.
233
	   Thus,	   the	  
economic	  incentive	  in	  those	  cases	  could	  have	  a	  negative	  effect.	  
The	  debate	  in	  Congress	  also	  took	  into	  consideration	  a	  survey	  of	  popular	  attitudes	  
that	   had	   been	   conducted	   by	   the	   National	   Department	   for	   Statistics	   in	   2007.
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According	   to	   legislative	   debates	   popular	   actions	   are	   not	   known	   by	   the	   population	   in	  
comparison	   with	   the	   action	   of	   tutelage	   and	   the	   action	   to	   request	   information	   from	  
governmental	  agencies.	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The	  Congress	  just	  focused	  on	  the	  results	  of	  the	  survey	  for	  2007,	  which	  is	  the	  first	  
year	   in	   which	   the	   Dane	   published	   the	   results	   of	   this	   survey.	   According	   to	   the	   same	  
survey	  in	  2011	  44.2%	  of	  the	  interviewees	  have	  heard	  about	  popular	  actions	  while	  87.7%	  
have	   heard	   of	   the	   action	   of	   tutelage	   and	   77.6%	   have	   heard	   about	   the	   action	   to	  
formulate	  petitions	   to	   the	  administration.
235
	   It	   is	   relevant	   that	   in	  2011,	  even	  after	   the	  
monetary	   incentive	   was	   eliminated,	   citizens	   seemed	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   the	   existence	   of	  
popular	  actions	  as	  mechanisms	  for	  protecting	  rights.	  	  
Taking	  all	   these	  elements	   into	  consideration	  the	  Congress	  decided	  to	  eliminate	  
the	  monetary	  incentive.	  The	  Colombian	  Congress	  reached	  this	  decision	  after	  resolving	  a	  
disagreement	  between	  the	  House	  and	  the	  Senate.	  The	  House	  favored	  the	  elimination	  of	  
the	  incentive	  while	  the	  Senate	  leaned	  towards	  reducing	  the	  monetary	  incentive.	  After	  a	  
final	   debate	   among	   members	   of	   the	   two	   chambers	   the	   Congress	   voted	   in	   favor	   of	  
eliminating	  the	  economic	  incentive	  for	  plaintiffs.
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Conclusion	  
This	   chapter	   has	   shown	   that	   the	   Colombian	   Congress	   has	   recognized	   that	   key	  
constitutional	  rights	  are	  not	  self-­‐enforcing	  and	  has	  addressed	  how	  to	  encourage	  private	  
lawsuits	  as	  a	  means	  of	   this	  enforcement.	  Like	   legislatures	   in	  other	  countries,	   including	  
the	   United	   States,	   the	   Colombian	   Congress	   adopted	   a	   statute	   aimed	   at	   facilitating	  
private	   lawsuits	   by	   providing	   litigants	   with	   a	   monetary	   incentive	   to	   help	   cover	   their	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costs.	  But	  then,	  amidst	  growing	  controversy	  over	  these	  lawsuits,	  the	  Congress	  rescinded	  
this	  support.	  
The	   initial	   statute	   of	   popular	   actions	   developed	   the	   procedural	   features	   of	   these	  
actions	   and	   provided	   guidelines	   for	   their	   implementation.	   They	   were	   designed	   to	  
encourage	  people’s	  participation	  in	  order	  to	  enforce	  collective	  rights,	  one	  of	  them	  being	  
administrative	   morality.	   The	   statute	   included	   mechanisms	   for	   supporting	   popular	  
participation	  such	  as	  a	  monetary	  incentive	  in	  cases	  when	  the	  judge	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  
claim.	  Also,	  according	   to	   the	  statute	   the	  suit	  was	  not	   required	  to	   fulfill	   the	   formalities	  
that	  are	  common	   in	  ordinary	  actions,	  and	   the	  plaintiff	   could	   receive	   legal	  advice	   from	  
oversight	  agencies	  when	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  file	  the	  suit.	  	  
When	   analyzing	   the	   legislative	   debates	   it	   is	   noticeable	   that	   foreign	   experiences	  
influenced	   the	   legislation	   on	   this	   topic.	   Legislative	   documents	  mention	   the	   successful	  
experience	   of	   North	   American,	   Latin	   American,	   European,	   and	   Asian	   countries	   in	  
relation	   to	   judicial	   actions	   that	   focused	   on	   protecting	   collective	   rights.	   In	   addition	   to	  
foreign	  experiences	  legislative	  documents	  referred	  to	  popular	  actions	  already	  existent	  in	  
the	  Colombian	   legislation	  emphasizing	  on	  the	  experience	  that	  the	  country	  already	  had	  
with	  similar	  legal	  mechanisms.	  	  	  
After	  some	  years	  of	  implementation	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  popular	  actions	  
focused	  on	  plaintiff’s	  motivations	  for	  filing	  a	  suit.	  In	  this	  debate	  the	  standard	  of	  a	  good	  
citizen	  was	   identified	  with	   an	   altruist	  motivation	   and	   consequently	   the	  motivation	   of	  
receiving	  a	  monetary	  incentive	  was	  considered	  as	  superfluous.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  cases	  
when	   the	   plaintiff	   filed	   suits	   pursuing	  monetary	   compensation	   he	  was	   perceived	   as	   a	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selfish	  and	  opportunist	   individual.	  Another	  element	   that	  was	   taken	   into	   consideration	  
was	  the	  economic	  impact	  of	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  on	  public	  funds.	  In	  the	  debates	  the	  
Congress	   frequently	   referred	   to	   the	   negative	   economic	   effect	   of	   popular	   actions	   over	  
local	   governments,	   specifically	   those	   actions	   related	   to	   administrative	   morality.	  
Regardless	  of	  this	  assertion	  none	  of	  the	  governmental	  or	  legislative	  documents	  analyzed	  
empirical	  data	  that	  quantified	  the	  economic	  impact	  of	  popular	  actions	  on	  public	  funds.	  	  
As	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  debate,	  the	  Congress	  eliminated	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  for	  
plaintiffs.	   My	   interview	   respondents	   unanimously	   agreed	   that	   the	   elimination	   of	   the	  
incentive	  will	  have	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  use	  of	  popular	  actions.	  While	   interviewees	  
recognized	  that	  plaintiffs	  were	  interested	  in	  receiving	  monetary	  compensation	  and	  that	  
some	   of	   them	   have	   engaged	   in	   frivolous	   litigation	   they	   also	   indicated	   that	   popular	  
actions	   have	   brought	   to	   public	   attention	   some	   problems	   that	   were	   hidden	   before.	  
Popular	   actions	   created	   an	  opportunity	   for	   citizens	   to	   legally	   ask	   for	   protection	  when	  
collective	  rights	  are	  violated.	  	  
The	  plaintiffs’	  perspective	  of	  the	  enabling	  legislation	  reveals	  skepticism	  with	  regards	  
the	   real	   potential	   of	   the	   action.	   Although	   the	   statute	   was	   meant	   to	   provide	   a	   real	  
opportunity	   for	   individuals	   to	   check	   governmental	   performance	   García	   and	   Londoño	  
explained	   that	   in	   their	   experience	   in	   popular	   actions	   this	   rarely	   occurs	   because	   the	  
government	   has	   considerable	   power.	   They	   argued	   that	   governmental	   agencies	   have	  
used	  the	  legal	  procedures	  to	  portray	  symbolic	  compliance	  with	  the	  constitution	  and	  the	  
statute	  on	  matters	  related	  to	  collective	  rights.	  In	  other	  words,	  although	  popular	  actions	  
had	   created	   the	   opportunity	   of	   combining	   efforts	   from	   different	   key	   actors	   the	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government	   still	   has	   significant	   power	   over	   some	   stages	   of	   the	   process	   like	   the	  
committee	  for	  verifying	  ruling	  compliance.	  	  
When	   analyzing	   the	   key	   actors	   who	   have	   participated	   in	   the	   debates	   of	   popular	  
actions	   and	   the	   statute	   businesses	   seemed	   to	   have	   an	   important	   voice.	   Fenalco,	   the	  
most	   important	   business	   association,	   participated	   of	   the	   debates	   and	   supported	   the	  
elimination	  of	  the	  incentive.	  Also,	  NGO’s	  like	  Fundepublico	  took	  part	  in	  the	  debate	  and	  
had	  a	   key	   role	   in	   relation	   to	   administrative	  morality.	   This	  NGO	  argued	   in	   favor	  of	   the	  
elimination	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  in	  fact	  the	  definitive	  version	  
of	  the	  statute	  left	  administrative	  morality	  undefined.	  	  
The	   legislative	   debates	   rested	   on	   a	   lack	   of	   a	   systematic	   analysis	   of	   the	   impact	   of	  
popular	   actions.	   In	   1998	   (when	   the	   original	   statute	   passed)	   the	   Congress	   legislated	  
under	   the	   assumption	   of	   making	   popular	   actions	   an	   effective	   mechanism	   of	   popular	  
participation.	   In	  2010,	  when	   the	  monetary	   incentive	  was	  eliminated,	   the	  Congress	  did	  
not	  make	  a	  rigorous	  analysis	  of	  the	   impact	  of	  the	  action	  or	  even	  the	  economic	   impact	  
that	  it	  had	  caused.	  	  
Still,	   based	   on	   the	   experience	   of	   the	  United	   States,	   as	   documented	   by	   the	   studies	  
discussed	   above,	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	   conclude	   that	   eliminating	   the	  monetary	   incentive	  











Chapter	  4:	  The	  Administrative	  code	  and	  popular	  actions	  
	  
In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  1991	  constitutional	  reform	  the	  Congress	  adopted	  one	  other	  
key	  piece	  of	  legislation	  to	  implement	  the	  reform:	  the	  new	  administrative	  code	  (Law	  
1437	  of	  2011).	  The	  administrative	  code	  is	  among	  the	  most	  important	  regulations	  for	  
administrative	  agencies	  and	  was	  adopted	  as	  an	  effort	  at	  modernizing	  the	  administrative	  
jurisdiction	  and	  bureaucratic	  behavior.	  According	  to	  the	  legislators	  modernizing	  public	  
administration	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  application	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  and	  consequently	  
the	  code	  develops	  some	  elements	  of	  the	  new	  causes	  of	  action	  created	  by	  the	  
Constitution.237	  	  
The	  administrative	  code	  includes	  three	  articles	  that	  regulate	  popular	  actions	  and	  
administrative	  morality.	  Article	  3	  provides	  a	  list	  of	  principles	  that	  the	  authorities	  should	  
interpret	  and	  apply	  in	  administrative	  behavior,	  one	  of	  them	  being	  administrative	  
morality.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  definition	  of	  administrative	  morality	  provided	  by	  the	  Colombian	  
legislation.	  Article	  139	  regulates	  the	  action	  to	  overrule	  electoral	  acts	  and	  Article	  144	  
regulates	  the	  action	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  collective	  rights	  and	  interests	  (popular	  
actions).	  These	  two	  norms	  reduced	  the	  authority	  of	  judges	  in	  popular	  actions	  to	  
overrule	  administrative	  regulations,	  contracts,	  or	  electoral	  acts	  even	  if	  they	  are	  related	  
to	  a	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  these	  cases	  the	  judge	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  
demand	  the	  necessary	  behaviors	  to	  stop	  the	  harm	  or	  threat	  to	  administrative	  morality	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  "Exposición	  De	  Motivos	  Ley	  1437	  ",	  	  (Gaceta	  del	  Congreso	  No.	  11732009).	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but	  the	  judge	  cannot	  refer	  to	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  administrative	  regulation,	  contract,	  or	  
electoral	  act.	  My	  analysis	  will	  focus	  specifically	  on	  these	  provisions.	  	  
These	  regulations	  have	  profound	  effects	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  
morality.	  The	  Constitution	  has	  been	  in	  place	  for	  twenty	  years	  and	  in	  this	  time	  frame	  
different	  actors	  (legislators,	  courts,	  plaintiffs,	  administrative	  agencies,	  media,	  and	  civil	  
society	  organizations)	  have	  developed	  a	  notion	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  1998,	  as	  
we	  saw	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  Congress	  adopted	  a	  statute	  for	  popular	  actions	  that	  
aimed	  to	  facilitate	  popular	  litigation	  regarding	  administrative	  morality	  by	  providing	  a	  
financial	  incentive	  to	  file	  these	  lawsuits.	  Then	  in	  2010,	  as	  the	  previous	  chapter	  also	  
showed,	  Congress	  adopted	  a	  statute	  that	  eliminated	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  for	  
plaintiffs	  in	  popular	  actions.	  This	  norm	  is	  a	  setback	  in	  the	  development	  of	  popular	  
actions	  with	  regards	  the	  high	  hopes	  that	  the	  framers	  put	  in	  these	  actions.	  	  
Against	  this	  backdrop	  of	  previous	  legislative	  action,	  and	  twenty	  years	  after	  
adoption	  of	  the	  1991	  constitution,	  the	  Congress	  passed	  the	  new	  administrative	  code	  
that	  brings	  essential	  elements	  about	  popular	  actions	  and	  administrative	  morality.	  How	  
the	  norms	  of	  the	  code	  interact	  with	  the	  existent	  regulatory	  frame	  for	  popular	  actions	  is	  
the	  topic	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  
With	  the	  purpose	  of	  analyzing	  the	  new	  administrative	  code	  I	  study	  legislative	  and	  
governmental	  documents	  related	  to	  its	  approval.	  238	  I	  also	  analyze	  interviews	  with	  actors	  
with	  broad	  experience	  in	  litigation	  of	  popular	  actions:	  one	  plaintiff	  (Juan	  Carlos	  Garcia),	  
one	  administrator	  (Camilo	  Orrego),	  two	  scholars	  and	  practitioners	  (Luis	  Felipe	  Botero	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  A	  full	  list	  of	  these	  gazettes	  is	  in	  Appendix	  B.	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and	  Nicolás	  Polanía),	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  NGO	  Transparency	  Colombia	  (Marcela	  
Restrepo).	  	  
Following	  the	  approach	  of	  Chapter	  3,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  consider	  the	  new	  
administrative	  code	  in	  light	  of	  theories	  of	  the	  legislative	  development	  and	  mobilization	  
of	  constitutional	  rights.	  I	  summarized	  these	  theories	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  and	  will	  not	  
repeat	  that	  discussion	  here	  other	  than	  to	  note	  that	  it	  is	  widely	  understood	  by	  scholars	  of	  
constitutional	  rights	  that	  enforcement	  of	  these	  rights	  is	  facilitated	  by	  legislative	  
enactments	  that	  lower	  the	  financial	  cost	  of	  filing	  these	  lawsuits.239	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  
observation,	  this	  chapter	  analyzes	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  code,	  the	  parties	  that	  
participated	  in	  legislative	  debates,	  and	  the	  articles	  of	  the	  code	  that	  will	  impact	  litigation	  
in	  administrative	  morality.	  	  	  
	  
History	  of	  the	  Administrative	  code	  
The	  idea	  of	  passing	  a	  new	  Administrative	  code	  was	  born	  in	  Colombia’s	  
administrative	  courts.	  Judges	  at	  different	  levels	  (administrative	  judges,	  tribunals,	  and	  
the	  Council	  of	  state)	  developed	  the	  concept	  of	  “Re-­‐thinking	  the	  administrative	  
jurisdiction”	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  making	  it	  more	  capable	  of	  facing	  current	  challenges.240	  	  
The	  former	  Administrative	  code	  was	  framed	  in	  specific	  historical	  circumstances241	  and	  
by	  2010	  it	  seemed	  necessary	  to	  formulate	  new	  rules	  and	  structures	  for	  the	  
administrative	  jurisdiction.	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  Farhang,	  The	  Litigation	  State:	  Public	  Regulation	  and	  Private	  Lawsuits	  in	  the	  United	  States;	  Epp,	  The	  
Rights	  Revolution:	  Lawyers,	  Activists,	  and	  Supreme	  Courts	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective.	  
240	  "Exposición	  De	  Motivos	  Ley	  1437	  ",	  	  56.	  
241	  Presidencia	  de	  la	  República	  de	  Colombia,	  "Decreto	  Ley	  01,"	  in	  Por	  el	  cual	  se	  reforma	  el	  Código	  
Contencioso	  Administrativo	  (Bogotá1984).	  
101	  
	  
In	  the	  document	  that	  explains	  the	  draft	  of	  the	  new	  Administrative	  code,	  judges	  
and	  members	  of	  the	  government	  argued	  that	  since	  the	  previous	  administrative	  code	  
passed	  four	  major	  changes	  had	  taken	  place,	  changing	  considerably	  social	  life	  and	  the	  
legal	  practice.	  These	  four	  changes	  demanded	  a	  new	  legal	  scheme	  for	  the	  administrative	  
jurisdiction.242	  	  
First,	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  government	  and	  the	  state	  had	  changed	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  globalization.	  A	  globalized	  world	  had	  implied	  the	  standardization	  of	  
social,	  political,	  technological,	  and	  cultural	  processes,	  affecting	  the	  relationship	  between	  
the	  government	  and	  the	  people.	  Also,	  new	  technologies	  had	  modified	  the	  traditional	  
role	  of	  the	  government	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  people.243	  Second,	  the	  constitution	  
of	  1991	  changed	  the	  role	  and	  expectations	  of	  the	  government	  in	  social	  life.	  The	  
constitution	  of	  1991	  changed	  the	  paradigm	  of	  legality	  from	  being	  based	  on	  laws	  and	  
statutes	  to	  a	  paradigm	  in	  which	  the	  constitution	  was	  the	  most	  important	  source	  of	  
rights.	  This	  shift	  in	  paradigm	  posed	  challenges	  on	  public	  administration	  because	  it	  
meant	  a	  change	  in	  bureaucratic	  behavior,	  from	  focusing	  in	  the	  legislation	  to	  focusing	  on	  
constitutional	  principles.	  These	  principles	  implied	  a	  new	  type	  of	  accountability	  that	  
public	  administrators	  were	  not	  familiar	  with	  and	  consequently	  a	  new	  administrative	  
code	  was	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  this	  new	  type	  of	  accountability.244	  Third,	  the	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  "Exposición	  De	  Motivos	  Ley	  1437	  ".	  
243	  Ibid.,	  53.	  
244	  Ibid.,	  55.	  Specifically	  the	  principles	  of	  public	  administration	  stated	  in	  article	  209244	  of	  the	  
constitution	  demanded	  from	  public	  authorities	  the	  commitment	  to	  these	  principles.	  These	  principles	  
were	  not	  entirely	  new	  to	  the	  Colombian	  legal	  system	  but	  they	  were	  perceived	  as	  aspirations	  more	  
than	  legal	  obligations.	  The	  constitution	  of	  1991	  created	  judicial	  actions	  to	  enforce	  these	  principles.	  
Administrative	  morality	  is	  one	  of	  these	  principles.	  	  
The	  new	  role	  of	  the	  government	  was	  also	  mentioned	  in	  documents	  and	  drafts	  of	  the	  code	  while	  the	  
legislative	  process	  developed.	  For	  instance	  when	  the	  Senate	  first	  debated	  the	  code,	  Senators	  argued	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structure	  of	  administrative	  judges	  and	  courts	  had	  changed	  since	  the	  former	  code	  
passed.	  Originally	  Administrative	  Tribunals	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  were	  the	  organs	  
with	  authority	  to	  rule	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  governmental	  services	  were	  involved.	  Tribunals	  
would	  work	  by	  regions	  of	  the	  territory	  while	  the	  Council	  would	  work	  as	  an	  appellate	  
court	  for	  the	  entire	  territory.245	  After	  several	  years	  of	  development,	  in	  2006	  
administrative	  judges	  were	  created	  and	  started	  performing	  as	  first	  instance	  judges,	  
changing	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Tribunals	  into	  appellate	  courts.246	  Thus,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  
develop	  new	  regulations	  for	  judges,	  Tribunals,	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  State.	  Fourth,	  judicial	  
congestion	  had	  been	  growing	  with	  serious	  negative	  effects	  for	  the	  legal	  system.	  
Consequently,	  the	  new	  administrative	  code	  could	  contribute	  to	  improve	  this	  
situation.247	  	  
These	  four	  factors	  supported	  the	  initiative	  of	  crafting	  a	  new	  administrative	  code	  
with	  the	  final	  purpose	  of	  modernizing	  the	  Colombian	  administrative	  law.248	  The	  
document	  that	  explains	  the	  draft	  of	  the	  code	  gives	  signs	  of	  the	  negative	  perception	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  and	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  have	  expanded	  the	  
obligations	  of	  the	  government.	  An	  example	  of	  these	  obligations	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  “essential	  minimum”	  
developed	  by	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  and	  that	  demands	  from	  the	  government	  to	  guarantee	  to	  the	  
people	  access	  to	  all	  the	  goods	  and	  services	  that	  would	  need	  to	  have	  a	  dignified	  living.	  According	  to	  
the	  Senate	  these	  demands	  imply	  a	  new	  role	  of	  the	  government	  that	  should	  be	  reflected	  in	  modern	  
legal	  regulations	  for	  public	  administration.	  NationalPress,	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  1210,"	  
(Bogotá2009),	  2.	  	  
245	  Presidencia	  de	  la	  República	  de	  Colombia,	  "Decreto	  Ley	  01."	  Article	  82.	  	  
246	  Consejo	  de	  Estado,	  	  http://www.consejodeestado.gov.co/.	  
247	  "Exposición	  De	  Motivos	  Ley	  1437	  ",	  	  57.	  
248	  During	  the	  process	  of	  legislative	  approval	  of	  the	  code	  sometimes	  modernization	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  
matter	  of	  survival	  of	  administrative	  law.	  The	  document	  that	  presented	  the	  code	  to	  the	  Senate	  for	  its	  
first	  debate	  states:	  “Globalization	  of	  the	  economy	  leads	  to	  globalization	  of	  the	  legal	  system…	  Those	  
countries	  that	  do	  not	  face	  this	  direction	  take	  the	  risk	  that	  legal	  actors	  chose	  to	  go	  to	  international	  
arbitration,	  contracts,	  international	  courts	  or	  chamber	  for	  alternative	  dispute	  resolution,	  and	  
consequently	  they	  will	  end	  up	  throwing	  away	  the	  internal	  administrative	  law	  of	  those	  who	  are	  
resisting	  to	  change”	  NationalPress,	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  1210."	  In	  this	  case,	  alternative	  dispute	  
resolution	  and	  private	  mechanisms	  to	  solve	  conflicts	  are	  perceived	  as	  threats	  for	  traditional	  




public	  administration	  held	  by	  judges	  and	  members	  of	  the	  government.249	  For	  instance,	  
when	  referring	  to	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  and	  how	  it	  changed	  the	  standards	  for	  public	  
administration,	  the	  document	  argues	  that	  public	  administrators	  with	  their	  performance	  
violate	  and	  ignore	  some	  constitutional	  rights	  of	  the	  people.	  Specifically	  the	  document	  
refers	  to	  the	  omission	  of	  the	  administration	  when	  it	  does	  not	  replying	  citizens’	  requests	  
or	  when	  it	  does	  it	  but	  not	  in	  a	  timely	  manner.	  According	  to	  this	  draft	  the	  Colombian	  
administration	  has	  set	  a	  burden	  on	  people’s	  shoulders	  by	  leaving	  them	  no	  other	  
alternative	  than	  filing	  lawsuits	  so	  judges	  would	  grant	  what	  the	  administration	  
neglected.250	  This	  draft	  crafted	  by	  judges	  and	  the	  government	  suggests	  that	  litigation	  is	  
a	  consequence	  of	  governmental	  mistakes.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  judges	  who	  prepared	  the	  
draft	  of	  the	  new	  administrative	  code	  worked	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  they	  could	  use	  
the	  new	  institutional	  frame	  (causes	  of	  action,	  fundamental	  rights,	  among	  others)	  to	  do	  
what	  the	  administration	  wrongfully	  has	  failed	  to	  do.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  draft	  the	  new	  administrative	  code	  the	  executive	  created	  a	  
commission	  with	  justices	  from	  two	  high	  courts,	  two	  governmental	  ministers,	  and	  two	  
additional	  representatives	  of	  the	  government.	  This	  commission	  received	  advice	  from	  
the	  French	  Administrative	  Council	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  learning	  about	  current	  legal	  
frames	  in	  Europe.	  According	  to	  the	  draft	  of	  the	  new	  administrative	  code,	  the	  Colombian	  
legal	  system	  was	  framed	  by	  following	  the	  French	  system,	  and	  consequently	  learning	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from	  its	  recent	  developments	  seemed	  to	  be	  necessary	  in	  the	  process	  of	  modernizing	  the	  
Administrative	  jurisdiction.251	  	  
In	  order	  to	  modernize	  rules	  and	  structures	  administrative	  judges	  gathered	  in	  
meetings	  and	  forums	  since	  2007.	  Judges	  and	  members	  from	  Tribunals	  from	  all	  around	  
the	  country	  participated	  in	  these	  events	  and	  assessed	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  
administrative	  jurisdiction.	  They	  also	  analyzed	  new	  sources	  for	  funding	  of	  the	  
jurisdiction	  and	  mechanisms	  to	  improve	  judicial	  congestion.	  When	  these	  debates	  
developed	  further	  the	  judges	  called	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  executive	  in	  order	  to	  include	  
the	  reform	  of	  the	  administrative	  jurisdiction	  in	  the	  political	  agenda.	  The	  executive	  
agreed	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  modernizing	  the	  administrative	  jurisdiction	  through	  a	  
legislative	  reform.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  executive	  supported	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “structural	  
legislative	  reform”	  leading	  to	  the	  approval	  of	  a	  new	  administrative	  code.252	  
Significantly,	  this	  document	  also	  aims	  to	  strengthen	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
administrative	  courts	  in	  general	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  State,	  the	  apex	  administrative	  court,	  
in	  particular.	  After	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  was	  framed	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  was	  
perceived	  as	  progressive	  and	  liberal	  while	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  courts,	  including	  the	  Council	  of	  
State,	  were	  perceived	  as	  conservative.	  This	  document	  argues	  that	  the	  Constitution	  of	  
1991	  also	  changed	  the	  goals	  and	  character	  of	  the	  administrative	  jurisdiction	  and	  this	  
jurisdiction	  is	  capable	  of	  going	  beyond	  legality	  to	  grant	  constitutional	  rights.	  
Traditionally	  the	  administrative	  jurisdiction	  focused	  on	  analyzing	  the	  legality	  of	  
administrative	  regulations	  and	  behaviors	  and	  this	  was	  perceived	  as	  conservative	  since	  





administrative	  judges	  supposedly	  focused	  on	  protecting	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  instead	  of	  
individual	  rights.	  In	  order	  to	  change	  this	  perception,	  judges	  who	  crafted	  the	  draft	  of	  the	  
Administrative	  code	  argued	  that	  after	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  administrative	  judges	  
started	  focusing	  on	  protecting	  constitutional	  rights	  for	  the	  people.	  The	  document	  argues	  
that	  the	  new	  constitutional	  causes	  of	  action,	  being	  highly	  informal	  and	  flexible,	  
motivated	  a	  change	  in	  judges’	  rulings	  and	  allowed	  them	  to	  focus	  on	  individual	  rights	  
rather	  than	  mere	  legality.253	  Thus,	  the	  new	  administrative	  code	  was	  crafted	  with	  the	  
intention	  of	  improving	  people’s	  perception	  of	  administrative	  judges.	  
	  
Legislative	  approval	  of	  the	  Administrative	  code	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  arguments	  that	  the	  Colombian	  Congress	  took	  
into	  consideration	  when	  passing	  the	  Administrative	  code.	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  official	  
publications	  about	  the	  drafts	  in	  progress	  of	  the	  Administrative	  Code	  after	  each	  session	  
of	  debate.	  	  
The	  first	  draft	  of	  the	  Administrative	  code	  provided	  a	  longer	  definition	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  than	  the	  one	  in	  the	  final	  version.	  According	  to	  this	  draft,	  the	  
principle	  of	  morality	  implies	  that	  administrative	  behaviors	  should	  follow	  rules	  of	  public	  
ethics	  and	  morals	  and	  that	  consequently	  public	  servants	  should	  behave	  with	  rectitude	  
and	  honesty.	  Also,	  this	  definition	  of	  Administrative	  morality	  demanded	  from	  public	  
authorities	  the	  adoption	  of	  codes	  of	  ethics	  and	  good	  government.254	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  NationalPress,	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  1173,"	  in	  Project	  198	  of	  2009	  (Bogotá2009).	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By	  including	  the	  term	  “public	  ethics”	  this	  document	  added	  an	  additional	  element	  
to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Administrative	  morality.	  This	  element	  placed	  administrative	  
behavior	  in	  the	  context	  not	  of	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  morals	  but	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ethical	  
behavior255.	  In	  my	  interview	  with	  the	  director	  for	  public	  sector	  in	  the	  NGO	  Transparency	  
Colombia	  she	  argued	  that	  the	  term	  public	  ethics	  could	  bring	  a	  more	  accurate	  meaning	  
because	  it	  avoids	  the	  reference	  to	  religious	  morals.	  Also,	  the	  term	  public	  ethics	  is	  used	  
in	  the	  international	  context	  in	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  campaign.256	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  the	  final	  
version	  of	  the	  code	  eliminated	  the	  reference	  to	  public	  ethics.	  	  
When	  referring	  to	  popular	  actions	  the	  draft	  already	  stated	  that	  when	  the	  
violation	  of	  collective	  rights	  had	  origins	  on	  the	  behavior	  of	  a	  public	  agency	  it	  would	  be	  
possible	  to	  file	  a	  popular	  action	  to	  protect	  this	  right,	  even	  if	  the	  violation	  was	  related	  to	  
an	  administrative	  regulation	  or	  a	  public	  contract.	  This	  norm	  also	  banned	  the	  judge	  from	  
overruling	  the	  administrative	  regulation	  or	  contract	  that	  could	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  
violation	  of	  the	  collective	  right257.	  	  This	  version	  of	  the	  document	  did	  not	  emphasize	  the	  
limit	  for	  the	  judge	  in	  popular	  actions	  when	  analyzing	  electoral	  administrative	  
regulations.258	  	  
During	  the	  first	  debate	  of	  the	  code	  in	  the	  Senate	  it	  was	  proposed	  to	  expand	  the	  
definition	  of	  Administrative	  morality.	  The	  proposed	  definition	  stated:	  “Due	  to	  the	  
principle	  of	  administrative	  morality	  all	  public	  employees	  and	  private	  contractors	  who	  
perform	  public	  functions	  are	  obliged	  to	  perform	  always	  with	  rectitude	  and	  honesty,	  and	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  "Interview	  Marcela	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  NationalPress,	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  1173,"	  Art	  141.	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by	  following	  parameters	  of	  good	  administration.	  Thus,	  the	  administrative	  behavior	  
should	  conform	  not	  only	  to	  strict	  legality	  but	  also	  to	  ethical	  standards	  and	  public	  morals,	  
particularly	  in	  managing	  and	  taking	  care	  of	  public	  funds;	  avoiding	  the	  expedition	  and	  
implementation	  of	  illegal	  administrative	  acts.	  In	  fulfillment	  of	  this	  principle	  the	  
authorities	  would	  adopt	  codes	  of	  ethics	  and	  good	  government.”259	  	  
This	  norm	  included	  new	  elements	  such	  as	  mentioning	  private	  contractors	  as	  
implementers	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  It	  also	  referred	  to	  “good	  administration”	  and	  
“public	  funds”	  like	  additional	  criteria	  in	  the	  application	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  
Finally,	  this	  draft	  made	  reference	  to	  going	  beyond	  strict	  legality	  in	  the	  public	  service	  in	  
order	  to	  apply	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  proposition,	  the	  Senate	  passed	  in	  
first	  debate	  a	  simpler	  version	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  This	  version	  
took	  out	  the	  concepts	  of	  “good	  administration”,	  “strict	  legality”,	  public	  funds,	  and	  the	  
avoidance	  of	  illegal	  acts.260	  	  
The	  House	  of	  Representatives	  debated	  the	  document	  approved	  by	  the	  Senate.	  
When	  the	  House	  analyzed	  the	  draft	  of	  the	  code	  it	  took	  into	  consideration	  comments	  
sent	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  State,	  some	  scholars,	  and	  some	  people	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
document.	  These	  comments	  reflect	  the	  interest	  of	  different	  stakeholders	  not	  only	  when	  
crafting	  the	  draft	  of	  the	  code	  but	  also	  during	  the	  legislative	  approval.261	  	  	  
During	  the	  first	  debate	  the	  House	  passed	  a	  simpler	  definition	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  by	  stating:	  “Due	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  administrative	  morality	  all	  the	  people	  and	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  "Congressional	  Gazette	  264,"	  (Bogotá2010).	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  Ibid.,	  73.	  
261	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  683,"	  (Bogotá2010).	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  951,"	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the	  public	  employees	  are	  obliged	  to	  perform	  with	  rectitude,	  loyalty,	  and	  honesty	  in	  
administrative	  behavior.”262	  This	  definition	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  included	  in	  the	  definitive	  
version	  of	  the	  code	  and	  it	  focuses	  on	  principles	  that	  resemble	  administrative	  morality	  
such	  as	  rectitude,	  loyalty,	  and	  honesty.	  This	  draft	  not	  only	  focuses	  on	  public	  officials	  and	  
private	  contractors	  but	  it	  opens	  the	  door	  for	  ordinary	  citizens	  to	  file	  lawsuits	  to	  enforce	  
administrative	  morality.263	  	  
During	  the	  first	  debate	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  included	  a	  new	  paragraph	  
in	  the	  article	  about	  popular	  actions.	  According	  to	  this	  norm,	  before	  filing	  a	  lawsuit	  the	  
plaintiff	  should	  request	  the	  authority	  or	  the	  private	  contractor	  to	  adopt	  actions	  in	  order	  
to	  protect	  the	  collective	  right	  under	  threat.	  If	  the	  authority	  or	  private	  contractor	  does	  
not	  respond	  to	  the	  request	  within	  15	  days	  then	  the	  plaintiff	  could	  file	  the	  lawsuit.264	  	  
This	  new	  requirement	  gives	  the	  administration	  the	  opportunity	  of	  improving	  its	  
behavior	  or	  correcting	  a	  mistake	  before	  the	  judicial	  process	  starts.	  	  
This	  requirement	  could	  be	  a	  valuable	  opportunity	  for	  the	  administration	  
especially	  if	  public	  agents	  perceive	  popular	  actions	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  improve	  public	  
services	  rather	  than	  a	  competition	  against	  the	  people.	  In	  my	  interview	  with	  Orrego,	  
former	  head	  legal	  counsel	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Bogota,	  he	  referred	  to	  his	  experience	  as	  the	  
legal	  director	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Bogotá	  in	  relation	  to	  popular	  actions.	  He	  alluded	  to	  the	  
hearing	  (audiencia	  de	  pacto	  de	  cumplimiento)	  that	  takes	  place	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  
popular	  action	  in	  which	  the	  parties	  try	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  in	  relation	  to	  the	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  "Congressional	  Gazette	  683."	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  951."	  
263	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  683."	  "Congressional	  Gazette	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264	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  951."	  This	  norm	  states	  that	  exceptionally	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  entitled	  to	  file	  a	  
lawsuit	  without	  requesting	  an	  action	  from	  the	  authority	  when	  there	  is	  a	  threat	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  right.	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protection	  of	  collective	  rights.	  He	  argued:	  “I	  say	  that	  when	  you	  are	  sued	  in	  a	  popular	  
action	  it	  is	  an	  opportunity	  of	  learning	  about	  how	  do	  people	  and	  society	  see	  you	  and	  they	  
tell	  you,	  hey	  look,	  there	  are	  not	  street	  signs	  here	  so	  cars	  are	  running	  over	  people,	  or	  the	  
city	  is	  not	  picking	  up	  trash	  here,	  or	  there	  is	  an	  electricity	  wire	  loose	  and	  it’s	  going	  to	  
electrocute	  somebody.	  It	  is	  an	  opportunity	  to	  improve.”265	  If	  public	  agents	  perceive	  
popular	  actions	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  improve	  their	  processes	  and	  grant	  a	  better	  service	  
to	  the	  people,	  then	  the	  request	  of	  a	  plaintiff	  before	  filing	  a	  lawsuit	  is	  an	  ideal	  scenario	  to	  
save	  resources	  (costs	  and	  time	  related	  to	  litigation)	  that	  could	  be	  invested	  in	  protecting	  
collective	  rights.	  	  
Orrego	  argued	  that	  the	  administration	  is	  not	  always	  aware	  of	  where	  the	  
problems	  are	  and	  that	  popular	  actions	  could	  be	  an	  opportunity	  for	  collaboration	  
between	  plaintiffs	  and	  the	  administration.	  “…	  This	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  counterparts	  but	  
this	  is	  about	  protecting	  rights.	  The	  citizen	  points	  out:	  you	  with	  your	  action	  or	  inaction	  
are	  threatening	  or	  harming	  a	  right.	  	  If	  as	  a	  rule	  of	  behavior	  I	  am	  supposed	  to	  protect	  
rights	  and	  among	  them	  collective	  rights,	  then	  when	  the	  citizen	  tells	  me	  there	  is	  a	  
violation	  I	  am	  supposed	  to	  go	  and	  make	  it	  right.	  The	  thing	  is	  that	  one	  does	  not	  know	  all	  
the	  risks	  that	  exist	  against	  collective	  rights…”266	  Thus	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  Orrego	  popular	  
actions	  do	  not	  depict	  the	  traditional	  example	  of	  litigation	  in	  which	  two	  parties	  confront	  
each	  other	  and	  one	  wins	  and	  the	  other	  loses.	  This	  is	  not	  about	  the	  government	  against	  
the	  people	  but	  about	  the	  government	  and	  the	  people	  collaborating	  to	  protect	  collective	  
rights.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Orrego	  presents	  one	  positive	  perspective	  of	  popular	  actions	  and	  their	  possible	  
impact	  on	  public	  administration,	  but	  other	  stakeholders	  perceive	  them	  differently.	  In	  my	  
interview	  with	  Juan	  Carlos	  Garcia	  he	  described	  his	  experience	  as	  a	  popular	  actor	  
(litigator)	  as	  frustrating.	  He	  argued:	  	  
“…	  we	  decided	  to	  be	  popular	  actors	  because	  we	  really	  thought	  that	  these	  
actions	  had	  high	  impact,	  that	  was	  the	  only	  thing	  we	  wanted	  to	  do.	  Yes,	  
we	  were	  doing	  it,	  and	  getting	  monetary	  compensation	  motivated	  us,	  but	  
we	  were	  doing	  it	  in	  pursue	  of	  nice	  things;	  but	  the	  answer	  of	  the	  tribunals	  
was	  completely	  inequitable,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  won	  the	  cases.	  
Sadly,	  what	  I	  understood	  out	  of	  the	  rulings	  was	  that	  …	  the	  people	  were	  
winning	  these	  cases	  because	  the	  administration	  was	  not	  complying	  with	  
its	  functions.	  The	  governmental	  inefficiency	  generated	  convictions	  but	  
rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  what	  the	  administration	  should	  improve	  the	  
solution	  was	  to	  keep	  doing	  the	  same	  things	  and	  these	  things	  are	  
violations	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  entire	  community	  due	  to	  the	  inefficiency	  of	  
public	  administration.	  I	  think	  that	  this	  reasoning	  is	  completely	  stupid	  and	  
hum	  if	  I	  were	  the	  administration	  I	  would	  invest	  on	  prevention	  even	  if	  it	  
were	  costly	  rather	  than	  keep	  paying	  little	  by	  little…	  So	  that	  was	  very	  
disappointing	  on	  the	  judiciary.”267	  	  
	  
Garcia’s	  disappointment	  is	  noticeable	  in	  phrases	  when	  he	  contrasts	  what	  he	  
wanted	  to	  achieve	  when	  decided	  to	  be	  a	  popular	  actor	  and	  the	  high	  purposes	  he	  
wanted	  to	  serve	  with	  the	  discouraging	  answer	  of	  the	  judges	  in	  popular	  actions.	  He	  refers	  
to	  “high	  impact”,	  “doing	  nice	  things”,	  and	  he	  even	  acknowledges	  his	  monetary	  
motivation	  by	  almost	  apologizing	  for	  this	  economic	  interest.	  Garcia’s	  disappointment	  
focuses	  on	  two	  aspects	  of	  popular	  actions.	  One	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  focuses	  on	  the	  
judiciary	  and	  the	  simplistic	  rulings	  they	  made	  in	  popular	  actions.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  he	  
focuses	  on	  the	  inefficiency	  of	  the	  Colombian	  public	  administration.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267	  "Interview	  Juan	  Carlos	  Garcia."	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In	  relation	  to	  the	  judiciary,	  during	  the	  interview	  he	  referred	  to	  the	  high	  cost	  
related	  to	  filing	  a	  popular	  action	  and	  the	  costs	  involved	  in	  pursuing	  this	  type	  of	  action.	  
These	  costs	  are	  never	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  judge	  and	  to	  make	  things	  worse,	  according	  
this	  plaintiff,	  the	  ruling	  do	  not	  solve	  the	  real	  problem	  that	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  lawsuit.	  
These	  seem	  to	  be	  symbolic	  rulings	  that	  won’t	  improve	  governmental	  performance.	  
When	  he	  referred	  to	  the	  governmental	  performance	  he	  also	  revealed	  disappointment.	  
He	  argued	  that	  there	  could	  be	  a	  very	  good	  opportunity	  for	  the	  Colombian	  public	  
administration	  in	  popular	  actions	  to	  identify	  failures	  in	  processes	  in	  order	  to	  make	  
things	  better.	  	  In	  his	  opinion,	  instead	  of	  taking	  advantage	  of	  this	  opportunity	  the	  
government	  keeps	  paying	  monetary	  compensations	  in	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  because	  
there	  is	  no	  improvement	  implemented	  as	  a	  consequence	  popular	  actions.	  	  
Although	  Garcia	  agrees	  with	  the	  Orrego	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  opportunity	  that	  
popular	  actions	  provide	  to	  governmental	  agencies,	  Garcia	  is	  more	  skeptical	  of	  the	  use	  of	  
this	  opportunity.	  In	  his	  experience,	  governmental	  agencies	  are	  not	  learning	  from	  what	  
popular	  actors	  point	  out	  as	  faulty	  behavior	  but	  they	  keep	  doing	  the	  same	  things,	  and	  
consequently	  governmental	  agencies	  keep	  being	  sued	  and	  losing	  in	  cases	  for	  popular	  
actions.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  if	  administrative	  agencies	  are	  not	  taking	  advantage	  of	  this	  
opportunity	  to	  improve,	  then	  the	  requirement	  of	  filing	  a	  complaint	  directly	  against	  the	  
governmental	  agency	  before	  filing	  a	  popular	  action	  might	  not	  make	  a	  difference.	  	  
The	  final	  version	  of	  the	  code	  was	  approved	  by	  a	  commission	  for	  conciliation	  with	  
members	  of	  the	  Senate	  and	  the	  House.268	  The	  code	  kept	  the	  shorter	  version	  of	  the	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  "Congressional	  Gazette	  1075,"	  (Bogotá2010).	  "Congressional	  Gazette	  1072,"	  (Bogotá2010).	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definition	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  stated	  that	  the	  judge	  in	  popular	  actions	  could	  
not	  overrule	  administrative	  regulations	  or	  public	  contracts.269	  Also,	  the	  code	  kept	  the	  
requirement	  of	  before	  filing	  a	  popular	  action,	  plaintiffs	  should	  request	  directly	  to	  the	  
administrative	  agency	  to	  stop	  the	  violation	  of	  the	  collective	  right	  or	  to	  develop	  actions	  
to	  protect	  it.	  	  
	  
Structure	  of	  the	  administrative	  code	  
On	  its	  first	  articles	  the	  code	  states	  the	  purpose,	  scope,	  and	  principles	  of	  public	  
administration.	  Specifically,	  article	  3	  states	  that	  all	  authorities	  should	  interpret	  and	  
apply	  the	  norms	  of	  the	  code	  and	  the	  administrative	  procedures	  in	  light	  of	  constitutional	  
principles,	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  administrative	  code,	  and	  the	  other	  principles	  in	  specific	  
regulations.	  Specifically	  the	  code	  refers	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  due	  process,	  equality,	  
impartiality,	  good	  faith,	  morality,	  participation,	  responsibility,	  transparency,	  publicity,	  
coordination,	  efficacy,	  economy,	  and	  celerity270.	  	  
The	  Administrative	  code	  is	  the	  first	  legislative	  norm	  that	  defines	  administrative	  
morality.	  The	  code	  states:	  “5.	  Through	  the	  principle	  of	  morality,	  all	  individuals	  and	  
public	  servants	  are	  obliged	  to	  perform	  with	  rectitude,	  loyalty,	  and	  honesty	  in	  
administrative	  behavior.”271	  This	  definition	  refers	  to	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  
principle.	  It	  uses	  the	  same	  terms	  as	  article	  209	  of	  the	  constitution.	  	  This	  suggests	  an	  
obligation	  for	  public	  agents	  to	  behave	  by	  following	  ethical	  standards	  of	  rectitude,	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  The	  final	  version	  of	  the	  code	  was	  published	  in:	  "Official	  Journal	  47956,"	  (Bogotá2011).	  
"Congressional	  Gazette	  12,"	  (Bogotá2011).	  
270	  Colombia,	  "Código	  De	  Procedimiento	  Administrativo	  Y	  De	  Lo	  Contencioso."	  
271Ibid.	  Article	  3,	  num	  5.	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loyalty,	  and	  honesty.	  This	  principle	  implies	  an	  obligation	  for	  public	  agents	  to	  behave	  
ethically,	  and	  it	  also	  grants	  individuals	  a	  right	  to	  demand	  from	  public	  agents	  the	  
application	  of	  these	  ethical	  standards	  and	  enforce	  this	  right	  in	  court.	  	  
Although	  this	  definition	  provides	  some	  elements	  clarifying	  the	  range	  of	  
application	  for	  administrative	  morality,	  these	  elements	  are	  still	  vague.	  The	  code	  defines	  
administrative	  morality	  in	  terms	  of	  other	  values	  such	  as	  rectitude,	  loyalty,	  and	  honesty,	  
which	  are	  broad	  and	  non-­‐concrete.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  the	  essence	  
of	  this	  new	  legal	  principle	  is	  its	  vagueness.	  Some	  might	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  a	  virtue	  since	  
this	  principle	  aims	  to	  address	  all	  manner	  of	  administrative	  actions	  and	  procedures,	  and	  
to	  do	  so	  vagueness	  or	  generality	  is	  desirable.	  While	  this	  is	  true,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  collective	  rights	  the	  constitution	  created	  entitlements	  for	  
the	  people	  to	  file	  a	  lawsuit	  against	  governmental	  agencies	  and	  these	  lawsuits	  imply	  
specific	  obligations	  for	  administrative	  agencies.	  How	  judges	  in	  particular	  cases	  are	  to	  
give	  specific	  and	  concrete	  meaning	  to	  this	  vague	  and	  general	  principle	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  
the	  problem.	  They	  will	  necessarily	  have	  wide	  discretion	  to	  supply	  this	  meaning.	  	  
In	  one	  of	  my	  interviews	  to	  Nicolás	  Polanía,	  one	  of	  the	  few	  scholars	  who	  has	  done	  
extensive	  research	  on	  administrative	  morality,	  referred	  to	  the	  definition	  provided	  by	  the	  
code	  arguing	  that	  it	  was	  a	  mistake.272	  	  He	  suggested,	  first,	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	  define	  
administrative	  morality	  is	  an	  impossible	  task.	  Essentially	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  identify	  
characteristics	  of	  administrative	  morality	  but	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  define	  it	  since	  by	  
defining	  it	  one	  may	  set	  boundaries	  to	  the	  concept.	  Concepts	  like	  good	  faith	  and	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  "Interview	  Nicolás	  Polanía."	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administrative	  morality	  are	  essentially	  flexible	  and	  it	  is	  better	  to	  interpret	  them	  rather	  
than	  defining	  them.	  “By	  interpreting	  rather	  than	  defining	  you	  could	  get	  better	  results	  
because	  words	  are	  like	  ties	  and	  the	  excessive	  definition	  of	  a	  concept	  makes	  institutions	  
more	  vulnerable.”273	  In	  Polania’s	  opinion	  flexibility	  in	  administrative	  morality	  could	  
contribute	  to	  institutional	  resilience	  probably	  because	  flexible	  concepts	  facilitate	  
adaptability	  to	  new	  circumstances.	  	  
Defining	  and	  setting	  boundaries	  to	  abstract	  concepts	  has	  some	  disadvantages,	  as	  
Polania	  argues.	  When	  a	  legal	  system	  privileges	  reliability	  and	  predictability	  the	  potential	  
development	  of	  some	  legal	  concepts	  is	  reduced	  because	  individuals	  interpret	  those	  
institutions	  in	  a	  restrictive	  way.	  Administrative	  morality,	  Polania	  argues,	  is	  a	  concept	  
aimed	  to	  control	  public	  authorities’	  behavior	  and	  any	  type	  of	  definition	  would	  reduce	  its	  
potential.	  “You	  end	  up	  opening	  the	  door	  to	  some	  type	  of	  illusion	  because	  if	  a	  certain	  
behavior	  does	  not	  fit	  perfectly	  well	  in	  the	  definition	  there	  would	  not	  be	  any	  immoral	  
behavior.”274	  In	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  the	  definition	  provided	  by	  the	  new	  Administrative	  
code	  Polania	  argues	  that	  the	  legislator	  used	  “ethereal”	  notions	  that	  were	  equally	  
abstract	  and	  vague.	  Thus,	  this	  definition	  did	  not	  contribute	  to	  clarifying	  the	  
understanding	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  	  
In	  spite	  the	  opinion	  of	  this	  scholar,	  it	  is	  undeniable	  that	  in	  the	  Colombian	  legal	  
culture	  reliability	  and	  predictability	  are	  very	  important	  values	  and	  so	  the	  vagueness	  in	  
the	  concept	  of	  administrative	  morality	  has	  created	  tensions	  on	  its	  application.	  Before	  
the	  Administrative	  code	  passed	  public	  agents	  were	  compelled	  to	  look	  into	  court	  cases	  to	  





try	  to	  find	  a	  definition	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  Court	  cases	  are	  scattered	  and	  not	  all	  
public	  agents	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  follow	  the	  latest	  decisions	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  State.	  
Therefore	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Administrative	  code	  provided	  a	  definition	  of	  this	  notion	  
favors	  clarity	  in	  the	  legal	  system.	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  advantage,	  the	  definition	  of	  article	  3	  
presents	  challenges	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  As	  Polania	  argued,	  
the	  code	  defined	  administrative	  morality	  in	  terms	  of	  other	  values	  that	  are	  similarly	  
vague	  and	  abstract.	  The	  code	  defines	  administrative	  morality	  as	  performance	  by	  
following	  criteria	  of	  rectitude,	  loyalty,	  and	  honesty.	  By	  mentioning	  these	  values	  the	  code	  
provided	  more	  information	  about	  the	  expectations	  of	  administrative	  behavior	  and	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  bureaucrats	  shall	  perform	  their	  duties	  but	  the	  problem	  of	  vagueness	  of	  the	  
norm	  remains.	  What	  does	  rectitude,	  loyalty,	  and	  honesty	  mean	  and	  how	  do	  they	  relate	  
to	  legality?	  	  
The	  code	  did	  not	  include	  more	  information	  about	  how	  to	  determine	  the	  content	  
of	  these	  values.	  The	  Congress	  might	  have	  kept	  this	  vagueness	  in	  order	  to	  grant	  flexibility	  
in	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
Polania	  further	  suggested	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  
flexibility	  and	  predictability	  is	  through	  trust	  in	  the	  administrative	  judges.	  	  We	  should	  
trust	  administrative	  judges	  as	  professional	  decision-­‐makers	  capable	  of	  developing	  
guidelines	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  “The	  worst	  case	  scenario	  
was	  trying	  to	  define	  administrative	  morality	  [legislatively]	  because	  a	  definition	  limits	  the	  
concept	  and	  it	  reduces	  its	  potential.	  When	  in	  doubt,	  we	  should	  trust	  the	  [judicial]	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institution	  rather	  than	  reducing	  it.”275	  According	  to	  Polania,	  the	  article	  3	  of	  the	  code	  
reduced	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  administrative	  morality,	  the	  code	  also	  sets	  other	  
parameters	  in	  the	  use	  of	  popular	  actions	  and	  collective	  rights.	  Specifically	  the	  code	  
addresses	  an	  important	  concern	  that	  had	  arisen	  in	  the	  implementation	  process	  of	  the	  
statute	  of	  popular	  actions	  and	  collective	  rights.	  Given	  the	  informality	  and	  flexibility	  of	  
popular	  actions,	  some	  people	  had	  filed	  lawsuits	  attacking	  the	  legality	  of	  administrative	  
regulations	  that	  had	  violated	  collective	  rights.	  In	  these	  cases	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  had	  
different	  opinions	  in	  relation	  to	  whether	  the	  judge,	  when	  deciding	  a	  popular	  action,	  had	  
the	  authority	  to	  overrule	  administrative	  regulations.	  Some	  judges	  in	  the	  Council	  argued	  
that	  the	  judge	  was	  not	  entitled	  to	  declare	  the	  illegality	  of	  an	  administrative	  regulation	  
but	  that	  should	  restrain	  his	  ruling	  to	  correcting	  the	  violation	  of	  the	  collective	  right	  under	  
discussion.	  Other	  judges	  in	  the	  Council	  argued	  that	  judges	  do	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  
overrule	  an	  administrative	  regulation	  that	  had	  violated	  a	  collective	  right.276	  
The	  Administrative	  code	  addressed	  this	  key	  issue	  and	  declared	  that	  judges	  in	  
popular	  actions	  do	  not	  have	  authority	  to	  overrule	  administrative	  regulations.	  Thus,	  the	  
code	  states:	  “When	  the	  threat	  on	  collective	  rights	  and	  interests	  comes	  from	  a	  
governmental	  agency’s	  behavior	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  file	  a	  suit	  even	  if	  the	  violation	  is	  caused	  
by	  an	  administrative	  ruling	  or	  a	  public	  contract,	  but	  in	  either	  of	  these	  cases	  the	  judge	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could	  not	  overrule	  the	  ruling	  or	  the	  contract;	  the	  judge	  is	  entitled	  to	  adopt	  the	  
necessary	  mechanisms	  to	  stop	  the	  threat	  or	  the	  harm	  for	  a	  collective	  right.”277	  The	  
judge	  in	  popular	  actions	  should	  protect	  the	  collective	  right	  under	  threat	  but	  to	  do	  so	  he	  
is	  not	  entitled	  to	  overrule	  the	  administrative	  regulation	  or	  contract	  that	  might	  be	  
related	  to	  the	  violation.	  	  
Article	  139	  also	  addressed	  a	  growing	  controversy	  over	  lawsuits	  that	  used	  the	  
right	  to	  administrative	  morality	  to	  attack	  the	  outcome	  of	  elections.	  In	  the	  years	  after	  
1991	  it	  had	  become	  common	  for	  individuals	  to	  use	  popular	  actions	  to	  attack	  the	  legality	  
of	  popular	  elections,	  alleging	  violations	  against	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  some	  of	  these	  
cases	  judges	  used	  their	  power	  to	  analyze	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  election	  or	  the	  legality	  of	  an	  
administrative	  regulation.	  Popular	  actions	  were	  perceived	  as	  a	  simple	  mechanism	  that	  
empowered	  common	  individuals	  to	  point	  out	  cases	  of	  corruption.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
these	  cases	  were	  perceived	  as	  an	  easy	  way	  to	  avoid	  the	  formality	  of	  ordinary	  
administrative	  actions	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  attack	  the	  legality	  of	  administrative	  
regulations	  related	  to	  elections.	  For	  instance,	  since	  any	  individual	  is	  entitled	  to	  file	  a	  
popular	  action	  without	  legal	  representation	  these	  lawsuits	  lacked	  the	  requirements	  of	  
an	  ordinary	  lawsuit.	  Plaintiffs	  in	  popular	  actions	  did	  not	  need	  to	  support	  their	  pledge	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  legality	  of	  an	  electoral	  act,	  contributing	  to	  congestion	  in	  the	  
jurisdiction.	  
Article	  139	  addressed	  this	  controversy	  by	  prohibiting	  judges	  from	  relying	  on	  
administrative	  morality	  to	  rule	  on	  the	  outcomes	  of	  elections.	  It	  stated:	  “Electoral	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  "Código	  De	  Procedimiento	  Administrativo	  Y	  De	  Lo	  Contencioso."	  Art.	  144.	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decisions	  cannot	  be	  attacked	  through	  the	  judicial	  mechanisms	  of	  protection	  for	  
collective	  rights	  included	  in	  the	  law	  472	  of	  1998.”278	  This	  article	  limits	  the	  authority	  of	  
judges	  in	  popular	  actions	  because	  in	  a	  case	  where	  the	  violation	  of	  a	  collective	  right	  is	  
related	  to	  an	  electoral	  decision	  the	  judge	  cannot	  analyze	  the	  legality	  of	  such	  regulation;	  
he	  should	  restrain	  his	  ruling	  to	  other	  mechanisms	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights.	  Motivated	  
by	  this	  critique,	  the	  code	  reduced	  the	  power	  of	  the	  judge	  in	  popular	  actions	  by	  not	  
allowing	  him	  to	  overrule	  administrative	  regulations.	  
These	  norms	  of	  the	  Administrative	  code	  have	  been	  controversial	  and	  the	  
Constitutional	  Court	  analyzed	  them	  in	  judicial	  review	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  lawsuit	  filed	  
by	  a	  citizen.	  The	  citizen	  argued	  that	  the	  article	  144	  of	  the	  code	  violated	  the	  Constitution	  
because	  this	  article	  changed	  the	  purpose	  of	  popular	  actions.	  According	  to	  the	  plaintiff,	  
when	  the	  code	  restricted	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  judge	  to	  overrule	  administrative	  
regulations	  and	  public	  contracts	  that	  could	  violate	  collective	  rights	  it	  created	  a	  norm	  
that	  discriminates	  against	  public	  agencies.	  Since	  article	  144	  only	  restricted	  the	  authority	  
of	  judges	  when	  analyzing	  public	  contracts	  it	  did	  not	  refer	  to	  contracts	  subscribed	  by	  
private	  parties.	  According	  to	  the	  plaintiff,	  the	  Administrative	  code	  changed	  the	  purpose	  
of	  popular	  rights	  as	  relevant	  mechanism	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights.279	  In	  this	  court	  case	  
several	  public	  and	  private	  organizations	  intervened,	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  them	  argued	  
that	  the	  article	  144	  of	  the	  code	  was	  in	  harmony	  with	  the	  Constitution	  and	  consequently	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




it	  should	  not	  be	  overruled.	  The	  Court	  summarized	  the	  main	  characteristics	  of	  popular	  
actions	  and	  concludes	  that	  the	  article	  144	  does	  not	  violate	  Constitutional	  mandates.280	  	  
Finally,	  the	  Court	  claims	  that	  by	  reducing	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  judge	  to	  rule	  on	  
administrative	  regulations	  and	  contracts,	  the	  code	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  possible	  impact	  of	  
popular	  actions.	  According	  to	  the	  Court	  the	  judge	  retains	  the	  authority	  to	  demand	  
behaviors	  from	  the	  parties	  in	  order	  to	  stop	  the	  threat	  or	  harm	  to	  collective	  rights.	  Thus,	  
overruling	  administrative	  regulations	  or	  public	  contracts	  is	  not	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  the	  
judge	  could	  do	  to	  ensure	  the	  protection	  of	  collective	  rights.	  For	  all	  these	  reasons,	  the	  
Court	  rules	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  article	  144.281	  	  
This	  ruling	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  court	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  judge	  in	  
popular	  actions	  has	  been	  controversial.	  From	  the	  court	  case	  and	  from	  the	  interviews	  I	  
conducted	  in	  Colombia	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  identify	  two	  aspects	  of	  the	  ruling.	  On	  the	  one	  
hand,	  one	  could	  ask	  whether	  article	  144	  is	  constitutional	  or	  not.	  This	  is	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  
content	  of	  the	  norm	  in	  relation	  to	  constitutional	  principles	  and	  values;	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  article	  144	  develops	  and	  agrees	  with	  constitutional	  values.	  Clearly,	  granting	  
administrative	  judges	  a	  new	  power	  akin	  to	  judicial	  review	  (the	  power	  to	  strike	  down	  
administrative	  regulations	  and	  contracts)	  would	  be	  a	  departure	  from	  traditional	  
understandings	  of	  the	  judicial	  role	  in	  civil	  law	  systems.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  
reaffirmed	  the	  traditional	  understanding	  of	  the	  judicial	  role.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  one	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  In	  cases	  of	  judicial	  review	  public	  and	  private	  organizations	  are	  allowed	  to	  intervene	  with	  the	  
purpose	  of	  presenting	  their	  opinion	  with	  regards	  the	  norm	  that	  is	  being	  analyzed.	  Six	  public	  agencies	  
(oversight	  agencies,	  ministries,	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  state),	  five	  academic	  institutions	  (public	  and	  
private),	  and	  citizens	  organized	  in	  seven	  clusters	  intervened	  in	  this	  case.	  Out	  of	  these	  nineteen	  




could	  ask	  whether	  the	  norm	  is	  conducive	  to	  effective	  enforcement	  of	  collective	  rights	  
and	  to	  giving	  the	  greatest	  effect	  to	  popular	  actions.	  	  Clearly	  the	  decision	  to	  remove	  
judicial	  authority	  to	  strike	  down	  administrative	  regulations	  works	  to	  limit	  the	  effective	  
enforcement	  of	  collective	  rights.	  	  
In	  my	  interview	  with	  Camilo	  Orrego	  who	  is	  the	  former	  head	  legal	  counsel	  for	  the	  
city	  of	  Bogota	  for	  several	  years	  and	  has	  worked	  as	  a	  public	  employee	  for	  eleven	  years,	  
he	  argued	  that	  article	  144	  is	  unconstitutional	  because	  it	  reduces	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
action.	  He	  argued:	  “…	  around	  40%	  of	  popular	  actions	  start	  because	  of	  an	  omission	  of	  the	  
administration,	  say,	  the	  government	  did	  not	  install	  street	  lights,	  the	  pavement	  is	  in	  bad	  
shape,	  etc,	  etc,	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  them	  start	  with	  actions	  of	  the	  administration.	  These	  
actions	  take	  the	  form	  of	  administrative	  regulations	  and	  contracts	  and	  currently	  these	  
are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  range	  of	  popular	  actions…	  I	  think	  that	  the	  code	  sacrificed	  collective	  
rights	  and	  that	  makes	  it	  unconstitutional.”282	  Orrego	  argues	  that	  the	  code	  sacrificed	  
collective	  rights	  because	  it	  pushed	  plaintiffs	  to	  choose	  ordinary	  administrative	  actions	  
over	  popular	  actions.	  Ordinary	  actions	  are	  not	  as	  salient	  as	  popular	  actions,	  since	  
popular	  actions	  were	  created	  by	  the	  constitution	  and	  judges	  privilege	  cases	  of	  
constitutional	  actions.	  While	  popular	  actions	  are	  decided	  in	  a	  year	  an	  ordinary	  action	  
takes	  15	  years	  in	  average	  to	  until	  its	  final	  ruling.	  Orrego	  argues	  that	  the	  article	  144	  of	  
the	  code	  left	  collective	  rights	  in	  a	  worse	  situation	  of	  protection	  than	  they	  were	  before	  in	  
those	  cases	  where	  administrative	  regulations	  and	  public	  contracts	  are	  at	  stake.	  
Consequently,	  this	  article	  should	  be	  unconstitutional.	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Others	  differ	  with	  Orrego’s	  assertion.	  For	  instance	  Luis	  Felipe	  Botero,	  scholar	  and	  
practitioner	  argues	  that	  article	  144	  is	  constitutional	  because	  the	  Congress	  is	  entitled	  to	  
regulate	  judicial	  decisions	  and	  procedures	  the	  way	  they	  want.	  “Simply	  put,	  the	  article	  88	  
of	  the	  Constitution	  [article	  on	  collective	  rights]	  did	  not	  refer	  to	  administrative	  
regulations	  or	  public	  contracts	  and	  so	  this	  topic	  was	  not	  regulated	  by	  the	  constitution.	  
Thus,	  it	  was	  under	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Congress	  to	  set	  and	  define	  the	  content	  and	  range	  
of	  these	  actions	  [popular	  actions].”283	  Botero	  answers	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  this	  
norm	  is	  constitutional	  or	  not	  from	  a	  different	  perspective.	  This	  scholar	  compares	  the	  
content	  of	  article	  144	  with	  what	  was	  regulated	  by	  the	  Constitution	  in	  relation	  to	  popular	  
actions.	  Since	  the	  Constitution	  kept	  silent	  about	  the	  range	  of	  popular	  actions	  then	  the	  
Congress	  was	  entitled	  to	  set	  its	  boundaries.	  Botero	  continues	  the	  analysis	  by	  stating	  that	  
article	  144	  did	  not	  ban	  judges	  from	  analyzing	  cases	  where	  administrative	  regulations	  are	  
involved.	  Even	  in	  those	  cases,	  judges	  should	  find	  different	  mechanisms	  to	  protect	  
collective	  rights	  different	  from	  overruling	  administrative	  regulations	  or	  public	  contracts.	  
It	  is	  possible	  for	  judges	  in	  popular	  actions	  to	  discuss	  the	  legality	  of	  these	  regulations	  but	  
he	  cannot	  overrule	  them.	  	  
In	   relation	   to	  whether	   article	   144	   is	   constitutional	   or	   not	   these	   two	   attorneys	  
present	  a	  different	  perspective.	  While	  Orrego	  argues	  that	  article	  144	  is	  unconstitutional	  
because	  it	  reduced	  the	  range	  of	  the	  action	  Botero	  argues	  that	   it	   is	  constitutional	  since	  
the	  Congress	  was	  entitled	  to	  reduce	  the	  faculties	  of	  the	  judge.	  The	  difference	  between	  
these	  opinions	  lies	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  what	  the	  constitution	  stated	  in	  relation	  to	  popular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283	  "Interview	  Luis	  Felipe	  Botero."	  
122	  
	  
actions.	  Botero	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  article	  88	  of	  the	  Constitution	  is	  clear	  and	  did	  not	  
authorize	  judges	  to	  strike	  down	  administrative	  regulations	  and	  contracts,	  and	  therefore	  
the	  interpreter	  should	  not	  assume	  what	  is	  not	  written	  in	  the	  article.	  Since	  article	  88	  did	  
not	   refer	   to	   administrative	   regulations	   or	   public	   contracts	   then	   the	   framers	   did	   not	  
intend	  to	  regulate	  this	  aspect	  and	  left	  the	  Congress	  with	  such	  authority.	  Orrego	  would	  
argue	   that	   article	   88	   created	   popular	   actions	   in	   order	   to	   allow	   the	   people	   to	   protect	  
collective	  rights	  through	  a	  judicial	  action	  that	  was	  effective,	  brief,	  and	  with	  high	  impact	  
to	   reduce	   inequalities	   between	   the	  people	   and	  businesses	   or	   the	   government.	   If	   that	  
was	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   constitution	   then	   article	   144	   is	   unconstitutional	   because	   it	  
reduced	  the	  range	  and	  impact	  of	  popular	  actions	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights.	  These	  are	  
two	   interpretations	  of	   the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  and	   they	   lead	   to	  different	  conclusions	  
with	  regard	  judicial	  review	  of	  article	  144	  of	  the	  Administrative	  code.	  	  
While	  these	  scholars	  differ	  in	  relation	  to	  whether	  article	  144	  is	  constitutional	  or	  
not	  they	  both	  agree	  on	  the	  negative	  impact	  that	  this	  norm	  will	  have	  on	  popular	  actions.	  
Botero,	  referring	  to	  administrative	  morality,	  argued:	  “I	  believe	  that	  popular	  actions	  are	  
still	  a	  tool	  because	  administrative	  morality	   is	  still	  a	  collective	  right	  and	  popular	  actions	  
are	  still	  one	  of	  several	  mechanisms	  that	  people	  could	  choose	  to	  protect	  society	  against	  
corruption…	   Perhaps	   these	   norms	   that	   restrict	   the	   range	   of	   popular	   actions	   would	  
change	  judges’	  minds	  into	  thinking	  that	  popular	  actions	  are	  not	  that	  important.	  	  Judges	  
in	  popular	  actions	  could	  think	  ‘you	  are	  bringing	  me	  an	  administrative	  act	  hmm	  no,	  here	  
we	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  overrule	  that,	  folks,	  so	  sorry’	  and	  they	  decide	  that	  case	  lightly.	  It	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may	  end	  up	  downgrading	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  action.”284	  	  Botero	  and	  Orrego	  concur	  on	  the	  
impact	  of	  this	  change	  on	  judges’	  minds	  with	  regards	  the	  importance	  of	  popular	  actions.	  
What	  was	  perceived	  as	   strength	  of	   the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	   (the	  creation	  of	  effective	  
judicial	  rights	  to	  protect	  constitutional	  rights)	  seemed	  to	  be	  under	  a	  risk	  due	  to	  the	  new	  
Administrative	  code.	  While	  these	  scholars	  agreed	  on	  this	   issue,	  they	  differ	  on	  whether	  
this	   is	   a	  matter	  of	   constitutional	   analysis	  or	  of	   convenience	  of	   the	   law.	  Botero	  argues	  
that	   this	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   convenience	   and	   Orrego	   contends	   that	   it	   is	   a	   matter	   of	  
unconstitutionality	  of	  the	  law.285	  
	  
Conclusion	  
The	  administrative	  code	  is	  a	  key	  piece	  of	  legislation	  that	  provides	  guidelines	  for	  
administrative	  agencies	  with	  regards	  their	  performance	  and	  procedures.	  The	  code	  
aimed	  to	  modernize	  administrative	  procedures	  and	  administrative	  litigation	  by	  
developing	  the	  principles	  that	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  set	  for	  governmental	  agencies.	  
Justices	  and	  members	  of	  the	  government	  who	  promoted	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  
administrative	  code	  in	  2010	  shared	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  Colombian	  public	  
administration	  had	  systematically	  ignored	  constitutional	  rights	  of	  the	  citizens	  and	  
constitutional	  principles.	  Specifically	  the	  reformers	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  a	  common	  use	  
that	  the	  administration	  did	  not	  provide	  answer	  to	  citizens’	  requests	  or	  at	  least	  they	  did	  
not	  do	  it	  in	  a	  timely	  manner.	  Given	  the	  lack	  of	  diligence	  of	  the	  administration	  the	  resort	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  These	  two	  positions	  reflect	  different	  approaches	  to	  constitutional	  interpretation.	  Botero	  follows	  
literal	  interpretation	  of	  the	  law	  while	  Orrego	  seems	  to	  follow	  a	  more	  teleological	  approach.	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to	  courts	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  best	  option	  to	  protect	  constitutional	  rights.	  This	  is	  the	  
assumption	  that	  lies	  behind	  the	  new	  administrative	  code.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  pursuing	  the	  modernization	  of	  administrative	  procedures	  
according	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  constitution,	  the	  code	  also	  brought	  key	  changes	  to	  
popular	  actions.	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  code	  was	  the	  first	  piece	  of	  legislation	  to	  define	  
administrative	  morality	  but	  in	  fact	  this	  definition	  does	  not	  provide	  enough	  elements	  for	  
the	  institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  Rectitude,	  loyalty,	  and	  honesty	  in	  
administrative	  behavior	  are	  the	  categories	  that	  Article	  3	  used	  to	  characterize	  
compliance	  with	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  good	  intentions	  of	  the	  Congress	  
of	  providing	  a	  normative	  frame	  for	  administrative	  morality	  this	  article	  did	  not	  bring	  
much	  clarity	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  By	  using	  vague	  principles	  
this	  article	  failed	  to	  provide	  clear	  implications	  to	  what	  administrative	  morality	  implies	  
for	  administrators.	  	  	  
One	  positive	  aspect	  of	  Article	  3	  is	  that	  it	  clarified	  that	  not	  only	  governmental	  
agents	  are	  compelled	  to	  comply	  with	  administrative	  morality.	  According	  to	  this	  norm	  
“all	  individuals	  and	  public	  servants	  are	  obliged	  to	  perform	  with	  rectitude,	  loyalty,	  and	  
honesty	  in	  administrative	  behavior.”286	  Thus,	  Article	  3	  states	  that	  private	  contractors	  
who	  are	  performing	  administrative	  functions	  are	  also	  obliged	  to	  comply	  with	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  that	  administrators	  do	  not	  have	  the	  exclusive	  responsibility	  
to	  implement	  this	  notion.	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While	  the	  Administrative	  code	  aimed	  to	  strengthen	  judicial	  checks	  over	  
administration	  it	  also	  set	  a	  key	  limitation	  to	  the	  potential	  of	  popular	  actions.	  The	  Articles	  
139	  and	  144	  of	  the	  code	  restricted	  the	  authority	  of	  judges	  in	  popular	  actions	  to	  overrule	  
administrative	  regulations,	  contracts,	  or	  to	  invalidate	  elections.287	  	  These	  articles	  were	  
analyzed	  by	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  This	  Court	  concluded	  that	  the	  administrative	  code	  
did	  not	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  popular	  actions	  since	  judges	  still	  kept	  their	  authority	  to	  
protect	  collective	  rights.288	  The	  Court	  did	  not	  define	  what	  type	  of	  authority	  is	  the	  one	  
that	  the	  judge	  still	  holds	  but	  it	  emphasized	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  administrative	  code	  only	  
restricted	  judges’	  authority	  to	  overrule	  administrative	  regulations,	  contracts,	  or	  
electoral	  acts	  but	  it	  left	  intact	  the	  rest	  of	  judges’	  powers	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights.289	  	  
Based	  on	  my	  interviews	  the	  forecast	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  norm	  on	  popular	  
actions	  is	  negative.	  Orrego	  and	  Botero	  argued	  that	  this	  restriction	  would	  discourage	  
judges	  to	  give	  popular	  actions	  the	  importance	  that	  the	  framers	  intended.	  Also,	  it	  could	  
prevent	  judges	  from	  solving	  what	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  collective	  rights.	  When	  
a	  plaintiff	  argues	  that	  a	  certain	  administrative	  regulation,	  contract,	  or	  electoral	  act	  has	  
violated	  administrative	  morality	  this	  violation	  will	  remain	  until	  the	  illegality	  of	  such	  an	  
act	  is	  reversed.	  	  
Despite	  the	  good	  intentions	  of	  the	  framers	  of	  the	  constitution	  in	  1991	  for	  making	  
popular	  actions	  an	  effective	  check	  to	  governmental	  performance	  the	  administrative	  
code	  of	  2011	  posed	  a	  considerable	  restriction	  to	  their	  possible	  impact.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Chapter	  5:	  Court	  Case	  Analysis	  
	  
Courts	  have	  had	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  the	  
absence	  of	  a	  legal	  definition,	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  and	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  have	  
developed	  criteria	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  Citizens,	  
businesses,	  civil	  society	  organizations,	  and	  governmental	  agencies	  have	  engaged	  in	  
administrative	  morality	  litigation	  and	  they	  have	  brought	  different	  elements	  to	  the	  
analysis	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  Court.	  	  
This	  chapter	  explores	  what	  types	  of	  litigants	  have	  brought	  these	  cases,	  what	  are	  
the	  key	  issues	  in	  these	  cases,	  and	  how	  the	  courts	  have	  resolved	  these	  cases,	  with	  
particular	  attention	  to	  changes	  over	  time.	  	  Do	  these	  cases	  mainly	  involve	  lower-­‐level	  
administrators	  or	  upper-­‐level	  administrators?	  	  Do	  they	  mainly	  involve	  individual	  errors	  
or	  abuses,	  or	  broader	  policy	  questions?	  	  Do	  these	  cases	  mainly	  involve	  claims	  against	  
local	  or	  regional	  governments,	  or	  do	  they	  also	  involve	  claims	  against	  the	  central	  
government?	  	  What	  policy	  areas	  are	  most	  and	  least	  implicated	  in	  these	  cases?	  	  Do	  these	  
cases	  involve	  all	  kinds	  of	  policy	  areas	  or	  just	  a	  few?	  	  If	  the	  latter,	  which	  policy	  areas	  are	  
most	  implicated?	  Who	  brings	  these	  cases?	  Are	  they	  mainly	  the	  product	  of	  individuals	  or	  
of	  organized	  groups?	  	  Who	  wins	  these	  cases?	  	  Do	  those	  bringing	  the	  complaint	  against	  
administrative	  agencies	  typically	  win,	  or	  do	  administrative	  agencies	  typically	  win?	  	  When	  
a	  plaintiff	  wins,	  what	  does	  “winning”	  mean?	  	  Do	  courts	  award	  financial	  damages,	  or	  do	  
they	  order	  changes	  in	  administrative	  practice	  or	  policy?	  Finally,	  over	  time,	  has	  the	  
Council	  of	  State	  given	  a	  broad	  or	  narrow	  interpretation	  of	  “administrative	  morality”?	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   Colombian	  scholarship	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  normative	  level	  of	  administrative	  
morality,	  aiming	  to	  identify	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  action,	  its	  features	  as	  a	  collective	  right,	  
and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  some	  of	  the	  actors	  who	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  its	  
development.	  For	  instance,	  a	  preliminary	  analysis	  performed	  in	  2003	  pointed	  out	  that	  
approximately	  72%	  of	  the	  actions	  were	  initiated	  by	  individuals	  instead	  of	  organizations,	  
and	  that	  51%	  of	  those	  individuals	  were	  not	  lawyers.	  This	  study	  also	  suggested	  that	  
among	  the	  lawsuits	  pursued	  through	  popular	  actions,	  administrative	  morality	  was	  the	  
least	  frequent	  cause	  of	  action.290	  	  
	   While	  these	  studies	  have	  contributed	  to	  our	  understanding,	  in	  order	  to	  
understand	  the	  implications	  and	  possible	  impact	  of	  administrative	  morality	  more	  fully	  it	  
will	  be	  helpful	  to	  develop	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  empirically-­‐based	  description	  of	  these	  
cases.	  	  
My	  analysis	  focuses	  especially	  on	  whether	  administrative	  morality	  cases	  have	  
challenged	  important	  governmental	  policies	  or	  merely	  the	  mistakes	  of	  low-­‐level	  
individual	  officials.	  If	  the	  former,	  one	  might	  think	  of	  administrative	  morality	  litigation	  as	  
a	  major	  factor	  in	  shaping	  government	  policy.	  If	  the	  latter,	  it	  is	  more	  akin	  to	  oversight	  by	  
the	  leaders	  of	  government	  policy	  over	  front-­‐line	  administration.	  This	  practical	  
distinction	  has	  been	  explored	  in	  some	  other	  studies	  of	  judicial	  policy	  making.	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  Beatriz	  Londoño	  Toro,	  Laura	  García	  Matamoros,	  and	  Carlos	  Parra	  Dussán,	  "Eficacia	  De	  Las	  
Acciones	  Constitucionales	  En	  Defensa	  De	  Los	  Derechos	  Colectivos,"	  Colección	  Textos	  de	  
Jurisprudencia,	  Universidad	  del	  Rosario,	  Bogota	  (2003).	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The	  literature	  on	  constitutional	  reforms	  in	  Latin	  America	  suggests	  that	  courts	  are	  
performing	  a	  key	  role	  in	  political	  systems	  by	  enforcing	  constitutional	  rights.291	  This	  Latin	  
American	  stream	  of	  literature	  developed	  by	  Javier	  Couso	  and	  others	  suggests	  that	  
through	  constitutional	  litigation	  and	  judicial	  review	  courts	  have	  received	  the	  power	  to	  
intervene	  actively	  in	  policy-­‐making	  and	  to	  impact	  social	  life.	  These	  scholars	  argue	  that	  
court	  cases	  have	  shaped	  language	  by	  teaching	  people	  about	  legal	  discourses	  that	  they	  
could	  use	  in	  order	  to	  being	  successful	  when	  pursuing	  the	  enforcement	  of	  constitutional	  
rights.292	  These	  writings	  suggest	  that	  Latin	  American	  courts	  have	  done	  more	  than	  simply	  
check	  or	  oversee	  low-­‐level	  officials:	  they	  are	  checking	  and	  reforming	  broad	  
governmental	  policy.	  
Other	  scholarship	  suggests	  that	  courts	  are	  likely	  to	  intervene	  primarily	  against	  
lower-­‐level	  officials,	  not	  broad	  policy.	  Some	  rational	  choice	  scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  
judicial	  review	  generally	  is	  a	  form	  of	  top-­‐down	  oversight	  over	  government	  
administration	  rather	  than	  a	  check	  on	  high	  government	  policies.293	  In	  the	  United	  States	  
the	  Supreme	  Court	  is	  more	  active	  in	  checking	  state	  and	  local	  policies	  and	  administration	  
than	  national	  policies.294	  This	  seems	  true	  of	  other	  countries,	  too.	  Rajeev	  Dhavan	  
analyzed	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  India’s	  decisions	  regarding	  government	  policies	  and	  
observed	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  involved	  decisions	  against	  low-­‐level	  officials	  rather	  than	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  Couso,	  Huneeus,	  and	  Sieder,	  Cultures	  of	  Legality:	  Judicialization	  and	  Political	  Activism	  in	  Latin	  
America.	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  Ibid.	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  Mathew	  McCubbins,	  Roger	  Noll,	  and	  Barry	  Weingast,	  "The	  Political	  Origins	  of	  the	  Administrative	  
Procedure	  Act,"	  Journal	  of	  Law,	  Economics,	  and	  Organization	  15,	  no.	  1	  (1999).	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  Herbert	  M	  Kritzer,	  "The	  Government	  Gorilla:	  Why	  Does	  Government	  Come	  out	  Ahead	  in	  Appellate	  
Courts?,"	  In	  Litigation:	  Do	  the	  ‘Haves’	  Still	  Come	  Out	  Ahead	  (2003).	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high	  government	  policy.295	  A	  related	  body	  of	  literature	  suggests	  that	  litigants	  fare	  better	  
in	  court	  the	  more	  they	  have	  key	  financial	  and	  organizational	  resources,	  and	  
governments	  tend	  to	  have	  more	  of	  these	  resources	  than	  private	  litigants.	  In	  a	  classic	  
article	  Marc	  Galanter	  argued	  that	  parties	  with	  more	  resources	  (the	  "haves")	  tend	  to	  
come	  ahead	  in	  litigation	  because	  they	  have	  superior	  material	  resources	  and	  usually	  they	  
are	  more	  experienced	  in	  filing	  lawsuits	  ("repeat	  player	  status").296	  Superior	  material	  
resources	  contribute	  to	  parties’	  capability	  to	  hire	  better	  legal	  representation	  and	  
investigate	  in	  developing	  a	  better	  litigation	  strategy.	  Resourceful	  parties	  are	  more	  likely	  
to	  bring	  expert	  witnesses	  and	  extensive	  discovery	  to	  the	  process,	  which	  increases	  their	  
opportunities	  to	  get	  a	  favorable	  decision.	  Likewise,	  the	  "repeat	  player	  status"	  gives	  
experience	  to	  parties	  and	  allow	  them	  to	  identify	  in	  a	  better	  way	  those	  factors	  that	  may	  
put	  them	  in	  a	  better	  situation	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  litigation	  dynamic.297	  In	  popular	  actions	  
on	  administrative	  morality	  the	  “haves”	  would	  be	  the	  governmental	  agencies	  that	  are	  
sued	  because	  they	  have	  more	  resources	  than	  the	  plaintiffs	  (who	  are	  frequently	  
individuals).	  Thus,	  party	  capability	  would	  suggest	  that	  governmental	  agencies	  are	  more	  
likely	  to	  win	  in	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  use	  this	  distinction	  between	  government	  policy	  and	  the	  mistakes	  
of	  lower-­‐level	  officials	  as	  a	  lens	  to	  analyze	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  and	  
Constitutional	  Court.	  I	  understand	  the	  latter	  category,	  individual	  mistakes,	  as	  involving	  
cases	  in	  which	  the	  administrative	  behavior	  that	  is	  being	  challenged	  was	  an	  action	  by	  an	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  Dhavan,	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	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  A	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  of	  Its	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  Techniques	  	  (NM	  
Tripathi,	  1977).	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  Marc	  Galanter,	  "Why	  the	  Haves	  Come	  out	  Ahead:	  Speculations	  on	  the	  Limits	  of	  Legal	  Change,"	  Law	  




individual	  official	  that	  affected	  an	  individual	  member	  of	  the	  public	  in	  a	  particular	  
situation.	  By	  contrast,	  policy	  or	  Institutional	  violations	  are	  those	  in	  which	  the	  complaint	  
is	  against	  a	  policy	  or	  institutional	  practice	  that	  affects	  a	  broader	  body	  of	  the	  public.	  
While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  individual	  mistakes	  can	  add	  up	  to	  a	  broad	  impact,	  the	  difference	  
between	  the	  two	  categories	  well	  captures	  differences	  between	  cases	  in	  my	  data	  set.	  
This	  approach	  to	  individual	  versus	  institutional	  violations	  speaks	  to	  how	  broad	  is	  the	  
possible	  impact	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  whether	  it	  has	  capacity	  to	  foster	  broad	  
social	  change	  by	  addressing	  high	  impact	  cases	  that	  refer	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  broad	  
policies.	  If	  court	  cases	  depict	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  collective	  right	  that	  targets	  
systematic	  violations,	  then	  courts’	  decisions	  are	  striving	  to	  meet	  the	  high	  aspirations	  of	  
the	  framers	  in	  1991.	  But	  if	  court	  cases	  mainly	  focus	  on	  mistakes	  by	  low-­‐level	  officials,	  
then	  it	  is	  doubtful	  whether	  these	  aspirations	  are	  being	  met.	  	  	  
	  
The	  administrative	  jurisdiction	  in	  Colombia	  
Although	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  will	  be	  summarized	  later	  in	  
this	  chapter,	  the	  chapter	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  the	  administrative	  jurisdiction,	  which	  are	  
the	  courts	  dedicated	  to	  hearing	  complaints	  about	  administrative	  actions	  .	  The	  
administrative	  jurisdiction	  in	  Colombia	  has	  three	  levels	  of	  hierarchy.	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  
administrative	  judges	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  make	  decisions	  in	  relation	  to	  administrative	  
issues.	  At	  the	  regional	  level	  (departments),	  administrative	  tribunals	  have	  the	  jurisdiction	  
regarding	  administrative	  affairs.	  At	  the	  national	  level	  is	  the	  Council	  of	  State,	  which	  is	  
responsible	  for	  making	  decisions	  in	  appeals	  and	  other	  major	  cases.	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Although	  administrative	  judges	  and	  tribunals	  in	  Colombia	  make	  decisions	  in	  
relation	  to	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality	  this	  research	  addresses	  only	  decisions	  made	  
by	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  and	  the	  Constitutional	  Court.	  Since	  the	  Colombian	  Council	  of	  
State	  (the	  Council)	  is	  the	  organ	  with	  highest	  hierarchy	  within	  the	  administrative	  
jurisdiction	  it	  is	  important	  to	  analyze	  the	  Council’s	  decisions	  because	  they	  guide	  other	  
judges’	  rulemaking.	  	  
Specifically	  in	  relation	  to	  collective	  rights	  and	  administrative	  morality,	  the	  
analysis	  of	  the	  Council’s	  ruling	  is	  relevant	  because	  this	  Court’s	  rulings	  have	  authority	  
over	  judges’	  rulemaking.	  Given	  the	  vagueness	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  administrative	  morality	  
it	  is	  important	  to	  analyze	  the	  Council’s	  decisions	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  decisions	  
shape	  public	  administration	  in	  Colombia.	  
	  
Judicial	  interpretation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  
A	  question	  related	  to	  administrative	  morality	  in	  the	  Colombian	  legal	  system	  is	  
the	  role	  of	  judicial	  decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  development	  of	  this	  concept.	  Due	  to	  the	  
ambiguity	  of	  the	  term	  administrative	  morality,	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  clarifying	  language	  in	  
the	  text	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  much	  of	  the	  legal	  definition	  of	  this	  term	  has	  been	  left	  to	  
judges,	  who	  have	  developed	  the	  concept	  through	  their	  decisions	  in	  cases.	  	  With	  regards	  
political	  dynamics,	  Latin	  American	  scholarship	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  traditional	  separation	  
of	  powers	  has	  been	  transformed	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  constitutional	  reforms.298	  Courts	  
in	  Latin	  America	  have	  received	  the	  power	  of	  making	  policy	  and	  enforcing	  it	  with	  the	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  Sieder,	  Schjolden,	  and	  Angell,	  Judicialization	  of	  Politics	  in	  Latin	  America.	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purpose	  of	  protecting	  constitutional	  rights.	  This	  new	  role	  of	  the	  judiciary	  has	  increased	  
the	  social	  impact	  of	  judicial	  decision-­‐making	  and	  has	  transformed	  the	  dynamics	  among	  
the	  three	  branches	  of	  power.299	  
	  
Data	  and	  Methods	  
The	  Council	  of	  State,	  the	  high	  court	  with	  jurisdiction	  over	  “administrative	  morality”	  
cases,	  has	  decided	  some	  215	  cases	  on	  this	  issue	  since	  1991.	  	  The	  Constitutional	  Court	  
has	  decided	  eight	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality,	  all	  since	  2001.	  	  
In	  relation	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  I	  identified	  215	  court	  cases	  by	  using	  the	  
descriptors	  morality,	  administrative	  morality,	  and	  principle	  of	  morality	  in	  the	  Council’s	  
search-­‐engine.300	  Out	  of	  these	  215	  cases,	  35	  files	  were	  not	  available	  on	  line	  and	  17	  cases	  
were	  not	  popular	  actions.	  Additionally,	  I	  did	  not	  include	  in	  this	  analysis	  12	  cases	  in	  which	  
the	  Council	  did	  not	  make	  a	  ruling	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  main	  legal	  issue	  at	  stake.301	  This	  
leaves	  151	  cases	  that	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  my	  analysis.	  	  
The	  majority	  of	  these	  cases	  were	  decided	  in	  the	  time	  frame	  of	  2001	  and	  2007	  
(84%),	  13%	  were	  decided	  between	  2008	  and	  2011,	  and	  only	  3%	  in	  the	  time	  frame	  1997-­‐
2000.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  analysis	  I	  will	  use	  these	  three	  time	  frames	  as	  stages	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299	  Helmke	  and	  Rios-­‐Figueroa,	  Courts	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Couso,	  "The	  Judicialization	  of	  Chilean	  Politics:	  
The	  Rights	  Revolution	  That	  Never	  Was;	  Couso,	  Huneeus,	  and	  Sieder,	  Cultures	  of	  Legality:	  
Judicialization	  and	  Political	  Activism	  in	  Latin	  America;	  Sieder,	  Schjolden,	  and	  Angell,	  Judicialization	  of	  
Politics	  in	  Latin	  America;	  Cepeda,	  "Judicialization	  of	  Politics	  in	  Colombia."	  
300	  "Consejo	  De	  Estado.	  Tribunal	  Supremo	  De	  Lo	  Contencioso-­‐Administrativo,"	  	  
http://www.consejodeestado.gov.co/.	  
301	  In	  relation	  to	  these	  12	  cases,	  4	  of	  them	  were	  eventual	  revisions	  and	  8	  referred	  to	  preliminary	  
rulings	  (autos).	  These	  decisions	  did	  not	  provide	  conceptual	  elements	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  legal	  issues	  at	  
stake	  and	  about	  administrative	  morality	  and	  consequently	  they	  are	  not	  in	  the	  database.	  The	  eventual	  
revision	  is	  a	  mechanism	  stated	  by	  the	  new	  Administrative	  Code	  and	  that	  aims	  to	  unify	  judicial	  criteria	  
in	  a	  certain	  topic.	  	  Ap	  01647,(2011).	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rulings	  of	  the	  Council	  since	  the	  data	  suggest	  them	  as	  changing	  points	  in	  the	  growth	  of	  
popular	  actions	  related	  to	  administrative	  morality.302	  	  
In	  relation	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  I	  identified	  nine	  cases	  under	  the	  
descriptors	  administrative	  morality	  and	  administrative	  morals.303	  One	  of	  these	  cases	  
was	  a	  preliminary	  ruling	  (“auto”)	  so	  I	  did	  not	  include	  it	  in	  this	  analysis.	  	  
All	  the	  cases	  of	  the	  Council	  in	  my	  database	  are	  popular	  actions	  related	  to	  
violations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  in	  which	  the	  Council	  ruled	  as	  the	  appellate	  level	  
court.	  In	  2006	  administrative	  judges	  started	  deciding	  cases	  as	  first-­‐level	  judges	  while	  the	  
Tribunals	  performed	  functions	  of	  the	  appellate	  court;	  consequently	  since	  2006	  the	  
Council	  has	  not	  received	  new	  cases	  as	  an	  appellate	  court	  so	  it	  can	  start	  performing	  its	  
role	  on	  unifying	  judicial	  criteria	  in	  eventual	  revisions.304	  My	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  
Council’s	  rulings	  in	  popular	  actions	  so	  I	  did	  not	  include	  data	  of	  eventual	  revisions	  in	  this	  
analysis	  due	  to	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  in	  my	  search	  I	  only	  found	  4	  cases	  of	  eventual	  revisions	  
decided	  by	  the	  Council	  until	  2011.These	  are	  not	  enough	  data	  to	  analyze	  the	  Council’s	  
decision-­‐making	  on	  its	  new	  role.	  Second,	  my	  research	  focuses	  on	  analyzing	  different	  
elements	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  the	  way	  it	  has	  been	  implemented	  by	  different	  
actors.	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  that	  question	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  criteria	  that	  the	  Council’s	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302	  See	  table	  of	  frequencies	  in	  Appendix	  C	  
303	  "Corte	  Constitucional	  De	  Colombia,"	  	  http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/.	  	  
304	  Art.	  272	  Administrative	  Code:	  “Purpose	  of	  the	  eventual	  revision	  in	  popular	  actions	  and	  group	  
actions.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  eventual	  revision	  stated	  in	  the	  article	  36A	  of	  the	  law	  270	  of	  1996,	  Statute	  
for	  the	  Jurisdiction…	  is	  to	  unify	  judicial	  criteria	  in	  processes	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights	  and	  interests	  
and	  the	  compensation	  of	  damages	  caused	  to	  groups;	  consequently	  [this	  action]	  will	  ensure	  the	  





developed	  in	  14	  years	  of	  analysis	  as	  an	  appellate	  court.	  To	  this	  extent	  eventual	  revisions	  
are	  out	  of	  my	  scope	  of	  analysis.	  	  
With	  regards	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  it	  has	  ruled	  in	  relation	  to	  administrative	  
morality	  in	  three	  different	  types	  of	  cases:	  one	  ruling	  of	  unification,	  five	  cases	  of	  judicial	  
review,	  and	  two	  revisions	  of	  actions	  for	  tutelage.	  With	  the	  ruling	  of	  unification	  the	  court	  
analyzes	  several	  court	  cases	  (even	  involving	  different	  jurisdictions)	  and	  sets	  criteria	  in	  
relation	  to	  constitutional	  rights.	  In	  a	  similar	  way,	  the	  Court	  has	  jurisdiction	  to	  revise	  
actions	  of	  tutelage305	  ruled	  by	  other	  judges	  when	  they	  have	  salience	  in	  terms	  of	  
constitutional	  rights.	  Finally,	  the	  Court	  has	  jurisdiction	  in	  cases	  of	  judicial	  review	  when	  
citizens	  or	  public	  agents	  file	  a	  claim	  that	  a	  certain	  regulation	  is	  unconstitutional.306	  	  
In	  my	  analysis	  I	  used	  a	  coding	  scheme	  involving	  twenty-­‐one	  variables	  in	  relation	  
to	  court	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality.307	  The	  first	  variable	  is	  the	  primary	  legal	  issue	  
at	  stake	  in	  the	  suit.	  Legal	  issues	  include	  financial	  malfeasance	  of	  a	  governmental	  agency,	  
willful	  misconduct	  by	  an	  individual	  official,	  and	  individual	  (human)	  rights	  violations.	  In	  
40%	  of	  the	  cases	  the	  plaintiff	  referred	  to	  a	  secondary	  legal	  issue	  so	  I	  included	  a	  variable	  
to	  identify	  this	  information.	  	  
The	  variables	  type	  of	  plaintiff	  and	  type	  of	  defendant	  address	  the	  characteristics	  
of	  the	  parties	  involved	  in	  the	  lawsuit;	  plaintiffs	  and	  defendants	  were	  classified	  in	  6	  
categories:	  individuals,	  businesses,	  non-­‐profit	  organizations,	  local	  governments,	  regional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305	  Art	  86	  Colombian	  Constitution:	  “Action	  for	  tutelage.	  Every	  person	  will	  be	  entitled	  to	  the	  action	  of	  
tutelage	  to	  claim	  from	  judges,	  at	  every	  moment	  and	  every	  place,	  with	  priority	  and	  a	  brief	  procedure,	  
for	  his	  own	  or	  a	  third	  party,	  the	  immediate	  protection	  of	  his	  constitutional	  rights	  whenever	  these	  
rights	  have	  been	  violated	  or	  posed	  under	  threat	  by	  the	  action	  or	  omission	  of	  a	  public	  authority.” 
306	  Art.	  241,	  Colombian	  Constitution.	  	  	  
307	  See	  list	  of	  codes	  in	  Appendix	  E.	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governments,	  and	  national	  government.	  In	  this	  analysis	  I	  included	  information	  about	  a	  
secondary	  plaintiff	  and	  a	  secondary	  defendant	  in	  order	  to	  characterize	  the	  different	  
parties	  that	  are	  using	  popular	  actions.308	  Also	  I	  explored	  whether	  the	  type	  of	  parties	  has	  
an	  effect	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  court	  case	  (decision).	  	  
The	  court	  cases	  under	  analysis	  focus	  on	  violations	  against	  the	  collective	  right	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  some	  of	  the	  cases	  also	  referred	  to	  other	  collective	  rights	  
that	  have	  been	  violated	  under	  the	  same	  circumstances.	  Thus,	  I	  also	  explored	  other	  
collective	  rights	  that	  were	  mentioned	  in	  the	  suit.	  	  
I	  also	  identified	  the	  policy	  area	  addressed	  in	  each	  lawsuit,	  and	  I	  consolidated	  
these	  policy	  areas	  into	  6	  of	  broadly	  defined	  areas:	  governmental	  service	  to	  individuals,	  
utilities,	  public	  finance,	  education,	  and	  environmental	  protection.	  	  
Also,	  I	  explored	  each	  case’s	  decision	  by	  identifying	  three	  types	  of	  cases:	  cases	  
where	  the	  plaintiff	  obtains	  a	  favorable	  ruling,	  cases	  where	  the	  defendant	  obtains	  a	  
favorable	  ruling,	  and	  cases	  where	  each	  party	  achieves	  partial	  satisfaction.	  	  
Following	  the	  discussion	  above,	  I	  also	  coded	  whether	  each	  article	  depicts	  the	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  The	  files	  do	  not	  refer	  necessarily	  to	  a	  categorization	  between	  primary	  and	  secondary	  plaintiff	  and	  
defendant	  but	  I	  coded	  these	  variables	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  claim	  and	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case.	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Traditionally	  there	  has	  been	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  constitutional	  court	  and	  the	  
council	  of	  state.	  What	  media	  called	  the	  “clash	  of	  trains”	  describes	  the	  tension	  between	  
these	  two	  courts	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  constitution	  had	  granted	  them	  jurisdiction	  to	  make	  
decisions	  involving	  governmental	  agencies.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  constitutional	  entitlement	  for	  
both,	  the	  constitutional	  court	  had	  claimed	  authority	  to	  have	  the	  last	  word	  with	  regards	  
constitutional	  rights.	  According	  to	  the	  Constitution	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  has	  the	  
authority	  to	  protect	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  constitution	  and	  with	  this	  purpose	  it	  assigned	  
the	  Court	  with	  several	  functions,	  one	  of	  them	  being	  to	  revise	  the	  court	  cases	  related	  to	  
the	  action	  of	  tutelage	  of	  constitutional	  rights.309	  The	  court	  interprets	  this	  constitutional	  
function	  as	  an	  authorization	  to	  analyze	  other	  courts’	  rulings	  when	  related	  to	  
constitutional	  rights.	  This	  interpretation	  has	  led	  to	  political	  conflicts	  among	  the	  courts	  
that	  are	  noticeable	  in	  some	  of	  the	  rulings.	  In	  a	  case	  of	  2011	  the	  Court	  selected	  for	  a	  
revision	  a	  case	  that	  the	  Council	  was	  analyzing	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  The	  Court	  argued	  that,	  
in	  spite	  of	  the	  Council’s	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  case,	  it	  was	  possible	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  study	  
the	  same	  issue	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  irreparable	  damages	  to	  constitutional	  rights.310	  Thus,	  
although	  the	  Council	  was	  analyzing	  this	  legal	  issue	  the	  Court	  claimed	  temporary	  
jurisdiction	  over	  the	  case	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  irreparable	  damages.	   
	   Another	  example	  of	  this	  tension	  between	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  and	  the	  
Council	  is	  a	  case	  of	  2007	  when	  the	  Court	  overruled	  a	  section	  of	  a	  Council’s	  decision	  for	  
it,	  according	  to	  the	  Court,	  lacked	  of	  a	  clear	  argument.311	  In	  a	  decision	  of	  2003	  the	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  Art.	  241,	  ordinal	  9th.	  Colombian	  constitution.	  	  
310	  T	  230,(2011).	  
311	  T	  446,(2007).	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Council	  declared	  the	  responsibility	  of	  a	  business	  in	  a	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  
The	  business	  filed	  an	  action	  of	  tutelage	  arguing	  that	  the	  Council	  made	  an	  illegal	  ruling	  
when	  declaring	  it	  responsible	  of	  this	  violation.	  According	  to	  the	  Court,	  judges	  should	  
support	  their	  decisions	  on	  arguments	  that	  are	  related	  to	  the	  facts	  and	  the	  legal	  
foundations	  of	  the	  case	  and	  the	  Council	  failed	  to	  do	  so.	  Thus,	  the	  Court	  overruled	  that	  
section	  of	  the	  Council’s	  decision.	  
	   Cases	  at	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  address	  a	  variety	  of	  legal	  issues,	  among	  them	  
cases	  of	  judicial	  review.	  For	  instance	  in	  a	  case	  of	  2000	  two	  citizens	  filed	  a	  suit	  arguing	  
that	  two	  articles	  of	  the	  statute	  of	  popular	  actions	  contradict	  the	  constitutional	  principle	  
of	  good	  faith.	  According	  to	  the	  plaintiffs,	  the	  article	  40	  of	  the	  statute	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  legal	  directors	  of	  public	  agencies	  and	  private	  contractors	  contradicts	  
the	  constitutional	  principle	  of	  good	  faith	  because	  this	  norm	  makes	  them	  responsible	  to	  
pay	  the	  public	  funds	  that	  were	  mismanaged.312	  	  
	   Another	  type	  of	  claim	  ruled	  by	  the	  Court	  is	  the	  revision	  of	  actions	  for	  tutelage	  
when	  the	  Court	  decides	  that	  the	  case	  has	  salience.	  In	  a	  case	  of	  2011	  the	  Court	  analyzed	  
the	  decision	  of	  an	  administrative	  tribunal	  in	  a	  popular	  action	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  
After	  the	  Tribunal	  made	  its	  final	  ruling	  the	  defendant	  (Ministry	  of	  Transportation)	  filed	  
an	  action	  for	  tutelage	  arguing	  that	  the	  Tribunal	  made	  blatant	  mistakes	  on	  its	  ruling	  and	  
that	  these	  mistakes	  were	  serious	  violations	  against	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  
	   Finally,	  in	  another	  case	  the	  Court	  unifies	  judicial	  criteria	  with	  regards	  the	  
selection	  process	  of	  notaries	  in	  the	  country.	  This	  topic	  brought	  several	  lawsuits	  in	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different	  jurisdictions,	  including	  several	  actions	  for	  tutelage.	  Thus,	  the	  Court	  decided	  to	  
revise	  the	  actions	  for	  tutelage	  ruled	  with	  regards	  the	  selection	  process	  of	  notaries	  and	  
clarify	  the	  implementation	  of	  different	  constitutional	  rights	  involved	  in	  this	  issue.313	  	  
	   In	  six	  of	  these	  cases	  the	  Court	  refers	  to	  an	  institutional	  implementation	  of	  
administrative	  morality,	  specifically	  when	  it	  relates	  a	  general	  interpretation	  of	  a	  certain	  
norm.	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  case	  of	  2005	  the	  Court	  analyzed	  the	  draft	  of	  the	  law	  that	  
regulates	  the	  election	  of	  the	  president.314	  In	  2004	  the	  Colombian	  constitution	  was	  
amended	  to	  allow	  presidential	  reelection	  and	  the	  Congress	  passed	  a	  law	  setting	  the	  
rules	  for	  this	  constitutional	  norm	  to	  be	  implemented.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  2005	  the	  Court	  
argued	  that	  the	  draft	  of	  law	  included	  some	  restrictions	  for	  the	  president	  when	  he	  has	  
decided	  to	  run	  for	  office	  on	  a	  second	  term	  and	  that	  these	  restrictions	  are	  legitimate	  
since	  they	  ensure	  equality	  and	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  Court	  referred	  
to	  administrative	  morality	  and	  its	  implementation	  with	  regards	  presidential	  reelection.	  
	   In	  two	  cases	  the	  Court	  referred	  to	  individual	  violations	  of	  administrative	  
morality.	  In	  a	  case	  of	  2007	  the	  Court	  revised	  the	  action	  of	  tutelage	  filed	  by	  a	  business	  
against	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  alleging	  that	  the	  Council	  violated	  constitutional	  rights	  in	  a	  
ruling	  for	  popular	  actions.315	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Court	  analyzed	  how	  the	  Council	  applied	  
administrative	  morality	  in	  this	  specific	  case.	  	  
	   The	  Constitutional	  court	  refers	  to	  the	  legal	  development	  of	  popular	  actions	  and	  
explains	  that	  these	  actions	  existed	  even	  before	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991.	  The	  ruling	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observed	  that	  a	  “long	  time	  before	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  was	  framed	  our	  legal	  system	  
stated	  popular	  actions	  according	  to	  the	  articles	  1005	  and	  2359	  of	  the	  Civil	  code…”316	  
According	  to	  the	  Court	  the	  framers	  acknowledged	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  
and	  decided	  to	  include	  a	  constitutional	  action	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights.	  	  
	   The	  Court	  follows	  the	  Council’s	  criteria	  for	  interpreting	  and	  implementing	  
administrative	  morality.	  “So	  now,	  in	  relation	  to	  popular	  actions	  for	  administrative	  
morality	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  follows	  the	  criteria	  set	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  on	  this	  
matter.”317	  In	  a	  ruling	  of	  unification,	  which	  sets	  criteria	  that	  other	  judges	  shall	  follow,	  
the	  Court	  summarized	  the	  Council’s	  criteria:	  “…	  according	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  the	  
criteria	  for	  popular	  actions	  of	  administrative	  morality	  to	  succeed	  are:	  1.	  The	  behavior	  
under	  analysis	  should	  be	  a	  public	  function.	  2.	  The	  behavior	  should	  be	  illegal.	  3.	  The	  
behavior	  should	  cause	  harm	  of	  a	  general	  interest	  and	  should	  favor	  the	  public	  agent	  or	  a	  
third	  party.	  4.	  The	  wrongful	  behavior	  should	  violate	  legal	  principles.”318	  The	  Court	  
recognizes	  the	  requirements	  set	  by	  the	  Council	  and	  applies	  them	  when	  analyzing	  
whether	  a	  particular	  behavior	  violated	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  other	  words,	  although	  
the	  Court	  makes	  decisions	  in	  relation	  to	  administrative	  morality	  it	  applies	  Council’s	  
criteria	  to	  define	  whether	  there	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  or	  not.	  	  
	   The	  Court	  argued	  that	  administrative	  morality	  is	  a	  principle	  encourages	  
administrators	  to	  attend	  to	  key	  purposes	  of	  administrative	  procedures	  rather	  than	  
simply	  following	  procedures	  legalistically.	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  case	  of	  2001	  the	  Court	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  Ibid.	  In	  a	  case	  of	  2004	  the	  Court	  also	  referred	  to	  the	  legal	  development	  of	  popular	  actions,	  before	  
the	  constitution	  of	  1991.	  C	  459,(2004).	  	  
317	  T	  230.	  
318	  Su	  913.	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analyzed	  whether	  the	  expiry	  of	  a	  certain	  legal	  action	  was	  constitutional.319	  In	  that	  case	  
the	  Court	  argued	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  constitution	  was	  not	  only	  to	  make	  rights	  real	  
but	  also	  to	  make	  processes	  efficient.	  The	  Court	  went	  on	  to	  say	  that	  the	  principles	  of	  
equality,	  morality,	  efficacy,	  and	  economy	  should	  guide	  procedural	  rules.	  In	  a	  case	  of	  
2006	  two	  citizens	  filed	  a	  suit	  against	  a	  norm	  of	  the	  criminal	  code	  for	  it	  violated	  the	  
principle	  of	  morality	  because	  it	  reduced	  the	  punishment	  for	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  felonies.	  
According	  to	  the	  plaintiffs	  the	  Congress,	  trying	  to	  achieve	  efficiency	  in	  the	  jurisdiction,	  
violated	  administrative	  morality	  because	  it	  overlooked	  the	  seriousness	  of	  that	  type	  of	  
behavior.	  The	  Court	  argued:	  “…	  in	  this	  case…	  there	  is	  no	  contradiction	  between	  
efficiency	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  morality….	  	  This	  is	  a	  case	  where	  the	  Congress	  has	  
discretion,	  granted	  by	  the	  Constitution,	  to	  legislate	  by	  applying	  criteria	  of	  good	  reason	  
and	  proportionality.”320	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Court	  harmonized	  the	  application	  of	  efficacy	  and	  
morality	  as	  principles	  that	  seemed	  to	  be	  contradictory	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  criminal	  code.	  
In	  this	  case	  administrative	  morality	  was	  applied	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  procedure	  and	  it	  worked	  
as	  a	  criterion	  for	  whether	  such	  procedure	  was	  constitutional	  or	  not.	  	  
	   In	  sum,	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality	  in	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  involve	  a	  mix	  
of	  higher	  government	  policies	  and	  lower	  administrative	  activities	  and	  procedures.	  Still,	  
in	  examining	  these	  cases	  one	  would	  be	  hard-­‐pressed	  to	  conclude	  that	  they	  address	  the	  
key	  issues	  of	  government	  fraud	  and	  abuse	  that	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  the	  concern	  of	  the	  
framers	  in	  1991.	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   Narratives	  in	  Council	  of	  State’s	  cases	  
	   The	  Council	  of	  State	  is	  the	  court	  that	  has	  more	  clearly	  developed	  guidelines	  for	  
the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  these	  guidelines	  are	  followed	  by	  the	  
Constitutional	  Court,	  lower	  level	  administrative	  courts,	  and	  administrators.	  In	  this	  
section	  I	  will	  study	  the	  characteristics	  of	  administrative	  morality	  that	  have	  been	  
developed	  in	  rulings	  of	  the	  Council	  since	  1997.	  	  
	   The	  Council	  of	  State’s	  analysis	  with	  regards	  administrative	  morality	  has	  varied	  
with	  time.	  During	  the	  first	  years	  the	  Council’s	  rulings	  referred	  to	  administrative	  morality	  
as	  a	  principle	  of	  public	  administration	  and	  how	  it	  should	  impact	  governmental	  
performance	  based	  on	  article	  209	  of	  the	  Colombian	  constitution.321	  In	  the	  latter	  years	  
the	  Council	  refers	  to	  administrative	  morality	  more	  frequently	  as	  a	  right,	  based	  on	  article	  
88	  of	  the	  constitution,	  and	  supports	  its	  decisions	  on	  previous	  rulings,	  the	  Constitution,	  
and	  the	  law.	  	  
	   The	  difference	  between	  these	  two	  norms	  consists	  in	  the	  emphasis	  they	  give	  to	  
administrative	  morality.	  The	  article	  209	  lists	  the	  principles	  that	  administrators	  should	  
pursue	  in	  their	  performance;	  these	  are	  principles	  like	  equality,	  morality,	  efficiency,	  
economy,	  celerity,	  impartiality,	  and	  publicity.	  The	  Council	  focused	  on	  this	  article	  in	  the	  
early	  years	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  it	  
developed	  some	  guidelines	  about	  what	  morality	  implies	  for	  the	  Colombian	  public	  
administration.	  For	  instance	  one	  of	  the	  topics	  that	  the	  Council	  analyzed	  was	  the	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  The	  article	  209	  of	  the	  constitution	  states	  the	  principles	  that	  guide	  the	  Colombian	  public	  
administration.	  According	  to	  this	  article,	  public	  agencies	  shall	  perform	  by	  following	  principles	  of	  
equality,	  morality,	  efficiency,	  economy,	  celerity,	  impartiality,	  and	  publicity.	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relationship	  between	  morality	  and	  legality	  and	  whether	  they	  imply	  the	  same	  demands	  
for	  public	  administrators.322	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  article	  88	  focuses	  on	  litigation	  on	  
collective	  rights	  and	  the	  entitlement	  for	  individuals	  to	  enforce	  them	  through	  popular	  
actions.	  When	  the	  Council	  refers	  to	  this	  article	  its	  rulings	  are	  less	  abstract	  and	  they	  
stress	  what	  plaintiffs	  could	  demand	  from	  governmental	  authorities.323	  	  
	   Plaintiffs	  have	  used	  these	  two	  articles	  as	  legal	  basis	  when	  filing	  suits	  for	  
violations	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  one	  of	  these	  articles	  has	  
been	  more	  closely	  related	  in	  the	  suits	  to	  high	  government	  policy	  versus	  individual	  
mistakes	  of	  the	  administration.	  The	  Council	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  this	  issue	  either	  and	  
analyzes	  both	  articles	  without	  relating	  them	  to	  high	  government	  policy	  or	  to	  individual	  
mistakes	  of	  the	  administration.	  
	   When	  characterizing	  administrative	  morality	  the	  Council	  has	  focused	  on	  
three	  main	  topics:	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  notion	  of	  open	  texture,	  the	  criteria	  for	  
applying	  administrative	  morality,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  legality	  and	  morality.	  In	  
a	  case	  of	  2006	  the	  Council	  argued	  that	  according	  to	  the	  article	  1	  of	  the	  constitution	  
Colombia	  is	  a	  pluralistic	  country	  and	  that	  consequently	  providing	  a	  definition	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  could	  harm	  the	  core	  principle	  of	  plurality.	  “In	  other	  words,	  
administrative	  morality	  that	  is	  stated	  in	  article	  88	  of	  the	  Constitution	  and	  in	  article	  4	  of	  
the	  law	  472	  of	  1998	  as	  a	  collective	  right	  and	  in	  article	  209	  of	  the	  Constitution	  as	  a	  
principle	  of	  the	  administration	  has	  an	  open	  texture,	  and	  is	  the	  judge’s	  responsibility	  to	  
articulate	  it;	  the	  judge	  should	  not	  do	  it	  on	  a	  subjective	  way	  but	  based	  on	  the	  ends	  that	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  Ap	  170,(2001).	  
323	  Ap	  00908,(2011).	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the	  administrative	  act	  pursues.”324	  Understanding	  administrative	  morality	  as	  an	  open	  
texture	  concept	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  interpreting	  tool	  for	  making	  it	  compatible	  with	  the	  
notion	  of	  pluralism.	  If	  pluralism	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  core	  principle	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  it	  
is	  necessary	  to	  make	  administrative	  morality	  a	  flexible	  concept	  that	  adapts	  to	  each	  
circumstance.	  Under	  this	  perspective	  the	  uncertainty	  that	  is	  related	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  
unique	  definition	  of	  administrative	  morality	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  requirement	  of	  pluralism.	  	  
	   The	  Council	  developed	  criteria	  for	  judges	  to	  keep	  into	  consideration	  when	  
analyzing	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  First,	  the	  Council	  applies	  a	  concept	  from	  
criminal	  law	  and	  refers	  to	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  blank	  norm.325	  According	  to	  this	  
criterion,	  the	  article	  4	  of	  the	  statute	  of	  popular	  actions	  that	  refers	  to	  collective	  rights	  
and	  specifically	  to	  administrative	  morality	  is	  a	  blank	  norm	  that	  needs	  of	  other	  norms	  to	  
complete	  its	  meaning.	  Thus,	  the	  judge	  should	  take	  into	  consideration	  those	  other	  norms	  
that	  relate	  to	  a	  moral	  public	  administration	  in	  a	  specific	  case.	  It	  is	  relevant	  that	  the	  
norms	  related	  to	  administrative	  morality	  vary	  from	  case	  to	  case	  and	  the	  judge	  is	  called	  
to	  determine	  which	  norms	  apply	  in	  a	  specific	  situation.	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  criterion	  
suggests	  that	  judges	  have	  discretion	  to	  complete	  the	  meaning	  of	  administrative	  morality	  
given	  that	  it	  is	  a	  blank	  concept.	  	  
	   The	  second	  criterion	  is	  that	  a	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  implies	  a	  
violation	  of	  legality	  that	  affects	  the	  entire	  society.326	  With	  this	  requirement	  the	  Council	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  Ap	  01546,(2006).	  
325	  Ap	  00818,(2006).	  
326	  Not	  any	  violation	  of	  the	  law	  implies	  a	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  “According	  to	  the	  room	  
[of	  decision]	  while	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  is	  relevant	  for	  the	  entire	  society	  …	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  
that	  a	  simple	  violation	  of	  legality	  is	  a	  violation	  of	  a	  collective	  right;	  according	  to	  the	  Law	  472	  of	  1998	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argues	  that	  although	  all	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  imply	  a	  violation	  of	  legality	  
it	  demands	  additional	  elements.	  The	  plaintiff	  should	  prove	  that,	  besides	  an	  illegal	  
behavior,	  the	  motives	  of	  the	  administrative	  act	  are	  opposed	  to	  what	  legality	  demands	  
like	  it	  occurs	  in	  cases	  of	  corruption	  or	  fraud.	  	  Consequently	  the	  plaintiff	  should	  prove	  an	  
illegal	  behavior	  and	  illegal	  motives	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  administrative	  act.327	  When	  
exploring	  the	  relationship	  between	  morality	  and	  legality	  the	  Council	  observed	  that	  not	  
every	  violation	  of	  legality	  is	  a	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  For	  a	  violation	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  to	  take	  place	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  the	  intention	  behind	  the	  act	  is	  
different	  from	  the	  one	  that	  the	  act	  should	  have	  according	  to	  the	  law.328	  	  
	   In	  some	  cases	  the	  Council	  has	  interpreted	  legality	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
violation	  of	  a	  specific	  norm	  but	  as	  the	  violation	  of	  legal	  principles.	  In	  a	  case	  of	  2006	  the	  
Council	  argued:	  “As	  a	  consequence	  the	  room	  [of	  decision]	  does	  not	  find	  any	  proof	  of	  the	  
violation	  of	  this	  right	  [administrative	  morality]	  since	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  on	  file	  of	  the	  
violation	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  administrative	  function,	  or	  evidence	  of	  corruption,	  
waist	  of	  funds,	  or	  other	  behaviors	  that	  favor	  individual	  interests	  and	  harming	  the	  public	  
interest”.329	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Council	  described	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  as	  
violations	  of	  legal	  principles.	  Thus,	  when	  the	  judge	  relates	  administrative	  morality	  not	  
only	  to	  norms	  and	  procedures	  but	  also	  to	  legal	  principles	  the	  range	  of	  its	  applicability	  
broadens	  since	  legal	  principles	  are	  abstract	  concepts	  (I.E.	  equality,	  economy,	  morality,	  
and	  so	  on).	  In	  one	  of	  my	  interviews	  with	  an	  auxiliary	  justice	  at	  the	  Council,	  Fabian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  violation	  of	  a	  collective	  right	  implies	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  entire	  society	  and	  not	  only	  a	  
situation	  where	  legality	  is	  at	  stake”	  ibid.	  
327	  Ap	  1640,(2006).	  
328	  Ap	  01546.	  
329	  Ap	  01345,(2006).	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Marin330,	  he	  argued	  that	  the	  interpretation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  has	  had	  stages.	  
On	  a	  first	  stage	  legality	  was	  interpreted	  as	  norms	  and	  procedures	  that	  the	  government	  
should	  follow	  while	  on	  a	  second	  stage	  legality	  was	  interpreted	  as	  including	  legal	  
principles.	  The	  case	  of	  2006	  seems	  to	  fit	  into	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
Council.	  	  
	   A	  third	  requirement	  related	  to	  a	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  is	  
that	  although	  there	  is	  no	  legal	  definition	  of	  administrative	  morality	  the	  Council	  referred	  
to	  the	  definition	  in	  one	  of	  the	  drafts	  of	  statute	  of	  popular	  actions:	  “Administrative	  
morality	  is	  the	  right	  of	  the	  community	  so	  that	  public	  funds	  would	  be	  managed	  according	  
to	  the	  law,	  and	  by	  following	  the	  care	  and	  diligence	  of	  a	  good	  public	  agent.”331	  With	  this	  
reference	  the	  Council	  emphasized	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  administrative	  morality	  
and	  public	  funds.	  In	  a	  case	  of	  2001	  the	  Council	  argued	  that	  theoretically	  it	  might	  be	  
possible	  to	  find	  a	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  isolated	  from	  its	  consequences	  but	  
that	  in	  fact	  it’s	  hard	  to	  find	  an	  event	  where	  governmental	  agencies	  violate	  only	  
administrative	  morality;	  usually	  this	  type	  of	  violations	  also	  affect	  other	  rights	  like	  public	  
funds,	  free	  economic	  competition,	  public	  safety,	  prevision	  of	  disasters,	  besides	  
others.332	  	  According	  to	  the	  quantitative	  analysis	  (Figure	  2),	  in	  85%	  of	  the	  cases	  plaintiffs	  
identified	  other	  collective	  rights	  under	  threat	  in	  the	  same	  circumstances	  of	  the	  suit.	  In	  
other	  words,	  plaintiffs	  also	  related	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  to	  violations	  to	  
other	  collective	  rights	  like	  public	  funds	  and	  public	  space.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330	  "Interview	  Fabian	  Marin,"	  	  (2010).	  
331	  Ap	  00818.	  




Patterns	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  
	   Cases	  at	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  seem	  to	  fall	  under	  three	  stages.	  In	  the	  first	  stage	  
(1997-­‐2000)	  just	  a	  few	  cases	  were	  decided	  while	  the	  majority	  of	  cases	  were	  decided	  in	  
the	  second	  stage	  (2001-­‐2007),	  with	  a	  high	  concentration	  of	  cases	  in	  2001,	  2005,	  and	  
2006.	  Finally,	  there	  is	  a	  third	  stage	  (2008-­‐2011)	  in	  which	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  dropped	  
considerably.333	  Although	  the	  constitution	  created	  popular	  actions	  in	  1991	  it	  was	  only	  in	  
1997	  when	  the	  Council	  decided	  the	  first	  case.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  Statute	  of	  popular	  
action	  that	  passed	  in	  the	  Congress	  in	  1998	  boosted	  the	  number	  of	  popular	  actions	  and	  it	  
took	  three	  years	  for	  this	  growth	  to	  reach	  at	  the	  Council	  level.	  This	  time	  frame	  is	  
understandable	  given	  that	  the	  Council	  was	  the	  appellate	  court	  in	  administrative	  lawsuits	  
and	  consequently	  that	  the	  Tribunals	  were	  the	  first	  level	  courts.	  	  
The	  Council’s	  cases	  refer	  to	  three	  types	  of	  claims:	  cases	  related	  to	  financial	  
malfeasance,	  cases	  referring	  to	  a	  willful	  misconduct	  of	  a	  governmental	  agent,	  and	  cases	  
where	  the	  violation	  of	  collective	  rights	  implied	  a	  violation	  of	  individual	  rights.	  Claims	  of	  
financial	  malfeasance	  represent	  51%	  of	  the	  court	  cases	  while	  41%	  of	  the	  cases	  refer	  to	  
willful	  misconduct.	  Individual	  rights	  violations	  were	  the	  main	  legal	  issue	  at	  stake	  only	  in	  
8%	  of	  the	  cases	  (see	  figure	  1).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








Financial	  malfeasance	  refers	  to	  situations	  in	  which	  public	  funds	  have	  been	  
mismanaged	  due	  to	  corruption,	  inefficiency,	  illegal	  behavior,	  lack	  of	  transparency,	  or	  
improper	  decisions	  of	  the	  administration.	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  case	  decided	  in	  2001	  the	  
union	  of	  the	  Procuraduría	  General	  de	  la	  Nación	  (oversight	  agency	  at	  the	  National	  level)	  
sued	  the	  head	  of	  the	  agency	  (the	  Procurador)	  for,	  according	  to	  the	  union	  members,	  he	  
did	  not	  comply	  with	  a	  ruling	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  that	  overruled	  the	  appointment	  of	  
72	  employees	  of	  this	  agency.	  According	  to	  the	  Union	  the	  Procurador	  approved	  that	  
these	  employees	  kept	  receiving	  salaries	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  Council’s	  decision.	  In	  this	  case	  the	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Union	  demanded	  from	  the	  Council	  to	  declare	  that	  the	  Procurador’s	  behavior	  was	  illegal	  
and	  that	  he	  mismanaged	  public	  funds.334	  	  
In	  claims	  related	  to	  financial	  malfeasance	  the	  plaintiffs	  attempt	  to	  prove	  that	  
there	  has	  been	  an	  improper	  management	  of	  public	  funds	  that	  had	  affected	  social	  
interests	  and	  that	  consequently	  the	  defendants	  should	  be	  responsible	  for	  paying	  the	  
sums	  that	  were	  misspent.	  The	  majority	  of	  cases	  in	  the	  database	  focus	  on	  financial	  
malfeasance	  and	  this	  finding	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  variable	  “other	  
rights”.	  In	  order	  to	  support	  their	  claim	  plaintiffs	  identify	  all	  the	  collective	  and	  individual	  
rights	  that	  they	  think	  have	  been	  violated	  under	  the	  circumstances	  related	  to	  the	  suit.	  I	  
explored	  the	  collective	  rights	  that	  plaintiffs	  considered	  violated	  in	  addition	  to	  
administrative	  morality	  (variable	  “other	  rights”).	  In	  the	  majority	  of	  cases	  the	  plaintiffs	  
related	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  to	  violations	  of	  public	  funds	  (Figure	  2).335	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334	  Ap	  167,(2001).	  
335	  Under	  the	  category	  “other	  collective	  rights”	  in	  Figure	  2	  plaintiffs	  referred	  to	  a	  healthy	  
environment,	  access	  to	  public	  services	  or	  efficient	  provision	  of	  public	  services,	  public	  security,	  free	  
economic	  competition,	  rights	  of	  consumers	  and	  users,	  protection	  of	  the	  cultural	  patrimony,	  access	  to	  
infrastructure	  related	  to	  public	  health,	  and	  ecologic	  equilibrium	  and	  rational/sustainable	  




Figure	  2:	  Collective	  rights	  other	  than	  administrative	  morality	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  in	  which	  
administrative	  morality	  is	  the	  primary	  issue.	  N=127.	  	  
	  
	  
In	  relation	  to	  a	  secondary	  legal	  issue	  at	  stake,	  in	  40%	  of	  the	  cases	  the	  plaintiffs	  
identified	  a	  secondary	  type	  of	  claim	  (issue2).	  Mismanagement	  of	  public	  funds	  (39%	  of	  
the	  cases)	  and	  willful	  misconduct	  (38%)	  are	  the	  most	  frequent	  categories	  of	  secondary	  
issue	  at	  stake	  identified	  by	  plaintiffs	  (Figure	  2).	  	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  case	  of	  2007	  the	  
citizen	  Luis	  Domingo	  Cárdenas	  sued	  the	  city	  of	  Bogota	  arguing	  that	  the	  city	  did	  not	  
comply	  with	  the	  contract	  C-­‐4016	  of	  June	  25th	  of	  1998.	  By	  this	  contract	  the	  city	  hired	  a	  
private	  firm	  to	  dispose	  waste	  from	  a	  trash	  yard	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  contamination	  to	  the	  
Tunjuelito	  River.	  The	  plaintiff	  argued	  that	  the	  contractor	  polluted	  the	  River	  and	  that	  the	  
city	  was	  responsible	  for	  this	  violation.	  The	  plaintiff	  filed	  a	  popular	  action	  so	  the	  judge	  
would	  declare	  the	  noncompliance	  of	  the	  contract	  and	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  city	  due	  
to	  the	  violation	  of	  its	  duty	  to	  oversight	  contract	  execution.	  As	  a	  secondary	  petition	  the	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plaintiff	  focused	  on	  the	  violation	  against	  public	  funds	  and	  demanded	  from	  the	  city	  to	  




Figure	  3:	  Secondary	  type	  of	  claim	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  in	  which	  administrative	  morality	  is	  the	  
primary	  issue.	  N=61.	  
	  
With	  regards	  the	  variation	  of	  the	  primary	  type	  of	  claim	  in	  time	  cases	  of	  financial	  
malfeasance	  represented	  50%	  of	  the	  claims	  in	  the	  entire	  time	  frame	  1997	  to	  2011.	  
Willful	  misconduct	  became	  a	  relevant	  category	  since	  2001	  when	  it	  started	  representing	  
over	  40%	  of	  the	  cases.	  In	  relation	  to	  individual	  rights,	  although	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  they	  
represented	  half	  of	  the	  cases	  that	  the	  Council	  decided	  (with	  a	  very	  small	  N)	  in	  the	  
second	  and	  third	  stages	  there	  were	  only	  a	  few	  cases	  under	  this	  category	  (Figure	  4).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Figure	  4:	  Type	  of	  claim	  over	  time	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality.	  1997-­2000:	  N=4.	  
2001-­2007:	  N=127.	  2008-­2011,	  N=20.	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  a	  legal	  issue	  at	  stake	  plaintiffs	  also	  identify	  a	  norm	  that	  support	  
their	  claim.	  In	  72%	  of	  the	  cases	  plaintiffs	  referred	  to	  the	  Constitution,	  the	  statute,	  or	  an	  
administrative	  regulation	  as	  the	  norm	  that	  entitled	  them	  to	  file	  a	  popular	  action.	  In	  
these	  cases	  the	  plaintiffs	  seemed	  to	  have	  some	  legal	  knowledge	  that	  allow	  them	  to	  
identify	  a	  legal	  norm	  supporting	  their	  claim.	  The	  court	  cases	  do	  not	  provide	  information	  
about	  the	  legal	  training	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  or	  they	  do	  not	  assert	  whether	  the	  plaintiffs	  are	  
attorneys.	  Due	  to	  this	  lack	  of	  information	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  
how	  do	  plaintiffs	  learn	  about	  the	  legal	  sources	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  popular	  
actions.	  When	  plaintiffs	  make	  reference	  to	  a	  legal	  source	  they	  mainly	  refer	  to	  the	  
statute	  of	  popular	  actions	  (68%)	  and	  in	  a	  smaller	  percentage	  they	  refer	  to	  constitutional	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norms	  (31%).337	  Contrary	  to	  widespread	  expectations	  the	  plaintiffs	  refer	  more	  
frequently	  to	  the	  statute	  than	  to	  the	  constitution.	  The	  constitution	  of	  1991	  was	  framed	  
to	  bring	  the	  people	  closer	  to	  the	  government	  and	  different	  public	  agencies	  have	  lead	  
communication	  campaigns	  to	  increase	  citizens’	  awareness	  of	  their	  constitutional	  rights.	  
If	  such	  campaigns	  of	  constitutional	  rights’	  promotion	  achieved	  their	  purposes	  one	  might	  
expect	  that	  plaintiffs	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  refer	  to	  constitutional	  norms	  as	  a	  support	  
to	  their	  claims	  but	  the	  data	  suggest	  that	  plaintiffs	  more	  frequently	  refer	  to	  the	  statute	  of	  
popular	  actions.	  This	  finding	  is	  also	  counterintuitive	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  it	  
would	  be	  easier	  for	  the	  people	  to	  get	  familiar	  with	  the	  constitution	  rather	  than	  specific	  
pieces	  of	  legislation.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5:	  Policy	  area	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality.	  N=149.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




In	  relation	  to	  the	  policy	  area	  that	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  claims,	  the	  policy	  areas	  fall	  
into	  seven	  categories:	  governmental	  service	  provision,	  utilities,	  law	  enforcement,	  public	  
finance,	  education,	  environmental	  protection,	  and	  political	  system.	  The	  majority	  of	  
cases	  falls	  under	  the	  category	  service	  provision	  (38%)	  and	  refers	  to	  cases	  where	  the	  
government	  has	  failed	  to	  provide	  services	  or	  when	  those	  services	  have	  low	  quality.	  
Examples	  of	  these	  services	  are	  housing,	  road	  construction,	  public	  lights,	  and	  oil	  and	  
natural	  gas	  distribution.	  In	  a	  case	  of	  2001	  two	  citizens	  sued	  the	  national	  agency	  for	  oil	  
refinement	  and	  distribution	  (ECOPETROL)	  arguing	  that	  ECOPETROL	  signed	  a	  contract	  to	  
build	  a	  line	  of	  gas	  pipes	  with	  a	  private	  contractor	  that	  did	  not	  have	  the	  financial	  capacity	  
to	  comply	  with	  this	  contract.	  According	  to	  the	  plaintiffs	  ECOPETROL	  selected	  the	  
contractor	  based	  on	  an	  initial	  estimate	  of	  the	  contract	  but	  it	  later	  added	  additional	  
objects	  to	  the	  contract	  that	  overcome	  the	  financial	  capacity	  of	  the	  contractor.	  As	  a	  
result,	  the	  contract	  did	  not	  comply	  with	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  contract	  affecting	  third	  
parties.338	  In	  this	  case	  the	  plaintiffs	  highlighted	  the	  lack	  of	  transparency	  of	  ECOPETROL	  
because	  it	  did	  not	  select	  from	  the	  beginning	  a	  contractor	  that	  had	  the	  financial	  capacity	  
that	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  contract.	  Instead,	  it	  seemed	  like	  
ECOPETROL	  divided	  the	  contract	  in	  parts	  so	  it	  would	  appear	  as	  if	  the	  contractor	  had	  
enough	  experience	  and	  assets	  to	  build	  the	  gas	  line.	  The	  noncompliance	  of	  the	  
contractor	  implied	  that	  ECOPETROL	  had	  to	  invest	  more	  resources	  than	  it	  was	  expected	  
and	  it	  also	  harmed	  economic	  interests	  of	  those	  who	  had	  commercial	  relations	  with	  the	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contractor.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Council	  ruled	  against	  the	  plaintiffs	  arguing	  that	  they	  did	  not	  
provide	  evidence	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  by	  ECOPETROL.	  The	  Council	  
found	  evidence	  of	  disagreements	  among	  the	  contractors	  and	  the	  contractors	  and	  third	  
parties	  but	  these	  disagreements	  are	  not	  related	  to	  violations	  of	  public	  funds	  or	  
administrative	  morality.	  Thus,	  the	  Council	  denied	  the	  action.339	  This	  is	  a	  case	  in	  which	  
the	  plaintiffs	  related	  administrative	  morality	  to	  a	  faulty	  behavior	  of	  the	  administration	  in	  
service	  provision,	  specifically	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  infrastructure	  (gas	  pipes).	  According	  
to	  the	  plaintiffs	  this	  faulty	  behavior	  of	  the	  administration	  (choosing	  a	  contractor	  with	  
inadequate	  capacity	  for	  complying	  with	  the	  contract)	  was	  posing	  risks	  to	  the	  public	  
service	  and	  to	  rights	  of	  the	  third	  parties	  affected	  by	  the	  contract.	  It	  is	  also	  relevant	  that	  
according	  to	  the	  Council’s	  view	  this	  was	  not	  a	  case	  of	  violation	  of	  collective	  rights	  but	  a	  
case	  of	  legal	  disputes	  among	  private	  parties	  (the	  contractors	  and	  the	  contractors	  and	  
third	  parties).	  There	  was	  not	  evidence	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  or	  
public	  funds.	  	  	  
The	  second	  most	  common	  policy	  areas	  are	  utilities	  and	  law	  enforcement,	  with	  	  
17%	  of	  the	  cases	  on	  each	  category	  (Figure	  5).	  	  Although	  utilities	  are	  a	  type	  of	  service	  
that	  the	  government	  provides	  or	  guarantees	  to	  the	  population	  I	  analyzed	  these	  data	  
separately	  since	  one	  of	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  framers	  when	  creating	  popular	  actions	  was	  
to	  entitle	  the	  people	  with	  a	  legal	  mechanism	  that	  allowed	  them	  to	  protect	  their	  
interests	  in	  an	  uneven	  relationship	  like	  the	  one	  between	  individuals	  and	  utilities’	  
companies.	  The	  rights	  of	  consumers	  and	  users	  were	  a	  big	  concern	  of	  the	  framers	  and	  




consequently	  it	  was	  expected	  that	  users	  of	  utilities	  would	  benefit	  from	  popular	  actions	  
to	  demand	  good	  services.	  	  17%	  of	  the	  cases	  fall	  under	  the	  category	  “utilities.”	  In	  a	  case	  
of	  2007	  a	  citizen	  filed	  a	  suit	  against	  the	  Superintendent	  for	  Public	  Utilities	  arguing	  that	  
this	  agency	  was	  threatening	  collective	  rights	  due	  to	  its	  decision	  to	  contract	  out	  the	  
water	  service	  in	  the	  region	  of	  San	  Andres.	  According	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  the	  
Superintendence	  opened	  a	  public	  bidding	  to	  contract	  out	  this	  service	  and	  that	  some	  of	  
the	  conditions	  of	  the	  public	  bidding	  implied	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  water	  
service	  for	  the	  region.340	  This	  case	  did	  not	  only	  focus	  on	  a	  specific	  case	  of	  defective	  
service	  provision	  but	  it	  targeted	  a	  broader	  impact	  of	  what	  the	  plaintiff	  perceived	  as	  a	  
threat	  to	  the	  community	  of	  that	  region.	  When	  answering	  to	  the	  suit	  the	  regional	  
government	  and	  the	  Superintendent	  revealed	  that	  the	  water	  provision	  in	  the	  region	  had	  
been	  going	  through	  a	  low	  coverage	  crisis	  and	  that	  the	  Superintendence	  hired	  a	  
consultant	  to	  explore	  alternatives	  to	  solve	  this	  crisis.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  study	  the	  
Superintendent	  and	  the	  regional	  government	  decided	  to	  contract	  out	  the	  water	  service	  
and	  one	  of	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  contractor	  was	  to	  develop	  a	  plan	  to	  expand	  coverage	  
to	  all	  the	  population	  in	  the	  region.	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  the	  plaintiff	  perceived	  this	  contract	  as	  
a	  threat	  against	  the	  population	  and	  their	  right	  to	  access	  public	  utilities	  given	  that	  this	  
region	  attracts	  tourists	  and,	  according	  to	  the	  plaintiff,	  by	  contracting	  out	  water	  
provision	  the	  contractor	  would	  focus	  on	  the	  tourist	  areas	  of	  the	  region	  (hotel	  
complexes)	  rather	  than	  reaching	  all	  sectors	  of	  the	  population.	  The	  Council	  ruled	  in	  favor	  
of	  the	  defendant	  arguing	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  did	  not	  prove	  that	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	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Superintendence	  violated	  administrative	  morality.	  Furthermore,	  according	  to	  the	  
Council,	  the	  Superintendent’s	  behavior	  was	  aimed	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights	  by	  
planning	  a	  gradual	  increase	  in	  the	  water	  service	  coverage	  for	  the	  region.341	  In	  this	  case	  
the	  popular	  action	  was	  not	  a	  mechanism	  for	  the	  plaintiff	  to	  stand	  up	  to	  the	  agencies	  
responsible	  for	  providing	  access	  to	  public	  utilities.	  Instead	  the	  Council	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  
governmental	  agencies	  that	  prove	  having	  a	  plan	  to	  improve	  service	  provision.	  	  
The	  cases	  under	  the	  category	  law	  enforcement	  refer	  to	  areas	  like	  jail	  
administration,	  oversight	  agencies,	  homeland	  security,	  and	  policy	  enforcement.	  For	  
instance	  in	  a	  case	  of	  2003	  two	  citizens	  sued	  the	  city	  of	  Bogota	  for	  negligence	  in	  
maintaining	  several	  sidewalks	  in	  the	  city	  that	  were	  being	  used	  as	  parking	  spots	  or	  as	  
sites	  for	  informal	  vendors	  to	  do	  business.	  Consequently,	  pedestrians	  have	  been	  forced	  
to	  walk	  on	  the	  road	  assuming	  unnecessary	  risks.	  With	  this	  popular	  action	  the	  plaintiffs	  
demanded	  from	  the	  city	  to	  take	  control	  over	  these	  public	  areas	  by	  removing	  individuals	  
and	  vehicles	  that	  have	  been	  illegally	  occupying	  the	  public	  space	  and	  to	  rebuild	  the	  
sidewalks	  that	  have	  been	  destroyed.342	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Council	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  
plaintiff	  because	  there	  was	  a	  violation	  to	  the	  collective	  right	  to	  public	  space.	  At	  the	  same	  
time	  the	  Council	  acknowledged	  that	  administrative	  morality	  was	  not	  violated	  by	  the	  
defendant	  since	  there	  was	  evidence	  that	  the	  defendant	  have	  performed	  its	  duties	  with	  
diligence.343	  This	  case	  shows	  popular	  actions	  as	  an	  effective	  legal	  mechanism	  to	  protect	  
collective	  rights	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  Council	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  plaintiff.	  To	  this	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  Ibid.	  




extent	  the	  Council	  gave	  popular	  actions	  the	  meaning	  that	  the	  framers	  pursued.	  At	  the	  
same	  time	  in	  this	  ruling	  the	  Council	  acknowledged	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  administration	  to	  
perform	  properly	  and	  declared	  that	  these	  efforts	  were	  enough	  evidence	  to	  declare	  that	  
administrative	  morality	  was	  not	  violated.	  	  
What	  types	  of	  plaintiffs	  have	  been	  using	  popular	  actions?	  As	  Figure	  2	  illustrates,	  
by	  far	  the	  largest	  proportion	  of	  primary	  plaintiffs	  are	  individuals	  (Figure	  6)	  and	  the	  
majority	  of	  them	  are	  men.344	  This	  pattern	  is	  constant	  in	  the	  three	  stages:	  1997-­‐2000,	  
2001-­‐2007,	  and	  2008-­‐2011.345	  Only	  20%	  of	  the	  cases	  had	  a	  secondary	  litigant	  and	  in	  this	  
category	  the	  largest	  proportion	  of	  plaintiffs	  are	  individuals.346	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6:	  Primary	  plaintiff	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality.	  N=151.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344	  In	  the	  universe	  of	  cases	  74%	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  are	  men	  (N=151).	  	  	  
345	  In	  the	  time	  frame	  1997-­‐2000	  75%	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  were	  individuals	  (N=3),	  from	  2001	  to	  2007	  
individuals	  represented	  83%	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  (N=105),	  and	  from	  2008	  to	  2011	  90%	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  
were	  individuals	  (N=18).	  	  
346	  Under	  the	  category	  secondary	  litigant	  94%	  of	  plaintiffs	  are	  individuals	  (N=32).	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   Although	  according	  to	  the	  files	  majority	  of	  plaintiffs	  are	  individuals	  it	  is	  not	  
possible	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  these	  individuals	  had	  some	  organizational	  support	  or	  
affiliation	  that	  they	  did	  not	  acknowledge	  in	  the	  suit.	  In	  other	  cases	  it	  might	  be	  possible	  
that	  the	  court	  clerk	  that	  summarized	  the	  claim	  for	  the	  file	  did	  not	  include	  this	  
information	  because	  it	  was	  unclear	  in	  the	  claim	  or	  because	  the	  clerk	  did	  not	  perceive	  
this	  information	  as	  relevant.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  case	  of	  2007	  three	  citizens	  appeared	  as	  
individual	  plaintiffs	  suing	  the	  Secretary	  for	  Transportation	  of	  Bogota.347	  At	  a	  first	  glance	  
this	  was	  the	  case	  of	  Epaminondas	  Moreno	  Parrado,	  Jorge	  Eliécer	  Miranda,	  and	  José	  
Cipriano	  Leon	  against	  the	  city	  of	  Bogota	  but	  when	  reading	  more	  about	  the	  case	  it	  seems	  
that	  these	  individual	  plaintiffs	  had	  organizational	  support	  to	  file	  the	  suit:	  “Since	  the	  
lawsuit	  is	  very	  confusing	  we	  will	  transcribe	  some	  fragments	  here:	  ‘According	  to	  the	  
articles	  12	  and	  18	  of	  the	  Law	  472	  of	  1998	  [statue	  of	  popular	  actions]	  we	  EPAMINONDA	  
MORENO	  PARRADO	  acting	  as	  an	  individual	  and	  currently	  I	  am	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Union	  
of	  the	  Secretary	  for	  Transportation	  of	  Bogota	  (SETT);	  JORGE	  ELIECER	  MIRANDA	  TELLEZ	  
acting	  as	  an	  individual	  and	  currently	  I	  am	  a	  board	  member	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  
Employees	  of	  the	  Contraloria	  Distrital	  [oversight	  agency],	  we	  file	  this	  suit	  to	  protect	  the	  
rights	  of	  public	  funds	  and	  administrative	  morality…’”348	  This	  case	  illustrates	  the	  
possibility	  that	  some	  or	  even	  many	  of	  the	  cases	  of	  individual	  litigants	  are	  in	  fact	  cases	  
brought	  by	  organizations.	  This	  poses	  a	  challenge	  in	  terms	  of	  exploring	  the	  applicability	  
of	  theories	  like	  party	  capability	  because	  what	  was	  presented	  as	  a	  case	  of	  three	  
individuals	  suing	  a	  governmental	  agency	  in	  fact	  has	  the	  support	  of	  a	  union	  and	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




employees’	  association.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  assume	  that	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  plaintiffs	  have	  got	  
organizational	  support	  when	  filing	  the	  suit.	  There	  are	  other	  similar	  cases	  in	  which	  
although	  the	  plaintiffs	  identified	  themselves	  as	  individuals	  they	  had	  organizational	  
resources	  to	  support	  their	  claim.	  In	  a	  case	  of	  2001	  two	  citizens	  filed	  a	  suit	  against	  the	  
mayor	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Sandoná	  (Nariño)	  but	  these	  were	  not	  two	  common	  citizens.	  One	  of	  
them	  was	  a	  city	  Council	  member	  and	  the	  other	  one	  was	  a	  member	  of	  an	  advisory	  board	  
of	  the	  city;	  although	  they	  did	  not	  file	  the	  suit	  in	  their	  condition	  of	  council	  member	  or	  
board	  member	  their	  organizational	  affiliations	  influence	  their	  role	  as	  litigants.	  Thus,	  
although	  the	  largest	  proportion	  of	  primary	  plaintiffs	  are	  individuals	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  
that	  they	  had	  organizational	  support	  when	  filing	  a	  popular	  actions.	  	  
	   According	  to	  the	  media	  analysis	  some	  journalistic	  articles	  referred	  to	  
plaintiffs	  as	  “bounty	  hunters”	  especially	  when	  particular	  plaintiffs	  filed	  several	  suits	  
against	  different	  governmental	  agencies	  for	  the	  same	  reason.	  When	  conducting	  the	  
analysis	  of	  the	  Council’s	  cases	  I	  identify	  seven	  cases	  with	  the	  same	  type	  of	  claim	  and	  
same	  facts	  filed	  by	  two	  different	  plaintiffs.	  Two	  individuals	  sued	  seven	  different	  cities	  
alleging	  that	  they	  did	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  statute	  of	  public	  utilities.349	  According	  to	  
Sergio	  Sanchez	  (who	  filed	  two	  suits)	  and	  Jose	  Omar	  Cortes	  filed	  (who	  filed	  five	  suits)	  the	  
majors	  and	  councils	  of	  these	  cities	  ignored	  their	  legal	  duties	  related	  to	  the	  law	  142	  of	  
1998	  that	  created	  the	  “Fund	  of	  solidarity	  and	  social	  redistribution”	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  
subsidizing	  low	  income	  population	  and	  facilitate	  their	  access	  to	  public	  utilities.	  It	  was	  the	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  Ap	  00932,(2006).	  Ap	  00938,(2006).	  Ap	  00857,(2006).	  Ap	  00543,(2006).	  Ap	  00290,(2006).	  Ap	  
00413,(2007).	  Ap	  10838,(2006).	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responsibility	  of	  the	  cities	  to	  implement	  this	  norm	  by	  creating	  the	  Fund	  and	  none	  of	  
these	  cities	  had	  created	  this	  Fund.	  	  
	   In	  six	  of	  these	  cases	  the	  Council	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  defendant	  arguing	  that	  
the	  cities	  did	  create	  the	  Fund	  given	  that	  the	  city	  council	  passed	  a	  norm	  to	  do	  so.	  Even	  
more	  the	  Council	  criticized	  the	  role	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  observing	  that	  the	  suit	  lacked	  of	  the	  
necessary	  elements	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  cities	  violated	  collective	  rights:	  “The	  room	  [of	  
decision]	  insists	  that,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  plaintiff	  just	  filed	  a	  suit	  based	  on	  generic	  
accusations	  that	  are	  almost	  identical	  to	  the	  ones	  he	  used	  in	  all	  the	  other	  popular	  actions	  
he	  had	  filed	  against	  different	  cities.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  on	  file	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  prove	  
the	  legal	  existence	  of	  the	  Fund.	  These	  proofs	  were	  ignored	  by	  the	  plaintiff.”350	  This	  case	  
reveals	  a	  negative	  tone	  from	  the	  Council	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  who	  had	  filed	  several	  
popular	  actions	  against	  different	  defendants	  by	  using	  “almost	  identical”	  arguments.	  
What	  seemed	  to	  be	  problematic	  is	  not	  only	  that	  the	  arguments	  were	  almost	  identical	  
from	  one	  suit	  to	  other	  but	  that	  also	  that	  the	  claim	  seemed	  to	  ignore	  basic	  evidence	  that	  
controverts	  the	  main	  legal	  issue	  at	  stake.	  Moreover,	  in	  two	  of	  these	  cases	  the	  Council	  
confirmed	  fines	  against	  the	  plaintiff	  that	  the	  Tribunals	  had	  imposed	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  
ruling.	  “As	  noted	  by	  the	  Tribunal	  the	  Fund	  was	  created	  five	  years	  before	  the	  suit	  was	  
filed	  and	  consequently	  the	  Council	  will	  confirm	  the	  fine	  of	  20	  minimum	  wages.”351	  In	  the	  
latter	  case	  the	  Council	  not	  only	  disapproved	  the	  plaintiff’s	  arguments	  but	  it	  also	  
punished	  his	  behavior	  with	  a	  fine.	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  Ap	  00413.	  
351	  Ap	  00543.	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   With	  regards	  the	  defendants	  in	  55%	  of	  the	  cases	  local	  governments	  are	  sued	  
for	  violations	  against	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  29%	  of	  the	  cases	  the	  defendant	  is	  the	  
national	  government	  or	  public	  organizations	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  Regional	  governments	  
and	  regional	  level	  public	  organizations	  only	  account	  for	  13%	  of	  defendants.	  In	  2%	  of	  the	  
cases	  businesses	  were	  sued	  in	  their	  role	  of	  contractors	  of	  the	  government	  or	  when	  they	  
have	  participated	  of	  the	  violation.	  In	  1%	  of	  the	  cases	  the	  plaintiffs	  sued	  an	  individual	  for	  
a	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  (Figure	  7).	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  7:	  Primary	  defendant	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality.	  N=149	  
	  
During	  the	  first	  three	  years	  (1997-­‐2000)	  all	  the	  cases	  were	  against	  the	  national	  
government	  or	  organizations	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  During	  the	  second	  period	  (2001-­‐
2007)	  local	  governments	  appear	  as	  defendants	  in	  over	  50%	  of	  the	  cases	  while	  the	  
national	  government	  only	  accounts	  for	  25%	  of	  the	  cases.	  In	  the	  third	  period	  (2008-­‐2011)	  
local	  governments	  and	  organizations	  at	  the	  local	  government	  constitute	  over	  50%	  of	  the	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Figure	  8:	  Type	  of	  defendant	  per	  year	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality.	  1997-­2000,	  
N=2.	  2001-­2007,	  N=127.	  2008-­2001,	  N=20	  
	  
An	  example	  of	  a	  lawsuit	  against	  a	  local	  government	  organization	  is	  a	  case	  of	  
2005	  when	  the	  Personería	  de	  Cartagena	  (oversight	  agency	  at	  the	  local	  level)	  sued	  the	  
local	  government	  of	  Cartagena	  for	  it	  restricted	  the	  transit	  of	  vehicles	  in	  some	  streets	  in	  
the	  historic	  center	  of	  the	  city.352	  The	  city	  government	  stated	  that	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  
cultural	  zones	  some	  roads	  would	  be	  only	  destined	  to	  the	  use	  of	  pedestrians.	  According	  
to	  the	  plaintiff	  the	  city	  government	  did	  not	  have	  legal	  authorization	  to	  regulate	  the	  use	  
of	  the	  roads	  because	  that	  function	  was	  legally	  assigned	  to	  the	  city	  Council.	  The	  plaintiff	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  Ap	  00135,(2005).	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also	  argued	  that	  the	  government	  lacked	  adequate	  planning	  and	  it	  did	  not	  take	  the	  
people’s	  perspective	  into	  consideration	  before	  changing	  the	  regulations	  in	  the	  historic	  
area.	  According	  to	  the	  plaintiff,	  the	  population	  disagreed	  with	  the	  governmental	  
decision	  since	  it	  violated	  collective	  and	  individual	  rights.	  Due	  to	  this	  decision	  people	  
were	  forced	  to	  take	  long	  walks	  to	  reach	  their	  destinations;	  kids	  were	  forced	  to	  walk	  on	  
their	  own	  since	  school	  buses	  cannot	  take	  them	  to	  their	  homes,	  etc.	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  
Council	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  because,	  according	  to	  this	  Court,	  the	  city	  
government	  made	  a	  decision	  that	  was	  under	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  city	  council.	  In	  spite	  
of	  this,	  the	  Council	  argued	  that	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  because	  the	  plaintiff	  failed	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  administration	  pursued	  illegal	  
motives.353	  This	  ruling	  has	  mixed	  messages	  with	  regards	  the	  potential	  of	  popular	  actions	  
and	  administrative	  morality.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  popular	  actions	  were	  an	  effective	  
check	  on	  governmental	  performance	  because	  they	  allowed	  a	  citizen	  to	  point	  out	  to	  a	  
wrongful	  behavior	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Cartagena.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Council	  seemed	  did	  
not	  find	  enough	  evidence	  to	  proof	  an	  illegal	  motivation	  in	  the	  administration	  and	  
consequently	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
In	  a	  case	  of	  2006	  the	  defendant	  was	  a	  governmental	  agency	  at	  the	  National	  
level.	  Mr.	  Carlos	  Farfan	  sued	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  for	  it	  did	  not	  comply	  with	  legal	  
regulations.354	  According	  to	  Mr.	  Farfan	  the	  law	  44	  of	  1990	  stated	  that	  the	  national	  
government	  would	  provide	  funding	  to	  the	  cities	  were	  native	  Colombian	  reservations	  are	  
located	  since	  the	  reservations	  do	  not	  pay	  taxes	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  land.	  According	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353	  Ibid.	  
354	  Ap	  02753,(2006).	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plaintiff	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Ortega	  there	  are	  11	  reservations	  and	  the	  national	  government	  had	  
not	  paid	  the	  funds	  stated	  in	  the	  law	  44	  of	  1990.	  	  
With	  regards	  popular	  actions	  against	  individuals,	  in	  a	  case	  of	  2005	  an	  oversight	  
agency	  at	  the	  national	  level	  (the	  Procuraduría	  General	  de	  la	  Nación)	  sued	  Amadeo	  
Tamayo	  a	  contractor	  for	  the	  region	  of	  Cesar.	  The	  Procuraduría	  argued	  that	  Mr.	  Tamayo	  
did	  not	  comply	  with	  its	  legal	  obligations	  and	  that	  consequently	  he	  was	  not	  entitled	  to	  
receive	  the	  salary	  set	  in	  the	  contract.	  In	  this	  case	  although	  Mr.	  Tamayo	  was	  an	  
individual,	  due	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  legal	  bond	  with	  the	  region	  of	  Cesar	  he	  was	  
responsible	  of	  for	  complying	  with	  administrative	  morality.355	  	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  identifying	  a	  primary	  defendant,	  over	  half	  of	  the	  cases	  (52%)	  
involve	  a	  secondary	  defendant.	  	  As	  Figure	  9	  illustrates	  local	  governments,	  businesses,	  
and	  the	  national	  government	  are	  the	  most	  frequently	  parties	  identified	  as	  secondary	  
defendants	  in	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality.356	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  Ap	  01588,(2005).	  
356	  Only	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  the	  cases	  included	  a	  third	  defendant	  (25%,	  N=38)	  and	  consequently	  I	  





Figure	  9:	  Secondary	  defendant	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality.	  N=78.	  
	  
	  
	   	  
I	  am	  interested	  in	  exploring	  whether	  popular	  actions	  have	  been	  focusing	  on	  institutional	  
violations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  or	  if	  they	  have	  focused	  on	  individual	  cases.	  
Individual	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  refer	  to	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  administrative	  
behavior	  affected	  an	  individual	  in	  a	  particular	  situation.	  In	  other	  words	  cases	  of	  
individual	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  are	  those	  in	  which	  the	  plaintiff	  pointed	  
out	  to	  an	  immoral	  administrative	  behavior	  that	  produced	  negative	  effects	  for	  a	  
determined	  individual.	  Institutional	  violations	  are	  those	  in	  which	  the	  administrative	  
behavior	  brings	  negative	  consequences	  to	  a	  broader	  group.	  These	  cases	  are	  framed	  by	  
plaintiffs	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  broad	  negative	  effective	  that	  comes	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  an	  
immoral	  behavior	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  general	  policy.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  variable	  
individual	  versus	  institutional	  speaks	  to	  the	  possible	  impact	  of	  popular	  actions	  and	  
166	  
	  
whether	  they	  have	  targeted	  high	  impact	  cases	  that	  refer	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  
broad	  policies	  or	  whether	  they	  have	  focused	  in	  cases	  with	  limited	  impact.	  The	  data	  
suggest	  that	  popular	  actions	  have	  focused	  more	  on	  individual	  violations	  (70%)	  rather	  
than	  on	  institutional	  policy	  (Figure	  10).	  An	  example	  of	  an	  individual	  case	  is	  the	  suit	  filed	  
by	  the	  union	  of	  health-­‐care	  professionals	  ANTHOC	  against	  the	  lottery	  of	  Bogotá.357	  The	  
plaintiff	  argued	  that	  the	  lottery	  contracted	  out	  management	  services	  for	  the	  time	  frame	  
2000	  -­‐	  2001	  and	  that	  in	  this	  process	  the	  lottery	  chose	  a	  contractor	  that	  did	  not	  fulfill	  the	  
requirements	  of	  the	  bidding	  process.	  ANTHOC	  argued	  that	  the	  lottery	  contracted	  
SONAPI	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  SONAPI	  did	  not	  make	  the	  best	  offer	  in	  the	  process	  since	  
the	  other	  participant	  (Unión	  Temporal	  Multinacional	  de	  Apuestas)	  offered	  better	  
conditions.	  ANTHOC	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  lottery	  manipulated	  the	  bidding	  process	  the	  
favor	  SONAPI.	  The	  Council	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  defendant	  arguing	  that	  SONAPI	  fulfilled	  
all	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  bidding	  process	  and	  that	  its	  offer	  was	  competitive.	  The	  
Council	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  failed	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  offer	  of	  the	  participant	  
Unión	  Temporal	  Multinacional	  de	  Apuestas	  was	  better	  than	  the	  offer	  of	  SONAPI.358	  In	  
this	  case	  the	  plaintiff	  filed	  the	  suit	  arguing	  that	  administrative	  morality	  had	  been	  
violated	  by	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  contractor	  SONAPI	  in	  this	  specific	  case.	  The	  Council	  ruled	  
against	  the	  plaintiffs	  arguing	  that	  the	  lottery’s	  behavior	  did	  not	  violate	  the	  law.	  	  
	   An	  example	  of	  a	  case	  involving	  an	  institutional	  violation	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  is	  the	  suit	  of	  two	  citizens	  against	  the	  Superior	  Council	  for	  the	  Public	  notaries.359	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  Ibid.	  
359	  Ap	  447,(2002).	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According	  to	  the	  plaintiffs	  the	  Superior	  Council	  for	  Public	  notaries	  started	  an	  illegal	  
selection	  process	  to	  appoint	  notaries	  in	  the	  country.	  	  The	  selection	  process	  started	  in	  
1999	  and	  in	  2000	  the	  Administrative	  Tribunal	  of	  Cundinamarca	  demanded	  the	  Ministry	  
of	  Justice	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Council	  to	  postpone	  the	  selection	  process	  until	  the	  Congress	  
have	  provided	  legal	  parameters	  for	  the	  issue.	  The	  plaintiffs	  argued	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  this	  
ruling	  the	  Supreme	  Council	  “willingly	  and	  stubbornly”	  continued	  with	  the	  process	  and	  
misspent	  public	  funds	  on	  it.	  In	  2000	  the	  Congress	  passed	  the	  law	  588	  regulating	  public	  
notaries	  and	  set	  the	  requirements	  for	  the	  selection	  process	  of	  notaries.	  In	  opinion	  of	  the	  
plaintiffs	  the	  criteria	  set	  by	  the	  Congress	  are	  different	  from	  the	  ones	  that	  guided	  the	  
selection	  process.	  Thus,	  the	  process	  to	  select	  public	  notaries	  had	  been	  illegal.	  This	  case	  
referred	  to	  the	  entire	  selection	  process	  of	  all	  public	  notaries	  in	  the	  country	  and	  
consequently	  targeted	  an	  institutional	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  10:	  Type	  of	  claim:	  individual	  claims	  vs.	  institutional	  claims	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  on	  





	   Plaintiffs	  have	  mainly	  pursued	  individual	  violations	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  and	  this	  pattern	  has	  not	  changed	  in	  time	  (Figure	  11).	  In	  the	  three	  periods	  under	  
analysis	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  cases	  have	  focused	  on	  individual	  cases	  rather	  than	  
institutional	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
	  
Figure	  11:	  Type	  of	  claim:	  individual	  claims	  vs.	  institutional	  claims	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  on	  
administrative	  morality	  per	  year.	  1997-­2000,	  N=3.	  2001-­2007,	  N=127.	  2008-­2011,	  N=20.	  
	  
	   Turning	  to	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  cases	  it	  is	  noticeable	  that	  the	  Council	  
strongly	  tends	  to	  decide	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  defendant	  (Figure	  12).	  This	  tendency	  has	  not	  
changed	  in	  time	  since	  in	  the	  three	  stages	  under	  analysis	  the	  defendants	  have	  won	  








Figure	  13:	  Type	  of	  decision	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality	  per	  year.	  1997-­2000,	  
N=3.	  2001-­2007,	  N=127.	  2008-­2011,	  N=20.	  
	  
	   One	  of	  the	  arguments	  of	  the	  Council	  for	  ruling	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  defendants	  
is	  that	  the	  plaintiffs	  failed	  to	  prove	  the	  alleged	  violation.	  In	  a	  case	  of	  2006	  a	  citizen	  filed	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a	  suit	  against	  the	  water	  supply	  company	  of	  Bogota	  because	  it	  contracted	  out	  auditing	  
services	  over	  the	  city’s	  performance.360	  According	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  the	  contract	  between	  
the	  city	  and	  the	  contractor	  (Arthur	  Andersen)	  violated	  collective	  rights	  of	  public	  funds	  
and	  administrative	  morality	  because	  the	  auditing	  functions	  could	  have	  been	  performed	  
by	  oversight	  agencies	  at	  the	  local	  level	  with	  no	  cost	  for	  the	  city.	  On	  a	  first	  ruling	  the	  
Tribunal	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  but	  the	  Council	  overruled	  this	  decision	  and	  
favored	  the	  defendant.	  According	  to	  the	  Council	  the	  plaintiff	  should	  have	  proved	  that	  
the	  public	  agency	  violated	  administrative	  morality	  and	  public	  funds	  by	  contracting	  out	  
auditing	  services	  but	  this	  did	  not	  happen.	  The	  only	  thing	  that	  was	  proved	  in	  this	  case,	  
according	  to	  the	  Council,	  was	  that	  the	  water	  supply	  company	  had	  signed	  a	  contract	  with	  
Arthur	  Andersen	  but	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  the	  contract	  in	  
terms	  of	  public	  funds	  and	  administrative	  morality.361	  In	  a	  case	  of	  2007	  the	  Council	  
reiterated	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  evidence	  provided	  by	  the	  plaintiff	  when	  arguing:	  “On	  
this	  case,	  although	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  not	  completely	  accurate	  with	  regards	  the	  facts	  that	  
led	  him	  to	  file	  the	  popular	  action,	  the	  evidence	  highlights	  the	  omission	  of	  the	  
administration	  by	  not	  investing	  due	  funds	  on	  the	  solidarity	  account	  from	  2000	  to	  2006.	  
This	  omission	  affected	  low-­‐income	  and	  vulnerable	  population…”362	  In	  this	  case	  the	  
Council	  did	  not	  condemn	  the	  lack	  of	  accuracy	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  with	  regards	  the	  facts	  of	  
the	  case	  because	  there	  was	  enough	  evidence	  to	  determine	  that	  collective	  rights	  were	  
violated.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360	  Ap	  1640.	  	  
361	  	  Another	  example	  of	  this	  argument	  by	  the	  Council	  is	  the	  case	  Ap	  02356,(2006).	  
362	  Ap	  01252,(2007).	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   In	  other	  cases	  the	  Council	  rules	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  defendant	  but	  it	  recognized	  
that	  the	  governmental	  performance	  could	  improve.	  In	  a	  case	  of	  2007	  the	  plaintiff	  
argued	  that	  the	  city	  of	  Popayan	  has	  not	  finished	  a	  road	  construction	  and	  that	  this	  lack	  of	  
efficiency	  was	  harming	  the	  population.363	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Council	  argued	  that	  the	  
plaintiff	  failed	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  population	  was	  suffering	  harm	  and	  consequently	  ruled	  
in	  favor	  of	  the	  defendant.	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  decision	  the	  Council	  urged	  the	  city	  to	  finish	  the	  
road	  construction,	  making	  sure	  that	  there	  would	  be	  enough	  future	  funding	  for	  this	  
purpose,	  and	  taking	  the	  necessary	  actions	  to	  facilitate	  the	  transit	  during	  the	  rainy	  
season.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Council	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  defendant	  but	  it	  acknowledged	  that,	  
in	  spite	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  evidence	  on	  file	  with	  regards	  rights’	  violations,	  the	  governmental	  
service	  seemed	  to	  be	  defective.	  	  
	   Do	  the	  Council’s	  decisions	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  plaintiff?	  When	  
focusing	  on	  cases	  of	  individual	  plaintiffs	  the	  Council’s	  decisions	  have	  been	  changing	  in	  
time.	  On	  a	  first	  period	  the	  Council	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  governmental	  agencies	  in	  all	  cases	  
but	  this	  pattern	  changed	  in	  the	  second	  and	  third	  stage	  when	  the	  Council	  started	  
granting	  actions	  to	  the	  plaintiffs.	  In	  the	  second	  period	  (2001-­‐2007)	  the	  Council	  ruled	  in	  
favor	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  in	  21%	  of	  the	  cases	  while	  in	  the	  third	  period	  plaintiffs	  won	  28%	  of	  
the	  suits	  (Figure	  14).	  Although	  28%	  is	  still	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  cases	  won	  by	  plaintiffs	  
these	  data	  suggest	  that	  the	  Council	  has	  been	  more	  prone	  to	  grant	  plaintiffs	  claims	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363	  Ap	  01837,(2007).	  In	  a	  similar	  way	  in	  a	  case	  of	  2011	  the	  Council	  acknowledged	  the	  limitations	  of	  
the	  government	  to	  provide	  services	  like	  public	  utilities.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Council	  urged	  the	  water	  
supply	  company	  of	  Bucaramanga	  to	  conduct	  analysis	  in	  order	  to	  check	  the	  availability	  of	  continuous	  
water	  supply	  for	  the	  neighborhood	  Mirador	  de	  Arenales	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Giron.	  Also,	  the	  Council	  urged	  




later	  years	  and	  it	  may	  suggest	  that	  the	  possible	  impact	  of	  popular	  actions	  has	  increased.	  
It	  may	  be	  possible	  that	  the	  perception	  of	  justices	  at	  the	  Council	  with	  regards	  plaintiffs	  
and	  their	  claims	  has	  improved	  or	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  the	  plaintiffs	  have	  gotten	  
experience	  and	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  frame	  their	  suits	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  more	  acceptable	  
for	  the	  justices.364	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  14:	  Type	  of	  decision	  per	  year	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality	  when	  plaintiffs	  
are	  individuals.	  1997-­2000,	  N=3.	  2001-­2007,	  N=127.	  2008-­2011,	  N=20.	  	  	  
	  
	   Do	  the	  Council’s	  decisions	  vary	  with	  the	  type	  of	  defendant?	  In	  cases	  when	  
the	  national	  government	  is	  sued	  it	  tends	  to	  win	  in	  a	  largest	  proportion	  of	  cases	  (79%)	  in	  
comparison	  to	  the	  cases	  that	  plaintiffs	  win	  (19%).	  The	  same	  occurs	  when	  regional	  
governments	  or	  regional	  agencies	  are	  sued	  (they	  win	  in	  79%	  of	  the	  cases),	  and	  when	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364	  One	  element	  that	  could	  shape	  justices’	  perception	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  is	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  
monetary	  incentive	  because	  that	  would	  change	  the	  motivation	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  to	  file	  a	  suit.	  Without	  
being	  entitled	  to	  a	  monetary	  incentive	  plaintiffs	  who	  bring	  cases	  to	  the	  jurisdiction	  aim	  to	  strengthen	  
the	  legal	  system	  and	  to	  protect	  collective	  rights	  without	  what	  it	  has	  been	  perceived	  as	  a	  selfish	  
motivation	  to	  receive	  a	  reward.	  Since	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  incentive	  took	  place	  in	  2010	  future	  
research	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  estimate	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  Council’s	  decisions.	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local	  governments	  are	  sued	  (66%).	  Local	  governments	  and	  local	  agencies	  are	  the	  level	  of	  
government	  most	  frequently	  sued	  and	  although	  the	  Council	  frequently	  rules	  in	  their	  
favor	  it	  does	  it	  in	  a	  smaller	  proportion	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  national	  and	  regional	  
governments	  (Figure	  15).	  	  
	   These	  data	  provide	  evidence	  of	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  litigant	  capacity	  
theory	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  individual	  plaintiffs	  lose	  in	  the	  largest	  proportion	  of	  cases	  
while	  the	  government	  wins.365	  Even	  more,	  when	  comparing	  the	  proportion	  of	  winnings	  
the	  national	  government	  gets	  favorable	  decisions	  in	  a	  larger	  than	  proportion	  than	  the	  
regional	  and	  local	  level	  of	  government.	  In	  other	  words	  the	  national	  government	  as	  the	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  Marc	  Galanter,	  "Why	  The'haves'	  Come	  out	  Ahead:	  Speculations	  on	  the	  Limits	  of	  Legal	  Change,"	  




Figure	  15:	  Decision	  by	  type	  of	  defendant	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality.	  Defendant	  
national	  government,	  N=42.	  Defendant	  regional	  government=19.	  Decision	  local	  government=83.	  	  
	  
	   Who	  wins,	  however,	  varies	  dramatically	  by	  type	  of	  case.	  The	  defendant	  
(the	  government)	  wins	  in	  a	  largest	  proportion	  of	  cases	  about	  financial	  malfeasance	  and	  
willful	  misconduct	  but	  this	  is	  reversed	  in	  cases	  of	  individual	  rights	  (Figure	  16).	  When	  
individual	  rights	  are	  at	  stake	  the	  plaintiffs	  win	  in	  58%	  of	  the	  cases	  while	  the	  defendants	  
win	  in	  42%.	  Although	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  related	  to	  individual	  rights	  as	  a	  main	  issue	  is	  
low	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  other	  two	  categories	  the	  Council	  seems	  to	  favor	  plaintiffs.	  For	  
example	  in	  a	  case	  of	  2004	  the	  Council	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  and	  it	  emphasized	  on	  
the	  role	  of	  popular	  actions	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  consumers’	  protection.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  
citizen	  Exenober	  Hernandez	  sued	  the	  National	  Company	  for	  telecommunications	  
(TELECOM)	  because	  it	  charged	  different	  rates	  for	  the	  same	  type	  of	  services	  in	  different	  
areas	  of	  Bogota.366	  TELECOM	  offers	  services	  of	  long-­‐distance	  calls	  in	  stores	  located	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366	  Ap	  00254,(2004).	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different	  areas	  of	  the	  country	  and	  Mr.	  Hernandez	  argued	  that	  in	  two	  stores	  in	  the	  city	  of	  
Bogota	  TELECOM	  was	  charging	  different	  rates	  to	  call	  to	  the	  city	  of	  Honda	  in	  Colombia.	  
For	  Mr.	  Hernandez	  this	  difference	  in	  call	  rates	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  equal	  protection	  of	  the	  
law.	  The	  Tribunal	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  TELECOM	  arguing	  that	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  agency	  realized	  
that	  there	  was	  a	  mistake	  in	  the	  rates	  it	  corrected	  the	  situation.	  According	  to	  the	  Tribunal	  
since	  the	  mistake	  was	  solved	  the	  claim	  was	  not	  applicable	  and	  the	  ruling	  should	  go	  in	  
favor	  of	  the	  defendant.	  At	  the	  appellate	  level,	  the	  Council	  analyzed	  the	  case	  from	  a	  
different	  perspective.	  The	  Council	  found	  enough	  evidence	  suggesting	  that	  there	  had	  
been	  a	  violation	  of	  collective	  rights	  but	  the	  question	  addressed	  by	  the	  Council	  was	  
different:	  does	  a	  change	  in	  the	  circumstances	  that	  motivated	  the	  popular	  action	  imply	  a	  
ruling	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  defendant?	  According	  to	  the	  Council,	  the	  Statute	  of	  popular	  actions	  
entitled	  plaintiffs	  to	  file	  a	  suit	  when	  collective	  rights	  are	  violated	  in	  the	  present	  or	  when	  
they	  have	  been	  violated.	  The	  Council	  argued:	  “In	  this	  case	  the	  violation	  does	  not	  simply	  
disappear	  when	  technical	  mistakes	  are	  improved,	  otherwise	  it	  would	  be	  like	  saying	  that	  
consumers,	  who	  are	  the	  weaker	  party	  in	  a	  commercial	  relationship,	  do	  not	  have	  legal	  
mechanisms	  to	  protect	  themselves.	  The	  room	  [court	  panel]	  will	  rule	  against	  TELECOM	  
but	  will	  not	  demand	  from	  it	  to	  compensate	  damages	  or	  will	  not	  demand	  any	  specific	  
behavior	  from	  it.”367	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Council	  seems	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  symbolic	  value	  of	  the	  
ruling	  because	  by	  favoring	  the	  defendant	  it	  could	  have	  communicated	  that	  popular	  
actions	  do	  not	  have	  the	  potential	  of	  protecting	  consumers.	  The	  Council	  seemed	  to	  want	  
to	  emphasize	  symbolic	  value	  of	  recognizing	  that	  the	  plaintiff,	  the	  consumer,	  was	  right.	  	  






Figure	  16:	  Decision	  by	  primary	  type	  of	  claim	  in	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality.	  
Financial	  malfeasance	  N=76.	  Willful	  misconduct,	  N=62.	  Individual	  rights,	  N=12.	  	  	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   Court	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality	  fall	  under	  two	  categories,	  
depending	  on	  the	  Court	  that	  made	  the	  decision.	  Decisions	  from	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  
follow	  the	  traditional	  pattern	  of	  a	  litigious	  procedure	  in	  which	  a	  plaintiff	  (mostly	  
individuals	  according	  to	  the	  data)	  sues	  a	  defendant	  (local	  governments	  and	  the	  national	  
government	  in	  majority	  of	  the	  cases)	  by	  arguing	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  violation	  of	  
administrative	  morality.	  The	  second	  category,	  decisions	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  
combines	  different	  types	  of	  actions	  that	  follow	  a	  more	  public	  type	  of	  litigation	  in	  which	  
a	  claimant	  argues	  that	  a	  certain	  regulation	  is	  unconstitutional	  or	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  
decides	  to	  revise	  a	  certain	  decision	  for	  its	  salience	  in	  terms	  of	  constitutional	  rights.	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These	  different	  types	  of	  court	  cases	  set	  the	  criteria	  for	  different	  parties	  to	  understand	  
and	  apply	  the	  concept	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
	   Cases	  from	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  popular	  actions	  as	  a	  
mechanism	  set	  by	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  that	  aimed	  to	  entitle	  individuals	  to	  protect	  
collective	  rights.	  According	  to	  the	  data	  popular	  actions	  have	  been	  successful	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  individuals	  are	  the	  most	  frequent	  plaintiffs	  and	  that	  they	  have	  targeted	  
violations	  perpetrated	  by	  local	  governments	  and	  the	  national	  government.	  In	  other	  
words,	  individuals	  have	  used	  this	  legal	  mechanism	  to	  enforce	  collective	  rights	  against	  
big	  players	  like	  local	  and	  national	  governments.	  	  
	   At	  a	  first	  glance	  these	  findings	  seem	  like	  good	  news	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
democratic	  implications	  of	  popular	  actions	  but	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  plaintiffs	  are	  
receiving	  organizational	  support	  when	  filing	  the	  claim.	  In	  my	  interview	  with	  the	  auxiliary	  
justice	  Roberto	  Molina	  at	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  he	  argued	  that	  civil	  society	  organizations	  
do	  not	  present	  themselves	  as	  plaintiffs	  in	  popular	  actions	  because	  some	  justices	  have	  
negative	  perceptions	  of	  them.	  Civil	  society	  organizations	  like	  NGOs	  could	  be	  authors	  of	  
popular	  actions	  but	  they	  choose	  not	  to	  participate	  directly	  to	  avoid	  negative	  rulings.368	  
Future	  research	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  explore	  the	  organizational	  support	  that	  some	  
plaintiffs	  receive	  when	  filing	  a	  popular	  action.	  	  
	   	  Most	  frequently	  plaintiffs	  sue	  the	  government	  for	  cases	  of	  financial	  
malfeasance	  in	  policy	  areas	  related	  to	  service	  provision.	  In	  my	  interview	  with	  Eduardo	  
Arce,	  a	  public	  agent	  working	  at	  a	  National	  level	  organization,	  he	  argued	  that	  popular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368	  "Interview	  Roberto	  Molina,"	  	  (2012).	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actions	  have	  focused	  on	  certain	  policy	  areas	  in	  which	  the	  government	  invests	  
considerable	  resources	  because	  plaintiffs	  have	  perceived	  litigation	  as	  a	  possible	  source	  
of	  income.	  	  
“The	  thing	  is,	  and	  I	  believe	  we	  discussed	  this	  topic	  before,	  the	  impact	  of	  
popular	  actions	  on	  the	  daily	  life	  of	  public	  agents	  is	  almost	  zero	  unless	  we	  
refer	  to	  specific	  policy	  areas….	  popular	  actions	  have	  targeted	  certain	  areas	  
where	  public	  agencies	  have	  big	  budgets	  like	  mine	  exploitation,	  road	  
construction,	  environment.	  Other	  sectors	  like	  banking,	  education,	  that	  are	  
core	  areas,	  I	  think	  that	  plaintiffs	  did	  not	  care…”369	  
	  
	   According	  to	  this	  interviewee	  since	  the	  motivation	  of	  plaintiffs	  is	  
economic	  they	  have	  focused	  mainly	  on	  policy	  areas	  where	  considerable	  public	  funds	  are	  
invested.	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  perception	  the	  data	  suggest	  that	  plaintiffs	  file	  actions	  in	  areas	  
that	  supposedly	  involve	  high	  budgets	  (like	  road	  construction	  and	  fuel	  exploitation)	  and	  
in	  areas	  that	  are	  not	  economically	  salient	  (like	  public	  utilities	  and	  education).	  	  
	   The	  data	  suggest	  that	  local	  governments	  are	  the	  most	  frequently	  sued	  in	  
popular	  actions.	  This	  finding	  is	  related	  to	  the	  constitutional	  attribution	  to	  different	  levels	  
of	  government.	  According	  to	  the	  constitution,	  the	  local	  level	  of	  government	  is	  
responsible	  for	  granting	  services	  to	  the	  population	  while	  the	  regional	  government	  is	  
responsible	  for	  working	  as	  a	  middle	  level	  between	  the	  national	  government	  and	  the	  
cities,	  by	  articulating	  and	  supporting	  policy	  implementation.370	  Given	  the	  constitutional	  
functions	  of	  the	  cities	  individuals	  perceive	  them	  as	  the	  level	  of	  government	  closest	  to	  
them	  and	  the	  one	  that	  is	  responsible	  for	  granting	  good	  public	  services.	  Thus,	  they	  are	  
the	  most	  frequently	  sued	  in	  popular	  actions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369	  "Interview	  Eduardo	  Arce."	  
370	  Art.	  298	  and	  Art.	  311,	  Colombian	  constitution.	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   In	  spite	  of	  the	  positive	  aspects	  of	  popular	  actions	  (citizen	  engagement	  and	  
demanding	  better	  public	  services	  from	  local	  governments)	  their	  impact	  is	  still	  reduced	  
since	  the	  Council	  tends	  to	  rule	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  defendant	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases.	  Also	  
the	  data	  suggest	  that	  plaintiffs	  target	  individual	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  in	  
majority	  of	  cases	  rather	  than	  institutional	  violations.	  These	  findings	  also	  suggest	  that	  
popular	  actions	  regarding	  administrative	  morality	  may	  have	  only	  a	  limited	  impact	  on	  
governmental	  performance.	  	  
	   In	  considering	  the	  overall	  significance	  of	  these	  cases	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that	  a	  key	  reason	  why	  the	  Council	  rules	  against	  plaintiffs	  is	  that	  plaintiffs	  fail	  to	  
provide	  enough	  evidence	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  Judges	  
undoubtedly	  need	  evidence	  to	  make	  informed	  decisions.	  But	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  
evidence	  in	  many	  of	  these	  cases	  suggests	  a	  key	  limitation	  of	  the	  popular	  action	  
mechanism.	  Popular	  actions	  were	  intended	  to	  allow	  any	  citizen	  to	  demand	  responsibility	  
from	  the	  government.	  But	  citizens	  without	  legal	  training	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  present	  
adequate	  evidence	  or	  be	  able	  to	  navigate	  the	  complex	  legal	  procedures	  and	  formalities	  
involved	  in	  these	  cases.	  Popular	  actions	  could	  have	  a	  higher	  potential	  if	  they	  are	  
conceptualized	  not	  as	  public	  actions	  but	  as	  ordinary	  actions	  without	  the	  formalities	  of	  
administrative	  actions.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case	  it	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  purpose	  
of	  popular	  actions	  is	  different	  from	  the	  one	  conceived	  by	  the	  framers.	  Auxiliary	  justice	  
Molina	  argued	  that,	  in	  fact,	  popular	  actions	  are	  not	  perceived	  as	  constitutional	  actions	  
(public	  actions).	  That	  these	  actions	  have	  been	  implemented	  as	  ordinary	  administrative	  
actions	  and	  that	  consequently	  the	  litigant	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  succeed	  if	  he	  has	  had	  legal	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training.	  Only	  trough	  legal	  training	  the	  litigant	  could	  prove	  that	  there	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  a	  
collective	  right.371	  	  
	   The	  data	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  an	  exception	  of	  the	  pattern	  of	  rulings	  
against	  the	  plaintiffs	  when	  referring	  to	  cases	  of	  individual	  rights’	  violations.	  In	  cases	  of	  
individual	  rights’	  violations	  plaintiffs	  win	  in	  58%	  of	  the	  cases,	  while	  in	  cases	  of	  financial	  
malfeasance	  and	  willful	  misconduct	  plaintiffs	  lose	  in	  majority	  of	  the	  cases.	  The	  data	  
suggest	  that	  the	  Council	  gives	  importance	  to	  the	  symbolic	  value	  of	  the	  rulings	  when	  
referring	  to	  individual	  rights.	  
	   Finally,	  with	  regards	  the	  evolution	  of	  popular	  actions	  at	  the	  Council	  the	  
situation	  of	  plaintiffs	  has	  improved	  in	  a	  little	  proportion	  in	  the	  time	  frame	  2008-­‐2011.	  In	  
cases	  of	  individual	  plaintiffs,	  in	  a	  first	  period	  of	  the	  rulings	  (1997-­‐2000)	  the	  defendants	  
won	  all	  cases	  while	  in	  a	  second	  period	  (2001-­‐2007)	  the	  defendants	  won	  79%	  of	  the	  
cases;	  in	  a	  third	  period	  (2008-­‐2011)	  defendants	  won	  72%	  of	  the	  cases.	  These	  data	  reveal	  
a	  variation	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  that	  could	  be	  related	  to	  a	  change	  of	  perception	  of	  
justices	  in	  relation	  to	  plaintiffs	  or	  to	  an	  improvement	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  suits.	  	  
	   These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  popular	  actions	  have	  only	  partially	  fulfilled	  the	  
framers’	  expectations.	  Individuals	  are	  the	  most	  frequent	  plaintiffs	  who	  have	  been	  using	  
popular	  actions	  to	  enforce	  administrative	  morality	  and	  this	  is	  evidence	  that	  these	  
actions	  have	  motivated	  citizen	  engagement.	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  the	  possible	  impact	  of	  these	  
suits	  seems	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  low-­‐level	  cases	  given	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  suits	  focus	  on	  
individual	  mistakes	  of	  the	  administration	  rather	  than	  on	  addressing	  broad	  policy	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mistakes.	  Suits	  on	  administrative	  morality	  have	  mainly	  focused	  on	  cases	  of	  financial	  
malfeasance	  confirming	  that	  administrative	  morality	  is	  perceived	  as	  a	  check	  for	  the	  
management	  of	  public	  funds.	  With	  regards	  the	  rulings,	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  has	  been	  
conservative	  by	  frequently	  granting	  the	  actions	  to	  the	  defendants	  (mainly	  governmental	  
agencies	  at	  the	  local	  and	  national	  level).	  











Chapter	  6:	  Interpreting	  “administrative	  morality”	  for	  public	  administration	  
	  
Studies	  of	  the	  administrative	  interpretation	  of	  legal	  rules	  often	  find	  that	  
administrators	  creatively	  adapt	  these	  rules	  to	  their	  settings.372	  	  This	  creative	  adaptation	  
is	  shaped	  by	  prominent	  professional	  interpretations	  of	  legal	  requirements,	  and	  these	  
professional	  interpretations	  at	  times	  vary	  considerably	  from	  a	  strictly	  legal	  
interpretation.	  
	   Institutionalization	  of	  legal	  reforms	  is	  a	  core	  part	  of	  the	  implementation	  process	  
of	  these	  reforms	  and	  it	  contributes	  to	  develop	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  what	  new	  legal	  
institutions	  imply.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  as	  part	  of	  the	  anticorruption	  and	  transparency	  policy	  of	  the	  Colombian	  
government	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  administrators	  have	  implemented	  it.	  I	  focus	  on	  public	  
administrators’	  understanding	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  this	  
notion	  applies	  to	  their	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  The	  research	  question	  that	  I	  will	  
address	  in	  this	  chapter	  is:	  How	  do	  public	  administrators	  interpret	  and	  apply	  
constitutional	  and	  judicial	  criteria	  of	  administrative	  morality?	  
There	  are	  two	  main	  governmental	  agencies	  that	  develop	  policy	  criteria	  with	  
regard	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  campaign	  and	  transparency	  in	  governmental	  performance:	  
the	  Presidency	  and	  the	  National	  Direction	  for	  Planning.	  One	  would	  expect	  to	  find	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  popular	  actions	  as	  key	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	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and	  transparency	  policies	  given	  that	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  thought	  about	  them	  as	  
such.	  Therefore	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  anti-­‐corruption	  and	  transparency	  
documents	  from	  these	  agencies.	  	  
Also	  I	  will	  analyze	  interviews	  with	  three	  key	  public	  administrators	  who	  referred	  
to	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  with	  regards	  administrative	  morality	  and	  the	  criteria	  that	  
public	  administrators	  apply	  on	  this	  topic.	  	  
Theories	  on	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  new	  legal	  norms	  provide	  somewhat	  
competing	  explanations.	  	  As	  described	  below,	  some	  scholars	  have	  characterized	  
institutionalization	  of	  legal	  reforms	  in	  the	  US	  as	  processes	  of	  symbolic	  compliance,	  
others	  describe	  it	  as	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  systems	  of	  accountability	  based	  on	  professional	  
values,	  and	  others	  refer	  to	  the	  interaction	  of	  different	  normative	  systems.	  I	  will	  use	  
these	  theories	  as	  frameworks	  to	  describe	  the	  institutionalization	  process	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  in	  Colombia.	  My	  purpose	  with	  this	  chapter	  is	  not	  to	  test	  the	  
applicability	  of	  these	  theories	  to	  the	  Colombian	  context	  but	  to	  use	  them	  as	  lenses	  to	  
improve	  understanding	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  administrative	  morality	  as	  
it	  is	  applied	  by	  governmental	  agents.	  I	  will	  use	  policy	  documents	  and	  interviews	  to	  
achieve	  this	  purpose.	  	  
	  
Theoretical	  conceptions	  of	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  legal	  norms	  
Whether	  and	  how	  new	  legal	  norms	  are	  institutionalized	  in	  administrative	  
processes	  is	  a	  subject	  of	  much	  research.	  An	  influential	  body	  of	  scholarship	  led	  by	  Lauren	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Edelman373	  argues	  that	  when	  legal	  reforms	  are	  ambiguous	  public	  organizations	  mimic	  
what	  others	  are	  doing	  to	  symbolize	  compliance	  to	  legal	  demands.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Civil	  
Rights	  Act	  of	  1964	  bureaucratic	  agencies	  created	  visible	  structures	  (EEO	  offices)	  and	  
rules	  that	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  verify	  compliance	  in	  case	  of	  litigation.	  Then,	  what	  started	  
being	  just	  bureaucratic	  symbolic	  compliance	  was	  later	  adopted	  by	  courts	  as	  the	  right	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  and	  the	  way	  for	  demonstrating	  compliance.	  In	  this	  
case	  bureaucratic	  interpretation	  of	  a	  legal	  reform	  shaped	  the	  courts’	  understanding	  and	  
implementation	  of	  a	  legal	  institution.	  	  
	   Another	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  role	  of	  bureaucracies	  in	  legal	  reforms’	  
implementation	  is	  that	  legal	  reforms	  are	  capable	  of	  fostering	  institutional	  changes	  when	  
advocates	  of	  implementation	  outside	  of	  public	  agencies	  and	  inside	  of	  them	  press	  for	  
institutionalization.	  In	  the	  US	  Epp	  argues	  that	  the	  rights	  revolution	  generated	  profound	  
institutional	  changes	  in	  areas	  of	  police	  use	  of	  force,	  workplace	  sexual	  harassment,	  and	  
playground	  safety.	  374	  According	  to	  Epp,	  under	  pressure	  from	  these	  internal	  and	  external	  
advocates	  of	  change,	  a	  new	  model	  of	  legalized	  accountability	  has	  grown	  and	  
consolidated	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  administrative	  regulations,	  training,	  and	  systems	  of	  
internal	  oversight	  to	  enforce	  compliance	  of	  the	  legal	  reforms.	  According	  to	  Epp	  these	  
reforms	  went	  considerably	  beyond	  what	  Edelman	  has	  characterized	  as	  merely	  symbolic	  
compliance.	  These	  mechanisms	  of	  implementation	  suggest	  that	  bureaucratic	  
professional	  norms	  and	  identities	  adapted	  to	  these	  internal	  and	  external	  pressures,	  thus	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373	  Edelman,	  "Legal	  Ambiguity	  and	  Symbolic	  Structures:	  Organizational	  Mediation	  of	  Civil	  Rights	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374	  Epp,	  Making	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  State.	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fostering	  legal	  reforms’	  implementation.	  	  
Alternatively	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  formal	  law	  is	  incapable	  of	  displacing	  other	  
normative	  bases	  for	  administrative	  action.	  The	  theory	  of	  “legal	  pluralism”	  posits	  that	  in	  
many	  contexts	  formal	  law	  competes	  with	  other	  normative	  orders	  and	  fails	  to	  control	  the	  
field.	  One	  of	  characteristics	  of	  the	  implementation	  process	  of	  the	  Colombian	  
constitution	  of	  1991	  is	  its	  interaction	  with	  legal	  norms	  that	  were	  in	  place	  before	  1991.	  
These	  norms	  that	  pre-­‐existed	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  constitution	  could	  have	  influenced	  
bureaucrat’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  legal	  reforms	  that	  came	  with	  the	  Constitution.	  Merry	  
argues	  that	  in	  a	  certain	  society	  two	  or	  more	  legal	  systems	  can	  coexist	  in	  the	  same	  social	  
field	  and	  generate	  complex	  interactions	  among	  them.	  375	  These	  legal	  systems	  could	  be	  
state	  and	  non-­‐state	  regulations	  or	  in	  other	  words	  the	  interaction	  between	  norms	  could	  
be	  fostered	  by	  regulations	  set	  by	  the	  government	  or	  regulations	  set	  by	  other	  social	  
groups	  such	  as	  corporations,	  universities,	  clubs,	  religious	  groups,	  etc.	  	  The	  interaction	  of	  
these	  different	  types	  of	  regulations	  is	  a	  complex	  process	  that	  brings	  as	  a	  result	  the	  
understanding	  of	  “law”	  that	  is	  actually	  applied.376	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  administrative	  morality,	  anti-­‐corruption	  and	  transparency	  
regulations	  that	  were	  already	  in	  place	  by	  1991	  could	  have	  shaped	  administrators’	  
understanding	  of	  its	  application	  and	  possible	  impact.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  non-­‐state	  
regulations	  could	  have	  shaped	  the	  bureaucratic	  understanding	  of	  this	  collective	  right.	  
Norms	  based	  on	  religious	  beliefs	  or	  individual	  ethical	  values	  may	  be	  part	  of	  what	  
governmental	  agents	  take	  into	  consideration	  in	  their	  daily	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	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  J.	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Merry	  and	  Griffith,	  scholars	  who	  support	  the	  theory	  of	  legal	  pluralism,	  argue	  that	  
there	  are	  multiple	  possible	  effects	  to	  the	  interaction	  between	  legal	  orders	  in	  society.377	  
One	  option	  is	  that	  state	  law	  penetrates	  and	  changes	  other	  normative	  orders	  and	  so	  
state	  law	  could	  be	  capable	  of	  fostering	  institutional	  changes.	  Other	  option	  could	  be	  that	  
nonstate	  normative	  orders	  resist	  legal	  reforms	  and	  try	  to	  avoid	  its	  implementation;	  it	  is	  
also	  possible	  that	  nonstate	  normative	  orders	  strategically	  adapt	  to	  legal	  reforms	  by	  
capturing	  the	  symbolic	  capital	  of	  state	  law.378	  By	  analyzing	  data	  from	  interviews	  with	  
strategic	  governmental	  agents	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  elements	  related	  to	  the	  interaction	  
between	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  Constitution	  
and	  by	  the	  Courts,	  policy	  documents,	  and	  professional	  bureaucratic	  values.	  	  
These	  three	  theoretical	  frameworks	  provide	  somewhat	  competing	  conceptions	  
of	  institutionalization	  of	  legal	  reforms.	  As	  I	  go	  through	  the	  data	  I	  will	  analyze	  whether	  
the	  institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  morality	  has	  meant	  an	  empty	  symbolism,	  a	  
deeper	  institutional	  reform	  due	  to	  forces	  internal	  and	  external	  to	  governmental	  
organizations,	  or	  whether	  it	  has	  failed	  to	  penetrate	  social	  phenomena	  given	  its	  
interaction	  with	  other	  norms.	  	  	  
	  
Data	  and	  methods	  
Policy	  documents	  on	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  campaign	  and	  transparency	  are	  made	  
by	  the	  Presidency	  and	  the	  National	  Direction	  for	  Planning.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  analyze	  these	  
documents	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  the	  governmental	  understanding	  of	  administrative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377	  Merry,	  "Legal	  Pluralism."	  Griffiths,	  "What	  Is	  Legal	  Pluralism."	  
378	  Merry,	  "Legal	  Pluralism."	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morality	  and	  its	  expected	  impact	  on	  public	  administration.	  
I	  will	  also	  analyze	  interviews	  with	  three	  key	  agents	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  exploring	  
the	  factors	  that	  bureaucrats	  take	  into	  consideration	  in	  their	  decision-­‐making	  process	  
related	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  These	  three	  interviewees	  are	  managers	  at	  
organizations	  of	  the	  National	  level	  of	  government	  and	  they	  have	  experience	  in	  different	  
policy	  areas.	  	  
	  
Policy	  documents	  
When	  analyzing	  policy	  documents	  related	  to	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  and	  
transparency	  it	  is	  surprising	  to	  find	  that	  they	  do	  not	  mention	  administrative	  morality	  or	  
popular	  actions.	  The	  document	  “Strategies	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  an	  anticorruption	  and	  
citizen	  service’s	  plan”	  by	  the	  Presidency	  includes	  four	  types	  of	  strategies:	  calculating	  
corruption	  risks	  per	  governmental	  agency,	  reducing	  procedures	  (red	  tape),	  
accountability	  (rendición	  de	  cuentas),	  and	  improving	  citizen	  services.	  With	  regards	  
citizen	  engagement	  this	  document	  focuses	  on	  accountability	  as	  a	  means	  to	  bring	  the	  
public	  closer	  to	  the	  administration.	  It	  focuses	  on	  strengthening	  what	  is	  called	  “public	  
scenarios”	  for	  accountability	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  citizens	  with	  transparent	  information	  of	  
what	  administrators	  are	  doing.	  These	  mechanisms	  strengthen	  values	  like	  transparency	  
and	  trust	  in	  institutions	  but	  they	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  Thus,	  the	  
governmental	  strategies	  for	  transparency	  and	  citizen	  services	  do	  not	  contemplate	  
administrative	  morality	  or	  popular	  actions	  as	  part	  of	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies.	  	  
The	  Secretary	  of	  Transparency,	  a	  division	  of	  the	  Presidency,	  is	  responsible	  for	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anti-­‐corruption	  policies	  in	  the	  country	  by	  focusing	  on	  prevention	  and	  sanction	  of	  corrupt	  
behaviors.	  The	  Secretary	  designs	  specific	  policies	  based	  on	  policy	  areas	  and	  levels	  of	  
government	  (national,	  regional,	  or	  local)	  given	  the	  assumption	  that	  corruption	  varies	  
from	  one	  level	  to	  another.	  On	  a	  video	  in	  their	  website	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Transparency	  
invites	  citizens	  to	  participate	  in	  policy	  making	  through	  three	  mechanisms:	  social	  
media379,	  through	  email	  address,	  and	  through	  the	  website	  www.urnadecristal.gov.co	  
(www.glassurn.com).	  The	  website	  “glass	  urn”	  encourages	  citizen	  participation	  by	  
allowing	  individuals	  to	  ask	  questions	  on	  specific	  policy	  topics	  such	  as	  protection	  to	  
children	  and	  adolescents,	  protection	  to	  national	  parks,	  and	  homeland	  security.380	  The	  
people	  can	  post	  their	  questions	  or	  comments	  on	  the	  website	  and	  the	  government	  
answers	  these	  comments.	  The	  website	  is	  organized	  around	  three	  categories:	  
governmental	  transparency,	  citizen	  participation,	  and	  government	  answers.	  Thus,	  the	  
website	  focuses	  on	  providing	  visibility	  to	  specific	  policies	  that	  are	  considered	  salient.	  It	  
also	  allows	  citizens	  to	  ask	  questions	  and	  receive	  answers	  from	  the	  government.	  There	  is	  
no	  mention	  of	  administrative	  morality	  of	  collective	  rights	  on	  the	  website.	  	  
The	  Secretary	  for	  Transparency	  coordinates	  the	  Observatory	  for	  anticorruption	  
and	  integrity.381	  The	  Observatory	  is	  a	  recent	  initiative	  of	  the	  government	  and	  is	  an	  
information	  system	  that	  aims	  to	  foster	  knowledge	  generation,	  dialogue,	  and	  education	  
with	  regards	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  campaign.	  The	  Observatory	  works	  under	  the	  
assumption	  that	  through	  information	  different	  parties	  such	  as	  public	  agencies,	  civil	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






society,	  the	  private	  sector,	  the	  international	  community,	  and	  citizens	  can	  create	  
synergies	  to	  fight	  corruption.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal	  the	  Observatory	  engages	  in	  
three	  activities:	  information	  management,	  fostering	  dialogue	  amongst	  parties	  with	  
regards	  corruption,	  and	  providing	  education	  on	  individual	  integrity.382	  	  
The	  Observatory	  articulates	  efforts	  of	  five	  types	  of	  organizations	  to	  achieve	  
these	  purposes:	  the	  Secretary	  for	  Transparency,	  the	  National	  Commission	  for	  
Citizenship,	  the	  National	  Commission	  for	  Moralization,	  Regional	  Commissions	  for	  
Moralization,	  and	  oversight	  agencies.	  Ministers	  from	  different	  areas,	  justices,	  members	  
of	  oversight	  agencies,	  congressmen,	  and	  administrators	  are	  members	  of	  the	  
commissions	  for	  moralization	  and	  their	  function	  is	  to	  coordinate	  annual	  anticorruption	  
strategies	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  transparency,	  efficiency,	  and	  morality	  in	  public	  
administration.383	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Observatory	  the	  notion	  of	  morality	  is	  used	  to	  
refer	  to	  the	  governmental	  commissions	  that	  focus	  on	  anti-­‐corruption	  policy.	  The	  
presence	  of	  national	  and	  regional	  commissions	  for	  moralization	  speaks	  about	  a	  policy	  
where	  morals	  are	  a	  parameter	  for	  bureaucratic	  performance.	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  reference	  
to	  morals,	  administrative	  morality	  and	  popular	  actions	  are	  not	  mentioned	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
Observatory’s	  functions.	  Thus,	  morality	  is	  a	  core	  notion	  in	  the	  Observatory	  but	  it	  is	  not	  
enforced	  through	  popular	  actions.	  The	  Observatory	  favors	  information	  management,	  
education,	  and	  citizen	  engagement	  over	  other	  legal	  mechanisms	  like	  administrative	  
morality.	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  http://www.anticorrupcion.gov.co/observatorio	  
383	  http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2011/Diciembre/Paginas/20111209_01.aspx.	  A	  graph	  of	  
the	  structure	  of	  the	  Observatory	  is	  included	  in	  Appendix	  F.	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The	  National	  Direction	  for	  Planning	  also	  provides	  guidelines	  for	  administrators.	  
Specifically,	  the	  National	  Council	  for	  economic	  and	  social	  policy	  (CONPES),	  a	  division	  of	  
the	  National	  Direction	  for	  Planning,	  sets	  policy	  that	  relates	  to	  bureaucratic	  performance.	  
I	  found	  four	  documents	  related	  to	  bureaucratic	  performance384	  but	  there	  was	  not	  a	  
specific	  document	  on	  administrative	  morality	  or	  popular	  actions.	  The	  Document	  3186,	  A	  
national	  policy	  for	  improving	  efficiency	  and	  transparency	  in	  public	  contracting,	  analyzes	  
the	  negative	  effects	  of	  corruption	  on	  public	  contracting	  and	  argues	  that	  corruption	  
harms	  public	  morals	  and	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  government.	  This	  document	  refers	  to	  the	  
Statute	  for	  public	  contracting385	  as	  a	  development	  of	  constitutional	  principles	  for	  public	  
administration	  such	  as	  morality.	  These	  are	  the	  only	  references	  to	  morality	  in	  this	  
document	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reference	  to	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  collective	  right	  or	  to	  
popular	  actions.	  	  
The	  Document	  3248,	  Renewing	  Public	  Administration,	  analyzes	  modernization	  
of	  the	  government	  based	  on	  three	  characteristics:	  fostering	  a	  managerial	  government,	  
participation,	  and	  decentralization.386	  According	  to	  this	  document	  a	  modern	  
government	  is	  achieved	  through	  austerity,	  efficacy	  and	  efficiency,	  results-­‐oriented	  
administration,	  and	  flexibility.	  In	  this	  document	  there	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  or	  popular	  actions.	  	  
The	  Document	  3249,	  A	  Policy	  of	  Public	  Procurement	  for	  a	  Managerial	  State,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384	  CONPES,	  "	  Document	  3186.	  A	  National	  Policy	  for	  Improving	  Efficiency	  and	  Transparency	  in	  Public	  
Contracting."	  "Document	  3249.	  A	  Policy	  of	  Public	  Procurement	  for	  a	  Managerial	  State,"	  
(Bogotá2003).	  "Document	  3248.	  Renewing	  Public	  Administration,"	  (Bogotá2003).	  "Document	  3294.	  
A	  Renovation	  of	  Public	  Administration:	  Result-­‐Based	  Performance	  and	  Reform	  of	  the	  Performance	  
Review	  System,"	  (Bogotá2004).	  
385	  Congreso	  de	  la	  República	  de	  Colombia,	  "Ley	  80,"	  (Bogotá1993).	  
386	  CONPES,	  "Document	  3248.	  Renewing	  Public	  Administration."	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argues	  that	  there	  are	  four	  pillars	  to	  governmental	  contracting	  out:	  the	  approval	  of	  a	  
new	  statute	  for	  public	  procurement,	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  new	  institutional	  frame,	  
implementation	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  system	  for	  online	  contracting	  out,	  and	  training.387	  	  
These	  strategies	  focus	  on	  improving	  efficiency,	  transparency,	  and	  a	  managerial	  
approach	  to	  the	  Colombian	  public	  administration.	  This	  document	  does	  not	  mention	  
administrative	  morality	  or	  popular	  actions.	  	  
The	  Document	  3294,	  Renovation	  of	  Public	  Administration:	  Result-­‐Based	  
Performance	  and	  Reform	  of	  the	  Performance	  Review	  System,	  aims	  to	  strengthen	  a	  
result-­‐oriented	  public	  administration	  through	  processes	  of	  evaluation,	  follow-­‐ups,	  and	  
accountability.388	  According	  to	  this	  document	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  performance	  review	  
system	  are:	  increasing	  the	  impact	  of	  public	  policies	  and	  public	  organizations,	  improving	  
the	  application	  of	  efficiency	  and	  transparency	  in	  planning	  public	  funds’	  allocation,	  
motivating	  the	  application	  of	  transparency	  in	  public	  organizations	  through	  citizen	  
engagement.	  This	  document	  focuses	  on	  transparency	  and	  efficiency	  in	  the	  Colombian	  
public	  administration	  but	  it	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  administrative	  morality	  or	  popular	  actions.	  	  
In	  sum,	  it	  is	  striking	  that	  among	  the	  various	  documents	  addressing	  
administrative	  corruption	  and	  accountability	  administrative	  morality	  is	  never	  
mentioned.	  These	  documents	  provide	  guidelines	  for	  the	  improvement	  of	  governmental	  
performance	  through	  the	  reduction	  of	  corruption	  and	  strengthening	  transparency.	  
These	  documents	  focus	  on	  a	  managerial	  approach	  and	  a	  result-­‐oriented	  performance	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387	  "Document	  3249.	  A	  Policy	  of	  Public	  Procurement	  for	  a	  Managerial	  State."	  
388	  "Document	  3294.	  A	  Renovation	  of	  Public	  Administration:	  Result-­‐Based	  Performance	  and	  Reform	  
of	  the	  Performance	  Review	  System."	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highlighting	  the	  importance	  of	  citizen	  participation.	  The	  documents	  refer	  to	  morality	  as	  
a	  principle	  that	  is	  violated	  by	  corruption	  but	  there	  is	  not	  further	  development	  of	  this	  
notion	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reference	  or	  criteria	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  collective	  right	  
of	  administrative	  morality.	  Consequently,	  policy	  documents	  do	  not	  institutionalize	  
administrative	  morality	  or	  popular	  actions.	  
If	  policy	  documents	  are	  not	  providing	  policy	  guidelines	  for	  administrative	  
morality	  in	  governmental	  performance,	  how	  do	  administrators	  implement	  it?	  In	  the	  
next	  section	  I	  will	  analyze	  interviews	  with	  administrators.	  	  
	  
Administrative	  morality	  in	  agents’	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  
Administrators	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  government	  and	  in	  different	  policy	  areas	  
implement	  administrative	  morality	  in	  diverse	  ways.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  
interviews	  with	  four	  key	  actors	  on	  governmental	  institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  
morality:	  three	  governmental	  agents	  and	  the	  director	  for	  legal	  affairs	  of	  the	  NGO	  
Transparency	  Colombia.	  These	  four	  interviewees	  have	  wide	  experience	  in	  governmental	  
performance	  in	  different	  policy	  areas	  and	  they	  represent	  different	  approaches	  to	  the	  
institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
The	  first	  interviewee	  is	  William	  Espinosa,	  the	  Provost	  for	  Academic	  Affairs	  for	  
the	  Superior	  School	  for	  Public	  Administration	  that	  is	  the	  governmental	  organization	  
that	  provides	  training	  to	  public	  administrators.	  As	  the	  head	  of	  academic	  affairs	  of	  the	  
school	  Espinosa	  designs	  and	  coordinates	  research,	  teaching,	  and	  service	  activities	  in	  the	  
training	  for	  public	  administrators	  at	  the	  undergraduate	  and	  graduate	  levels.	  Espinosa’s	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experience	  and	  knowledge	  in	  training	  public	  administrators	  brought	  valuable	  elements	  
of	  the	  teaching	  strategies	  that	  the	  school	  uses	  with	  regards	  administrative	  morality	  and	  
ethics	  in	  public	  administration.	  	  
I	  will	  also	  analyze	  my	  interview	  with	  Camilo	  Orrego	  who	  has	  experience	  in	  two	  
major	  fields	  that	  are	  highly	  relevant	  for	  my	  research.	  Orrego	  was	  the	  head	  legal	  counsel	  
of	  the	  city	  of	  Bogota	  (the	  biggest	  city	  and	  capital	  of	  Colombia)	  for	  seven	  years	  and	  
currently	  works	  as	  a	  policy	  expert	  on	  the	  recently	  created	  National	  Agency	  for	  the	  
Judicial	  defense	  of	  the	  government.	  Based	  on	  his	  experience	  while	  being	  the	  head	  legal	  
counsel	  of	  Bogota	  Orrego	  provided	  core	  information	  about	  how	  local	  governments	  
implement	  administrative	  morality.	  Also,	  and	  based	  on	  his	  current	  position,	  Orrego	  
provided	  valuable	  insights	  on	  the	  possible	  impact	  of	  administrative	  morality	  on	  
governmental	  performance.	  	  
Eduardo	  Arce	  who	  is	  the	  Legal	  Vice-­‐President	  of	  the	  Fiduciary	  “La	  Previsora”	  
has	  worked	  for	  the	  government	  for	  seven	  and	  a	  half	  years	  and	  has	  experience	  working	  
at	  different	  policy	  areas	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  Based	  on	  his	  current	  experience	  Arce	  
referred	  to	  the	  variation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  in	  different	  regions	  of	  the	  country.	  
Since	  majority	  of	  the	  court	  cases	  on	  administrative	  morality	  decided	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  
State	  are	  cases	  on	  financial	  malfeasance	  the	  testimony	  of	  Arce	  is	  highly	  relevant	  given	  
that	  the	  Fiduciary	  “La	  Previsora”	  develops	  bank-­‐like	  activities	  and	  manages	  pensions	  
from	  public	  teachers	  in	  the	  country.	  	  
The	  last	  interview	  I	  will	  analyze	  in	  this	  section	  captures	  the	  perception	  of	  civil	  
society	  organizations	  that	  focus	  on	  anticorruption	  and	  transparency	  in	  public	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administration.	  Transparency	  Colombia	  has	  been	  a	  key	  actor	  in	  promoting	  and	  
preventing	  corruption	  in	  public	  organizations	  for	  the	  last	  15	  years	  and	  it	  has	  focused	  on	  
bringing	  transparency	  back	  to	  the	  public	  agenda.	  My	  interview	  with	  the	  director	  for	  
legal	  affairs	  of	  Transparency	  Colombia,	  Marcela	  Restrepo,	  I	  gathered	  key	  information	  on	  
the	  perspective	  of	  a	  civil	  society	  organization	  on	  governmental	  performance.	  Specifically	  
this	  interviewee	  referred	  to	  her	  experience	  on	  the	  strategies	  that	  civil	  society	  
organizations	  could	  use	  to	  support	  the	  anticorruption	  campaign	  and	  keeping	  public	  
organizations	  accountable.	  Transparency	  Colombia	  works	  with	  public	  organizations	  in	  
different	  areas	  of	  the	  country	  so	  Restrepo	  provided	  highly	  relevant	  information	  on	  how	  
governmental	  ethics	  vary	  from	  one	  place	  to	  another.	  	  
My	  analysis	  of	  these	  interviews	  allows	  me	  to	  characterize	  different	  sides	  of	  the	  
spectrum	  with	  regards	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  Although	  
these	  four	  interviews	  are	  not	  a	  representative	  sample	  of	  governmental	  agents	  and	  
NGOs’	  perceptions	  on	  administrative	  morality	  they	  provide	  evidence	  of	  the	  sharp	  
differences	  between	  them.	  These	  interviews	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  shared	  
discourse	  on	  administrative	  morality	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  the	  Colombian	  public	  
administration.	  
	  
William	  Espinosa,	  Provost	  for	  Academic	  Affairs	  of	  the	  Superior	  School	  for	  Public	  
Administration	  
The	  Provost	  for	  Academic	  Affairs	  of	  the	  Superior	  School	  for	  Public	  Administration	  




“…	  I	  guess	  that	  they	  	  [the	  constitutional	  and	  governmental	  notion	  of	  
administrative	  morality]	  talk	  about	  administrative	  habits	  that	  regulate	  
governmental	  behavior,	  I	  mean,	  the	  law	  but	  not	  only	  the	  law;	  it	  is	  the	  law	  plus	  
something	  anchored	  in	  traditions,	  like	  habits	  …	  so	  [duties	  related	  to]	  
administrative	  morality	  are	  explicit	  in	  principles	  like	  economy,	  efficiency,	  
efficacy…	  but	  it	  is	  about	  ethics,	  ethics	  that	  overcome	  all…”.389	  
	  
Thus,	  according	  to	  Espinosa	  administrative	  morality	  is	  related	  to	  good	  habits	  and	  
values	  like	  economy,	  efficiency,	  and	  efficacy.	  He	  argued	  that	  by	  complying	  with	  these	  
principles	  governmental	  agents	  are	  loyal	  to	  ethical	  standards	  that	  ensure	  the	  common	  
good.390	  This	  interviewee	  defined	  administrative	  morality	  by	  relating	  it	  to	  the	  ethical	  
standards	  that	  bind	  bureaucratic	  behavior	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  state,	  which	  is	  to	  serve	  
the	  public.	  Although	  Espinosa	  provided	  philosophical	  elements	  to	  the	  ethical	  component	  
of	  bureaucratic	  behavior	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  in	  this	  interview	  what	  administrative	  morality	  is.	  	  
With	  regards	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  given	  his	  
experience	  as	  the	  Provost	  of	  Academic	  Affairs	  he	  referred	  to	  the	  curriculum	  of	  the	  
School	  and	  its	  potential	  for	  training	  public	  administrators.	  Espinosa	  argued	  that	  the	  
curriculum	  is	  good	  but	  it	  lacks	  essential	  elements	  such	  as	  training	  in	  socio-­‐legal	  studies	  
and	  humanities,	  and	  ethics.	  In	  his	  opinion	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  include	  this	  elements	  
in	  the	  curriculum	  in	  order	  to	  modernize	  it	  and	  make	  it	  more	  flexible	  so	  it	  would	  provide	  
public	  administrators	  with	  the	  necessary	  skills.391	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





In	  spite	  of	  Espinosa’s	  skepticism	  towards	  the	  current	  training	  provided	  by	  the	  
school	  he	  acknowledged	  the	  core	  role	  of	  formal	  education	  in	  bureaucratic	  performance.	  	  
He	  argued	  that	  training	  has	  the	  potential	  for	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  administrative	  
decision	  by	  motivating	  responsibility	  in	  governmental	  agents:	  “Why	  does	  the	  Colombian	  
government	  is	  so	  weak	  on	  its	  performance?	  It	  is	  because	  of	  that,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  
have	  agents	  with	  training	  for	  making	  responsible	  decisions	  and	  that	  what	  is	  college	  
could	  give”.392	  
Espinosa’s	  conception	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  its	  institutionalization	  tells	  
the	  story	  of	  a	  notion	  that	  goes	  beyond	  the	  law	  that	  could	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  improve	  
bureaucratic	  performance	  by	  connecting	  it	  to	  the	  common	  good	  but	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  to	  
implement	  this	  notion.	  With	  regards	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  this	  concept	  it	  is	  
noticeable	  that	  in	  his	  opinion	  the	  curriculum	  of	  the	  School	  does	  not	  have	  elements	  that	  
would	  be	  necessary	  to	  provide	  training	  on	  administrative	  morality	  and	  ethical	  values.	  In	  
spite	  of	  this	  limitation	  Espinosa	  sees	  potential	  on	  formal	  training	  to	  implement	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  ethical	  values	  in	  bureaucratic	  contexts.	  In	  his	  opinion	  there	  
are	  cases	  in	  Colombia	  of	  successful	  bureaucratic	  performance.	  That	  is	  the	  case	  of	  
Medellin	  (the	  second	  largest	  city	  in	  the	  country).	  He	  explained	  that	  in	  Colombia	  there	  is	  
a	  wrong	  assumption	  that	  a	  successful	  agent	  is	  the	  one	  who	  applies	  the	  law	  when	  in	  fact	  
success	  should	  be	  dictated	  by	  one	  agent’s	  capacity	  of	  solving	  problems.	  In	  his	  opinion	  
the	  “Empresas	  publicas	  de	  Medellin”	  is	  successful	  because	  all	  governmental	  agents	  
there	  focus	  on	  solving	  problems	  and	  they	  have	  the	  power	  to	  do	  it	  while	  in	  other	  regions	  




and	  organizations	  public	  agents	  live	  out	  of	  fear.	  Espinosa	  explained	  that	  training	  could	  
foster	  an	  understanding	  of	  performance	  based	  on	  responsibility,	  which	  is	  an	  example	  of	  
successful	  bureaucratic	  performance.	  393	  	  
What	  Espinosa	  describes	  as	  administrative	  morality	  is	  not	  an	  action	  of	  symbolic	  
compliance	  with	  this	  collective	  right	  nor	  he	  refers	  to	  internal	  and	  external	  forces	  that	  
interact	  to	  create	  new	  mechanisms	  of	  bureaucratic	  accountability.	  Espinosa	  describes	  
his	  own	  approach	  to	  administrative	  morality	  that	  is	  based	  on	  legal	  compliance	  but	  it	  is	  
complemented	  with	  ethical	  notions	  and	  values.	  These	  notions	  and	  values	  are	  reflected	  
in	  what	  he	  thinks	  could	  improve	  bureaucratic	  training	  that	  is	  emphasis	  on	  legal	  training,	  
professional	  ethics,	  and	  humanism.	  	  
	  
Camilo	  Orrego,	  former	  head	  legal	  counsel	  for	  the	  city	  of	  Bogotá	   	  
Camilo	  Orrego	  who	  was	  the	  head	  legal	  counsel	  for	  the	  city	  of	  Bogotá	  referred	  to	  
administrative	  morality	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  Orrego	  argued	  that	  administrative	  morality	  
was	  not	  a	  fundamentally	  new	  notion	  to	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991:	  	  
“Accepting	  that	  it	  is	  something	  new	  would	  be	  as	  much	  as	  saying	  that	  governmental	  
performance	  before	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  aimed	  to	  privilege	  particular	  interests	  and	  
there	  is	  not	  evidence	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case	  because	  on	  the	  constitution	  of	  1886	  clearly	  
stated	  that	  governmental	  performance	  focuses	  on	  the	  public	  interest;	  that	  has	  been	  the	  
basis	  for	  our	  rule	  of	  law,	  it	  is	  tradition”.394	  
Orrego	  mentioned	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  moral	  public	  administration	  as	  the	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  "Interview	  Camilo	  Orrego."	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governmental	  performance	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  common	  good	  existed	  prior	  the	  
constitution	  of	  1991.	  The	  demand	  for	  governmental	  agents	  to	  pursue	  the	  common	  good	  
in	  their	  actions	  was	  already	  established	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  1886	  so,	  according	  to	  
Orrego,	  what	  was	  new	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  was	  the	  entitlement	  for	  individuals	  to	  
demand	  compliance	  through	  the	  jurisdiction.395	  	  
When	  explaining	  the	  notion	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  violations	  to	  it	  Orrego	  
argued	  that	  they	  imply	  two	  things.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  violation	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  implies	  corruption;	  an	  illegal	  behavior	  displayed	  by	  the	  public	  agent.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  a	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  implies	  that	  the	  public	  agent	  
performed	  based	  on	  the	  wrong	  reasons,	  reasons	  different	  from	  the	  common	  good.	  
Orrego	  argues	  that	  this	  diversion	  from	  what	  should	  be	  the	  right	  motivation	  (the	  
common	  good)	  is	  often	  related	  to	  a	  mismanagement	  of	  public	  funds	  but	  that	  this	  is	  not	  
an	  essential	  element	  to	  all	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality.396	  
Orrego	  explained	  that	  governmental	  agents	  follow	  a	  rational	  and	  deductive	  
process	  to	  analyze	  laws	  and	  statutes	  in	  a	  specific	  situation	  and	  that	  these	  regulations	  
allow	  them	  to	  judge	  whether	  their	  behavior	  is	  legal	  and	  if	  it	  complies	  with	  
administrative	  morality.	  As	  examples	  of	  regulations	  he	  mentioned	  the	  anticorruption	  
statute	  and	  the	  law	  734	  that	  regulates	  conflict	  of	  interests	  and	  other	  circumstances	  that	  
could	  bias	  agents’	  objectivity	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.397	  In	  Orrego’s	  opinion	  
agents’	  decision-­‐making	  process	  is	  rational	  and	  it	  allows	  them	  to	  differentiate	  mere	  






legality	  from	  compliance	  with	  administrative	  morality.	  It	  is	  also	  noticeable	  that	  the	  
regulations	  he	  referred	  to	  (the	  anti-­‐corruption	  statute	  and	  the	  law	  734)	  relate	  to	  ethics	  
in	  governmental	  performance.	  	  
According	  to	  Orrego	  regulations	  provide	  governmental	  agents	  with	  information	  
about	  governmental	  goals	  which	  is	  what	  determines	  compliance	  of	  administrative	  
morality:	  “…you	  know	  if	  you	  are	  behaving	  ethically,	  complying	  with	  administrative	  
morality,	  when	  you	  realize	  that	  in	  your	  decision	  you	  pursued	  governmental	  goals	  …	  So	  
this	  is	  about	  whether	  your	  goals	  when	  performing	  match	  public	  goals,	  and	  public	  goals	  
you	  can	  find	  in	  the	  constitution	  and	  are	  developed	  by	  laws,	  policy	  (CONPES)	  documents,	  
administrative	  regulations,	  governmental	  strategies	  and	  programs,	  and	  public	  
investments”.398	  For	  Orrego	  regulations	  provide	  governmental	  agents	  with	  information	  
about	  governmental	  goals	  and	  they	  determine	  administrative	  morality	  compliance.	  	  	  
Orrego	  analyzes	  morals	  as	  a	  component	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  he	  
argues	  that	  it	  relates	  to	  bureaucratic	  behavior	  in	  two	  ways.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  when	  
public	  agents	  are	  appointed	  they	  receive	  the	  trust	  of	  the	  entire	  society	  and	  that	  imposes	  
on	  them	  the	  demand	  for	  honoring	  that	  trust.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  public	  servant	  
should	  behave	  with	  rectitude	  and	  by	  following	  ethics	  when	  managing	  public	  funds	  
because	  they	  belong	  to	  the	  entire	  society.399	  	  
With	  regards	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  morality	  Orrego	  differs	  
from	  the	  Provost	  for	  Academic	  Affairs.	  Orrego	  explained	  that	  he	  did	  not	  receive	  training	  
on	  administrative	  morality	  and	  that	  in	  his	  opinion	  this	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  individual	  





formation	  rather	  than	  training:	  “…I	  mean,	  I	  believe	  that	  …	  this	  is	  an	  issue	  of	  personal	  
formation,	  this	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  values…”.400	  Orrego	  explained	  that	  when	  a	  public	  agent	  
gives	  oath	  to	  protect	  the	  constitution	  and	  the	  law	  he	  does	  not	  need	  a	  paper	  that	  
explains	  what	  administrative	  morality	  is.	  To	  that	  extent	  administrative	  morality,	  in	  
Orrego’s	  opinion,	  lies	  on	  “the	  bottom	  of	  each	  person”:	  “This	  is	  like	  something	  like	  when	  
your	  parents,	  at	  home,	  at	  elementary	  school	  they	  teach	  you	  that	  you	  should	  not	  
steal”.401	  Thus	  Orrego	  argued	  that	  training	  would	  not	  contribute	  to	  the	  implementation	  
of	  administrative	  morality	  because	  it	  cannot	  instill	  the	  right	  motivation	  to	  public	  agents.	  	  
Although	  Orrego	  conceptualized	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  two	  dimensional	  
concept	  (legal	  compliance	  and	  motivation)	  he	  argued	  that	  in	  a	  daily	  basis	  public	  agents	  
interpret	  administrative	  morality	  as	  legal	  compliance:	  “…in	  the	  basic	  language	  of	  a	  
public	  agent	  I	  mean,	  day	  by	  day,	  the	  public	  agent	  believes	  that	  he	  acts	  correctly	  because	  
he	  complies	  with	  the	  law	  and	  his	  morals	  is	  the	  law	  because	  the	  law	  is,	  bottom	  line,	  a	  
positive	  criteria	  and	  the	  law	  tells	  you	  what	  is	  right	  and	  what	  is	  wrong.	  If	  you,	  as	  a	  public	  
agent	  as	  a	  servant	  of	  the	  law,	  comply	  with	  it	  and	  make	  others	  to	  comply	  with	  it	  then	  you	  
are	  right…	  and	  I	  believe	  this	  is	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  life	  of	  our	  public	  agents,	  it	  is	  ones	  day-­‐to-­‐
day”.402	  	  
According	  to	  this	  interviewee	  then	  there	  is	  a	  different	  conception	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  that	  focuses	  only	  on	  the	  law.	  Although	  courts	  have	  ruled	  in	  
relation	  to	  administrative	  morality	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  clarifying	  this	  notion	  Orrego	  






argued	  that	  not	  everybody	  has	  access	  to	  court	  cases.	  Orrego	  explained	  that	  the	  courts	  
develop	  certain	  criteria	  and	  they	  refer	  to	  legal	  principles	  as	  guidelines	  for	  administrative	  
morality	  but	  that	  it	  is	  not	  realistic	  to	  expect	  that	  all	  individuals	  would	  have	  access	  to	  
these	  sources.	  In	  a	  similar	  way	  it	  would	  not	  be	  realistic	  to	  expect	  that	  the	  people	  would	  
get	  to	  read	  about	  legal	  principles	  and	  consequently	  a	  more	  simplistic	  approach	  to	  
administrative	  morality	  could	  be	  more	  common	  amongst	  parties	  who	  apply	  the	  
concept.403	  This	  suggests	  the	  existence	  of	  different	  understandings	  of	  administrative	  
morality.	  	  
	   Thus,	  Orrego	  provides	  elements	  of	  an	  understanding	  of	  administrative	  morality	  
that	  is	  based	  on	  different	  normative	  orders.	  This	  interviewee	  argued	  that	  the	  
regulations	  previous	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  regulations	  ensured	  that	  governmental	  
agents	  perform	  with	  the	  right	  motivation	  and	  that	  was	  the	  basis	  for	  administrative	  
morality.	  Also,	  regulations	  on	  ethics	  and	  transparency	  in	  public	  administration	  inform	  
bureaucratic	  decision-­‐making.	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  different	  normative	  sources	  that	  
interact	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  Orrego	  refered	  to	  the	  
different	  conception	  of	  other	  administrative	  agents	  for	  whom	  administrative	  morality	  
means	  mere	  legal	  compliance.	  These	  elements	  provide	  evidence	  of	  legal	  pluralism	  with	  
regards	  this	  notion.	  	  
	  
Eduardo	  Arce,	  Legal	  Vice-­‐President	  of	  the	  Fiduciary	  “La	  Previsora”	  
A	  different	  approach	  to	  administrative	  morality	  was	  presented	  by	  Eduardo	  




Arce,	  the	  Legal	  Vice-­‐President	  of	  the	  Fiduciary	  “La	  Previsora”.	  Eduardo	  Arce,	  who	  has	  
been	  working	  for	  the	  government	  for	  seven	  and	  a	  half	  years,	  explained	  that	  
governmental	  agents	  apply	  administrative	  morality	  when	  they	  comply	  with	  the	  law,	  the	  
constitution,	  transparency,	  and	  correctness	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  behavior,	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  processes	  they	  lead,	  and	  the	  decisions	  they	  make.404	  It	  is	  noticeable	  that	  in	  his	  initial	  
description	  of	  administrative	  morality	  Arce	  refers	  to	  legal	  regulations	  like	  the	  law	  and	  
the	  constitution	  but	  he	  also	  refers	  to	  some	  concepts	  that	  seem	  to	  go	  beyond	  legality	  
such	  as	  transparency	  and	  correctness.	  
With	  regards	  the	  legal	  component	  Arce	  argued	  that	  the	  evolution	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  has	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  rules	  that	  work	  as	  guidelines	  for	  public	  
agents	  in	  their	  decision-­‐making	  processes:	  “So,	  nowadays	  all	  public	  agencies	  have	  
internal	  codes	  of	  conduct,	  ethics	  codes,	  corporate	  government	  manuals…	  That,	  plus	  the	  
required	  training	  on	  the	  disciplinary	  regulations	  …	  help	  public	  servants	  to	  make	  a	  
decision	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  compliance	  of	  administrative	  morality”.405	  It	  is	  noticeable	  
that	  the	  regulations	  mentioned	  by	  this	  interviewee	  relate	  to	  ethical	  behavior	  in	  public	  
administration	  such	  as	  codes	  of	  ethics	  or	  the	  disciplinary	  regime	  for	  public	  agents.	  	  
In	  relation	  to	  the	  supra	  legal	  component	  of	  administrative	  morality	  Arce	  
explained	  that	  there	  are	  two	  possible	  approaches	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  The	  first	  
approach	  is	  based	  on	  legality	  and	  consequently	  legal	  compliance	  implies	  compliance	  
with	  administrative	  morality.	  The	  second	  approach	  sees	  administrative	  morality	  is	  a	  
concretion	  of	  morals	  and	  consequently	  it	  goes	  beyond	  legality.	  In	  this	  second	  approach	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




public	  agents	  understand	  their	  performance	  as	  a	  fulfillment	  of	  moral	  obligations	  and	  
individual	  understanding	  of	  morality:	  “…	  it	  depends	  on	  who	  is	  giving	  you	  the	  answer.	  
Based	  on	  my	  formation	  the	  term	  administrative	  morality	  is	  a	  type,	  a	  specific	  form	  of	  a	  
moral	  command	  but	  not	  everybody	  can	  have	  the	  same	  formation	  or	  that	  approach	  and	  
so	  for	  them	  it	  [administrative	  morality]	  would	  be	  only	  a	  tool	  that	  based	  only	  on	  a	  
constitutional	  norm	  or	  a	  legal	  obligation”.406	  This	  testimony	  points	  out	  to	  the	  different	  
approaches	  to	  administrative	  morality	  depending	  on	  individual	  formation	  and	  individual	  
understanding	  of	  morality.	  Arce’s	  perception	  highlights	  the	  role	  of	  ethical	  and	  moral	  
norms	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
This	  interviewee	  also	  highlighted	  the	  variation	  in	  conceptions	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  among	  regions	  of	  the	  country	  and	  among	  different	  levels	  within	  an	  
organization.	  With	  regards	  geographical	  variations	  Arce	  explained:	  “There	  are	  regions	  of	  
the	  country	  where	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  receive	  training,	  all	  the	  stuff	  related	  to	  
administrative	  morality,	  in	  fact,	  that	  thing	  does	  not	  stick.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  there	  are	  
organizations	  with	  bad	  reputation	  but	  that	  try	  hard	  to	  improve	  it”.407	  This	  quote	  speaks	  
to	  the	  different	  approaches	  to	  administrative	  morality	  that	  different	  organizations	  
choose.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  organizations	  in	  all	  regions	  follow	  the	  same	  
regulations	  and	  policy	  documents	  some	  implement	  it	  in	  a	  more	  efficient	  way	  that	  
others.	  	  
In	  relation	  to	  the	  variation	  among	  levels	  of	  organizations	  Arce	  argued	  that	  in	  
higher	  levels	  of	  organizations,	  agents	  with	  more	  discretion	  are	  more	  sensitive	  to	  





administrative	  morality.	  He	  argued	  that	  at	  the	  managerial	  level	  agents	  are	  more	  
exposed	  to	  public	  pressure	  of	  the	  media	  and	  civil	  society	  organizations	  and	  
consequently	  they	  are	  more	  careful	  in	  the	  application	  of	  administrative	  morality.408	  
More	  research	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  explore	  whether	  exposure	  to	  control	  of	  the	  media	  
and	  civil	  society	  organizations	  shape	  managers’	  decision-­‐making	  with	  regards	  
administrative	  morality.	  Also,	  future	  research	  could	  clarify	  whether	  street-­‐level	  
bureaucrats	  implement	  administrative	  morality	  in	  a	  different	  way	  from	  managers.	  
In	  relation	  to	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  morality,	  specifically	  
when	  referring	  to	  training,	  Arce	  explained	  that	  public	  agents	  have	  several	  opportunities	  
to	  learn	  about	  transparency	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  mechanisms.	  According	  to	  Arce	  there	  
are	  conferences	  on	  transparency	  organized	  by	  different	  Ministries.	  In	  Arce’s	  opinion	  
transparency	  is	  the	  “twin	  sister”	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  consequently	  when	  
receiving	  training	  on	  it	  public	  agents	  are	  learning	  about	  administrative	  morality.	  Arce	  
also	  mentioned	  that	  the	  Administrative	  Department	  for	  the	  Public	  function	  and	  some	  
oversight	  agencies	  like	  the	  “Procuraduría	  General	  de	  la	  Nación”	  have	  developed	  
guidelines	  related	  to	  corruption.	  In	  his	  opinion	  these	  institutional	  mechanisms	  had	  
helped	  to	  make	  more	  specific	  the	  dimension	  of	  administrative	  morality	  that	  goes	  
beyond	  legality	  and	  that	  otherwise	  would	  be	  extremely	  vague:	  “So	  let’s	  say	  that	  going	  
beyond	  formal	  legality,	  that	  I	  do	  believe	  that	  public	  agents	  know	  it	  very	  well	  specifically	  
with	  regards	  their	  own	  duties,	  that	  set	  of	  institutional	  tools	  that	  are	  presented	  as	  public	  
policies	  and	  that	  have	  been	  given	  to	  governmental	  agencies,	  had	  helped	  public	  agents	  




to	  bring	  to	  the	  ground	  all	  those	  concepts	  and	  contexts	  that	  probably	  otherwise	  
wouldn’t’	  be	  clear.”409	  	  
This	  interviewee	  seemed	  to	  recall	  different	  forms	  of	  institutionalization	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  like	  training	  and	  policy	  documents	  and	  he	  had	  a	  very	  positive	  
impression	  of	  those	  institutional	  tools.	  It	  is	  noticeable	  that	  all	  the	  institutional	  tools	  he	  
mentioned	  focused	  on	  transparency	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  mechanisms	  but	  not	  to	  
administrative	  morality	  or	  popular	  actions.	  In	  his	  perspective	  those	  institutional	  
mechanisms	  have	  provided	  him	  with	  the	  necessary	  elements	  to	  understand	  
administrative	  morality	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  no	  specific	  policy	  or	  training	  on	  
administrative	  morality.	  	  
It	  is	  also	  noticeable	  that	  when	  referring	  to	  these	  trainings	  and	  documents	  Arce	  
suggested	  that	  sometimes	  they	  motivate	  organizations	  to	  develop	  certain	  behaviors	  as	  a	  
sign	  of	  symbolic	  compliance:	  “One	  notices	  the	  rush	  for	  introducing	  this	  topic	  
[transparency]	  but	  in	  several	  cases,	  I	  cannot	  say	  that	  it	  is	  in	  all	  cases…	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  
about	  answering	  what	  the	  public	  wants	  to	  hear	  and	  to	  generate	  a	  perception	  that	  we	  
are	  working,	  that	  we	  are	  honest,	  that	  we	  are	  transparent,	  and	  consequently	  that	  our	  
administrative	  behavior	  fulfills	  morality”.410	  To	  this	  extent	  Edelman’s	  theory	  on	  symbolic	  
compliance	  could	  applicable	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  Policies	  on	  transparency	  and	  
anti-­‐corruption	  mechanisms	  could	  have	  led	  administrative	  organizations	  to	  prove	  
symbolic	  compliance	  but	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  courts	  adopted	  administrative	  
behaviors	  as	  proofs	  of	  compliance	  with	  administrative	  morality.	  Further	  research	  would	  





be	  necessary	  on	  this	  issue.	  	  
Arce	  was	  the	  only	  interviewee	  who	  referred	  specifically	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  over	  governmental	  agencies.	  “Indeed,	  the	  topic	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  would	  not	  have	  much	  importance,	  I	  mean,	  people	  would	  not	  
pay	  that	  much	  of	  attention	  to	  it	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  two	  enforcement	  mechanisms:	  one	  
that	  is	  formal	  and	  institutional	  …	  and	  another	  that	  is	  non-­‐institutional	  or	  civil”.411	  When	  
referring	  to	  formal	  mechanisms	  Arce	  mentioned	  the	  role	  of	  oversight	  agencies	  when	  
investigating	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  With	  regards	  non-­‐institutional	  
mechanisms	  Arce	  highlighted	  the	  role	  of	  the	  media,	  interest	  groups,	  oversight	  groups,	  
and	  civil	  society	  organizations.	  In	  his	  opinion	  the	  combination	  of	  these	  two	  types	  of	  
strategies	  is	  what	  gives	  salience	  to	  administrative	  morality	  in	  the	  public	  agenda.	  	  
Arce	  argued	  that	  litigation	  has	  low	  impact	  on	  governmental:	  “We	  don’t	  have	  a	  
stable	  bureaucracy	  …	  and	  so	  the	  rulings	  with	  this	  purpose	  [rulings	  enforcing	  
administrative	  morality]	  come	  when	  the	  individuals	  responsible	  for	  the	  violations	  are	  
already	  gone,	  then	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  initiate	  other	  types	  of	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  
like	  disciplinary	  and	  fiscal	  actions	  but	  inside	  the	  organization	  the	  message	  we	  receive	  is	  
like	  oh!	  the	  rogue	  agent	  is	  already	  gone”.412	  Arce	  points	  out	  to	  judicial	  congestion	  and	  
the	  lack	  of	  stability	  in	  public	  organizations	  as	  causes	  of	  the	  low	  impact	  of	  popular	  actions	  
on	  organizations.	  Judicial	  congestion	  implies	  that	  rulings	  on	  administrative	  morality	  
cannot	  be	  implemented	  at	  a	  timely	  manner	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  stability	  implies	  that	  it	  is	  
easier	  to	  blame	  individuals	  who	  are	  not	  working	  at	  the	  agency	  anymore.	  To	  this	  extent	  





Arce	  suggested	  that	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  are	  perceived	  as	  individual	  
mistakes	  rather	  than	  institutional	  violations.	  	  
Thus,	  Arce	  exemplifies	  a	  mixed	  approach	  to	  administrative	  morality	  and	  its’	  
institutionalization.	  He	  concurs	  with	  Espinosa	  and	  Orrego	  about	  the	  two	  dimensions	  of	  
administrative	  morality:	  it	  is	  the	  law	  but	  it	  is	  something	  else.	  When	  defining	  the	  extra	  
legal	  aspect	  to	  administrative	  morality	  Arce’s	  testimony	  differs	  from	  other	  interviews.	  
Arce	  spoke	  about	  the	  different	  conceptions	  of	  administrative	  morality	  depending	  on	  the	  
individual	  understanding	  of	  morality.	  Also	  he	  referred	  to	  the	  regional	  and	  organizational	  
variation	  in	  the	  conception	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  This	  lack	  of	  a	  unique	  notion	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  exemplifies	  the	  existence	  of	  several	  layers	  of	  norms	  that	  interact	  
in	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  Arce	  referred	  to	  constitutional	  norms,	  
legal	  norms,	  ethical	  norms,	  and	  policies	  as	  institutional	  mechanisms	  that	  guide	  
bureaucratic	  decision-­‐making	  and	  that	  explain	  different	  understandings	  of	  this	  notion.	  
These	  different	  layers	  of	  norms	  and	  regulations	  suggest	  that	  legal	  pluralism	  is	  applicable	  
to	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
Arce	  also	  explained	  that	  there	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  
mechanisms	  that	  have	  fostered	  the	  consolidation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  As	  formal	  
mechanisms	  he	  referred	  to	  policy	  documents	  and	  training	  that	  bureaucrats	  receive	  but	  
none	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  is	  specifically	  focused	  on	  administrative	  morality.	  Arce	  
emphasized	  the	  role	  of	  informal	  mechanisms	  like	  the	  media	  and	  civil	  society	  groups	  in	  
promoting	  transparency	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  as	  core	  topics	  in	  the	  public	  agenda.	  This	  
combination	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  mechanisms	  exemplifies	  what	  Epp	  called	  external	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advocates	  and	  their	  role	  in	  implementing	  legal	  reforms.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  in	  Arce’s	  
testimony	  of	  professional	  bureaucratic	  values	  or	  internal	  advocates	  supporting	  the	  
implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
Arce’s	  perception	  also	  suggested	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  in	  bureaucratic	  organizations	  has	  been	  an	  application	  of	  Edelman’s	  symbolic	  
compliance.	  This	  interviewee	  argued	  that	  due	  to	  institutional	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  
training	  and	  policy	  documents	  organizations	  have	  tended	  to	  prove	  symbolic	  compliance	  
that	  does	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  administrative	  performance.	  
Arce	  described	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  morality	  by	  referring	  
to	  training	  and	  policy	  documents	  on	  transparency	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  mechanisms.	  It	  is	  
noticeable	  that	  the	  institutional	  mechanisms	  that	  he	  identified	  as	  a	  development	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  do	  not	  refer	  specifically	  to	  it	  or	  to	  popular	  actions.	  	  
	  
Administrative	  morality	  and	  Transparency	  Colombia	  	  
With	  over	  fifteen	  years	  of	  experience	  in	  this	  area	  the	  NGO	  Transparency	  
Colombia	  is	  an	  important	  actor	  with	  regards	  the	  implementation	  of	  transparency	  and	  
anti-­‐corruption	  policies.	  This	  organization	  has	  focused	  on	  prevention	  of	  corruption:	  
“Transparency	  Colombia	  wants	  to	  promote	  transparency	  and	  integrity	  in	  governmental	  
agencies	  in	  Colombia,	  we	  want	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  transparency”.413	  
Transparency	  Colombia	  provides	  a	  key	  perspective	  of	  civil	  society’s	  organizations	  with	  
regards	  transparency	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  policies.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  analyze	  my	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  "Interview	  Marcela	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interview	  with	  the	  Director	  for	  public	  affairs	  of	  this	  NGO,	  Marcela	  Restrepo.	  	  
Restrepo	  explained	  that	  administrative	  morality	  is	  an	  adaptation	  of	  Christian	  
ethics	  to	  public	  service	  but	  in	  her	  opinion	  the	  creation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  its	  
implementation	  lacks	  a	  rigorous	  discussion	  of	  its	  implications.	  Restrepo	  argued	  that	  
administrative	  morality	  refers	  to	  the	  ethical	  demands	  that	  governmental	  agents	  should	  
comply	  with	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  than	  medical	  doctors	  have	  their	  ethical	  codes.	  These	  ethical	  
codes	  are	  higher	  demands	  than	  other	  types	  of	  standards.414	  	  In	  Restrepo’s	  opinion	  this	  
understanding	  of	  the	  ethical	  standards	  for	  governmental	  agents	  has	  not	  been	  yet	  
developed	  in	  Colombia.	  “One	  thing	  is	  if	  I	  am	  a	  very	  decent	  person	  and	  all	  but	  a	  different	  
thing	  is	  when	  I	  understand	  that	  I	  have	  a	  collective	  responsibility,	  that	  I	  have	  in	  my	  hands	  
people’s	  lives.	  That	  is	  a	  different	  dimension.”415	  	  
In	  these	  quotes	  Restrepo	  identified	  different	  aspects	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  
The	  first	  aspect	  is	  related	  to	  the	  ethical	  component	  that	  applies	  to	  public	  administrators	  
in	  a	  similar	  way	  that	  medical	  ethics	  applies	  to	  doctors.	  Second,	  this	  ethical	  component	  is	  
related	  to	  public	  trust	  and	  administrators’	  responsibility	  of	  managing	  public	  resources	  
that	  could	  benefit	  the	  entire	  population.	  The	  third	  component	  is	  related	  to	  the	  social	  
understanding	  of	  the	  ethical	  demands	  of	  the	  public	  service.	  Restrepo	  referred	  to	  the	  
development	  of	  this	  ethical	  understanding	  as	  dependant	  of	  social	  evolution.	  In	  more	  
developed	  societies	  (specifically	  she	  mentioned	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  campaign	  in	  Spain)	  
there	  is	  a	  different	  level	  of	  institutional	  development	  that	  allows	  society	  to	  understand	  
and	  implement	  ethics	  in	  public	  administration.	  	  





According	  to	  Restrepo	  these	  levels	  of	  development	  vary	  considerably	  from	  one	  
region	  of	  the	  country	  to	  another:	  “And	  so	  when	  we	  work	  with	  governmental	  agencies	  
we	  ask	  them,	  ok	  how	  far	  are	  you	  willing	  to	  go?	  The	  hard	  way	  or	  the	  easy	  way?	  And	  we	  
have	  sat	  with	  governors	  like	  Sergio	  Fajardo	  [governor	  of	  Antioquia]	  and	  we	  have	  told	  
him	  ok	  governor,	  we	  are	  very	  sorry	  but	  you	  cannot	  keep	  talking	  here	  about	  promoting	  
transparency,	  no,	  you	  have	  to	  go	  after	  the	  bad	  guys,	  you	  have	  all	  the	  institutional	  
capacity,	  but	  I	  cannot	  ask	  the	  same	  to	  the	  mayor	  of	  San	  Jose	  del	  Guaviare,	  no”.416	  In	  this	  
quote	  Restrepo	  refers	  to	  different	  levels	  of	  institutional	  capacity	  that	  allow	  different	  
organizations	  in	  different	  regions	  of	  the	  country	  to	  implement	  ethics	  and	  administrative	  
morality	  in	  public	  administration.	  
	  	   Restrepo	  also	  related	  administrative	  morality	  to	  non-­‐governmental	  rules	  that	  
refer	  to	  ethical	  behaviors	  and	  rectitude	  in	  social	  life.	  These	  norms	  could	  shape	  
bureaucratic	  understanding	  of	  administrative	  morality:	  traditional	  good	  manners,	  
Christian	  morals,	  and	  ethical	  principles:	  “So	  the	  reading	  we	  give	  to	  morality	  is	  like	  the	  
laws	  of	  civility	  by	  Carreño417,	  like	  Christian	  morals,	  like	  stealing	  is	  bad,	  they	  [the	  framers]	  
took	  them	  and	  like	  that,	  they	  copied	  it	  to	  governmental	  performance…”.418	  	  
	   Restrepo’s	  portrayal	  of	  administrative	  morality	  describes	  the	  interaction	  of	  
different	  types	  of	  norms,	  governmental	  and	  non-­‐governmental,	  that	  shape	  the	  
conception	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  Restrepo	  mentioned	  the	  constitution	  as	  the	  key	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416	  Ibid.	  
417	  A	  traditional	  handbook	  on	  good	  manners.	  Manuel	  Antonio	  Carreño,	  El	  Manual	  De	  Carreño:	  Manual	  
De	  Urbanidad	  Y	  Buenas	  Costumbres	  Para	  Uso	  De	  La	  Juventud	  De	  Ambos	  Sexos	  En	  El	  Cual	  Se	  Encuentran	  
Las	  Principales	  Reglas	  De	  Civilidad	  Y	  Etiqueta	  Que	  Deban	  Observarse	  in	  Las	  Diversas	  Situaciones	  
Sociales	  	  (Libros	  de	  El	  Nacional,	  2001).	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  "Interview	  Marcela	  Restrepo."	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governmental	  norm	  with	  regards	  administrative	  morality.	  With	  regards	  informal	  norms	  
she	  mentioned	  ethics,	  social	  rules	  based	  on	  institutional	  development,	  and	  non-­‐
governmental	  rules	  that	  refer	  to	  ethical	  behaviors	  and	  rectitude	  in	  social	  life.	  The	  
interaction	  of	  governmental	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  rules	  is	  described	  by	  legal	  pluralism	  
as	  the	  implementation	  process	  of	  legal	  reforms	  and	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  according	  to	  Restrepo.	  	  
	   	  
Conclusion	  
Policy	  documents	  and	  interviews	  suggest	  two	  different	  interpretations	  regarding	  
bureaucratic	  interpretation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  The	  first,	  based	  in	  the	  
government’s	  official	  anticorruption	  and	  transparency	  policy	  documents,	  is	  a	  story	  of	  
the	  complete	  absence	  of	  administrative	  morality	  from	  the	  anticorruption	  and	  
transparency	  discourse	  of	  the	  government.	  This	  is	  a	  striking	  finding	  because	  it	  suggests	  
that	  the	  country’s	  executive	  has	  not	  institutionalized	  the	  notion	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  in	  Colombia.	  	  
Policy	  documents	  on	  transparency	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  mechanisms	  focus	  on	  
values	  like	  transparency	  and	  citizen	  engagement,	  and	  emphasize	  on	  a	  result-­‐oriented	  
public	  administration.	  Morality	  is	  mentioned	  only	  three	  times	  in	  the	  documents	  that	  I	  
analyzed	  and	  in	  none	  of	  them	  is	  it	  explained	  as	  a	  collective	  constitutional	  right.	  Instead,	  
it	  is	  presented	  as	  an	  informal	  principle	  of	  public	  administration.	  When	  documents	  
referred	  to	  morality	  they	  suggest	  that	  morality	  shall	  guide	  bureaucratic	  behavior,	  but	  
there	  is	  no	  discussion	  of	  what	  this	  might	  mean.	  The	  treatment	  suggests	  that	  the	  authors	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of	  the	  documents	  were	  not	  referring	  to	  the	  new	  constitutional	  right	  but	  instead	  to	  a	  
traditional	  popular	  conception	  of	  morality.	  Thus,	  governmental	  policies	  do	  not	  provide	  
professional	  guidelines	  as	  to	  the	  way	  of	  implementing	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
Even	  more,	  the	  Colombian	  government	  has	  not	  included	  popular	  actions	  
(litigation)	  in	  administrative	  morality	  as	  part	  of	  the	  transparency	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  
mechanisms	  that	  the	  government	  privileges.	  This	  suggests	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  framers’	  
attempts	  to	  authorize	  new	  judicial	  controls	  on	  governmental	  performance	  these	  
controls	  are	  not	  perceived	  by	  the	  government	  as	  one	  of	  their	  priorities	  when	  designing	  
anti-­‐corruption	  policy.	  	  	  
The	  second	  interpretation	  is	  based	  on	  public	  officials’	  perceptions	  of	  what	  
administrative	  morality	  is	  and	  what	  it	  implies	  for	  their	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  The	  
officials	  interviewed	  for	  this	  dissertation,	  Espinosa,	  Orrego,	  Arce,	  and	  Restrepo,	  agreed	  
that	  administrative	  morality	  is	  an	  important	  concept.	  This	  is	  significant,	  especially	  in	  
light	  of	  the	  complete	  absence	  of	  the	  concept	  from	  official	  government	  documents.	  They	  
also	  agreed	  that	  administrative	  morality	  has	  two	  components:	  legal	  compliance	  and	  
something	  that	  goes	  beyond	  it.	  They	  also	  agreed	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  public	  trust.	  According	  to	  these	  officials,	  administrative	  
morality	  is	  related	  to	  	  the	  public	  trust	  that	  comes	  with	  their	  appointment	  as	  
governmental	  agents.	  Administrative	  morality,	  they	  said,	  requires	  officials	  to	  adjust	  their	  
motivations	  to	  serve	  the	  public	  interest.	  	  
	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  agreement	  the	  interviewees	  disagreed	  sharply	  on	  questions	  of	  
meaning	  and	  implementation.	  They	  refer	  to	  governmental	  and	  non-­‐governmental	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norms	  that	  provide	  meaning	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  Some	  of	  the	  interviewees,	  like	  
Arce,	  emphasized	  individual	  ethics	  as	  a	  component	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  Others,	  
like	  Espinosa,	  interpreted	  administrative	  morality	  as	  referring	  not	  to	  one’s	  individual	  
ethics	  but	  to	  the	  common	  good,	  following	  Greek	  philosophy.	  	  
Interviewees	  also	  differ	  on	  the	  value	  of	  training	  as	  part	  of	  the	  institutionalization	  
of	  administrative	  morality.	  Espinosa	  argued	  that	  training	  could	  improve	  public	  
administration	  by	  training	  bureaucrats	  for	  being	  more	  responsible	  and	  result-­‐oriented.	  
Orrego	  explained	  that	  administrative	  morality	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  training	  because	  it	  
depends	  on	  socialization	  that	  occurs	  in	  the	  family	  or	  elementary	  school.	  Arce	  explained	  
that	  one	  side	  of	  administrative	  morality	  depends	  on	  individual	  socialization	  processes	  
but	  he	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  government	  could	  and	  has	  provided	  training	  and	  guidelines	  
with	  regards	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
In	  sum,	  there	  is	  no	  shared	  discourse	  on	  what	  administrative	  morality	  means	  or	  
on	  whether	  training	  as	  a	  mechanism	  of	  institutionalization	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  
implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  This	  lack	  of	  a	  shared	  discourse	  reduces	  the	  
possible	  impact	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  its	  potential	  for	  fostering	  social	  change.	  
Also,	  the	  diverse	  notions	  of	  administrative	  morality	  provide	  evidence	  of	  the	  different	  
normative	  layers	  that	  take	  part	  of	  the	  development	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  
Interviewees	  argued	  that	  popular	  actions	  and	  administrative	  morality	  exists	  in	  the	  
Colombian	  legal	  system	  before	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  stated	  them.	  To	  this	  extent	  legal	  
norms	  and	  institutions	  from	  before	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  have	  shaped	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administrators’	  understanding	  of	  administrative	  morality.419	  The	  interviewees	  also	  
recognize	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  and	  its	  enabling	  legislation	  as	  part	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  
administrative	  morality.	  Individual	  values,	  ethics,	  and	  religious	  values	  also	  shape	  
individuals’	  understanding	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  These	  diverse	  normative	  criteria	  
interact	  to	  shape	  the	  implementation	  process	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  they	  are	  
evidence	  of	  the	  applicability	  of	  legal	  pluralism.	  	  
There	  is	  little	  evidence	  that	  something	  like	  legalized	  accountability,	  as	  Epp	  
describes	  it,	  has	  taken	  hold	  in	  Colombia.	  	  Given	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  shared	  discourse	  at	  the	  
executive	  level	  there	  are	  not	  internal	  forces	  (professional	  values)	  that	  could	  foster	  the	  
implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  legal	  reform.	  Advocacy	  groups	  such	  as	  
Transparency	  Colombia	  have	  motivated	  the	  implementation	  of	  transparency	  and	  anti-­‐
corruption	  strategies	  and	  they	  have	  been	  successful	  in	  putting	  these	  topics	  in	  the	  public	  
agenda.	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  partial	  success	  advocacy	  groups	  are	  not	  exerting	  pressure	  in	  a	  
same	  direction	  with	  professional	  democratic	  values	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  implementing	  
administrative	  morality.	  	  
Likewise,	  Edelman’s	  theory	  of	  symbolic	  compliance	  only	  explains	  part	  of	  the	  
phenomena	  described	  by	  Arce	  with	  regards	  the	  importance	  of	  informal	  mechanisms	  in	  
shaping	  bureaucratic	  behavior.	  In	  Arce’s	  opinion	  formal	  mechanisms	  have	  had	  a	  lower	  
impact	  on	  governmental	  agencies	  to	  comply	  with	  transparency	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  
demands.	  But	  informal	  mechanisms	  have	  put	  transparency	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419	  Supporting	  this	  approach	  to	  administrative	  morality	  and	  popular	  actions:	  Londoño-­‐Toro	  and	  
Torres-­‐Villarreal,	  "¿Podrán	  Las	  Acciones	  Populares	  Colombianas	  Sobrevivir	  a	  Los	  Recientes	  Ataques	  
Legislativos	  Y	  Jurisprudenciales?."	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mechanisms	  in	  the	  public	  agenda,	  motivating	  some	  organizations	  to	  develop	  actions	  to	  
prove	  bureaucratic	  compliance	  with	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
Instead,	  the	  theory	  of	  legal	  pluralism	  seems	  to	  help	  illuminate	  remarkably	  
different	  understandings	  of	  administrative	  morality	  among	  professional	  administrators.	  
If	  conceptions	  of	  administrative	  morality	  vary	  considerably	  among	  high	  officials	  in	  the	  
nation’s	  capital,	  we	  might	  expect	  these	  interpretations	  to	  vary	  even	  more	  widely	  
throughout	  the	  country’s	  diverse	  regions	  and	  levels	  in	  administrative	  agencies.	  Further	  




Chapter	  7:	  Coverage	  of	  Administrative	  Morality	  in	  the	  Popular	  Media	  
	  
“The	  new	  constitution	  blows	  its	  first	  candle	  this	  week	  but	  
the	  ambience	  is	  not	  entirely	  festive.	  One	  year	  after	  the	  
constitution	  was	  framed	  the	  new	  constitution	  does	  not	  
inspire	  the	  same	  zeal,	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  dreams	  that	  the	  
country	  wanted	  to	  achieve	  do	  not	  look	  possible	  anymore.	  
Instead	  of	  realities	  they	  have	  revealed	  themselves	  as	  goals	  
perhaps	  too	  distant	  to	  be	  true.	  The	  peace,	  human	  rights’	  
protection,	  administrative	  morality,	  political	  renewal;	  these	  
were	  ideals	  that	  motivated	  the	  need	  of	  a	  deep	  political	  
reform,	  as	  deep	  as	  the	  one	  we	  had,	  but	  that	  today	  seem	  as	  
unachievable	  as	  they	  were	  before”.	  (Revista	  Semana,	  July	  
27th,	  1992)	  
	  
This	  chapter	  examines	  how	  the	  Colombian	  media	  have	  characterized	  the	  new	  
right	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  	  To	  what	  extent	  have	  the	  media	  characterized	  this	  right	  
positively?	  	  To	  what	  extent	  have	  the	  characterized	  it	  negatively?	  To	  what	  extent	  have	  
they	  portrayed	  it	  as	  a	  meaningful	  judicial	  check	  on	  bureaucratic	  abuses?	  To	  what	  extent	  
do	  the	  media	  characterize	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  check	  on	  systemic	  or	  institutional	  
problems—or	  merely	  as	  a	  check	  on	  abuses	  by	  individual	  officials?	  
Answering	  these	  questions	  is	  important	  because	  the	  news	  media	  in	  Colombia	  
play	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  Colombian	  politics	  and	  law,	  and	  their	  coverage	  is	  likely	  to	  
influence	  how	  both	  members	  of	  the	  public	  and	  public	  officials	  understand	  the	  meaning	  
of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  	  
The	  Colombian	  media	  had	  an	  important	  role	  in	  both	  the	  constitutional	  reforms	  
of	  1991	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  these	  reforms.	  Scholars	  argued	  that	  media	  provided	  the	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institutional	  support	  that	  was	  necessary	  for	  the	  constitutional	  reform	  to	  succeed.420	  
Since	  1986	  president	  Barco	  (1986-­‐1990)	  attempted	  to	  pass	  several	  constitutional	  
reforms	  through	  the	  Congress	  but	  none	  of	  them	  was	  approved.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  March	  of	  
1990	  when	  a	  student	  movement	  with	  the	  support	  of	  mass	  media	  encouraged	  citizens	  to	  
add	  a	  “seventh	  ballot”	  in	  the	  elections	  in	  order	  to	  support	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Constitutional	  
Assembly.421	  
	  
Media	  coverage	  of	  administrative	  morality	  
Helmke	  and	  Levitsky	  observe	  that	  in	  Latin	  America	  the	  courts	  and	  government	  
agencies	  have	  too	  often	  undermined	  constitutional	  rights	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
interpretation	  and	  application.422	  They	  suggest	  that	  informal	  mechanisms	  have	  partially	  
filled	  the	  gap	  left	  by	  inadequate	  governmental	  enforcement.423	  They	  define	  informal	  
institutions	  as	  “socially	  shared	  rules,	  usually	  unwritten,	  that	  are	  created,	  communicated,	  
and	  enforced	  outside	  officially	  sanctioned	  channels”.424	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420	  Olano	  Garcia,	  Constitucion	  Politica	  De	  Colombia	  (Comentada	  Y	  Concordada).	  
421	  J.	  Dugas,	  "Structural	  Theory	  and	  Democratization	  in	  Colombia:	  The	  Role	  of	  Social	  Classes,	  Civil	  
Society,	  and	  the	  State	  in	  the	  1991	  Constitutional	  Reform"	  (1995).	  The	  role	  of	  media	  appeared	  as	  
crucial	  since	  the	  Congress	  seemed	  to	  be	  incapable	  to	  adjust	  the	  constitutional	  frame	  to	  the	  political	  
needs	  at	  that	  time:	  “The	  ignominious	  failure	  of	  Congress	  to	  enact	  significant	  constitutional	  reform	  did	  
not	  go	  unnoticed….The	  apparent	  inability	  of	  congressional	  politicians	  to	  confront	  the	  political	  crisis	  
provoked	  a	  growing	  student	  movement	  to	  rally	  behind	  the	  idea	  of	  reforming	  the	  1886	  constitution	  
by	  means	  of	  a	  popularly-­‐elected	  National	  Constitutional	  Assembly….	  The	  student	  movement	  with	  the	  
help	  of	  the	  mass	  media,	  encouraged	  citizens	  to	  include	  an	  extra	  ballot	  in	  their	  electoral	  envelopes…”.	  
Thus,	  mass	  media	  was	  part	  of	  the	  support	  structure	  that	  was	  necessary	  to	  reform	  the	  Constitution	  of	  
1886.	  	  	  
422	  G.	  Helmke	  and	  S.	  Levitsky,	  Informal	  Institutions	  and	  Democracy:	  Lessons	  from	  Latin	  America	  	  (Johns	  
Hopkins	  Univ	  Pr,	  2006).	  
423	  Ibid.	  
424	  Ibid.	  Although	  Helmke	  and	  Levitsky	  argue	  that	  the	  core	  element	  of	  informal	  institutions	  is	  a	  
“socially	  shared	  meaning”	  this	  concept	  is	  debated	  among	  scholars.	  For	  instance,	  Brinks	  contend	  that	  
the	  essence	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  rules’	  enforcement.	  Brinks	  argues	  that	  informal	  rules	  include	  
prescriptions	  (what	  individuals	  shall	  do)	  and	  means	  of	  enforcement	  in	  case	  of	  violations	  to	  the	  rule.	  	  
These	  means	  of	  enforcement	  are	  informal	  and	  this	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  informal	  institutions.	  D.	  Brinks,	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While	  it	  would	  be	  nearly	  impossible	  for	  me	  to	  conduct	  an	  adequate	  study	  of	  
popular	  understandings	  of	  “administrative	  morality”	  among	  ordinary	  Colombians,	  a	  
workable	  alternative	  is	  to	  examine	  coverage	  of	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  popular	  news	  media.	  
In	  addressing	  the	  Colombian	  media’s	  characterization	  of	  the	  new	  right	  to	  
administrative	  morality,	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  William	  Haltom	  and	  
Michael	  McCann	  who	  analyzed	  media	  coverage	  of	  tort	  litigation	  in	  the	  US.	  425	  They	  show	  
that	  the	  popular	  media’s	  interpretations	  of	  key	  legal	  rights	  differ	  significantly	  from	  
strictly	  “legal”	  interpretations	  and	  have	  considerable	  influence.426	  According	  to	  these	  
scholars	  the	  American	  media	  have	  consistently	  portrayed	  tort	  litigation	  as	  the	  product	  
of	  individual	  mistakes	  (like	  spilling	  coffee	  on	  oneself,	  in	  the	  famous	  McDonald’s	  coffee-­‐
burn	  lawsuit)	  rather	  than	  institutional	  or	  systemic	  problems	  (like	  the	  McDonalds	  
Corporation’s	  decision	  to	  sell	  its	  coffee	  at	  temperatures	  that	  were	  certain	  to	  cause	  
severe	  burns	  within	  seconds	  if	  spilled	  on	  skin).	  This	  systematic	  skewing	  of	  media	  
coverage,	  Haltom	  and	  McCann	  argue,	  undercuts	  the	  potential	  for	  tort	  litigation	  to	  
address	  institutional	  failings.	  	  	  
It	  is	  possible	  that	  Haltom	  and	  McCann’s	  observations	  are	  especially	  characteristic	  
of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  may	  not	  be	  as	  widespread	  elsewhere.	  	  Haltom	  and	  McCann	  
suggested	  that	  the	  values	  of	  individual	  responsibility	  and	  populist	  antipathy	  toward	  
formal	  state	  intervention	  are	  powerful	  in	  the	  American	  cultural	  context,	  and	  this	  context	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
"The	  Rule	  of	  (Non)	  Law,"	  Informal	  Institutions	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Baltimore,	  Johns	  
Hopkins	  (2006).	  




contributed	  to	  the	  media	  bias	  that	  they	  observed.427	  	  These	  individualistic	  values	  are	  
somewhat	  less	  prominent	  in	  Colombia,	  and	  with	  this	  study	  I	  will	  be	  able	  to	  analyze	  
whether	  media	  coverage	  of	  the	  1991	  Colombian	  constitutional	  reforms	  is	  systematically	  
skewed	  in	  a	  similar	  way.	  	  	  
Latin	  American	  scholarship,	  by	  contrast,	  argues	  that	  popular	  discourse	  has	  been	  
considerably	  influenced	  by	  the	  language	  used	  by	  courts	  in	  their	  rulings.428	  Through	  the	  
media	  the	  people	  have	  learned	  about	  individual	  successful	  cases	  and	  the	  courts’	  
reasoning	  in	  these	  cases.	  Thus,	  according	  to	  this	  Latin	  American-­‐based	  research,	  many	  
people	  have	  adopted	  the	  language	  and	  categories	  used	  by	  judges.429	  
In	  order	  to	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  media	  in	  the	  development	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  this	  chapter	  examines	  how	  the	  news	  media	  in	  Colombia	  have	  framed	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  the	  cases	  raising	  this	  issue.430	  	  To	  do	  so,	  I	  will	  ask	  questions	  
similar	  to	  those	  examined	  by	  Haltom	  and	  McCann.	  They	  showed	  that	  popular	  media	  
reporting	  of	  court	  cases	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  individual	  actors	  rather	  than	  institutional	  
processes,	  and	  on	  individual	  mistakes	  rather	  than	  institutional	  sources	  of	  harm.	  	  For	  
example,	  the	  reporting	  of	  the	  infamous	  McDonald’s	  coffee-­‐burn	  case	  focused	  nearly	  
exclusively	  on	  Stella	  Liebeck’s	  mistake	  in	  opening	  a	  hot	  cup	  of	  coffee	  on	  her	  lap,	  but	  not	  
on	  the	  fact	  that	  McDonald’s	  Corporation	  had	  a	  corporate	  policy	  of	  serving	  its	  coffee	  at	  
20	  degrees	  above	  the	  industry	  standard,	  a	  temperature	  well	  known	  to	  cause	  severe	  
burns	  within	  seconds	  of	  contact	  with	  skin.	  	  Haltom	  and	  McCann	  argue	  that	  the	  media’s	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failure	  to	  report	  on	  institutional	  processes	  tends	  to	  undercut	  the	  possibility	  of	  using	  law	  
to	  contribute	  to	  institutional	  reform.	  Using	  Haltom	  and	  McCann’s	  framework,	  in	  a	  
similar	  way,	  the	  narratives	  that	  I	  will	  analyze	  in	  this	  paper	  convey	  meaning	  in	  the	  
Colombian	  context	  and	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  identify	  media’s	  perception	  of	  the	  use	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  its	  potential.	  
Haltom	  and	  McCann	  focused	  on	  analyzing	  print	  mass	  media	  because	  the	  print	  
mass	  media	  shape	  the	  agenda	  for	  other	  news	  media.	  Also,	  newspaper	  accounts	  are	  
perceived	  as	  more	  reliable	  than	  television	  news.	  For	  these	  reasons	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  
newspaper	  and	  magazine	  accounts	  of	  administrative	  morality	  for	  the	  last	  twenty	  years.	  	  
	  
Data	  and	  Methods	  
My	  data	  are	  drawn	  from	  an	  original	  database	  of	  176	  articles	  from	  printed	  media	  
sources	  in	  Colombia.	  	  These	  176	  articles	  are	  the	  universe	  of	  articles	  that	  refer	  to	  
“administrative	  morality”	  published	  by	  two	  national	  printed	  media,	  one	  newspaper	  and	  
one	  magazine,	  from	  1991	  through	  the	  end	  of	  2011.431	  	  I	  chose	  these	  sources	  because	  
they	  are	  two	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  media	  sources	  in	  the	  country	  with	  national	  coverage,	  
and	  one	  is	  generally	  regarded	  as	  conservative	  while	  the	  other	  is	  regarded	  as	  liberal.	  The	  
newspaper	  “El	  Tiempo”	  is	  regarded	  as	  conservative	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  be	  
favorable	  towards	  governmental	  actions.	  This	  newspaper	  is	  printed	  daily	  and	  it	  
circulates	  in	  all	  the	  territory.	  The	  magazine	  “Semana”	  is	  published	  weekly	  and	  it	  also	  
circulates	  in	  all	  the	  territory.	  “Semana”	  is	  known	  for	  being	  more	  liberal	  on	  its	  approach	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




and	  more	  critical	  towards	  governmental	  actions.	  These	  sources	  provide	  access	  to	  online	  
information,	  and	  using	  this	  online	  database	  I	  have	  gathered	  the	  universe	  of	  articles	  
published	  since	  1991	  that	  refer	  to	  “administrative	  morality.”	  The	  majority	  of	  articles	  in	  
the	  database	  were	  published	  in	  the	  time	  frame	  of	  2001	  to	  2011	  (102	  articles),	  while	  
during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991,	  74	  articles	  were	  published.	  The	  
majority	  of	  articles	  in	  the	  database	  were	  published	  in	  “El	  Tiempo”	  (92%	  of	  the	  articles),	  
while	  the	  rest	  of	  them	  were	  published	  in	  “Semana”	  (8%	  of	  the	  articles).	  	  
In	  my	  analysis	  I	  used	  a	  coding	  scheme432	  in	  which	  I	  identified	  fourteen	  variables	  
in	  relation	  to	  media’s	  portrayal	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  The	  first	  variable	  is	  the	  
primary	  legal	  issue	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  article.	  Legal	  issues	  include	  financial	  malfeasance	  of	  a	  
government	  agency,	  willful	  misconduct	  by	  an	  individual	  official,	  corruption	  in	  the	  
electoral	  process,	  disputes	  over	  financial	  incentives	  to	  support	  litigation,	  and	  individual	  
(human)	  rights.	  	  The	  variables	  type	  of	  defendant	  and	  type	  of	  plaintiff	  address	  the	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  parties	  identified	  in	  the	  articles;	  I	  classified	  the	  parties	  among	  6	  
categories:	  individuals,	  businesses,	  organizational	  interest	  groups,	  local	  governments,	  
regional	  governments,	  and	  national	  government.	  	  
I	  also	  identified	  the	  policy	  area	  addressed	  in	  each	  article,	  and	  for	  purposes	  of	  
presentation	  here	  I	  have	  consolidated	  these	  policy	  areas	  into	  6	  of	  broadly-­‐defined	  areas:	  
governmental	  service	  to	  individuals,	  security	  and	  criminal	  law,	  regulatory	  policy,	  publicly	  
owned	  businesses,	  political	  processes,	  and	  infrastructure.	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I	  also	  explored	  each	  article’s	  tone	  toward	  the	  plaintiff	  or	  claimant,	  the	  
defendant,	  toward	  administrative	  morality,	  and	  toward	  the	  formal	  mechanism	  or	  action	  
used	  to	  enforce	  administrative	  morality.	  “Tone”	  refers	  to	  whether	  the	  article	  generally	  
appears	  to	  offer	  a	  positive,	  negative	  or	  neutral	  impression	  of	  the	  object	  in	  question	  
(e.g.,	  toward	  the	  plaintiff).	  	  By	  analyzing	  the	  tone	  I	  will	  explore	  whether	  the	  Colombian	  
printed	  media	  are	  systematically	  more	  negative	  or	  positive	  toward	  plaintiffs	  or	  
defendants	  and	  toward	  the	  right	  to	  administrative	  morality	  and	  the	  legal	  action	  to	  
enforce	  it.	  	  
Following	  Haltom	  and	  McCann,	  I	  also	  coded	  whether	  each	  article	  depicts	  the	  
central	  issue	  as	  primarily	  a	  matter	  of	  individual	  mistake	  or	  abuse	  or	  institutional	  
failings.433	  	  
	  
Patterns	  in	  Colombia	  Media	  Coverage	  
The	  articles	  in	  the	  database	  fall	  into	  two	  broad	  classes:	  reports	  on	  specific	  cases	  
involving	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  general	  commentaries	  on	  
administrative	  morality	  that	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  specific	  case.	  	  General	  commentaries	  
represent	  40%	  of	  the	  articles	  in	  the	  database,	  while	  60%	  of	  the	  articles	  refer	  to	  actual	  
cases	  of	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
Within	  this	  category	  of	  articles	  that	  focus	  on	  particular	  cases,	  the	  articles	  refer	  to	  
five	  types	  of	  issues:	  	  financial	  malfeasance,	  violations	  of	  individual	  rights,	  willful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433	  I	  also	  identified	  whether	  a	  secondary	  issue,	  a	  second	  litigant,	  second	  defendant,	  a	  second	  type	  of	  
action,	  or	  second	  intent	  of	  reform	  appeared	  in	  the	  articles.	  Only	  a	  very	  small	  percentage	  of	  the	  
articles	  included	  information	  about	  these	  objects	  beyond	  the	  primary	  plaintiff,	  defendant,	  etc.,	  and	  so	  
these	  variables	  were	  not	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  this	  analysis.	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misconduct	  of	  the	  administration	  (other	  than	  violations	  of	  individual	  rights),	  electoral	  
corruption,	  and	  litigation	  incentives.	  The	  largest	  proportions	  focus	  on	  cases	  of	  financial	  
malfeasance	  and	  willful	  misconduct	  of	  the	  administration	  (see	  Figure	  17).	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  17:	  Primary	  issue.	  N=102.	  
	  
Financial	  malfeasance	  refers	  to	  situations	  in	  which	  public	  funds	  have	  been	  
mismanaged	  due	  to	  corruption,	  inefficiency,	  illegal	  behavior,	  lack	  of	  transparency,	  or	  
improper	  decisions	  of	  the	  administration.	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  an	  article	  of	  2001	  a	  
lawyer	  filed	  a	  popular	  action	  against	  the	  regional	  government	  for	  it	  invested	  2.017	  
million	  Colombian	  pesos	  (approximately	  one	  million	  dollars)	  to	  repair	  a	  public	  park.	  
According	  to	  the	  lawyer	  quoted	  in	  this	  article	  those	  funds	  were	  invested	  in	  a	  different	  
way	  from	  the	  one	  approved	  by	  the	  legislature	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  were	  supposed	  to	  
be	  spent	  on	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  region	  after	  an	  earthquake,	  and	  consequently	  the	  
government	  had	  violated	  the	  collective	  right	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  this	  article	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media	  coverage	  focused	  on	  whether	  the	  regional	  government	  had	  misspent	  public	  
funds	  or	  not.434	  	  
Willful	  misconduct	  refers	  to	  cases	  in	  which	  a	  public	  agency	  made	  an	  illegal	  or	  
inconvenient	  decision	  in	  matters	  not	  related	  to	  individual	  rights	  or	  public	  finance.	  Willful	  
misconduct	  is	  related	  to	  improper	  decisions	  of	  the	  administration,	  lack	  of	  transparency,	  
inefficiency	  or	  corruption.	  An	  example	  of	  willful	  misconduct	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Pedro	  
Jimenez,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  regional	  legislative	  organ	  in	  Cesar	  (region	  located	  in	  the	  North	  
of	  the	  country)	  who,	  at	  the	  time	  when	  he	  was	  elected,	  had	  a	  romantic	  relationship	  with	  
a	  governmental	  agent.	  	  According	  to	  the	  journalistic	  article,	  an	  oversight	  agency	  
condemned	  Jimenez	  for	  violating	  regulations	  regarding	  transparency	  in	  public	  
administration.435	  This	  article	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  case	  of	  inadequate	  management	  of	  
public	  funds	  but	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Jimenez	  did	  not	  comply	  with	  regulations	  that	  protect	  
public	  administration.	  	  
Another	  cluster	  of	  articles	  refer	  to	  fraud	  in	  elections.	  For	  example,	  some	  
plaintiffs	  used	  popular	  actions	  to	  denounce	  candidates	  who	  allegedly	  received	  electoral	  
support	  from	  dead	  voters.	  For	  instance,	  in	  an	  article	  published	  in	  2008	  the	  newspaper	  
“El	  Tiempo”	  tells	  the	  story	  of	  Diana	  Herrera,	  a	  young	  lawyer	  who	  noticed	  that	  the	  mayor	  
of	  a	  small	  town	  registered	  his	  candidacy	  by	  using	  signatures	  of	  dead	  people.	  According	  
to	  the	  newspaper,	  Diana	  was	  trying	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  mayor	  had	  violated	  administrative	  
morality	  and	  rules	  of	  fair	  game	  when	  he	  registered	  his	  candidacy	  to	  run	  for	  office.436	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  "El	  Parque	  Del	  Cafe	  Debe	  Devolver	  Dinero,"	  El	  Tiempo,	  July	  12th	  2001;	  ibid.	  
435	  "Diputado	  Pedro	  Jimenez	  Fue	  Destituido	  E	  Inhabilitado	  Por	  12	  Años,"	  El	  Tiempo,	  April	  18th	  2009.	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  "Denuncian	  Fraude	  En	  Elección	  Del	  Alcalde	  De	  Girardot,"	  El	  Tiempo,	  November	  28th	  2008.	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Articles	  about	  litigation	  incentives	  are	  those	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  monetary	  
incentive	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  receives	  when	  the	  judge	  grants	  the	  action.	  The	  Colombian	  
legislature	  assumed	  that	  citizens	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  file	  a	  lawsuit	  when	  a	  monetary	  
incentive	  was	  granted	  to	  those	  who	  file	  actions	  for	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality	  
and	  those	  actions	  succeed.437	  	  The	  monetary	  incentive	  is	  an	  issue	  discussed	  in	  6.86%	  of	  
these	  articles.	  In	  an	  article	  published	  in	  2008	  media	  call	  attention	  to	  a	  piece	  of	  news	  
according	  to	  which	  a	  councilman	  in	  Tunja	  (a	  city	  located	  in	  the	  central	  region	  of	  
Colombia)	  had	  declined	  to	  receive	  $1.200	  million	  Colombian	  pesos	  (approximately	  
$600,000	  dollars).	  According	  to	  this	  article,	  the	  city	  government	  had	  started	  
negotiations	  to	  sell	  the	  famers	  market	  to	  a	  private	  company	  and	  the	  councilman	  
decided	  to	  file	  a	  popular	  action	  to	  protect	  the	  farmers’	  right	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  
The	  judge	  granted	  the	  action	  and	  applied	  the	  statute	  that	  regulates	  popular	  actions	  by	  
awarding	  the	  councilman	  with	  a	  monetary	  incentive.438	  In	  this	  case	  the	  councilman	  
declined	  to	  receive	  the	  incentive	  but	  the	  article	  asks	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  
convenient	  or	  not	  to	  set	  a	  monetary	  incentive	  to	  motivate	  citizen	  participation	  in	  
enforcing	  collective	  rights.	  The	  article	  includes	  the	  testimony	  of	  two	  law	  professors	  who	  
argue	  that	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  leads	  to	  abuses	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  action	  by	  plaintiffs	  
who	  are	  just	  interested	  in	  receiving	  the	  incentive.	  	  
	   With	  regards	  individual	  rights,	  only	  6%	  of	  the	  articles	  referred	  to	  situations	  in	  
which	  an	  individual	  right	  has	  been	  violated.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  article	  “Anticorruption	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437	  Congreso	  de	  la	  Republica	  de	  Colombia,	  "Ley	  472."	  
438	  According	  to	  the	  statute	  in	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  entitled	  to	  receive	  up	  to	  
15%	  of	  the	  sum	  that	  is	  recovered	  through	  the	  action.	  Law	  472	  of	  1998,	  Article	  40.	  	  After	  several	  years	  
of	  debate	  the	  Congress	  eliminated	  this	  article	  of	  the	  statute	  and	  currently	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  no	  longer	  
entitled	  to	  a	  monetary	  incentive	  (Law	  1425	  of	  2010).	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campaign	  does	  not	  admit	  negligence”	  media	  allude	  to	  the	  case	  filed	  by	  Uriel	  Molina,	  a	  
public	  agent	  working	  with	  the	  Environmental	  Unit	  in	  the	  city	  Sevilla	  (located	  in	  the	  west	  
region	  of	  Colombia).	  Molina	  argued	  that	  his	  right	  to	  due	  process	  was	  violated	  when	  the	  
city	  of	  Sevilla	  	  conducted	  a	  disciplinary	  investigation	  without	  following	  legal	  procedures.	  
Molina	  argued	  that	  the	  city	  did	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  evidence	  in	  his	  favor,	  but	  
only	  evidence	  against	  him.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  Molina	  filed	  an	  action	  for	  tutelage	  arguing	  
violations	  of	  due	  process.	  The	  Colombian	  Constitutional	  Court	  analyzed	  the	  case	  and	  
concluded	  that	  the	  disciplinary	  investigation	  violated	  Molina’s	  rights	  to	  due	  process	  and	  
right	  to	  counsel.	  On	  its	  ruling	  the	  Court	  argued	  that	  the	  irregularities	  in	  criminal	  and	  
disciplinary	  processes	  reduce	  the	  governmental	  capacity	  to	  properly	  investigate	  
violations	  against	  administrative	  morality.439	  	  
The	  pattern	  observed	  here—a	  media	  focus	  primarily	  on	  financial	  malfeasance—
is	  striking.	  	  In	  this	  media	  coverage,	  administrative	  morality	  appears	  to	  be	  relevant	  mainly	  
to	  the	  proper	  management	  of	  public	  funds.	  	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  follow	  the	  same	  
pattern	  given	  that	  the	  over	  50%	  of	  the	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality	  refer	  to	  suits	  for	  
improper	  management	  of	  public	  funds	  (Figure	  1).	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  media	  have	  
covered	  cases	  other	  than	  those	  heard	  in	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  but	  the	  patterns	  of	  both	  
types	  of	  data	  (journalistic	  articles	  and	  court	  cases)	  suggest	  that	  administrative	  morality	  
has	  focused	  on	  the	  proper	  management	  of	  public	  funds.	  	  
It	  is	  possible	  that	  administrative	  morality	  has	  been	  used	  to	  enforce	  individual	  
rights’	  violations	  in	  cases	  that	  have	  not	  been	  publicized	  by	  the	  media	  because	  they	  do	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  "Lucha	  Anticorrupción	  No	  Admite	  Negligencia	  ",	  El	  Tiempo,	  January	  22th	  1995.	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not	  reach	  enough	  salience	  to	  get	  media	  coverage.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  violations	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  more	  focused	  on	  individual	  rights’	  violations	  have	  been	  analyzed	  
by	  lower-­‐level	  judges	  and	  they	  never	  get	  to	  attract	  public	  attention.	  This	  possible	  
interpretation	  is	  exemplified	  in	  the	  article	  of	  the	  public	  agent	  working	  with	  the	  
Environmental	  Unit	  in	  the	  city	  Sevilla	  mentioned	  before.	  Although	  this	  case	  reported	  a	  
violation	  of	  due	  process,	  it	  got	  salience	  because	  it	  was	  decided	  by	  the	  Constitutional	  
Court	  and	  it	  was	  framed	  by	  the	  media	  as	  a	  ruling	  with	  profound	  impact	  with	  regards	  
anticorruption	  policies.	  	  	  
The	  article	  highlights	  under	  the	  title	  a	  fragment	  of	  the	  ruling	  related	  to	  the	  
governmental	  anticorruption:	  “In	  an	  unequivocal	  ruling,	  yesterday	  the	  Constitutional	  
Court	  warned	  about	  the	  imminent	  threats	  that	  negligent	  behaviors	  pose	  on	  the	  
jurisdiction	  and	  oversight	  agencies	  in	  the	  anticorruption	  campaign”.440	  	  	  Although	  the	  
case	  was	  legally	  based	  on	  a	  public	  agency’s	  failure	  to	  fulfill	  legal	  requirements	  related	  to	  
due	  process,	  the	  journalistic	  article	  focused	  mainly	  on	  the	  Court’s	  analysis	  with	  regards	  
anti-­‐corruption	  policies.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  first	  paragraph	  the	  article	  writes:	  “It	  is	  so	  
little	  what	  the	  Colombian	  governmental	  would	  be	  capable	  of	  achieving	  in	  the	  campaign	  
against	  corruption,	  says	  the	  Court,	  if	  prosecutors	  do	  not	  fulfill	  its	  duties	  with	  diligence,	  
transparency,	  and	  effectiveness	  while	  conducting	  investigations	  against	  public	  officials”.	  	  
It	  was	  only	  in	  the	  last	  part	  of	  the	  article	  where	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  were	  summarized	  
and	  only	  then	  the	  article	  makes	  clear	  that	  this	  was	  a	  case	  of	  a	  violation	  of	  individual	  




rights.	  Thus,	  in	  those	  accounts	  related	  to	  individual	  rights’	  violations	  media	  draw	  on	  
general	  implications	  that	  went	  beyond	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  specific	  case.	  	  
What	  types	  of	  plaintiffs	  are	  featured	  in	  these	  media	  stories?	  	  Do	  the	  media	  focus	  
on	  organizational	  plaintiffs	  or	  on	  individual	  plaintiffs?	  	  As	  Figure	  18	  illustrates,	  by	  far	  the	  
largest	  proportion	  of	  articles	  focuses	  on	  individual	  plaintiffs	  	  (Figure	  18).	  An	  example	  of	  
an	  individual	  plaintiff	  filing	  a	  claim	  for	  administrative	  morality	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Mauricio	  
Agudelo	  who,	  according	  to	  an	  article	  published	  in	  2009,	  filed	  a	  lawsuit	  against	  the	  public	  
agency	  EMCALI	  (municipal	  company	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Cali),	  responsible	  for	  public	  utilities	  in	  
the	  city	  of	  Cali.	  The	  article	  does	  not	  provide	  more	  information	  about	  the	  plaintiff,	  just	  
his	  name	  and	  the	  facts	  that	  lead	  him	  to	  file	  the	  claim.441	  	  A	  much	  smaller	  proportion	  of	  
articles	  focuses	  on	  organizational	  interest	  group	  plaintiffs.	  	  A	  scattering	  of	  other	  
categories	  of	  plaintiffs	  appear	  in	  these	  articles,	  but	  the	  numbers	  are	  very	  small	  in	  most	  
of	  these	  other	  categories.	  	  (In	  Colombia,	  governments	  sometimes	  act	  as	  plaintiffs	  in	  
cases	  of	  administrative	  morality,	  so	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  they	  might	  appear	  as	  
plaintiffs	  in	  some	  of	  these	  articles.)	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  "36	  Mil	  Millones	  De	  Pesos	  Perdería	  Emcali	  Por	  Decisión	  Del	  Juzgado	  18	  Administrativo	  ",	  El	  




Figure	  18:	  Primary	  plaintiff.	  N=78	  	  
	  
In	  Council	  of	  State	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality	  individuals	  also	  represent	  the	  
majority	  of	  plaintiffs	  (84%	  of	  the	  suits)	  while	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  represent	  12%	  of	  
the	  plaintiffs	  (Figure	  6).	  The	  patterns	  in	  both	  types	  of	  data	  (journalistic	  articles	  and	  
Council	  of	  State	  cases)	  suggest	  that	  individuals	  have	  been	  using	  popular	  actions	  to	  
enforce	  administrative	  morality.	  These	  findings	  indicate	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  framers	  
to	  foster	  citizen	  engagement	  seems	  to	  be	  achieved.	  	  
With	  regards	  to	  defendants,	  39%	  of	  the	  articles	  refer	  to	  local	  governments	  as	  
defendants	  in	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  30%	  of	  the	  articles	  the	  defendant	  is	  
the	  national	  government	  or	  public	  organizations	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  Regional	  
governments	  and	  regional	  level	  public	  organizations	  only	  account	  for	  9%	  of	  defendants	  
according	  to	  journalistic	  articles.	  In	  9%	  of	  the	  cases	  the	  defendant	  was	  an	  individual	  
who,	  under	  particular	  circumstances,	  was	  responsible	  for	  complying	  with	  administrative	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morality.	  Examples	  of	  these	  cases	  are	  those	  involving	  former	  governmental	  officials	  or	  
candidates	  in	  public	  elections.	  Besides	  public	  organizations,	  in	  7%	  of	  the	  articles	  the	  
defendants	  were	  private	  businesses	  and	  in	  6%	  were	  organizational	  interest	  groups	  and	  
advocacy	  organizations.	  	  
Council	  of	  State	  cases	  confirm	  the	  same	  pattern	  with	  regards	  defendants	  (Figure	  
7).	  In	  litigation	  at	  the	  Council,	  local	  governments	  represent	  55%	  of	  the	  defendants	  while	  
the	  national	  government	  represents	  29%	  of	  the	  defendants.	  Journalistic	  articles	  and	  
court	  cases	  indicate	  that	  administrative	  morality	  has	  been	  mainly	  used	  to	  check	  
performance	  of	  local	  governments.	  These	  data	  also	  suggest	  that	  cases	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  had	  focused	  on	  the	  national	  government.	  	  
Turning	  to	  the	  policy-­‐area	  that	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  media	  coverage,	  the	  policy	  areas	  
fall	  into	  six	  general	  categories:	  governmental	  services	  to	  individuals,	  security	  and	  
criminal	  law,	  regulatory	  policy,	  publicly	  owned	  business,	  political	  process,	  and	  
infrastructure.	  The	  majority	  of	  articles	  falls	  under	  the	  category	  political	  process	  (Figure	  
19)	  and	  refer	  to	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality	  related	  to	  the	  interaction	  between	  
branches	  of	  power.	  These	  articles	  typically	  describe	  processes	  conducted	  by	  oversight	  
agencies,	  cases	  of	  political	  control	  exerted	  by	  the	  congress,	  new	  legislation	  in	  relation	  to	  
administrative	  morality,	  elections,	  and	  political	  appointments.	  An	  example	  of	  political	  
processes	  is	  the	  article	  titled	  “It’s	  not	  convenient	  that	  the	  Personero	  of	  Bogotá	  is	  friends	  
with	  the	  mayor,	  says	  councilman	  Vicente	  de	  Roux”.442	  In	  this	  article	  media	  report	  on	  the	  
appointment	  of	  the	  Personero	  in	  Bogota,	  who	  is	  responsible	  of	  promoting	  and	  enforcing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442	  "No	  Es	  Conveniente	  Que	  Personero	  De	  Bogotá	  Sea	  Amigo	  Del	  Alcalde,	  Dice	  Concejal	  Vicente	  De	  
Roux,"	  El	  tiempo,	  February	  20th	  2008.	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human	  rights	  and	  the	  disciplinary	  oversight	  over	  public	  servants	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  and	  is	  
appointed	  by	  the	  city	  council.443	  This	  journalistic	  article	  describes	  the	  appointment	  
process	  of	  the	  Personero	  in	  Bogota	  in	  2008	  and	  specifically	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  
congressman	  (Vicente	  de	  Roux)	  did	  not	  support	  the	  appointment	  of	  one	  member	  of	  his	  
political	  party.	  Congressman	  de	  Roux	  argued	  that	  he	  did	  not	  support	  the	  appointment	  of	  
the	  candidate	  of	  his	  party	  because	  he	  is	  a	  friend	  of	  the	  mayor.	  According	  to	  de	  Roux	  the	  
Personero	  is	  the	  main	  responsible	  for	  protecting	  administrative	  morality	  and	  is	  supposed	  
to	  exert	  oversight	  over	  the	  local	  government	  and	  consequently	  it	  was	  inconvenient	  to	  
appoint	  a	  close	  friend	  of	  the	  mayor.444	  The	  second	  most	  common	  policy	  area	  is	  
governmental	  services	  to	  individuals.	  Services	  such	  as	  social	  welfare,	  utilities,	  and	  
housing	  are	  included	  under	  this	  category	  (in	  Colombia,	  access	  to	  utilities	  is	  legislatively	  
assigned	  to	  local	  governments).445	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  Colombian	  constitution,	  1991.	  Article	  118.	  	  
444	  "No	  Es	  Conveniente	  Que	  Personero	  De	  Bogotá	  Sea	  Amigo	  Del	  Alcalde,	  Dice	  Concejal	  Vicente	  De	  
Roux."	  
445	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  the	  Art.	  331	  of	  the	  Colombian	  Constitution	  local	  governments	  are	  
responsible	  for	  granting	  public	  services,	  developing	  infrastructure,	  under	  the	  parameters	  defined	  by	  
the	  Congress.	  In	  relation	  to	  utilities,	  the	  Article	  5	  of	  the	  Law	  142	  of	  1994	  defers	  to	  local	  governments	  




Figure	  19:	  Primary	  policy	  area.	  n=171	  
	  
These	  findings	  differ	  from	  the	  policy	  areas	  of	  cases	  at	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  (Figure	  
5).	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  cases	  at	  the	  Council	  referred	  to	  governmental	  service	  provision,	  
utilities,	  and	  law	  enforcement	  while	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  journalistic	  articles	  fall	  under	  
the	  categories	  political	  processes.	  It	  seems	  like	  media	  gave	  salience	  to	  cases	  in	  which	  
administrative	  morality	  was	  a	  check	  for	  political	  issues	  like	  elections.	  On	  the	  contrary	  
the	  Council	  focused	  on	  cases	  where	  administrative	  morality	  could	  be	  a	  check	  for	  quality	  
in	  governmental	  services.	  	  
My	  central	  focus	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  on	  whether	  media	  coverage	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  focuses	  mainly	  on	  individual-­‐level	  violations	  or	  on	  systemic,	  institutional	  
problems.	  	  As	  noted,	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  media	  coverage	  of	  tort	  cases	  tends	  to	  focus	  
almost	  entirely	  on	  individual	  matters	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  systemic	  matters	  (Haltom	  and	  
McCann	  2004).	  	  Somewhat	  surprisingly,	  in	  Colombia	  the	  print	  media	  have	  focused	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almost	  equally	  on	  systemic,	  institutional	  issues	  and	  individual	  violations	  (Graph	  20).	  I	  will	  
return	  below	  to	  whether	  this	  relatively	  equal	  distribution	  has	  changed	  over	  time,	  and	  




Figure	  20.	  Primary	  framing	  of	  media	  article:	  systemic	  failings	  or	  individual	  errors.	  n=171	  	  
	  
	  
In	  addition,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  seeing	  whether	  the	  media	  discuss	  plaintiffs	  and	  
defendants	  with	  a	  generally	  positive	  or	  negative	  tone.	  	  “Tone”	  refers	  to	  whether	  the	  
person	  or	  agency	  is	  depicted	  positively	  or	  negatively	  (or	  neutrally).	  	  	  Strikingly,	  the	  
articles	  generally	  reveal	  a	  neutral	  to	  positive	  tone	  towards	  the	  plaintiffs,	  while	  the	  tone	  
towards	  the	  defendants	  tends	  to	  be	  neutral	  to	  negative	  (Figure	  21).	  	  It	  is	  noticeable	  that	  
the	  tone	  towards	  the	  defendants	  in	  these	  articles	  tends	  to	  be	  strongly	  negative	  while	  
234	  
	  





Figure	  21:	  Tone	  toward	  primary	  plaintiff	  and	  defendant.	  Plaintiff:	  n=113.	  Defendant:	  n=126.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
The	  tone	  in	  these	  articles	  does	  not	  vary	  significantly	  from	  one	  type	  of	  plaintiff	  to	  
the	  other.	  As	  indicated	  in	  Figure	  18	  individuals,	  organizational	  interest	  groups,	  and	  local	  
governments	  are	  the	  most	  frequently-­‐discussed	  plaintiffs	  and	  the	  tone	  toward	  each	  of	  
these	  three	  groups	  seems	  to	  be	  neutral	  to	  positive.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  defendants,	  the	  
tone	  is	  negative	  especially	  in	  relation	  to	  local	  governments	  and	  the	  national	  government	  






Figure	  22:	  Tone	  toward	  governmental	  defendants:	  local	  and	  national	  government.	  Local	  government	  
n=33.	  National	  government	  n=26.	  	  
	  
	  
In	  relation	  to	  the	  plaintiffs,	  Figure	  21	  suggests	  that	  generally	  the	  tone	  is	  neutral	  
to	  positive.	  This	  neutral-­‐to-­‐positive	  tone	  is	  present	  in	  both	  high-­‐profile	  challenges	  to	  the	  
fairness	  of	  political	  processes,	  (Figure	  23)	  and	  more	  low-­‐profile	  challenges	  to	  













Additionally,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  whether	  the	  tone	  toward	  the	  plaintiff	  varies	  with	  
whether	  the	  article	  focuses	  on	  individual	  mistakes	  or	  systemic/institutional	  problems.	  	  
Significantly,	  the	  tone	  with	  regards	  the	  plaintiff	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  vary.	  Media	  reports	  
are	  neutral	  to	  favorable	  towards	  the	  plaintiff	  both	  in	  articles	  framing	  the	  issue	  as	  an	  




Figure	  25:	  Tone	  toward	  plaintiffs:	  systemic	  versus	  individual	  focus.	  n=110	  
	  
Similarly,	  the	  tone	  toward	  the	  defendant	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  vary	  between	  articles	  





Figure	  26:	  Tone	  toward	  defendants:	  systemic	  versus	  individual	  focus.	  n=	  123	  
	  
Articles	  in	  the	  database	  make	  reference	  to	  different	  legal	  mechanisms	  used	  by	  
plaintiffs	  to	  enforce	  administrative	  morality.	  Some	  examples	  of	  the	  actions	  mentioned	  
are:	  popular	  actions,	  electoral	  actions,	  ordinary	  administrative	  actions,	  actions	  for	  
tutelage,	  and	  oversight	  agencies’	  procedures.	  In	  relation	  to	  these	  various	  legal	  
mechanisms	  the	  media’s	  tone	  tends	  to	  be	  neutral	  to	  positive	  (Figure	  27).	  The	  majority	  of	  
articles	  in	  which	  a	  legal	  procedure	  was	  used	  (56.50%	  of	  the	  articles	  in	  the	  database)	  
referred	  to	  popular	  actions	  as	  the	  procedure	  chosen	  by	  the	  plaintiff	  to	  enforce	  
administrative	  morality.	  In	  these	  articles	  the	  tone	  towards	  popular	  actions	  keep	  the	  














Finally,	  have	  these	  patterns	  in	  tone	  and	  framing	  remained	  relatively	  constant	  
over	  the	  twenty	  years	  since	  constitutional	  reform,	  or	  have	  they	  changed?	  Strikingly,	  the	  
tone	  toward	  plaintiffs	  has	  changed	  over	  time.	  	  In	  the	  first	  decade	  after	  1991,	  the	  tone	  
toward	  the	  plaintiffs	  was	  more	  positive	  than	  in	  the	  second	  decade	  	  (Figure	  28).	  Media	  
coverage	  seems	  to	  have	  become	  increasingly	  skeptical	  of	  plaintiffs’	  good	  intentions	  
when	  filing	  actions	  for	  administrative	  morality.	  	  Media	  coverage	  increasingly	  has	  alleged	  
that	  plaintiffs	  are	  interested	  mainly	  in	  securing	  financial	  compensation	  rather	  than	  
improvements	  in	  administrative	  policy	  or	  service,	  and	  coverage	  has	  implied	  that	  
lawsuits	  are	  unjustifiably	  consuming	  public	  resources	  without	  providing	  meaningful	  
benefits	  or	  improvements.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  an	  article	  of	  2009	  titled	  “The	  lawsuit	  hunter”	  
media	  described	  the	  case	  of	  Javier	  Elias	  Arias,	  a	  native	  Colombian	  who	  had	  filed	  900	  
lawsuits	  in	  nine	  regions	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  whose	  monetary	  pretensions	  were	  
estimated	  in	  $2.500	  million	  Colombian	  pesos	  (approximately	  $1,250,000	  dollars).	  
According	  to	  the	  article	  Arias’	  claims	  sometimes	  overcome	  the	  budget	  of	  the	  cities	  and	  
regions	  he	  has	  sued,	  and	  sometimes	  his	  claims	  are	  absurd.	  An	  example	  of	  an	  absurd	  
claim	  would	  be	  the	  lawsuits	  that	  Arias	  filed	  against	  the	  city	  of	  Cartago	  for	  not	  having	  
counters	  in	  public	  agencies	  for	  individuals	  who	  are	  shorter	  than	  the	  average	  height.	  One	  
employee	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Cartago	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  city	  there	  are	  no	  people	  considerably	  
shorter	  than	  the	  average	  and	  consequently	  such	  counters	  are	  not	  necessary.446	  Cases	  
like	  the	  one	  of	  Arias	  could	  have	  motivated	  a	  less	  optimistic	  perception	  with	  regards	  
plaintiffs	  and	  their	  motivation	  when	  filing	  popular	  actions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Figure	  29:	  Changes	  over	  time	  in	  media	  tone	  toward	  plaintiffs.	  First	  decade	  n=25.	  Second	  decade	  n=88	   	  
	  
	  
	   This	  increasingly	  negative	  tone	  toward	  litigants	  seems	  to	  be	  confined	  to	  
plaintiffs,	  as	  the	  media	  tone	  toward	  defendants	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  changed	  over	  
time	  (see	  Figure	  29).	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  tone	  toward	  defendants	  remains	  relatively	  
negative—but,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  tone	  toward	  plaintiffs,	  the	  tone	  toward	  defendants	  has	  
not	  become	  more	  negative	  over	  time.	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Figure	  30:	  Changes	  over	  time	  in	  media	  tone	  toward	  defendants.	  First	  decade	  n=31.	  Second	  decade	  n=95	  
	  
In	  relation	  to	  the	  action	  used	  by	  plaintiffs,	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  
implementation	  the	  tone	  was	  positive	  to	  neutral,	  probably	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  hopes	  
that	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  brought	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  new	  judicial	  actions	  that	  were	  
created	  (Figure	  30).	  During	  the	  second	  decade,	  journalistic	  articles	  seemed	  to	  be	  more	  
skeptical	  about	  the	  action	  used	  by	  plaintiffs	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  in	  majority	  of	  the	  articles	  





Figure	  31.	  Changes	  over	  time	  in	  tone	  toward	  the	  legal	  action.	  First	  decade	  n=	  27.	  Second	  decade	  n=88	  
	  
During	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  implementation	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  media	  
seemed	  to	  focus	  on	  cases	  of	  systemic	  reform	  (Figure	  31),	  suggesting	  the	  potential	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  popular	  actions	  to	  foster	  a	  systemic	  change.	  In	  an	  article	  of	  
1996	  an	  article	  of	  a	  newspaper	  analyzed	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  
Colombian	  Constitution	  on	  its	  fifth	  year.447	  This	  article	  suggests	  that	  five	  years	  are	  not	  
enough	  to	  perceive	  a	  real	  transformation	  in	  a	  country	  with	  several	  and	  serious	  
problems.	  It	  also	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  essential	  that	  the	  Congress	  focus	  on	  the	  development	  
of	  constitutional	  rights	  that	  were	  still	  pending	  to	  be	  implemented	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  
legislative	  regulation.	  One	  of	  these	  constitutional	  rights	  was	  popular	  actions	  that	  could	  
allow	  the	  enforcement	  of	  collective	  rights	  such	  as	  administrative	  morality.448	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Strikingly,	  in	  the	  second	  decade	  since	  reform	  this	  tendency	  shifted:	  the	  framing	  
of	  media	  coverage	  shifted	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  individual	  violations	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  	  
For	  instance,	  in	  2007	  media	  reported	  that	  a	  judge	  ruling	  against	  the	  mayor	  of	  Medellín	  
stating	  that	  he	  should	  move	  out	  of	  the	  house	  in	  which	  he	  was	  living	  for	  it	  was	  property	  
of	  the	  city.	  According	  to	  the	  judge	  the	  mayor	  violated	  administrative	  morality	  for	  using	  a	  
public	  good	  for	  his	  own	  particular	  benefit.449	  	  
	  
	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449	  "Noticias	  Breves	  De	  Justicia,"	  El	  Tiempo,	  January	  30th	  2007.	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   Conclusion	  
I	  began	  this	  chapter	  by	  noting	  the	  research	  showing	  that	  the	  popular	  media	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  adopt	  a	  generally	  negative	  tone	  toward	  plaintiffs	  in	  litigation	  and	  tend	  
to	  frame	  the	  issue	  in	  cases	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  individual	  mistake	  rather	  than	  institutional	  
failing.450	  It	  is	  thought	  that	  this	  diminishes	  the	  reform	  potential	  of	  lawsuits	  in	  the	  United	  
States.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  United	  States	  media	  
coverage	  in	  Colombia	  has	  adopted	  a	  surprisingly	  positive	  tone	  toward	  administrative	  
morality	  litigation.	  Further,	  the	  Colombian	  media	  have	  relatively	  often	  framed	  the	  issues	  
in	  administrative	  morality	  cases	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  institutional	  failings	  rather	  than	  merely	  
individual	  mistakes.	  	  The	  Colombian	  media	  have	  characterized	  administrative	  morality	  
as	  a	  right	  that	  demands	  certain	  behaviors	  not	  only	  from	  individuals	  in	  public	  
administration	  but	  also	  from	  institutions	  and	  policy	  in	  general.451	  	  
But	  this	  chapter	  has	  also	  shown	  that	  the	  popular	  media	  became	  increasingly	  
skeptical	  and	  negative	  toward	  administrative	  morality	  litigation	  over	  the	  past	  twenty	  
years.	  In	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  implementation	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  journalistic	  
articles	  commonly	  framed	  the	  issues	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  institutional	  failings	  and	  
administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  these	  institutional	  problems.	  .	  It	  seems	  that	  in	  
the	  second	  decade	  of	  implementation	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  the	  Colombian	  media	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450	  Haltom	  and	  McCann,	  Distorting	  the	  Law:	  Politics,	  Media,	  and	  the	  Litigation	  Crisis.	  
451	  An	  example	  of	  a	  case	  of	  a	  systemic	  violation	  against	  administrative	  morality	  is	  the	  article	  titled:	  “	  
‘The	  District	  [Bogota]	  does	  not	  want	  to	  assume	  responsibility	  for	  mistakes	  in	  property	  appraisals’	  
argues	  the	  Contralor	  Oscar	  Gonzalez	  Arana”.	  The	  Contralor	  is	  the	  head	  of	  an	  oversight	  agency	  
responsible	  for	  controlling	  budgetary	  management	  in	  public	  agencies.	  This	  article	  refers	  to	  the	  
investigation	  conducted	  by	  Gonzalez	  Arana	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  process	  of	  property	  appraisals	  in	  Bogota	  
that	  are	  the	  basis	  for	  calculating	  property	  taxes	  in	  the	  city.	  Gonzalez	  Arana	  identified	  weaknesses	  in	  
the	  process	  and	  filed	  a	  popular	  action	  against	  the	  city	  of	  Bogotá	  for	  the	  additional	  cost	  that	  taxpayers	  
assumed	  due	  to	  mistakes	  in	  the	  process	  of	  appraisal.	  "'El	  Distrito	  No	  Quiere	  Asumir	  Fallas	  En	  El	  
Avalúo	  Catastral;,	  Dice	  El	  Contralor	  Oscar	  Gonzalez	  Arana.,"	  El	  Tiempo,	  July	  13th	  2007.	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have	  shifted	  their	  focus	  somewhat	  from	  an	  institutional	  focus	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  individual	  
violations	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  has	  evolved	  and	  this	  evolution	  may	  have	  reduced	  its	  potential	  
impact	  for	  improving	  institutional	  performance	  in	  bureaucratic	  administration.	  	  
The	  tone	  in	  the	  articles	  with	  regards	  the	  defendants	  (mostly	  governmental	  
agencies	  at	  the	  local	  and	  national	  level)	  is	  neutral	  to	  negative	  during	  the	  two	  decades	  of	  
implementation	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  general,	  the	  tone	  with	  regards	  the	  
plaintiffs	  seems	  to	  be	  neutral	  to	  positive.452	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  general	  difference,	  during	  the	  
second	  decade	  of	  implementation	  the	  percentage	  of	  articles	  with	  a	  positive	  tone	  with	  
regards	  the	  plaintiff	  decreased	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  first	  decade.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
tone	  towards	  plaintiffs	  shifted	  over	  time	  from	  being	  majority	  positive	  to	  being	  more	  
neutral.453	  	  
Given	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  was	  created,	  
(circumstances	  of	  generalized	  violence,	  systemic	  corruption,	  and	  lack	  of	  
representativeness	  from	  main	  institutions	  like	  the	  Congress)	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  
brought	  hope	  of	  deep	  changes	  to	  the	  country.	  These	  changes	  were	  supposed	  to	  come	  
through	  citizen	  engagement	  revealed	  in	  different	  mechanisms	  of	  participation	  that	  the	  
Constitution	  created.	  One	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  is	  ‘popular	  actions’	  in	  cases	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452	  In	  general,	  the	  tone	  towards	  plaintiffs	  is	  more	  positive	  in	  cases	  of	  political	  processes	  than	  in	  cases	  
of	  governmental	  services	  to	  individuals	  (See	  Graphs	  7	  and	  8).	  This	  might	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
majority	  of	  articles	  related	  to	  political	  processes	  (83%)	  have	  a	  systemic	  focus	  while	  the	  majority	  of	  
articles	  related	  to	  governmental	  services	  to	  individuals	  (79%)	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  individual	  cases.	  
Future	  research	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  explore	  whether	  media	  tend	  to	  express	  a	  more	  positive	  tone	  
towards	  plaintiffs	  in	  cases	  of	  systemic	  reform.	  	  
453	  The	  Colombian	  Congress	  eliminated	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  for	  plaintiffs	  in	  cases	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  in	  2010.	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administrative	  morality.	  These	  hopes	  might	  be	  the	  reason	  for	  a	  systemic	  approach	  in	  
media	  coverage	  towards	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  after	  years,	  
cases	  of	  corruption	  and	  wrongful	  behavior	  of	  administration	  were	  identified	  and	  it	  was	  
possible	  to	  correct	  mistakes	  of	  public	  administration	  through	  popular	  actions.	  	  
In	  the	  second	  decade	  of	  implementation,	  these	  hopes	  brought	  by	  the	  
Constitution	  seem	  to	  have	  decreased.	  Media	  have	  become	  critical	  with	  regards	  plaintiffs	  
looking	  for	  monetary	  incentives	  and	  no	  interest	  in	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  public	  
administration.	  An	  article	  published	  in	  2010	  exemplifies	  the	  skepticism	  towards	  popular	  
actions	  due	  to	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  that	  plaintiffs	  receive.	  The	  article	  is	  titled	  “The	  
price	  of	  justice”	  and	  writes:	  	  
“Popular	  actions,	  a	  sort	  of	  tutelage	  that	  focuses	  on	  collective	  rights	  and	  
administrative	  morality,	  are	  about	  to	  be	  reformed	  in	  the	  Congress	  and	  there	  is	  a	  
strong	  controversy	  about	  the	  possible	  implications	  of	  the	  reform...	  This	  
constitutional	  mechanism	  helped	  to	  expose	  scandals	  such	  as	  the	  irregular	  
transaction	  in	  which	  former	  minister	  Fernando	  Londoño	  bought	  bond	  titles	  from	  
Invercolsa…	  and	  [the	  action	  also	  helped]	  to	  take	  care	  of	  environmental	  demands	  
of	  those	  who	  live	  near-­‐by	  dumpsters…	  In	  spite	  of	  its	  usefulness,	  the	  mechanism	  
has	  some	  weaknesses.	  The	  main	  weakness	  is	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  that	  
plaintiffs	  receive.”454	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454	  "El	  Precio	  De	  La	  Justicia,"	  Semana,	  November	  30th	  2010.	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This	  reference	  illustrates	  both	  the	  initial	  hopes	  attached	  to	  popular	  actions	  and	  
the	  growing	  disillusionment	  toward	  them.	  In	  the	  first	  years	  of	  implementation	  big	  
scandals	  of	  corruption	  were	  fought	  through	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  the	  
judiciary	  found	  a	  way	  to	  contribute	  to	  improving	  public	  administration	  through	  popular	  
actions.	  Later	  on,	  the	  media	  began	  suggesting	  that	  benefits	  of	  these	  actions	  were	  
outweighed	  by	  the	  costs,	  and	  began	  suggesting	  that	  plaintiffs	  were	  filing	  numerous	  and	  
absurd	  lawsuits	  for	  no	  reason	  other	  than	  the	  monetary.	  Currently,	  media	  seem	  to	  be	  
skeptical	  about	  the	  future	  impact	  of	  popular	  actions	  for	  administrative	  morality	  given	  
that	  the	  incentive	  was	  eliminated.	  	  
The	  Colombian	  constitution	  of	  1991	  intended	  to	  provide	  a	  participatory	  frame	  to	  
strengthen	  citizen	  engagement	  and	  human	  rights.	  The	  analysis	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  
suggests	  that	  while	  the	  media	  report	  extensive	  individual	  involvement	  in	  popular	  
actions,	  there	  is	  growing	  disillusionment	  with	  these	  actions.	  	  Media	  coverage	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  popular	  actions	  to	  enforce	  this	  new	  right	  has	  shifted	  
considerably	  in	  the	  twenty	  years	  since	  adoption	  of	  the	  constitution.	  Early	  hope	  in	  the	  
power	  of	  administrative	  morality	  to	  bring	  about	  institutional	  reform	  has	  shifted	  toward	  
disillusionment	  in	  popular	  actions.	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Chapter	  8:	  Conclusion	  
	  
The	  Colombian	  constitutional	  reform	  of	  1991	  was	  a	  profound	  change	  in	  the	  
institutional	  setting	  of	  the	  country.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  representatives	  from	  different	  
political,	  social,	  and	  demographic	  groups	  participated	  from	  a	  constitutional	  assembly	  
with	  the	  purpose	  of	  agreeing	  on	  a	  new	  institutional	  frame	  for	  Colombia.455	  One	  of	  the	  
main	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  was	  its	  emphasis	  on	  constitutional	  
rights	  (a	  longer	  catalog	  of	  rights	  was	  approved)	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  judicial	  actions	  that	  
allow	  citizens	  to	  demand	  from	  judges	  the	  enforcement	  of	  these	  rights.456	  	  
The	  Colombian	  constitutional	  reform	  of	  1991	  was	  not	  an	  exception	  in	  the	  Latin	  
American	  context.	  During	  the	  1990s	  several	  countries	  faced	  similar	  reforms	  with	  the	  
purpose	  of	  providing	  better	  protection	  to	  constitutional	  rights	  that	  were	  systematically	  
violated	  especially	  during	  states	  of	  exception	  when	  basic	  constitutional	  controls	  were	  
relaxed.457	  In	  these	  constitutional	  reforms	  the	  courts	  had	  a	  key	  role	  as	  enforcers	  of	  
constitutional	  rights	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  constitutions	  granted	  courts	  the	  power	  of	  
exerting	  control	  over	  bureaucratic	  behavior	  by	  enforcing	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  This	  new	  role	  
of	  courts	  in	  Latin	  America	  has	  brought	  new	  dynamics	  to	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  
specifically	  by	  allowing	  courts	  to	  participate	  in	  policy-­‐making	  processes.	  This	  process	  has	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been	  called	  the	  “judicialization	  of	  politics.”458	  The	  Colombian	  constitutional	  reform	  of	  
1991	  is	  an	  example	  of	  this	  process.	  	  
The	  judicialization	  of	  politics	  has	  impacted	  social	  life	  in	  several	  ways.459	  Courts’	  
rulings	  have	  shaped	  political	  discourse	  because	  the	  media	  has	  publicized	  the	  core	  
judicial	  cases	  and	  the	  people	  have	  learned	  about	  the	  categories	  and	  the	  language	  used	  
by	  courts.	  This	  language	  has	  been	  increasingly	  used	  by	  the	  people	  in	  their	  daily	  lives	  and	  
it	  is	  now	  part	  of	  citizens’	  relationships	  with	  the	  government.	  Courts’	  interpretation	  of	  
the	  constitution	  is	  now	  part	  of	  social	  dynamics.460	  	  	  
The	  resort	  to	  courts	  in	  the	  Latin	  American	  constitutional	  reforms	  was	  set	  with	  
the	  purpose	  of	  making	  rights	  more	  effective.	  By	  creating	  judicial	  actions,	  the	  
constitutions	  entitled	  the	  people	  to	  file	  suits	  against	  governmental	  authorities	  and	  
demand	  from	  them	  protection	  to	  constitutional	  rights.	  This	  check	  to	  bureaucratic	  
performance	  motivated	  a	  more	  active	  judiciary	  that	  changed	  from	  being	  isolated	  from	  
political	  debates	  to	  being	  one	  of	  its	  key	  actors.461	  	  
In	  the	  Colombian	  case	  popular	  actions,	  the	  term	  for	  lawsuits	  that	  are	  easily	  filed	  
by	  members	  of	  the	  public,	  are	  an	  example	  of	  the	  new	  constitutional	  actions	  that	  were	  
created	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  granting	  protection	  to	  constitutional	  rights.	  The	  relevance	  
of	  popular	  actions	  is	  related	  to	  the	  type	  of	  rights	  that	  they	  aim	  to	  enforce:	  “collective	  
rights.”	  The	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  was	  the	  first	  in	  Colombia	  to	  refer	  to	  collective	  rights,	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and	  the	  framers	  included	  this	  category	  in	  order	  to	  motivate	  citizen	  engagement	  in	  the	  
protection	  of	  social	  goods.	  Collective	  rights	  are	  different	  from	  civil	  rights	  because	  while	  
civil	  rights	  are	  individual,	  collective	  rights	  are	  said	  to	  belong	  to	  society	  as	  a	  whole.462	  
Some	  examples	  of	  collective	  rights	  are:	  public	  goods,	  public	  space,	  public	  security,	  free	  
economic	  competition,	  and	  administrative	  morality,	  among	  others.463	  This	  dissertation	  
has	  focused	  on	  administrative	  morality.	  Although	  the	  constitution	  did	  not	  provide	  a	  
definition	  of	  administrative	  morality,	  according	  to	  the	  framing	  process	  this	  right	  was	  
meant	  to	  protect	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  as	  a	  fundamental	  social	  value	  in	  administrative	  
processes.464	  	  
Popular	  actions	  aimed	  to	  foster	  solidarity	  among	  the	  population	  by	  allowing	  any	  
individual	  to	  file	  a	  suit	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  a	  collective	  right.465	  The	  creation	  of	  popular	  
actions	  and	  collective	  rights	  revealed	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  framers	  to	  motivate	  a	  social	  
change	  in	  the	  Colombian	  society	  by	  motivating	  citizens	  to	  acting	  in	  pursue	  of	  an	  interest	  
that	  goes	  beyond	  their	  individual	  motivations.	  Specifically	  in	  the	  case	  of	  popular	  actions	  
on	  administrative	  morality	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  framers	  was	  to	  motivate	  citizen	  
engagement	  in	  bureaucratic	  performance.466	  Has	  this	  purpose	  been	  achieved?	  Did	  
popular	  actions	  on	  administrative	  morality	  work	  as	  an	  effective	  check	  on	  bureaucratic	  
performance?	  In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  explored	  these	  questions	  and	  specifically	  addressed	  
whether	  the	  Colombian	  constitutional	  reform	  of	  1991	  has	  been	  able	  to	  change	  
governmental	  administration	  through	  popular	  actions	  on	  administrative	  morality.	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My	  research	  questions	  are:	  What	  is	  administrative	  morality?	  What	  are	  its	  
implications	  for	  the	  Colombian	  public	  administration?	  Studies	  in	  administrative	  morality	  
in	  Colombia	  have	  provided	  a	  normative	  analysis	  of	  this	  notion	  and	  have	  set	  the	  
theoretical	  foundations	  for	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  and	  empirical	  approach.467	  In	  this	  
research	  I	  explored	  the	  interpretation	  that	  different	  actors	  have	  on	  administrative	  
morality	  and	  their	  perception	  of	  the	  possible	  impact	  that	  this	  notion	  has	  had	  in	  the	  last	  
twenty	  years.	  	  I	  analyzed	  these	  data	  by	  using	  three	  theoretical	  frames	  about	  the	  
capacity	  of	  legal	  reforms	  to	  reform	  governmental	  administration.	  	  
The	  theoretical	  framework	  proposed	  by	  Gerald	  Rosenberg	  suggests	  that	  
constitutional	  rights	  and	  judicial	  enforcement	  of	  them	  generally	  cannot	  foster	  long-­‐term	  
social	  change.468	  According	  to	  Rosenberg	  the	  potential	  of	  courts	  to	  foster	  social	  change	  
is	  bounded	  by	  the	  political	  coalitions	  that	  exert	  power	  over	  the	  executive	  and	  the	  
legislature.	  	  Thus,	  in	  Rosenberg’s	  frame	  the	  potential	  of	  courts	  is	  limited	  and	  it	  depends	  
on	  the	  support	  of	  the	  other	  branches	  to	  generate	  impact	  over	  society.	  	  
A	  second	  theoretical	  framework	  proposed	  by	  Michael	  McCann	  suggests	  that	  
judicial	  decisions	  on	  constitutional	  rights	  can	  foster	  social	  change	  by	  changing	  people’s	  
conceptions	  of	  what	  is	  legally	  possible.469	  In	  a	  study	  of	  pay	  equity	  reform	  McCann	  
argued	  that	  legal	  mobilization	  inspired	  a	  change	  in	  people’s	  perception	  of	  what	  is	  legally	  
possible.	  Based	  on	  this	  change	  in	  people’s	  perception,	  the	  people	  used	  court	  decisions	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in	  order	  to	  pressure	  employers	  to	  change	  their	  behavior.	  Thus,	  according	  to	  this	  stream	  
of	  the	  literature	  while	  court	  cases	  cannot	  foster	  social	  change,	  popular	  pressure	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  litigation	  and	  legal	  mobilization	  can	  foster	  social	  reforms.	  
A	  third	  theoretical	  framework	  suggests	  that	  legal	  rights	  may	  contribute	  to	  policy	  
change	  when	  several	  key	  supporting	  conditions	  are	  present.470	  Epp	  argues	  that	  in	  
presence	  of	  a	  legal	  reform,	  liability	  pressure	  combined	  with	  support	  from	  key	  
administrators	  can	  foster	  social	  change.	  Epp	  demonstrated	  that	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  policing,	  
parks	  administration,	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  sexual	  harassment	  norms	  in	  the	  US	  
these	  conditions	  were	  present	  and	  they	  motivated	  local	  agencies	  to	  adapt	  their	  policies.	  
The	  decision	  of	  local	  agencies	  to	  change	  their	  policies	  and	  procedures	  was	  reached	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  the	  understanding	  that	  reforms	  were	  necessary	  not	  only	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  individual	  mistakes	  but	  also	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  systemic	  failures.471	  
Although	  these	  theories	  have	  been	  developed	  in	  the	  US	  context	  I	  used	  them	  as	  lenses	  to	  
understand	  the	  Colombian	  constitutional	  reform	  of	  1991.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  summarize	  my	  observations	  and	  then	  I	  will	  discuss	  its	  




Administrative	  morality	  was	  included	  in	  the	  Constitution	  as	  a	  collective	  right	  so	  
individuals	  could	  file	  a	  suit	  against	  governmental	  organizations.	  This	  dissertation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




provides	  the	  first	  analysis	  of	  the	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  addition	  of	  this	  key	  right	  to	  the	  
Constitution.	  Still,	  even	  after	  my	  examination	  of	  these	  debates	  in	  Chapter	  1	  the	  origins	  
of	  this	  collective	  right	  remain	  unclear.	  During	  the	  debates	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  
Assembly	  the	  framers	  initially	  referred	  to	  a	  collective	  right	  to	  demand	  legal	  compliance	  
from	  governmental	  agents.	  Framer	  Jesus	  Gomez	  Perez	  specially	  referred	  to	  this	  
collective	  right	  as	  the	  most	  essential	  of	  all	  because	  it	  was	  related	  to	  protecting	  the	  rule	  
of	  law.	  While	  the	  collective	  right	  to	  demand	  legal	  compliance	  from	  authorities	  
disappeared	  from	  the	  Constitution,	  administrative	  morality	  was	  included	  in	  the	  catalog	  
of	  collective	  rights.	  	  
The	  creation	  of	  popular	  actions	  and	  administrative	  morality	  as	  one	  of	  the	  
collective	  rights	  is	  an	  example	  of	  what	  scholars	  have	  called	  the	  judicialization	  of	  politics	  
in	  Latin	  America.472	  Latin	  American	  constitutions	  that	  were	  framed	  during	  the	  1990s	  
created	  judicial	  actions	  that	  allowed	  judges	  to	  participate	  in	  policy-­‐making	  processes.	  In	  
the	  Colombian	  case	  the	  Constitution	  created	  actions	  that	  entitled	  courts	  like	  the	  
Constitutional	  Court	  or	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  policy-­‐making	  processes.	  
Administrative	  morality	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  a	  cause	  of	  action	  that	  would	  allow	  
individuals	  to	  bring	  to	  the	  jurisdiction	  cases	  related	  to	  corruption,	  allowing	  judges	  to	  
impact	  policy-­‐making.	  	  
It	  is	  striking	  that	  during	  the	  constitutional	  framing	  process	  there	  was	  no	  debate	  
on	  the	  notion	  or	  implications	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  During	  the	  first	  four	  debates	  of	  
the	  article	  on	  popular	  actions	  framers	  mentioned	  a	  collective	  right	  to	  demand	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472	  Couso,	  Huneeus,	  and	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  Cultures	  of	  Legality:	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  Political	  Activism	  in	  Latin	  
America;	  Sieder,	  Schjolden,	  and	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  Judicialization	  of	  Politics	  in	  Latin	  America.	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authorities	  compliance	  of	  their	  legal	  duties.	  During	  the	  fifth	  debate	  of	  the	  article	  on	  
collective	  rights	  the	  notion	  of	  administrative	  morality	  appeared	  on	  the	  draft	  but	  there	  
was	  no	  explanation	  of	  where	  did	  the	  term	  came	  from.	  
Only	  in	  the	  last	  debate	  of	  the	  article	  related	  to	  collective	  rights	  some	  framers	  
studied	  the	  ambiguity	  that	  the	  expression	  administrative	  morality	  implied.	  These	  
framers	  showed	  concern	  about	  this	  vagueness	  and	  its	  possible	  implications	  for	  
bureaucratic	  performance.	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  analysis,	  the	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  
approved	  the	  inclusion	  of	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  collective	  right.	  In	  the	  framers’	  
opinions	  they	  did	  not	  have	  enough	  reasons	  to	  eliminate	  administrative	  morality	  and	  by	  
doing	  so	  they	  would	  only	  reduce	  possibilities	  for	  citizen	  engagement.	  Thus,	  from	  the	  
constitutional	  perspective	  administrative	  morality	  was	  born	  without	  a	  clear	  meaning.	  	  
In	  1998	  the	  Congress	  passed	  the	  first	  piece	  of	  enabling	  legislation	  on	  popular	  
actions:	  the	  law	  472,	  Statute	  for	  Popular	  Actions.473	  In	  Chapter	  2	  I	  analyzed	  this	  Statute	  
and	  its	  reform	  of	  2010.	  During	  the	  legislative	  debates	  Congress	  members	  acknowledged	  
the	  experience	  of	  foreign	  countries	  (South	  American	  countries,	  the	  US,	  and	  European	  
countries)	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  collective	  rights	  and	  popular	  actions.	  The	  Statute	  
aimed	  to	  motivate	  citizen	  participation	  by	  creating	  a	  monetary	  incentive	  for	  plaintiffs	  in	  
cases	  where	  the	  judge	  granted	  the	  action.	  The	  Statute	  also	  motivated	  citizen	  
participation	  by	  favoring	  flexibility	  with	  regards	  the	  formal	  requirements	  to	  file	  the	  suit.	  
The	  Statute	  did	  not	  provide	  a	  definition	  of	  administrative	  morality.	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  Congreso	  de	  la	  Republica	  de	  Colombia,	  "Ley	  472."	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In	  my	  interviews	  with	  key	  actors	  I	  found	  out	  that	  popular	  actions,	  as	  
characterized	  by	  the	  statute,	  were	  widely	  believed	  to	  have	  had	  a	  positive	  impact.	  For	  
instance,	  the	  professor	  and	  practitioner	  Luis	  Felipe	  Botero	  argued	  that	  popular	  actions	  
had	  brought	  up	  conflicts	  that	  were	  latent	  in	  society	  but	  that	  the	  people	  could	  not	  bring	  
to	  the	  authorities	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  legal	  mechanism.	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  positive	  impact,	  
as	  perceived	  by	  scholars,	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  was	  highly	  criticized	  by	  local	  
governments	  and	  by	  the	  judiciary.	  Local	  governments	  argued	  that	  plaintiffs	  had	  filed	  
frivolous	  suits	  and	  that	  they	  were	  impacting	  negatively	  local	  budgets.	  The	  media	  
documented	  local	  governments’	  critiques	  by	  referring	  to	  some	  plaintiffs	  as	  bounty	  
hunters.	  	  
The	  economic	  motivation	  of	  plaintiffs	  was	  interpreted	  as	  an	  abusive	  use	  of	  
popular	  actions.	  In	  my	  interview	  with	  Juan	  Carlos	  Garcia,	  a	  frequent	  litigator,	  he	  
explained	  that	  due	  to	  plaintiffs’	  interests	  on	  receiving	  the	  incentive	  popular	  actors	  were	  
perceived	  as	  petty	  and	  selfish.	  According	  to	  Garcia	  the	  media,	  judges,	  and	  the	  
administration	  portrayed	  a	  perverse	  image	  of	  plaintiffs	  in	  popular	  actions.	  	  
The	  government	  promoted	  a	  reform	  for	  the	  Statute	  of	  Popular	  actions	  with	  
regards	  the	  incentive	  arguing	  that	  the	  government	  was	  spending	  considerable	  sums	  of	  
money	  in	  responding	  to	  suits	  in	  popular	  actions.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  in	  2010	  the	  Congress	  
passed	  a	  law	  (Law	  1425	  of	  2010)	  eliminating	  the	  monetary	  incentive.474	  During	  the	  
debates	  of	  the	  law	  the	  Congress	  referred	  to	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  the	  monetary	  
incentive	  but	  there	  was	  no	  empirical	  data	  estimating	  this	  impact.	  Also,	  during	  the	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  "Ley	  1425."	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legislative	  process	  the	  debate	  focused	  on	  the	  motivation	  of	  plaintiffs	  for	  filing	  a	  suit.	  In	  
this	  debate	  the	  standard	  of	  a	  good	  citizen	  was	  identified	  with	  an	  altruist	  motivation	  and	  
consequently	  the	  plaintiff	  should	  not	  have	  initiated	  suits	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  receiving	  a	  
monetary	  incentive.	  
In	  several	  interviews	  scholars,	  practitioners,	  and	  government	  officials	  argued	  
that	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  incentive	  would	  impact	  negatively	  the	  implementation	  of	  
popular	  actions	  and	  administrative	  morality.	  Thus	  although	  in	  1998	  the	  Statute	  
attempted	  to	  motivate	  citizen	  participation	  the	  law	  of	  2010	  considerably	  reduced	  the	  
incentives	  to	  file	  popular	  actions.	  Future	  research	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  assess	  the	  
implementation	  of	  this	  norm	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  incentive.	  
With	  regards	  the	  procedure	  in	  popular	  actions	  plaintiffs	  argued	  that	  the	  
government	  is	  still	  in	  control	  of	  a	  considerable	  part	  of	  the	  process.	  Beatriz	  Londoño	  
(scholar	  and	  consultant	  for	  plaintiffs	  in	  popular	  actions)	  argued	  that	  although	  popular	  
actions	  have	  been	  an	  important	  mechanism	  to	  join	  forces	  in	  the	  improvement	  of	  
governmental	  performance	  they	  do	  not	  provide	  a	  good	  scenario	  for	  plaintiffs	  to	  
controvert	  governmental	  actions.	  According	  to	  Londoño	  the	  government	  has	  used	  
popular	  actions	  to	  convince	  judges	  of	  their	  good	  performance	  and	  consequently	  
plaintiffs	  had	  lost	  interest	  in	  this	  cause	  of	  action.	  Garcia	  confirmed	  this	  perception	  by	  
arguing	  that	  popular	  actions	  did	  not	  offer	  a	  real	  opportunity	  for	  plaintiffs	  to	  stand	  up	  to	  
the	  government.	  	  	  
In	  Chapter	  4	  I	  studied	  another	  fundamental	  piece	  of	  legislation	  that	  the	  Congress	  
passed	  in	  2011	  with	  regards	  popular	  actions	  and	  administrative	  morality:	  the	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administrative	  code.475	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  modernize	  judicial	  processes,	  justices	  in	  the	  
Council	  of	  State	  worked	  together	  with	  members	  of	  the	  government	  and	  civil	  society	  to	  
draft	  a	  new	  code	  that	  could	  contribute	  to	  reducing	  judicial	  congestion	  and	  improving	  
bureaucratic	  performance.	  The	  code	  was	  premised	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  
governmental	  performance	  is	  defective	  and	  that	  judicial	  intervention	  is	  necessary	  to	  
improve	  it.	  	  	  	  
On	  administrative	  morality	  and	  popular	  actions	  the	  code	  made	  two	  fundamental	  
contributions.	  First,	  the	  code	  included	  a	  definition	  of	  administrative	  morality	  stating	  that	  
all	  public	  servants	  shall	  perform	  with	  rectitude,	  loyalty,	  and	  honesty	  in	  their	  
administrative	  behavior.476	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  this	  definition,	  adopted	  ten	  years	  after	  the	  
constitution	  was	  framed,	  is	  the	  first	  formal	  legal	  definition	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  
But	  whether	  this	  definition	  will	  contribute	  to	  clarifying	  the	  meaning	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  remains	  unclear	  because	  this	  definition	  is	  value-­‐based.	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  code	  
described	  administrative	  morality	  in	  terms	  of	  “rectitude,	  loyalty,	  and	  honesty”	  in	  
administrative	  performance	  and	  it	  is	  uncertain	  whether	  this	  description	  will	  contribute	  
to	  clarify	  administrators’	  understanding	  of	  the	  notion	  in	  their	  responsibilities.	  Still,	  the	  
debates	  helped	  to	  clarify	  some	  elements	  of	  the	  legislators’	  understanding	  of	  the	  
meaning	  of	  this	  term.	  During	  the	  legislative	  debates	  several	  legislators	  referred	  to	  
administrative	  morality	  as	  related	  to	  the	  proper	  use	  of	  public	  funds.	  Although	  no	  
element	  of	  this	  discussion	  was	  enacted	  in	  to	  law,	  it	  suggests	  that	  legislators	  may	  think	  of	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  Colombia,	  "Código	  De	  Procedimiento	  Administrativo	  Y	  De	  Lo	  Contencioso."	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  Ibid.	  Article	  3.	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administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  legal	  norm	  that	  prohibits	  misuse	  of	  public	  funds	  or	  financial	  
malfeasance.	  	  
The	  second	  element	  developed	  by	  the	  administrative	  code	  is	  its	  restriction	  on	  
the	  power	  of	  judges	  in	  popular	  actions	  to	  overrule	  administrative	  acts	  or	  administrative	  
contracts.	  According	  to	  the	  administrative	  code	  judges	  in	  popular	  actions	  are	  entitled	  to	  
adopt	  the	  necessary	  mechanisms	  to	  stop	  the	  threat	  or	  harm	  to	  collective	  rights	  but	  they	  
are	  not	  entitled	  to	  overrule	  administrative	  acts	  or	  contracts.	  During	  the	  legislative	  
process	  judges	  argued	  that	  plaintiffs	  were	  using	  popular	  actions	  to	  avoid	  the	  formalities	  
related	  to	  ordinary	  administrative	  actions.	  Administrative	  actions	  are	  more	  demanding	  
than	  popular	  actions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  formalities	  and	  proofs	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  file	  a	  
claim.	  Consequently,	  in	  judges’	  opinions,	  the	  power	  to	  overrule	  acts	  and	  contracts	  
should	  be	  restricted	  to	  ordinary	  actions.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  administrative	  code	  reduced	  the	  
power	  of	  judges	  in	  popular	  actions.	  	  
In	  my	  interviews	  different	  parties	  expressed	  concern	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	  
this	  norm	  by	  reducing	  the	  impact	  of	  popular	  actions.	  Juan	  Carlos	  Garcia,	  a	  popular	  actor,	  
argued	  that	  this	  reduction	  in	  judges’	  power	  limits	  the	  impact	  of	  rulings	  to	  the	  extent	  
that	  rulings	  will	  not	  attack	  the	  real	  cause	  of	  the	  violations	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  
Camilo	  Orrego,	  former	  legal	  counsel	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Bogota	  also	  argued	  that	  this	  norm	  
would	  negatively	  affect	  popular	  actions.	  	  
In	  Chapter	  5	  I	  studied	  the	  guidelines	  that	  the	  courts	  have	  developed	  for	  the	  
implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  The	  Council	  of	  State	  has	  been	  the	  more	  
active	  court	  on	  this	  regard.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Council	  has	  explained	  that	  administrative	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morality	  is	  not	  related	  to	  individuals’	  understandings	  of	  morality	  but	  to	  the	  motivation	  
of	  governmental	  agents	  when	  performing	  their	  duties.	  A	  moral	  administration	  would	  be	  
the	  one	  in	  which	  the	  public	  agent	  fulfills	  the	  purpose	  pursued	  by	  laws	  applicable	  to	  the	  
specific	  case.	  It	  seem	  like	  with	  this	  criterion	  the	  Council	  aimed	  to	  reduce	  subjectivity	  in	  
the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  by	  clarifying	  that	  “morality”	  in	  
administrative	  morality	  is	  not	  related	  to	  an	  individual	  understanding	  of	  the	  notion	  but	  to	  
the	  agent’s	  motivation.	  	  	  
The	  Council	  has	  also	  argued	  that	  administrative	  morality	  is	  a	  concept	  with	  an	  
open	  texture	  and	  that	  is	  the	  judge’s	  responsible	  to	  fill	  it	  in	  with	  content	  in	  a	  case-­‐to-­‐case	  
basis.	  For	  instance	  the	  Council	  has	  argued	  that	  a	  violation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  is	  a	  
violation	  of	  legality	  that	  affects	  the	  entire	  society.	  This	  type	  of	  violation	  requires	  from	  
the	  plaintiff	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  administrative	  act	  is	  illegal	  and	  that	  it	  pursed	  wrong	  
motives.	  The	  Council	  has	  also	  emphasized	  the	  relationship	  between	  administrative	  
morality	  and	  public	  funds.	  This	  court	  has	  argued	  that	  in	  fact	  most	  violations	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  imply	  a	  mismanagement	  of	  public	  funds.	  	  
Cases	  decided	  by	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  reflect	  the	  tension	  between	  this	  court	  
and	  the	  Council	  of	  State.	  This	  tension	  is	  noticeable	  when	  the	  Court	  has	  claimed	  
jurisdiction	  over	  cases	  that	  the	  Council	  is	  also	  analyzing	  but	  that	  the	  Court	  argues	  to	  
have	  constitutional	  authorization	  to	  study	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  constitutional	  rights.	  In	  
spite	  of	  these	  tensions	  the	  Court	  applies	  criteria	  set	  by	  the	  Council.	  	  
In	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  court	  cases	  decided	  by	  the	  Council	  as	  the	  apex	  court	  in	  
administrative	  affairs	  I	  found	  that	  plaintiffs	  in	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  cases	  are	  individuals.	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There	  is	  evidence	  that	  some	  individuals	  have	  received	  organizational	  support	  when	  filing	  
their	  claims	  but	  in	  most	  of	  these	  cases	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  individual	  plaintiffs	  have	  
organizational	  support	  for	  their	  litigation.	  Further	  research	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  identify	  
how	  broad	  has	  been	  the	  organizational	  support	  for	  individual	  litigants.	  	  By	  exploring	  this	  
aspect	  of	  popular	  actions	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  determine	  more	  precisely	  whether	  the	  
party	  capability	  theory	  explains	  litigation	  in	  popular	  actions.	  	  
My	  data	  suggest	  that	  the	  plaintiffs	  who	  are	  suing	  the	  government	  (mainly	  local	  
governments	  and	  the	  national	  government)	  are	  primarily	  individuals	  and	  that	  the	  
Council	  rules	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  defendants	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases	  (71%).	  This	  pattern	  
holds	  for	  two	  of	  the	  three	  types	  of	  claims	  in	  cases	  of	  administrative	  morality:	  in	  cases	  of	  
financial	  malfeasance	  and	  willful	  misconduct	  defendants	  tend	  to	  win	  (74%	  for	  financial	  
malfeasance	  and	  72%	  for	  willful	  misconduct),	  but	  in	  cases	  of	  individual	  rights	  violations	  
plaintiffs	  win	  more	  frequently	  (58%).	  In	  cases	  of	  individual	  rights	  violations,	  the	  Council	  
seemed	  more	  concerned	  about	  the	  symbolic	  importance	  of	  its	  rulings	  and	  tends	  to	  grant	  
more	  actions	  than	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  other	  two	  types	  of	  claims.	  	  
In	  examining	  the	  court	  cases	  I	  also	  found	  that	  a	  primary	  reason	  for	  denying	  
plaintiffs’	  claims	  is	  that	  they	  lack	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  claim.	  The	  evidentiary	  
weaknesses	  of	  many	  plaintiffs’	  claims	  poses	  questions	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  capacity	  of	  
ordinary	  individuals	  as	  plaintiffs	  to	  develop	  plausible	  cases	  in	  court.	  It	  appears	  that	  
many	  ordinary	  plaintiffs	  have	  simply	  lacked	  the	  capacity	  to	  develop	  sufficient	  evidence	  
to	  support	  their	  claim.	  This	  suggests	  a	  basic	  dilemma	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  right	  to	  pursue	  
popular	  actions.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  popular	  actions	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  widely	  available	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for	  use	  by	  ordinary	  people.	  But	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  administrative	  morality	  relates	  to	  the	  
motivation	  of	  public	  agents,	  and	  these	  motivations	  are	  typically	  revealed	  only	  through	  
sophisticated	  development	  of	  evidence,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  typical	  plaintiffs	  can	  possibly	  
have	  access	  to	  the	  necessary	  evidence	  to	  prove	  their	  case.	  Some	  sort	  of	  legal	  training	  
may	  be	  necessary	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  this	  type	  of	  litigation.	  My	  interview	  with	  auxiliary	  
justice	  Roberto	  Medina	  confirms	  this	  analysis.477	  In	  his	  opinion,	  during	  the	  
implementation	  of	  popular	  actions	  they	  changed	  their	  character	  from	  being	  a	  
constitutional	  action	  (that	  challenges	  policy)	  to	  being	  an	  ordinary	  administrative	  action	  
(that	  challenges	  particular	  administrative	  decisions).	  According	  to	  Medina	  judges	  have	  
been	  demanding	  more	  rigorous	  requirements	  from	  plaintiffs	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  that	  they	  
do	  for	  ordinary	  administrative	  actions.	  	  
In	  my	  analysis	  over	  time	  the	  data	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  three	  time	  frames	  as	  
changing	  points	  in	  the	  growth	  of	  popular	  actions	  related	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  The	  
Council	  decided	  the	  first	  popular	  action	  for	  administrative	  morality	  in	  1997.	  In	  the	  first	  
time	  frame	  (1997-­‐2000)	  the	  Council	  decided	  just	  a	  few	  cases	  and	  plaintiffs	  lost	  all	  of	  
them	  (N=3).	  In	  2001	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  decided	  by	  the	  Council	  grew	  significantly	  and	  
this	  pattern	  seemed	  to	  be	  constant	  through	  2007.	  In	  the	  second	  time	  frame	  (2001-­‐2007)	  
the	  number	  of	  cases	  grew	  considerably	  (N=127)	  and	  defendants	  won	  in	  79%	  of	  the	  
cases.	  In	  my	  interview	  with	  Johanna	  Vega,	  an	  attorney	  working	  at	  the	  third	  section	  of	  
the	  Council,	  she	  explained	  that	  there	  are	  no	  apparent	  reasons	  that	  motivated	  this	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  "Interview	  Roberto	  Molina."	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change	  in	  the	  data.478	  In	  2008	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  ruled	  by	  the	  Council	  decreased	  
significantly,	  showing	  a	  new	  change	  in	  the	  data.	  In	  the	  time	  frame	  2008-­‐2011	  the	  
number	  of	  cases	  decreased	  (N=20)	  and	  the	  defendants	  kept	  wining	  but	  at	  a	  smaller	  
percentage	  than	  in	  previous	  years	  (72%).	  	  
	   With	  regards	  the	  type	  of	  claim	  the	  court	  case	  analysis	  confirms	  the	  low	  impact	  of	  
popular	  action	  on	  administrative	  morality	  based	  on	  the	  type	  of	  claim.	  In	  the	  majority	  of	  
cases	  (70%)	  plaintiffs	  filed	  suits	  with	  individual	  impact	  rather	  than	  with	  an	  institutional	  
impact.479	  In	  other	  words,	  only	  in	  30%	  of	  the	  cases	  the	  claims	  focused	  on	  achieving	  
deep-­‐institutional	  changes	  of	  behavior	  in	  the	  administrative	  agencies.	  	  
In	  Chapter	  6	  and	  Chapter	  7	  I	  examined	  how	  administrative	  morality	  has	  been	  
interpreted	  beyond	  the	  courts.	  In	  chapter	  6,	  I	  examined	  administrative	  interpretation	  of	  
administrative	  morality.	  I	  showed	  that	  the	  executive	  has	  not	  institutionalized	  
administrative	  morality,	  by	  which	  I	  mean	  that	  the	  government	  has	  not	  developed	  official	  
communications	  to	  its	  agencies	  to	  clarify	  the	  requirements	  of	  this	  right,	  agencies	  have	  
not	  conducted	  training	  or	  education	  regarding	  this	  right,	  and	  key	  administrators	  have	  
very	  different	  understandings	  of	  its	  meaning.	  	  
To	  understand	  the	  executive’s	  interpretation	  of	  administrative	  morality,	  I	  
analyzed	  policy	  documents	  on	  transparency	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  mechanisms.	  Also	  I	  
analyzed	  interviews	  with	  key	  actors	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  the	  government	  (local	  and	  
national	  governments)	  and	  agents	  with	  experience	  at	  different	  policy	  areas.	  Policy	  
documents	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  administrative	  morality	  and	  popular	  actions.	  These	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




documents	  only	  mentioned	  the	  term	  “morality”	  a	  few	  times	  as	  a	  principle	  of	  public	  
administration	  that	  governmental	  agents	  should	  apply	  and	  as	  a	  principle	  that	  gets	  
violated	  when	  administrative	  performance	  is	  inefficient.	  There	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  popular	  
actions	  or	  administrative	  morality	  as	  an	  entitlement	  that	  allows	  the	  people	  to	  demand	  a	  
better	  governmental	  performance.	  Thus,	  policy	  documents	  have	  not	  institutionalized	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  instead	  have	  left	  its	  interpretation	  to	  individual	  criteria	  of	  
governmental	  agents.	  	  
When	  analyzing	  interviews	  with	  governmental	  agents	  they	  agreed	  that	  
administrative	  morality	  implies	  legal	  compliance	  but	  that	  it	  also	  requires	  something	  
beyond	  mere	  legal	  compliance.	  The	  interviewees	  explained	  that	  “something	  else”	  in	  
terms	  of	  different	  elements	  like	  complying	  with	  the	  goals	  in	  specific	  regulations,	  
individual	  values	  and	  individual	  morality,	  and	  pursuing	  the	  public	  good.	  But	  what	  this	  
“something	  else”	  is	  varied	  considerably	  from	  person	  to	  person.	  Some	  emphasized	  
individual	  morality;	  others	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  the	  public	  interest;	  others	  referred	  to	  the	  norms	  about	  
ethics	  and	  transparency.	  These	  considerable	  differences	  in	  interpretation	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  highlight	  a	  basic	  theme	  of	  this	  dissertation:	  that	  there	  is	  the	  lack	  
of	  a	  shared	  discourse	  in	  Colombia	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  constitutional	  right	  to	  
administrative	  morality.	  	  
Interviewees	  also	  differ	  on	  the	  role	  of	  training	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  
institutionalizing	  administrative	  morality.	  Interviewees	  agreed	  that	  there	  is	  presently	  
little	  training	  on	  this	  concept.	  They	  disagreed	  over	  whether	  training	  would	  be	  helpful.	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William	  Espinosa,	  the	  Provost	  for	  Academic	  Affairs	  of	  the	  Superior	  School	  for	  Public	  
Administration,	  argued	  that	  training	  could	  contribute	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  to	  the	  improvement	  of	  governmental	  performance.	  By	  
fostering	  skills	  of	  responsibility	  and	  efficiency	  in	  public	  agents	  training	  could	  contribute	  
to	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  Camilo	  Orrego	  
explained	  that	  training	  does	  not	  impact	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  
because	  it	  is	  mainly	  related	  to	  individual	  values	  and	  personal	  education.	  Eduardo	  Arce,	  
Legal	  Vice-­‐President	  of	  the	  Fiduciary	  “La	  Previsora,”	  argued	  that	  the	  government	  has	  
provided	  training	  to	  public	  agents	  on	  topics	  like	  transparency	  and	  anti-­‐corruption.	  Arce	  
explained	  that	  these	  trainings	  contribute	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  
morality.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  Arce	  explained	  that	  in	  his	  opinion	  administrative	  morality	  is	  
rooted	  in	  the	  agent’s	  personal	  understanding	  of	  morality.	  To	  this	  extent	  administrative	  
morality	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  training	  but	  a	  matter	  of	  individual	  values.	  Different	  
perceptions	  on	  training	  also	  provide	  evidence	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  shared	  discourse	  on	  
administrative	  morality	  and	  its’	  institutionalization.	  	  
Different	  interviewees	  identified	  different	  normative	  systems	  that	  inform	  their	  
understanding	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  For	  instance,	  they	  referred	  to	  the	  
constitution,	  individual	  values,	  regulations	  that	  were	  in	  place	  when	  the	  constitution	  of	  
1991	  passed,	  and	  ethics	  as	  set	  of	  norms	  that	  are	  part	  of	  their	  notion	  of	  administrative	  
morality.	  As	  legal	  pluralism	  suggests	  there	  are	  several	  normative	  orders	  related	  to	  the	  
implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality.480	  Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  institutionalization	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  Is	  Legal	  Pluralism."	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of	  the	  notion	  of	  administrative	  morality	  different	  agents	  apply	  administrative	  morality	  
by	  focusing	  on	  different	  normative	  orders.	  This	  reduces	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  check	  for	  governmental	  performance.	  
As	  I	  showed	  in	  Chapter	  7,	  media	  coverage	  of	  administrative	  morality	  has	  become	  
increasingly	  disillusioned	  about	  the	  potential	  for	  this	  right	  to	  improve	  public	  
administration.	  Early	  journalistic	  articles	  on	  the	  new	  right	  expressed	  high	  expectations	  
and	  hope	  for	  how	  the	  new	  right	  might	  foster	  greater	  citizen	  participation	  in	  
government.	  But	  over	  time	  these	  expressions	  of	  hope	  were	  diminished.	  	  Additionally,	  
media	  coverage	  has	  changed	  from	  a	  focus	  on	  stories	  of	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  
corrective	  to	  institutional	  failings	  to	  a	  corrective	  merely	  of	  the	  mistakes	  of	  individual	  
officials.	  Thus,	  media	  reports	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  implementation	  of	  the	  
constitution	  (1991-­‐2001)	  focused	  on	  popular	  actions	  that	  targeted	  institutional	  
violations	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  During	  the	  second	  decade	  of	  implementation	  
(2002-­‐2011)	  media	  reports	  focused	  on	  cases	  of	  individual	  violations	  of	  administrative	  
morality.	  These	  reports	  changed	  from	  showing	  the	  possible	  impact	  of	  popular	  actions	  in	  
reducing	  institutional	  corruption	  to	  addressing	  cases	  of	  individual	  violations	  of	  
administrative	  morality.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  my	  analysis	  of	  media	  coverage	  revealed	  that	  the	  media	  have	  
been	  generally	  more	  positive	  toward	  plaintiffs	  (typically	  individuals)	  than	  toward	  
government	  defendants.	  	  The	  national	  government	  and	  local	  governments	  are	  the	  most	  
frequently	  sued	  in	  popular	  actions	  for	  administrative	  morality.	  The	  media’s	  tone	  with	  
regards	  defendants	  in	  popular	  actions	  tends	  to	  be	  neutral	  to	  negative.	  In	  other	  words,	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media	  tend	  to	  be	  neutral	  to	  negative	  towards	  governmental	  performance	  related	  to	  
popular	  actions	  for	  administrative	  morality.	  In	  relation	  to	  plaintiffs	  media’s	  tone	  reveals	  
an	  opposite	  tendency.	  	  
Still,	  the	  tone	  of	  stories	  has	  shifted	  over	  time.	  Stories	  have	  become	  increasingly	  
critical	  towards	  plaintiffs	  in	  the	  second	  decade	  of	  implementation	  of	  the	  constitution.	  
During	  the	  second	  decade	  media	  published	  reports	  on	  plaintiffs	  being	  bounty	  hunters	  
and	  filing	  frivolous	  suits	  against	  local	  governments.	  According	  to	  these	  journalistic	  
accounts	  plaintiffs’	  behaviors	  were	  contributing	  to	  judicial	  congestion	  and	  were	  
affecting	  negatively	  local	  governments’	  budgets.	  	  
Thus,	  media	  portrayal	  of	  popular	  actions	  on	  administrative	  morality	  reveals	  
skepticism	  about	  their	  potential.	  One	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  media	  have	  displayed	  a	  
negative	  tone	  with	  regard	  to	  defendants	  (local	  governments	  and	  the	  national	  
government),	  thus	  portraying	  governmental	  performance	  as	  deficient.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  the	  tone	  regarding	  plaintiffs	  has	  been	  changing	  from	  being	  positive	  to	  being	  more	  
neutral.	  What	  at	  the	  beginning	  seemed	  like	  positive	  portrayals	  of	  plaintiffs’	  interest	  and	  
capacity	  for	  improving	  policy-­‐making	  processes	  has	  turned	  into	  skepticism.	  Plaintiffs	  are	  
being	  described	  as	  selfish	  and	  unreasonable	  and	  as	  filing	  frivolous	  suits	  and	  
consequently	  they	  are	  portrayed	  as	  wasting	  public	  resources.	  This	  skepticism	  is	  
confirmed	  by	  the	  type	  of	  claim	  that	  media	  have	  described	  as	  related	  to	  popular	  actions	  
on	  administrative	  morality.	  During	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  implementation	  media	  related	  
administrative	  morality	  as	  capable	  of	  targeting	  institutional	  cases	  while	  in	  the	  second	  
decade	  media	  focused	  on	  individual	  cases.	  Thus,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  lawsuits	  portrayed	  in	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journalistic	  accounts	  has	  been	  decreasing	  suggesting	  that	  administrative	  morality	  has	  
not	  been	  able	  to	  foster	  the	  institutional	  change	  that	  seemed	  possible	  when	  the	  
constitution	  was	  framed.	  	  	  
Other	  key	  actors	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  morality	  are	  the	  
oversight	  agencies	  that	  exert	  fiscal	  and	  disciplinary	  control	  over	  governmental	  agencies.	  
In	  my	  interviews	  different	  participants	  mentioned	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  agencies	  on	  
governmental	  performance481	  and	  the	  power	  they	  have	  due	  to	  the	  reputational	  costs	  
that	  they	  could	  represent.	  Future	  research	  will	  address	  the	  role	  of	  oversight	  agencies	  
like	  the	  Procuraduria	  and	  the	  Contraloria	  as	  well	  as	  agencies	  at	  the	  regional	  and	  local	  
level	  of	  government.	  	  
Future	  research	  would	  also	  address	  the	  organizational	  support	  that	  plaintiffs	  
have	  received.	  This	  analysis	  revealed	  that	  individual	  plaintiffs	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  most	  
frequently	  file	  popular	  actions	  for	  administrative	  morality	  and	  the	  media	  analysis	  
confirmed	  this	  finding.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  the	  organizational	  support	  
that	  individuals	  have	  received	  in	  some	  cases.	  Future	  research	  could	  assess	  the	  types	  of	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481	  For	  instance,	  Espinosa	  argued	  that	  oversight	  agencies	  cause	  fear	  in	  governmental	  agents	  and	  
make	  them	  inefficient	  because	  governmental	  agents	  tend	  to	  make	  conservative	  decisions	  to	  avoid	  
investigations.	  Orrego	  and	  Arce	  mentioned	  codes	  of	  ethics	  and	  other	  regulations	  related	  to	  the	  ethical	  




This	  analysis	  of	  popular	  actions	  in	  administrative	  morality	  has	  three	  main	  broad	  
implications	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  its	  
possible	  impact	  on	  governmental	  performance.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  the	  framers	  had	  high	  
aspirations	  for	  the	  new	  constitutional	  right	  to	  administrative	  morality	  but	  these	  
aspirations	  have	  not	  been	  fulfilled.	  This	  is	  in	  part	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  clarity	  about	  this	  
concept	  in	  the	  framing	  debates	  themselves.	  The	  subsequent	  lack	  of	  clarity	  regarding	  the	  
new	  constitutional	  right	  can	  be	  traced	  directly	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  clarity	  among	  the	  framers	  
themselves.	  	  The	  second	  implication	  is	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  administrative	  
morality	  has	  been	  the	  story	  of	  growing	  disillusionment	  with	  an	  action	  that	  could	  have	  
brought	  a	  deep	  institutional	  change	  but	  that	  ended	  focusing	  on	  cases	  with	  little	  impact.	  
Third,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  shared	  discourse	  on	  administrative	  morality	  has	  reduced	  the	  impact	  
of	  administrative	  morality.	  I	  will	  address	  each	  of	  these	  in	  turn.	  
The	  framers	  had	  important	  aspirations	  in	  mind	  when	  they	  designed	  collective	  
rights	  like	  administrative	  morality	  and	  when	  they	  chose	  to	  enforce	  collective	  rights	  
through	  a	  judicial	  action	  that	  was	  supposed	  to	  being	  available	  to	  any	  person.	  This	  
collective	  right	  was	  created	  to	  be	  a	  check	  for	  legality	  in	  governmental	  performance	  but	  
the	  lack	  of	  a	  debate	  on	  this	  issue	  reduced	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  the	  action.	  During	  the	  
debates	  it	  was	  noticeable	  that	  the	  framers	  attempted	  to	  provide	  the	  people	  with	  a	  
mechanism	  that	  could	  motivate	  them	  to	  protect	  collective	  interests.	  This	  would	  have	  
meant	  a	  change	  in	  the	  Colombian	  culture	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  plaintiffs	  traditionally	  had	  
focused	  on	  individual	  rights	  and	  individual	  interests	  but	  these	  new	  actions	  targeted	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broader	  interests.	  Thus,	  enforcing	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  fostering	  a	  social	  change	  towards	  
solidarity	  were	  high	  aspirations	  of	  the	  framers	  but	  they	  were	  hindered	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  
debate	  and	  definition.	  	  
The	  framers	  assigned	  the	  Congress	  the	  responsibility	  of	  developing	  the	  elements	  
of	  popular	  actions	  and	  administrative	  morality	  but	  it	  took	  the	  Congress	  seven	  years	  to	  
pass	  the	  statute.	  Several	  key	  actors	  participated	  of	  the	  debate	  of	  the	  statute	  
demonstrating	  the	  salience	  of	  the	  topic.	  Oversight	  agencies,	  legislators,	  and	  NGOs	  
articulated	  their	  visions	  on	  popular	  actions	  and	  debated	  on	  the	  convenience	  of	  leaving	  
administrative	  morality	  undefined.	  The	  Congress	  decided	  to	  leave	  administrative	  
morality	  undefined	  and	  consequently	  deferred	  to	  the	  courts	  the	  task	  of	  stating	  its	  core	  
elements.	  During	  the	  legislative	  debates	  one	  NGO	  (Fundepublico)	  argued	  in	  favor	  of	  
leaving	  administrative	  morality	  undefined	  and	  in	  my	  interviews	  I	  found	  supporters	  of	  
this	  vagueness	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  if	  the	  Congress	  had	  provided	  more	  clear	  elements	  
to	  administrative	  morality	  its	  impact	  would	  have	  been	  higher.	  	  
Since	  1997	  the	  courts,	  specially	  the	  Council	  of	  State,	  have	  been	  making	  decisions	  
on	  popular	  actions	  for	  administrative	  morality	  and	  they	  have	  provided	  guidelines	  for	  its	  
implementation.	  These	  guidelines	  are	  the	  clearest	  process	  of	  institutionalization	  that	  
administrative	  morality	  has	  had	  and	  other	  actors,	  including	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  
have	  used	  these	  guidelines	  to	  clarify	  its	  meaning.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  advantages	  of	  this	  




One	  challenge	  of	  the	  institutionalization	  process	  of	  administrative	  morality	  by	  
the	  courts	  has	  been	  the	  demand	  for	  plaintiffs	  to	  provide	  evidence	  with	  regards	  the	  
illegal	  motivation	  of	  governmental	  agents	  when	  violating	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  It	  
may	  not	  be	  a	  realistic	  expectation	  that	  a	  citizen	  with	  no	  legal	  training	  could	  provide	  
evidence	  of	  the	  motivation	  of	  governmental	  agents	  and	  consequently	  plaintiffs	  are	  
prone	  to	  lose	  the	  lawsuits.	  In	  one	  of	  my	  interviews	  with	  an	  auxiliary	  justice	  at	  the	  
Council	  of	  State	  he	  argued	  that	  popular	  actions	  have	  shifted	  to	  being	  ordinary	  
administrative	  actions.	  He	  argued	  that	  in	  reality	  the	  flexibility	  and	  simple	  requirements	  
that	  were	  supposed	  to	  motivate	  citizen	  engagement	  have	  been	  replaced	  by	  a	  more	  
rigorous	  process	  from	  plaintiffs.	  This	  shift	  could	  pose	  a	  challenge	  for	  the	  success	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  in	  checking	  governmental	  performance.	  The	  institutionalization	  
of	  administrative	  morality	  by	  the	  courts	  has	  changed	  its	  character.	  	  
The	  governmental	  lack	  of	  institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  morality	  shows	  
the	  disarticulation	  between	  constitutional	  mechanisms	  like	  popular	  actions	  and	  
governmental	  strategies	  for	  transparency	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  campaigns.	  Governments	  
since	  1991	  have	  focused	  their	  anti-­‐corruption	  and	  transparency	  campaigns	  on	  strategies	  
that	  are	  not	  related	  to	  popular	  actions.	  In	  these	  documents	  the	  mention	  of	  morality	  only	  
appears	  as	  a	  reference	  to	  a	  principle	  of	  public	  administration	  that	  governmental	  
agencies	  should	  respect	  but	  not	  as	  the	  collective	  right	  that	  is	  enforced	  through	  popular	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actions.482	  Thus,	  the	  government	  does	  not	  take	  popular	  actions	  into	  consideration	  as	  
mechanisms	  for	  improving	  transparency	  in	  performance.	  	  
In	  my	  interview	  with	  Orrego,	  former	  head	  legal	  counsel	  of	  Bogota,	  he	  explained	  
that	  in	  his	  opinion	  popular	  actions	  for	  administrative	  morality	  offered	  valuable	  
opportunities	  of	  collaboration	  with	  the	  citizens.	  In	  his	  experience	  litigation	  offers	  the	  
administration	  with	  the	  opportunity	  of	  learning	  from	  things	  that	  are	  not	  working	  well	  in	  
relation	  to	  governmental	  services.	  In	  his	  opinion	  by	  approaching	  litigation	  with	  this	  
perspective	  the	  administration	  obtains	  two	  benefits.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  judicial	  
process	  could	  be	  used	  as	  an	  opportunity	  of	  mediation	  between	  the	  citizens	  and	  the	  
administration	  in	  which	  the	  administration	  improves	  the	  services	  that	  are	  not	  working	  
well.	  With	  this	  perspective,	  the	  judicial	  process	  could	  finish	  before	  the	  ruling	  and	  it	  
would	  be	  less	  expensive	  for	  both	  parties	  than	  facing	  the	  entire	  process.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  if	  the	  administration	  reaches	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  citizens	  before	  the	  ruling	  the	  
administration	  has	  more	  options	  to	  decide	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  governmental	  
service	  would	  improve.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  motivation	  for	  governmental	  
agents	  to	  negotiate	  with	  plaintiffs	  in	  popular	  actions	  to	  avoid	  the	  final	  ruling	  because	  
the	  final	  ruling	  implies	  an	  intervention	  of	  judges	  on	  administrative	  processes	  that	  they	  
do	  not	  know	  well.	  The	  approach	  described	  by	  Orrego	  is	  an	  example	  of	  what	  could	  be	  the	  
institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  morality	  by	  the	  government.	  Litigation	  in	  
administrative	  morality	  could	  be	  used	  as	  an	  opportunity	  for	  improving	  governmental	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performance	  if	  the	  administrative	  agents	  receive	  guidelines	  about	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  
these	  suits.	  	  
Currently	  the	  government	  has	  started	  developing	  policies	  regarding	  defense	  
against	  litigation	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  making	  more	  efficient	  the	  administration’s	  
response	  to	  litigation.	  In	  2011	  the	  government	  created	  the	  National	  Agency	  for	  Legal	  
Defense	  of	  the	  Government.483	  This	  agency	  aims	  to	  lead	  strategies	  for	  legal	  defense	  
through	  an	  efficient,	  comprehensive,	  and	  permanent	  administrative	  performance	  that	  
would	  protect	  constitutional	  rights;	  the	  agency	  also	  focuses	  on	  optimizing	  public	  funds	  
management.	  According	  to	  the	  agency’s	  webpage	  its	  goal	  for	  the	  year	  2017	  is	  to	  
progressively	  reduce	  rulings	  against	  the	  government	  and	  to	  change	  the	  litigious	  culture	  
in	  the	  country.484	  It	  seems	  like	  this	  new	  governmental	  agency	  provides	  a	  new	  approach	  
to	  litigation	  that	  could	  strengthen	  governmental	  performance.	  	  
The	  institutionalization	  of	  policies	  with	  regards	  governmental	  litigation	  could	  
provide	  administrative	  agents	  with	  elements	  that	  favor	  the	  implementation	  of	  
constitutional	  actions	  like	  popular	  actions.	  These	  policies	  could	  highlight	  questions	  of	  
the	  possible	  impact	  of	  administrative	  morality	  in	  governmental	  performance	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  by	  clarifying	  its	  impact	  the	  government	  could	  improve	  its	  performance	  and	  
reduce	  litigation.	  It	  is	  noticeable	  that	  one	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  agency	  is	  to	  reduce	  
rulings	  against	  the	  government.	  Future	  research	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  explore	  the	  
policy	  mechanisms	  designed	  by	  the	  agency	  with	  this	  purpose.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





The	  lack	  of	  institutionalization	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  its	  disarticulation	  
with	  governmental	  anti-­‐corruption	  mechanisms	  could	  be	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  NGO’s	  
like	  Transparency	  Colombia	  chose	  public	  pressure	  over	  formal	  mechanisms	  like	  popular	  
actions	  on	  their	  quest	  for	  transparency.	  This	  disarticulation	  leaves	  administrative	  
morality	  and	  popular	  actions	  as	  isolated	  events	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  have	  no	  concrete	  
repercussions	  on	  governmental	  performance.	  Since	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  civil	  society	  
organizations	  have	  chosen	  to	  exert	  pressure	  over	  the	  government	  by	  getting	  attention	  
of	  the	  media	  or	  other	  mechanisms	  that	  could	  imply	  a	  higher	  reputational	  cost.	  	  
The	  second	  implication	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  constitutional	  
reform	  of	  1991	  administrative	  morality	  promised	  to	  be	  a	  legal	  mechanism	  for	  
institutional	  reform	  but	  there	  is	  clear	  evidence	  of	  growing	  disillusionment	  with	  this	  high	  
aspiration.	  The	  framers	  envisioned	  collective	  rights	  as	  tools	  for	  deep	  institutional	  and	  
cultural	  changes	  that	  could	  focus	  people’s	  attention	  on	  social	  needs	  and	  specifically	  on	  a	  
high	  quality	  public	  administration.	  According	  to	  the	  media	  analysis	  and	  court	  case	  
analysis	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  implementation	  of	  the	  constitution	  actors	  used	  
administrative	  morality	  in	  cases	  of	  broad	  impact.	  These	  were	  cases	  of	  corruption	  that	  
involved	  high	  sums	  of	  public	  funds	  and	  cases	  in	  which	  implementation	  of	  general	  
policies	  violated	  administrative	  morality.	  By	  the	  second	  decade	  after	  adoption	  of	  the	  
new	  Constitution	  both	  the	  court	  cases	  and	  media	  coverage	  of	  the	  issue	  changed	  
towards	  focusing	  less	  on	  broad	  institutional	  problems	  in	  the	  government	  and	  more	  on	  
relatively	  minor	  mistakes	  by	  individual	  officials	  that	  affected	  one	  particular	  individual	  or	  
a	  small	  group.	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The	  reduction	  of	  the	  scope	  and	  aspiration	  of	  these	  cases	  is	  also	  related	  to	  the	  
growing	  debate	  in	  the	  second	  decade	  over	  whether	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  was	  
encouraging	  frivolous	  litigation.	  The	  debate	  about	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  focused	  on	  
the	  frivolous	  litigation	  that	  developed	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  plaintiffs’	  interest	  in	  gaining	  
the	  monetary	  incentive	  and	  that	  led	  to	  the	  stereotype	  of	  plaintiffs	  as	  bounty	  hunters.	  
This	  stereotype	  was	  consistent	  with	  the	  behavior	  of	  some	  litigants	  that	  filed	  frivolous	  
suits	  and	  were	  contributing	  to	  judicial	  congestion	  and	  inefficiency	  in	  administrative	  
behavior.	  Facing	  these	  problems	  the	  government,	  instead	  of	  developing	  guidelines	  to	  
improve	  their	  defense	  against	  litigation	  opted	  to	  discourage	  people’s	  use	  of	  popular	  
actions.	  Rather	  than	  choosing	  this	  alternative	  it	  would	  have	  been	  possible	  for	  judges	  to	  
sanction	  frivolous	  suits	  by	  using	  fees	  and	  other	  legal	  mechanisms	  rather	  than	  
eliminating	  the	  monetary	  incentive.	  Thus,	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  incentive	  by	  the	  
Congress	  favored	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  dramatically	  reduced	  the	  possibilities	  of	  popular	  
actions	  of	  fostering	  institutional	  change.	  	  
The	  third	  implication	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  shared	  discourse	  on	  
administrative	  morality	  has	  reduced	  its	  possible	  impact.	  The	  current	  normative	  frame	  
provided	  by	  the	  administrative	  code	  defined	  administrative	  morality	  like	  the	  obligation	  
to	  perform	  with	  rectitude,	  loyalty,	  and	  honesty	  in	  administrative	  behavior.	  According	  to	  
the	  Council	  of	  State	  and	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  the	  notion	  of	  administrative	  morality	  
should	  be	  implemented	  according	  to	  the	  specific	  legal	  norms	  that	  regulate	  specific	  
cases.	  These	  courts	  also	  argue	  that	  administrative	  morality	  refers	  to	  the	  motivation	  of	  
governmental	  agents	  when	  performing	  their	  duties.	  The	  media	  have	  portrayed	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administrative	  morality	  as	  an	  anti-­‐corruption	  mechanism	  related	  to	  the	  financial	  
administration.	  Finally,	  governmental	  officials	  relate	  administrative	  morality	  to	  different	  
notions	  of	  individual	  values	  and	  ethics,	  and	  to	  the	  public	  good.	  The	  different	  perceptions	  
of	  administrative	  morality	  are	  layers	  that	  have	  interacted	  and	  have	  characterized	  this	  
notion	  as	  of	  today.	  These	  layers	  are	  the	  different	  normative	  orders	  that	  legal	  pluralism	  
describe	  when	  explaining	  the	  implementation	  of	  legal	  reforms.	  	  
Various	  actors	  have	  implemented	  the	  notion	  of	  administrative	  morality	  based	  on	  
their	  own	  individual	  understanding	  of	  it.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  possible	  impact	  of	  
administrative	  morality	  is	  limited	  and	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  remain	  limited	  until	  this	  notion	  faces	  
an	  institutionalization	  process	  that	  brings	  together	  a	  shared	  perception	  of	  what	  is	  
required	  by	  this	  constitutional	  right.	  In	  my	  interview	  with	  justice	  Luis	  Fernando	  Alvarez	  
from	  the	  Council	  of	  state	  he	  explained	  that	  administrative	  morality	  has	  not	  fulfilled	  its	  
constitutional	  purpose	  partly	  because	  there	  is	  no	  shared	  understanding	  of	  its	  definition.	  
According	  to	  Alvarez,	  the	  most	  basic	  question	  related	  to	  administrative	  morality	  would	  
be	  “whose	  morality	  are	  we	  talking	  about?”	  and	  in	  his	  opinion	  in	  order	  fulfill	  the	  
potential	  of	  this	  notion	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  identify	  a	  notion	  of	  morality	  that	  could	  
be	  generalizable	  and	  that	  is	  not	  relative.485	  Alvarez’s	  analysis	  of	  administrative	  morality	  
identifies	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  shared	  notion	  as	  the	  factor	  that	  hinders	  the	  successful	  
implementation	  of	  it.	  	  
In	  sum,	  administrative	  morality	  has	  not	  fulfilled	  its	  potential	  due	  to	  its	  lack	  of	  
institutionalization	  that	  would	  allow	  articulating	  efforts	  from	  different	  social	  sectors.	  It	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  "Interview	  Luis	  Fernando	  Alvarez,"	  	  (2012).	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would	  be	  necessary	  for	  the	  congress	  to	  re	  instate	  the	  economic	  incentive	  for	  plaintiffs	  in	  
popular	  actions	  and	  for	  the	  congress	  to	  broaden	  the	  power	  of	  judges	  in	  this	  type	  of	  
actions.	  Also	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  courts	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  strengthen	  the	  will	  of	  
courts	  to	  enforce	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  check	  of	  bureaucratic	  performance.	  As	  a	  
third	  condition	  it	  would	  be	  essential	  to	  foster	  governmental	  institutionalization	  of	  
administrative	  motality	  by	  providing	  guidelines,	  training,	  and	  oversight	  in	  order	  to	  
support	  administrators’	  implementation	  of	  this	  notion.	  Lastly,	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  
motivate	  citizen	  engagement	  in	  popular	  actions	  for	  administrative	  morality	  as	  a	  check	  of	  
governmental	  performance.	  Without	  these	  conditions	  administrative	  morality	  only	  
partially	  could	  achieve	  its	  purpose.	  	  
	  
A	  general	  evaluation	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  dissertation	  has	  been	  to	  describe	  and	  map	  out	  the	  concept	  
of	  administrative	  morality	  in	  Colombia	  by	  studying	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  different	  parties	  
that	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  its	  implementation.	  Thus	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  analysis	  has	  not	  
been	  to	  evaluate	  the	  different	  elements	  of	  administrative	  morality	  but	  to	  describe	  them.	  
In	  spite	  of	  this	  purpose,	  it	  has	  been	  inevitable	  to	  draw	  normative	  implications	  regarding	  
the	  meaning	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  its	  possible	  impact	  on	  the	  Colombian	  public	  
administration	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
Empirical	  data	  provide	  evidence	  of	  the	  small	  impact	  that	  administrative	  morality	  
has	  had	  since	  the	  Constitution	  of	  1991.	  With	  this	  perspective	  it	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  argue	  
that	  administrative	  morality	  is	  not	  an	  efficient	  anti-­‐corruption	  mechanism	  and	  that	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framers’	  intentions	  have	  failed.	  This	  conclusion	  is	  confirmed	  by	  some	  of	  my	  interviews	  
specifically	  when	  interviewees	  explained	  that	  administrative	  morality	  has	  not	  changed	  
governmental	  performance	  in	  the	  country.	  To	  this	  extent	  constitutional	  norms	  have	  not	  
been	  capable	  of	  fostering	  institutional	  and	  cultural	  change.	  	  
Although	  this	  is	  a	  possible	  interpretation	  there	  is	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  that	  
in	  my	  opinion	  would	  more	  accurately	  describe	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  administrative	  
morality.	  Administrative	  morality	  has	  fostered	  some	  social	  change	  by	  entitling	  
individuals	  to	  voice	  concerns	  of	  corruption	  and	  lack	  of	  transparency	  in	  governmental	  
behavior	  that	  they	  could	  not	  raise	  before.	  Some	  of	  my	  interviewees	  explained	  that	  
popular	  actions	  have	  provided	  visibility	  to	  citizens’	  concerns	  about	  governmental	  
performance.	  	  
Administrative	  morality	  changed	  the	  people’s	  perception	  of	  the	  institutional	  
mechanisms	  that	  they	  could	  use	  to	  control	  corruption.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  well	  known	  that	  
notaries	  manage	  considerable	  sums	  of	  money	  and	  that	  they	  have	  significant	  power	  in	  
Colombia.	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  status	  of	  power	  two	  citizens	  in	  2002	  filed	  a	  suit	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  
transparency	  in	  the	  selection	  process	  of	  notaries	  in	  all	  the	  territory.486	  This	  is	  an	  example	  
of	  how	  administrative	  morality	  changed	  the	  notion	  of	  what	  was	  legally	  possible	  in	  the	  
country	  by	  empowering	  citizens	  to	  keep	  the	  administration	  accountable.	  Before	  the	  
constitution	  of	  1991	  these	  two	  citizens	  would	  not	  have	  had	  an	  institutional	  mechanism	  
that	  allowed	  them	  to	  voice	  their	  claim	  and	  administrative	  morality	  was	  the	  mechanism	  
to	  do	  it.	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Administrative	  morality	  provides	  evidence	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  public	  values	  in	  
Colombia.	  The	  framers	  included	  collective	  rights	  as	  a	  new	  institution	  in	  the	  
constitutional	  reform	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  fostering	  solidarity	  among	  the	  population.	  
They	  insisted	  in	  the	  importance	  of	  individual	  initiative	  to	  promote	  collective	  needs	  and	  
popular	  actions	  were	  the	  institutional	  mechanism	  to	  do	  it.	  Although	  popular	  actions	  on	  
administrative	  morality	  have	  not	  achieved	  their	  potential	  they	  have	  had	  an	  evolution	  
process	  that	  has	  made	  the	  people	  to	  think	  about	  their	  expectation	  of	  governmental	  
performance.	  
	  In	  all	  my	  interviews	  the	  participants	  defined	  administrative	  morality	  as	  the	  
combination	  of	  legality	  and	  “something	  else”.	  The	  ambiguity	  of	  administrative	  morality	  
and	  the	  need	  to	  explain	  what	  that	  “something	  else”	  is	  has	  motivated	  reflection	  and	  
discussion	  on	  the	  expectations	  of	  governmental	  performance	  or	  what	  is	  considered	  
corruption.	  This	  debate	  still	  lacks	  depth	  and	  it	  has	  not	  reached	  a	  conclusion	  of	  a	  shared	  
discourse	  on	  administrative	  morality	  but	  it	  has	  motivated	  courts,	  civil	  society,	  the	  
media,	  plaintiffs,	  and	  administrative	  agencies	  to	  walk	  towards	  an	  understanding	  of	  
public	  administration	  based	  on	  values	  rather	  than	  based	  on	  mere	  legality.	  For	  instance,	  
the	  Constitutional	  court	  argued	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  solidarity	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  
should	  be	  developed	  in	  agreement	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  religious	  pluralism.	  Given	  the	  
separation	  of	  church	  and	  state	  in	  Colombia	  there	  is	  no	  single	  exclusive	  ethical	  paradigm,	  
and	  Colombian	  institutions	  should	  be	  open	  to	  all	  ethical	  standards	  as	  long	  as	  they	  
respect	  constitutional	  rights.487	  	  This	  ruling	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  and	  its	  analysis	  of	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pluralism	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  development	  of	  public	  values	  in	  Colombia.	  Specifically	  it	  
speaks	  to	  the	  ethical	  component	  of	  administrative	  morality	  and	  how	  to	  articulate	  it	  with	  
other	  values	  like	  pluralism.488	  	  
There	  is	  evidence	  in	  Colombia	  of	  the	  positive	  impact	  that	  constitutional	  actions	  
have	  brought	  after	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991.	  The	  action	  for	  tutelage	  (article	  86	  of	  the	  
Constitution)	  fostered	  a	  profound	  institutional	  change	  in	  the	  country.	  This	  action	  has	  
been	  widely	  used	  by	  the	  people	  and	  has	  allowed	  them	  to	  demand	  protection	  of	  
constitutional	  rights	  when	  public	  and	  private	  authorities	  violate	  them.489	  Given	  its	  
simple	  and	  brief	  procedure	  the	  action	  for	  tutelage	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  providing	  
remedy	  to	  circumstances	  in	  which	  fundamental	  rights	  were	  under	  threat.	  The	  high	  
impact	  of	  the	  action	  for	  tutelage	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  judicialization	  of	  politics	  in	  
Colombia	  and	  it	  proves	  that	  constitutional	  actions	  could	  foster	  institutional	  change.	  In	  a	  
similar	  way	  popular	  actions	  could	  have	  the	  potential	  of	  motivating	  citizen	  engagement	  
towards	  checking	  governmental	  corruption.	  It	  will	  be	  necessary	  an	  institutionalization	  
process	  in	  which	  the	  object	  of	  administrative	  morality	  is	  well-­‐defined	  and	  in	  which	  it	  
becomes	  a	  priority	  in	  anti-­‐corruption	  policies.	  	  
The	  recently	  created	  Observatory	  for	  Anticorruption	  exemplifies	  the	  possible	  
future	  impact	  of	  administrative	  morality.	  The	  Observatory	  articulates	  efforts	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488	  Referring	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  1991	  in	  the	  anticorruption	  campaign	  a	  scholar	  in	  a	  
publication	  of	  an	  oversight	  agency	  at	  the	  national	  level	  (Contraloria	  General	  de	  la	  Republica)	  
explained:	  “This	  regenerating	  project	  is	  not	  far	  from	  the	  debate	  of	  whether	  to	  impose	  a	  certain	  ethical	  
paradigm	  on	  politics.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  debate	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  identify	  the	  values	  
accepted	  by	  a	  certain	  society	  in	  order	  to	  include	  them	  in	  the	  mythical	  system	  [symbols	  and	  
institutions]	  in	  order	  to	  define	  what	  is	  not	  incorrect,	  inappropriate,	  or	  corrupt	  in	  the	  political	  
environment”.	  
489	  Cepeda,	  "Judicialization	  of	  Politics	  in	  Colombia."	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national	  and	  regional	  commissions	  for	  moralization	  and	  the	  national	  commission	  of	  
citizens	  in	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  campaign.	  Commissions	  for	  moralization	  are	  new	  
initiatives	  launched	  in	  2011	  by	  president	  Santos	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  articulating	  
governmental	  efforts	  against	  corruption	  and	  to	  foster	  transparency,	  efficiency,	  and	  
morality	  in	  public	  administration.490	  The	  notion	  of	  morality	  in	  administration	  seems	  to	  
be	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  Observatory	  and	  the	  commissions.	  This	  could	  be	  an	  opportunity	  for	  
the	  government	  to	  institutionalize	  administrative	  morality	  and	  to	  use	  popular	  actions	  as	  
mechanisms	  to	  enforce	  a	  shared	  understanding	  of	  this	  notion.	  With	  this	  purpose	  the	  
National	  Agency	  for	  Legal	  Defense	  of	  the	  government	  could	  also	  design	  policies	  on	  the	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Appendix	  A:	  Debates	  Article	  88	  and	  Article	  209	  of	  the	  Constitution	  
	  
	  
Debates	  Article	  88	  of	  the	  Constitution	  
	  
	  
Commission	   Date	  of	  the	  
debate	  
Fifth	  	   April	  12th,	  1991	  
Fifth	   April	  16th,	  1991	  
First	   May	  6th,	  1991	  
Entire	  Assembly	   June	  10th,	  1991	  
Entire	  Assembly	   June	  14th,	  1991	  
Entire	  Assembly	   June	  29th,	  1991	  
Commission	  for	  coding	   June	  22nd,	  1991	  
	  
In	  a	  first	  search	  on	  the	  archives	  it	  seemed	  like	  the	  fourth	  commission	  had	  analyzed	  
administrative	  morality	  but	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  in	  the	  transcripts	  that	  this	  commission	  







Debates	  Article	  209	  of	  the	  Constitution	  
	  
	  
Commission	   Date	  of	  the	  
debate	  
Third	   May	  15th,	  1991	  
Entire	  Assembly	   May	  22th,	  1991	  
Entire	  Assembly	   May	  30th,	  1991	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  B:	  Congressional	  Gazettes	  and	  Official	  Journal	  with	  publications	  





Gazette	  number	   Date	   Debate	  
Gazette	  1173/09	   November	  17th,	  2009	   Draft	  analyzed	  by	  the	  Senate.	  
Project	  198	  of	  2009	  signed	  by	  
the	  president	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  
State	  and	  the	  Vice-­‐minister	  of	  
Justice.	  	  
Gazette	  1210/09	   November	  27th,	  2009.	  	   Report	  of	  the	  first	  debate	  
Senate	  -­‐	  Commission.	  	  
Gazette	  264/10	   May	  27th,	  2010	   Report	  of	  the	  second	  debate	  
Senate.	  	  
Gazette	  683/10	   September	  23th,	  2010	   First	  debate	  House	  –	  
Commission.	  
Gazette	  951/10	   November	  23th,	  2010	   Report	  of	  the	  first	  debate	  
House	  of	  Representatives	  	  -­‐	  
Commission.	  	  
Gazette	  1075/10	  House	  
Gazette	  1072/10	  Senate	  	  
December	  7th,	  2010	  
	  
Unified	  text	  –	  Commission	  of	  
conciliation	  Senate	  and	  
House.	  	  
Gazette	  12/11	   January	  7th,	  2011	   Publication	  of	  the	  final	  text.	  
Law	  1437,	  2011	  
Official	  Journal	  47956	   January	  18th,	  2011	   Publication	  of	  the	  final	  text.	  






















	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  
N=151	  
	  
Year	   Percentage	  
1997	   0.6	  
1998	   0	  
1999	   0.6	  
2000	   1	  
2001	   15	  
2002	   9	  
2003	   9	  
2004	   8	  
2005	   17	  
2006	   17	  
2007	   10	  
2008	   4	  
2009	   4	  
2010	   2	  
2011	   3	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Appendix	  D:	  Secondary	  foundation	  of	  the	  claim	  (Legal	  norms	  referenced	  by	  





Secondf	   Percentage	  
Statute	   68	  
Constitution	   31	  
Administrative	  








Appendix	  E:	  Codes	  Court	  Case	  Analysis	  
	  
	  
Variable	  name	  	   	   Variable	  label/	  instructions/codes	  (value	  labels)	  
	  
issue1,	  issue2,	  and	  issue3	   First	  substantive	  issue	  
	   	   	   	   Secondary	  substantive	  issue	  
	   	   	   	   Third	  substantive	  issue	  
Issue.	  According	  to	  the	  claim,	  which	  issue	  is	  pursued?	  
	  
0=none	  
	   	  
Financial	  Malfeasance	  (1-­‐20)	  
1=transparency491	  	  
2=corruption492	  
	   	   	   	   3=inefficiency493	  	  
4=improper	  decision	  (claimant	  not	  agreeing	  with	  
decision	  made	  by	  the	  agency)494	   	   	  
	  
	  
Individual	  Rights	  (21-­‐40)	  
	   	   21=due	  process	  	  
22=	  charging	  for	  services	  not	  provided/	  charging	  
excessively	  
	   	   	   	   23=	  improper	  decision	  
	   	   	   	   24=	  proper	  housing	  
	   	   	   	   25=	  efficiency	  
26=receiving	  proper	  answers	  from	  the	  
administration	  
27=freedom	  of	  movement	  
28=life/	  personal	  integrity	  
29=individual	  patrimony	  
30=equality	  
31=legal	  counseling	  and	  due	  process	  
32=recreation	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Willfull	  misconduct	  (41	  –	  60)	  
41=divert	  attention	  from	  administrative	  mistakes	  to	  other	  
factors	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491	  Normas	  de	  transparencia-­‐contratacion	  
492	  Openly	  argues	  corrupt	  or	  “favoreciendo	  a	  terceros”	  
493	  Didn’t	  do	  what	  it	  should/	  diligence	  













4=judicial	  decision	  	  
	  





















3=under	  18	  years	  old	  
4=gender	  not	  ascertained	  	  
	  




8=Medium	  size	  business	  	  
9=Big	  size	  business	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495	  Rules	  mentioned	  by	  platinffs	  in	  relation	  to	  Admin	  Morality	  and	  Popular	  Actions.	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10=Unable	  to	  clasify	  
	  
Private/Non-­‐profit	  organizations	  (11	  -­‐	  25)	  
11=	  non	  profit	  advocacy	  
12=	  professional	  association	  
13=	  union	  
14=	  educational	  association	  or	  institution	  
15=religious	  or	  charitable	  organization	  
16=	  political	  party	  or	  political	  group	  
17=	  tribe	  or	  association	  of	  indigenous	  people	  
18=	  other	  
19=Neighbor	  association/	  Junta	  de	  accion	  comunal	  	  
25=	  unable	  to	  classify	  specific	  type	  
	  
Government	  
100	  –	  299=	  local	  municipalities	  
	   101=municipio	  de	  Acacias	  
	   102=municipio	  de	  Medellin	  
	   103=municipio	  de	  San	  Juan	  de	  Pasto	  
	   104=municipio	  de	  Ibague	  
	   105=Alcaldia	  de	  Cali	  
	   106=Municipio	  de	  Palmira	  
107=Municipio	  de	  Pereira	  
108=Distrito	  turistico	  y	  cultural	  de	  Cartagena	  
109=	  Municipio	  de	  Bello	  
110=	  Municipio	  de	  Soledad	  
111=Municipio	  de	  Barbosa	  
112=Alcaldia	  municipal	  de	  San	  Jose	  de	  Cucuta	  
113=	  Alcaldia	  de	  Bogota/	  Distrito	  capital	  de	  Bogota	  
114=	  Municipio	  de	  Villavicencio	  
115=Municipio	  de	  Popayan	  
117=Municipio	  de	  dos	  quebradas	  
118=Alcalde	  de	  Calarca	  
119=Municipio	  de	  Neiva	  
120=Municipio	  de	  Ortega	  (Tolima)	  
121=	  Municipio	  de	  Sincé	  
122=	  Municipio	  de	  Zipaquirá	  
123=	  Municipio	  de	  Cómbita	  
124=	  Municipio	  de	  Guacayamas	  (Boyacá)	  
125=	  Municipio	  de	  Albania	  
126=	  Municipio	  de	  Dibulla	  
127=	  Municipio	  deDistraccion	  
128=	  Municipio	  de	  El	  Molino	  
129=	  Municipio	  de	  Hatonuevo	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130=	  Municipio	  de	  Barrancas	  
131=	  Municipio	  de	  Fonseca	  
132=	  Municipio	  de	  la	  Jagua	  del	  Pilar	  
133=	  Municipio	  de	  Maicao	  
134=	  Municipio	  de	  Manaure	  
135=	  Municipio	  de	  Riohacha	  
136=	  Municipio	  de	  San	  Juan	  del	  Cesar	  
137=	  Municipio	  de	  Urumita	  
138=	  Municipio	  de	  Villanueva	  
139=	  Municipio	  de	  Uribia	  
140=	  Municipio	  de	  San	  Juan	  de	  Tolima	  
141=Municipio	  de	  Tibacuy	  
142=Municipio	  de	  Ayapel	  
143=Municipio	  de	  Sincelejo	  
144=Municipio	  de	  Ocaña	  
145=Municipio	  de	  Pueblo	  Nuevo	  
146=Municipio	  de	  Sabanalarga	  
147=Municipio	  de	  Sandoná	  (Nariño)	  
148=	  Municipio	  de	  Madrid	  (Cundinamarca)	  
149=Municipio	  de	  Yaguará	  
150=Municipio	  de	  Tocaima	  
151=Municipio	  de	  Mesitas	  del	  Colegio	  
152=Municipio	  de	  Chaguaní	  
153=Municipio	  de	  Arauca	  
154=	  Municipio	  de	  Arauquita	  
155=	  Municipio	  de	  San	  Francisco	  de	  Putumayo	  
156=	  Municipio	  de	  Armenia	  
157=	  Municipio	  de	  Barrancabermeja	  
158=	  Municipio	  de	  Tunja	  
	  
	  
300	  –	  599=	  local	  agencies496	  
	   300=	  local	  policy	  agency	  
	   301=	  social	  welfare	  
	   302=Oversight	  agency	  	  
	   303=lottery	  
304=	  Empresa	  Ibaguerena	  de	  acueducto	  y	  
alcantarillado	  de	  Ibague	  
305=secretaria	  de	  educacion	  distrito	  turistico	  y	  
cultural	  de	  Cartagena	  
306=fondo	  financiero	  especializado	  de	  Cali	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




307=empresa	  licorera	  de	  Narino	  	  
308=Empresa	  de	  energia	  y	  alumbrado	  de	  Pereira	  
SA	  ESP	  
309=Caribetell	  SA	  ESP	  
310=Empresa	  de	  energia	  de	  Pereira	  SA	  ESP	  
311=	  Departamento	  administrativo	  del	  medio	  
ambiente	  del	  distrito	  de	  bogota	  
312=Alcaldia	  local	  de	  Chapinero	  
313=	  Junta	  administradora	  local	  de	  Chapinero	  
314=	  Departamento	  administrativo	  de	  la	  
defensoria	  del	  espacio	  publico	  Bogota	  
315=	  Instituto	  de	  desarrollo	  urbano	  
316=Departamento	  adminsitrativo	  de	  planeacion	  
distrital	  Bogota	  
317=Secretria	  de	  transito	  y	  tranporte	  de	  Bogota/	  
secretaría	  de	  movilidad	  
318=	  Secretaria	  de	  obras	  publicas	  de	  Bogota	  
319=Secretaria	  de	  planeacion	  de	  Ibague	  
320=Secretaria	  del	  interior	  de	  Ibague	  
321=	  Jefe	  de	  justicia	  y	  orden	  publico	  de	  Ibague	  
322=Empresa	  de	  acueducto	  y	  alcantarillado	  de	  
Bogota	  
323=Alcaldia	  local	  de	  ciudad	  Bolivar	  
324=Secretaria	  de	  hacienda	  Bogota	  
325=Direccion	  de	  impuestos	  distritales	  Bogota	  
326=Unidad	  de	  recaudo	  de	  impuestos	  a	  la	  
propiedad	  Bogota	  
327=	  Departamento	  administrativo	  de	  impuestos	  
distritales	  Bogota	  
328=	  Concejo	  municipal	  de	  Giron	  
329=	  Fondo	  de	  vivienda	  de	  interés	  social	  y	  reforma	  
urbana	  del	  Distrito	  de	  Cartagena	  
330=Curaduría	  urbana	  2a	  de	  Neiva	  
331=Departamento	  Admin	  Distrital	  de	  medio	  
ambiente	  de	  Barranquilla	  
332=Secretaria	  de	  Planeación	  distrital	  de	  
Barranquilla	  	  
333=	  Curaduría	  urbana	  2a	  de	  Barranquilla	  
334=Univ	  Distrital	  Francisco	  J	  de	  Caldas	  
335=	  Concejo	  distrital	  de	  B/quilla	  
336=	  Empresa	  de	  Servicios	  públicos	  de	  la	  Plata	  
Huila	  ESP	  
337=Empresas	  municipales	  de	  Cali	  EMCALI	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338=Empresa	  de	  Servicios	  públicos	  de	  acueducto	  y	  
alcantarillado	  de	  Sincelejo	  EMPAS	  
339=Agua	  de	  la	  sabana	  SA	  ESP	  
340=Empresa	  de	  servicios	  públicos	  de	  Ocaña	  ESPO	  
SA	  
341=Secretaría	  de	  desarrollo	  territorial	  y	  bienestar	  
social	  de	  Cali	  	  
342=Empresa	  de	  servicios	  públicos	  AAA	  Atlántico	  
SA	  ESP	  
343=Junta	  de	  Acción	  communal	  del	  barrio	  dos	  mil	  
Villavicencio	  
344=	  Fondo	  de	  Educación	  y	  seguridad	  vial.	  
Secretaria	  de	  tránsito	  de	  Bogotá	  
345=Jardín	  Botánico	  Bogotá	  
346=Empresa	  de	  acueducto,	  alcantarillado	  y	  aseo	  
de	  Madrid	  (Cundinamarca)	  
347=INEM	  Julián	  Motta	  Salas	  de	  Neiva	  
348=Juzgado	  civil	  del	  circuito	  de	  San	  Andrés	  
349=Alcaldía	  local	  de	  Teusaquillo	  
350=	  Electrificadora	  del	  Tolima	  SA	  
351=Alcaldía	  local	  de	  Mártires	  
352=Junta	  administradora	  local	  de	  Mártires	  
353=Empresa	  de	  servicios	  públicos	  de	  Neiva	  
354=Secretaría	  de	  gobierno	  de	  Cali	  




600	  –	  699=	  regional	  governments	  
	   	   600=	  regional	  policy	  agency	  
	   601=	  regional	  social	  welfare	  
	   	   602=Oversight	  agency	  
	   	   603=	  Departamento	  de	  Narino	  
	   	   604=	  Gobernacion	  del	  Valle	  del	  Cauca	  
605=Concesión	  Fund	  Aburrá	  
606=Gobernación	  de	  C/marca	  
607=Depto	  de	  Cauca	  
608=Depto	  de	  Cauca	  
609=Depto	  de	  Guajira	  
610=Depto	  de	  Boyacá	  
611=Gob	  de	  Bolivar	  
612=Depto	  archipiélago	  de	  San	  Andrés,	  Providencia	  
y	  Santa	  Catalina	  
612=	  Depto	  de	  Santander	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613=	  Depto	  de	  Arauca	  
614=	  Depto	  del	  Meta	  
	  
700	  –	  799=	  regional	  agencies	  
	   	   700=	  regional	  policy	  agency	  
	   701=	  regional	  social	  welfare	  
	   702=Oversight	  agency	  
703=	  Direccion	  departamental	  de	  Salud	  del	  Cauca	  
704=Corporacion	  autonoma	  regional	  del	  Valle	  
705=Electrificadora	  del	  Caribe	  SA	  ESP	  
706=	  Departamento	  administrativo	  de	  transito	  y	  
transporte	  del	  Valle.	  	  
707=	  Central	  hidroelectica	  de	  Caldas	  
708=Termoelectrica	  de	  la	  Dorada	  SA	  ESP	  
709=Industria	  licorera	  del	  Cauca	  
710=Asociación	  de	  municipios	  del	  macizo	  
colombiano	  
711=Asamblea	  de	  Boyacá	  
712=Comité	  departamental	  de	  cafeteros	  del	  Cauca	  
713=Industria	  licorera	  de	  Bolivar	  
714=Corporación	  autónoma	  regional	  de	  la	  Guajira	  
715=Lottery	  
715=Asamblea	  de	  Santander	  
716=Caja	  de	  compensación	  familiar	  del	  Cauca	  
COMFACAUCA	  
717=Departamento	  Administrativo	  distrital	  del	  
medio	  ambiente	  DADIMA.	  
718=Instituto	  Departamental	  de	  tránsito	  y	  
transporte	  del	  Meta	  
719=Corpoamazonía	  
	  
800=	  national	  government	  
	  
801=	  regional	  policy	  agency	  
	   802=	  regional	  social	  welfare	  
	   	   803=	  Oversight	  agency	  
804=Fondo	  Rotatorio	  del	  ejercito	  
	   	   805=Ministerio	  de	  Educacion	  Nacional	  
	   	   806=ICFES	  
807=Departamento	  Administrativo	  Nacional	  de	  la	  
economia	  	  
808=Ecopetrol	  




810=Registraduria	  nacional	  del	  estado	  civil	  
811=Senado	  de	  la	  Republica	  
812=Presidencia	  de	  la	  Republica	  
813=Consejo	  de	  Estado	  
814=Corte	  Suprema	  de	  Justicia	  
815=Ministerio	  de	  Desarrollo	  economico	  
816=Procurador	  general	  de	  la	  nacion	  
817=Superintendencia	  financiera	  
818=Ministerio	  de	  cultura	  y	  turismo	  
819=Departamento	  administrativo	  de	  la	  
presidencia	  de	  la	  republica	  
820=	  Ministerio	  de	  transporte	  
821=Consejo	  superior	  de	  la	  carrera	  notarial	  
822=	  Ministerio	  de	  Defensa	  nacional	  
823=INPEC	  (National	  institute	  for	  jails)	  
824=Empresa	  nacional	  de	  telecomunicaciones	  
(TELECOM)	  
825=Contraloria	  General	  de	  la	  republica	  
826=Banco	  del	  Estado	  
827=Ministerio	  de	  Hacienda	  y	  credito	  publico	  	  
828=Universidad	  Nacional	  de	  Colombia	  
829=INURBE	  
830=Policía	  Nacional	  	  
831=Instituto	  de	  Fomento	  Industrial	  IFI	  
832=Supersociedades	  
833=Instituto	  Geográfico	  Agustín	  Codazzi	  
834=Instituto	  Colombiano	  para	  la	  reforma	  agraria	  
(INCORA)	  
835=Congreso	  de	  la	  República	  
836=Min	  minas	  y	  energía	  
837=Supernotariado	  y	  registro	  
838=Vicepresidencia	  
839=Direcc	  de	  Impuestos	  y	  aduanas	  nacionales	  
(DIAN)	  
840=Min	  de	  protección	  social	  
841=Fondo	  de	  solidaridad	  y	  garantía	  (FOSYGA)	  
842=Consejo	  Nacional	  de	  seguridad	  social	  en	  salud	  
843=Supersalud	  
844=Ministerio	  de	  Comunicaciones	  
845=Ministerio	  de	  Comercio,	  industria	  y	  turismo	  
846=Comisión	  de	  regulación	  de	  agua	  potable	  y	  
saneamiento	  básico	  





849=Consejo	  superior	  de	  vivienda	  
850=Ministerio	  de	  agricultura	  y	  desarrollo	  rural	  
851=Caja	  nacional	  de	  prevision	  social	  
852=Instituto	  colombiano	  para	  el	  fomento	  de	  la	  
educación	  superior	  
853=Instituto	  de	  seguros	  sociales	  (ISS)	  
854=Dirección	  de	  reclutamiento	  y	  control	  reservas	  
Ejército	  Nacional	  
855=Unidad	  administrative	  especial	  aeronáutica	  
civil	  
856=Consejo	  Superior	  de	  la	  judicatura	  
900=Not	  ascertained	  
	  




chll	  	   	   	   	   Challenge	  to	  policy/individual	  official	  action497	  	   	  
0=	  challenge	  to	  policy	  




polar	   Policy	  area	  (defined	  by	  policy	  area	  of	  the	  agency,	  not	  
specific	  matter)	  
0=None	  
1=	  Security/	  homeland	  security	  
2=	  Social	  welfare/housing	  (similar	  to	  6)	  
3=	  Academic	  
4=	  Utilities	  (access	  to)	  
5=	  Policymaking	  
6=	  Service	  provision	  (infrastructure?):	  welfare,	  housing,	  oil	  
exploitation,	  highways,	  public	  banks,	  public	  lights,	  water,	  
emergency	  attention,	  pensions	  
7=	  Oversight	  agency	  
8=	  Lottery/	  liquor	  producer	  
9=	  Municipality/	  region	  
10=	  Education	  /	  universities	  
11=Court	  
12=Healthcare	  
13=Environmental	  issues	  (waste)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




15=Policy	  enforcement	  (law	  enforcement)>	  public	  space	  
16=Economic	  intervention	  (construction	  licenses)	  
17=Electoral	  system	  
18=culture	  and	  recreation	  
19=tranportation	  
20=communication	  to	  the	  public/telecommunications	  
21=political	  participation	  /	  political	  system	  
22=public	  finance	  (management	  of	  public	  funds>	  
destination	  of	  public	  funds,	  tax	  admin)	  
23=agriculture	  and	  development	  
24=infrastructure	  (public	  works	  –aqueduct	  64,	  sidewalk	  48	  
and	  49).	  Alcantarillado.	  Public	  lights?	  Same	  than	  6?	  
	  
	  
year	   	   	   	   Year	  of	  the	  decision.	  Ordinal	  variable	  	  
1997	   	  
1998	  
	  









5=access	  to	  public	  services/	  efficient	  provision	  of	  public	  
services	  
6=Public	  security	  
7=Free	  economic	  competition	  
8=	  Rights	  of	  consumers	  and	  users	  
9=Protection	  of	  the	  cultural	  patrimony	  
10=Access	  to	  infrastructure	  related	  to	  public	  health	  
11=Urban	  development	  according	  to	  norms	  
15=not	  mentioned	  
16=Right	  to	  security	  and	  prevention	  of	  disasters	  
17=Ecologic	  equilibrium	  and	  rational/sustainable	  







appellant	   	   	   Appelant	  
	   	   	   	   0=	  None	  




5=other	  (case	  74)	  
	  
decision	  
	   	   	   	   0=Plaintiff	  
	   	   	   	   1=defendant	  
	   	   	   	   2=both	  
	   	   	   	   3=other	  (case	  20	  –	  cosa	  juzgada)	  
	  
Judge	  name	  
	   	   	   	   .=not	  in	  the	  case	  







Type	  of	  decision	  (typeofdec)	  
	   	   	   	   0=Procedural	  decision	  /	  partial	  decision	  (auto)	  




	   	   	   	   0=no	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Variable	  name	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Variable	  label/	  instructions/codes	  (value	  labels)	  
	  
Topic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Main	  topic.	  What	  is	  the	  article	  about?	  	  
	  
Judicial	  action	  (Claimant	  filed	  a	  lawsuit	  to	  enforce	  administrative	  
morality.	  judicial	  process	  coded	  by	  the	  organ	  that	  made	  the	  decision)	  
801	  =	  Administrative	  judge	  	  
802	  =	  Tribunals	  
803	  =	  Council	  of	  State	  
804=	  Constitutional	  Court	  
805=	  Supreme	  Court	  
808=	  Not	  ascertained	  
	  
Oversight	  agency	  (Administrative	  morality	  is	  enforced	  by	  an	  
oversight	  agency)	  
810=	  Procuraduria	  	  
811=	  Contraloria	  	  
812=	  Personeria	  
813=Comite	  Interinstitucional	  para	  la	  Vigilancia	  y	  el	  control	  del	  
proceso	  electoral	  (Fiscalia	  –	  Procuraduria)	  
814=Inspecciones	  de	  policia1	  
	  
Social	  movement	  (civil	  society	  organizations	  fostering	  social	  change	  
through	  administrative	  morality)	  
820	  
	  
Statute	  /	  reform	  to	  a	  statute	  referred	  to	  administrative	  morality	  
840	  
	  
General	  commentary	  (the	  article	  comments	  on	  a	  certain	  situation	  or	  
concepts	  related	  to	  administrative	  morality.	  No	  lawsuit	  or	  oversight	  












	   	  
	  	  























Reform	  message:	  Does	  the	  article	  refer	  to	  the	  need	  of	  a	  systemic	  or	  an	  individual	  
solution?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0=	  individual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1=	  systemic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9=	  none	  or	  other	  
	  
Source:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1=	  el	  tiempo	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2=	  semana	  
	  
	  
